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Abstract
This is a study of the relations between Spain and the United States from the end 
of the Second World War to the conclusion of the Madrid Agreements which were 
signed in September 1953. Through these agreements Spain obtained military and eco­
nomic aid from the US. At the same time she was integrated into the western defence 
structure. In return Franco authorized the US to construct and use military bases, some 
of which were situated near Spanish cities. Furthermore the agreements limited Spain's 
foreign, economic and monetary policies.
The structure of the thesis is determined by the chronological events of the late 
1940s and early 1950s. The international background is analysed in the first part of the 
thesis, running up to July 1951. The second part covers the negotiations between the 
two countries. By following the chronological events of the negotiations, the thesis tries 
to assess which of the two parties was willing to compromise in key aspects.
Most of the thesis is based on American primary sources throughout the period. 
Many of the arguments developed contrast directly with those already put forward, 
notably by Spanish historians. The picture which emerges indicates that Washington, as 
well as Spain, had great military and strategic interests in signing the Madrid 
Agreements. This is surprising given the findings by other investigators that Spain was 
forced almost by circumstances into these agreements. The thesis tries to develop a 
counter-argument which, hopefully, lays the foundation for a constructive discussion on 
the issue.
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Introduction
This is a study o f  the relations between Spain and the United States from the 
end o f the Second World War to the conclusion o f the Madrid Agreements which 
were signed in September 1953. The structure o f the thesis is determined by the 
chronological events o f  the late 1940s and early 1950s.
In the 1940s, almost as soon as the western democracies had solved the 
fascist challenge to their social and economic structure, an old enemy,
Communism, renewed its claim as a plausible alternative to the capitalist economy. 
The struggle between the two systems, which engulfed almost the entire world, 
was unique in that the decisive battles rarely involved soldiers. More often they 
were fought out by diplomats, economists and industrialists all over the globe. The 
two superpowers continuously tried to extend their respective influence to as many 
countries as possible. In this context Spain, guarding the entrance to the 
Mediterranean was o f  particular strategic importance.
The first part o f  the thesis, covering chapters one to seven, sets the 
international context for the attempt by the US to bring Spain into the western 
defence structure. Chapter one analyses the coming about o f  the tripartite 
statement: a weak condemnation o f Spain as a fascist regime. For both historic and 
economic reasons, France felt more antipathy towards the Franco regime than 
either Britain or the US. The Quai d 'Orsay resolved to force the two other western 
allies into a condemnation o f  the Spanish government. However, Britain and the 
US were unwilling to jeopardise their cordial diplomatic relations with Spain. They 
succeeded in watering down French demands to such an extent that the ensuing 
statement had little real impact upon Spain herself.
One o f the developments that emerged following the statement was the 
discussion o f the Spanish problem at the UN. The way in which Communist 
countries tried to exploit the situation at the UN forms the topic o f  the second.
(Vi)
chapter. After long talks throughout 1946, the U N  passed a resolution which 
condemned Franco and, amongst other things, recommended the withdrawal o f  
ambassadors from Madrid.
The new found willingness on the part o f  the western democracies to speak 
out against Franco did not last. In the third and fourth chapter we see how  
economic, commercial and strategic interests in the US and in Britain encouraged a 
rapprochement to Spain between 1947 and 1948. Over these two years the US 
State Department, fearing possibly adverse diplomatic effects o f  close ties with 
Spain, was slowly pressurised by the Department o f  Defense and several influential 
Congressmen into accepting their point o f view. The international developments 
during 1949 and early 1950 led to a new official US policy towards Spain, based 
on National Security Council decision NSC72. The fifth chapter looks at the 
influence which the growing conflict between East and West had on US policy 
towards Spain.
Soon after the National Security Council issued NSC72, the Korean war 
broke out, adding to the fears o f policy makers in Washington. In the sixth chapter 
the importance o f this uncertainty is emphasised. Spain was quickly reintegrated 
into the international community and the UN revoked its own earlier 
recommendation to withdraw ambassadors from Madrid. Furthermore, the 
National Security Council initiated a revision o f  its policy, stressing the importance 
o f promptly making use o f Spain's geographic, military and strategic position. As 
becomes clear in chapter seven, the emerging US policy called for immediate talks 
with Spain, ignoring the diplomatic, military and moral concerns o f  its European 
allies. In June 1951 this policy was issued and authorised by the President. The 
background was then set for the two countries to come to a mutually beneficial 
agreement.
The second part o f the thesis concentrates more on the diplomatic relations 
and negotiations between the two countries than on the global context. Chapter 
eight analyses the first Spanish - American talks between General Franco in
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person and Admiral Sherman o f the US Navy. The friendly atmosphere o f  these 
initial meetings gave the misleading impression that the two countries were about 
to come to an arrangement.
Following these talks, two US study groups went to Spain: one covering 
economic, the other military aspects. Chapter nine looks at these two groups and 
the time they spent in Spain, while the following chapter analyses their reports as 
well as the resulting considerations. By this time it had become clear to both sides 
that the negotiations were not going to be as straight forward as it had initially 
seemed.
In early 1952, the US sent two negotiating teams to Spain which were to 
hold conferences with their Spanish counter-parts for almost a year and a half. 
Chapter eleven looks at the progress made in these talks throughout 1952. By the 
end o f the year it looked almost as if  the agreements could be signed but Franco's 
decision to withdraw concessions made by his negotiators forced the US into 
reconsidering her approach.
In chapter twelve this new approach is outlined. Washington initially decided 
to wait and see if Madrid would return to the negotiating table. Once it became 
clear that the Spaniards were unwilling to do so, the Americans tried to pressurise 
them by threatening to withhold funds already appropriated for Spain by Congress. 
The talks were on the verge o f collapse. A compromise, however, was found and 
the talks resumed. How this affected the final agreements and some o f the military 
and legal implications is summarised in chapter thirteen. The final chapter o f  the 
thesis takes a closer look at the agreements themselves and concludes with some 
developments which emerged shortly afterwards. Most o f the thesis is based on 
American primary sources throughout the period. Many o f the arguments 
developed contrast directly with those already put forward, notably by Spanish 
historians.
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While the negotiations were going on and shortly after the agreements had 
been signed, a series o f PhD theses were written in the US on Spain's diplomatic 
relations with the West. These studies, while having had the benefit o f  the 
contemporary developments, nevertheless lacked the benefit o f historic hindsight 
and the volume o f material declassified since.
The American Arthur P. Whitaker published one o f  the first comprehensive 
studies o f Spain's position in the western defence structure. His analysis, published 
in the early 1960's, gives a good reflection o f the negotiations from the public point 
o f view and based on the material available at the time.
Richard Rubottom and Carter J. Murphy wrote an analysis over 20 years 
later. While they had access to a wider range o f primary material, they decided to 
follow the relations between Spain and the US right up to the 1980's. What is 
clearly pointed out in their publication is the geographic importance Spain had for 
the defence o f  western Europe. The Pyrenees provided NATO forces with a 
natural defence line against a conventional attack by the Soviet Union. Even if  
West Germany, the Benelux countries and France had been lost in a sneak attack 
on Europe, NATO would still have been able to retain a strong foothold in Europe. 
Necessarily the depth o f their analysis somehow underestimates the importance o f  
the negotiation process itself. At the time o f writing, the available public material 
on the negotiations themselves were mainly speculative press reports, a series o f  
public statements by the negotiators and politicians, as well as a certain amount o f  
leaked documents giving an exaggerated view o f  harmony throughout the 
negotiations process. As far as their conclusion o f  the agreements is concerned, 
they correctly assessed them as the beginning o f  Spain's integration into the 
western defence structure. However, they did not nor did they attempt to assess 
the position o f Spain and the US throughout the negotiations and the impact this 
had on the final outcome o f the agreements. Spanish historians have been much 
more willing to comment on this.
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The most thorough research conducted on the negotiations must be the one 
by Antonio Marquina Barrio, covering Spain in the Western Defence structure up 
to 1986. However, his excellent investigation and broad topic leaves him little 
room for a final assessment o f the negotiations or o f  the agreements. One is left 
guessing whether Washington's strong position forced the Spanish negotiators to 
compromise in several important points. Even though this is never spelled out 
clearly, the impression one derives from his study is that this was the case.
Eduardo Chamorro, a Spanish journalist, was in his publication on the 
military bases in Spain much more willing to comment on the position o f the two 
countries throughout the negotiations and following the agreements. While this 
study gives a very readable account o f  the period, it nevertheless lacks the research 
and investigation o f  primary sources. Spain is portrayed as the weaker o f the two 
negotiators while Franco seems to sell out Spain's sovereignty for little in exchange 
apart from some obsolete war material. Incidents such as the near nuclear disaster 
in Spain in the 1960's, when by accident two life nuclear bombs fell o ff a plane but 
failed to explode, are discussed in detail. This gives a picture o f  Spain's inability to 
influence events.
Manuel Vazquez Montalban's study on the American penetration in Spain 
gives a more rounded picture though he does focus mainly on the cultural impact 
on Spain rather than on the political and diplomatic developments. The cultural 
impact o f  the association between the two countries only really filtered through on 
a national scale in the 1960's when economic prosperity allowed Spaniards to 
indulge in foreign mass products. Immediately following the signing o f  the 
agreements little changed for the average Spaniard. Even the construction o f  the 
bases in the second half o f the 1950's had only a limited regional influence on the 
Spanish culture. While Vazquez Montalban's study gives a comprehensive picture 
o f  the cultural implications he does not set out to analyse the negotiations 
themselves.
Florentino Portero gives a good summary o f Spain's foreign policy 
throughout the period o f isolation. Unfortunately, though, he stops in 1950 with
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the UN revoking her earlier recommendation o f  withdrawal o f  ambassadors from 
Spain.
By far the most comprehensive study o f the negotiations themselves and the 
implications for Spain was written by Angel Vinas. He comes to the conclusion 
that Franco had sold out Spain's sovereignty over foreign and defence policy. 
Following the signing o f the agreements and specifically the secret annex to the 
official agreements, the US could make use o f the bases in case o f  Soviet attack 
without even consulting with Spain. This meant that Spain had lost her ability to 
remain neutral in case o f conflict and thus could have been forced into a nuclear 
confrontation in Europe. According to this, Franco had given up a vital 
cornerstone o f the nationalist regime and one whose importance he himself had 
stressed throughout the creation o f the Franco myth that is to say his great ability 
to avoid Spain being dragged into a world conflict. Given this development, one 
clearly has to question the validity o f  the Franco myth and o f  Franco's real interest 
in Spain as opposed to his personal position as Spain's caudillo. In return for giving 
up control over foreign and defence policy, as well, though to a lesser extend, 
monetary and fiscal policy, Spain obtained military and economic aid. Vinas clearly 
feels that neither o f the two made up sufficiently for the downside o f  the 
agreements. He sees that military aid came to Spain as obsolete US war material 
left over from the Korean war and in some cases dating back to the Second World 
War. He concludes that for the US it was a cheap way o f getting rid o f  unwanted 
war material. On the economic side, Vinas sees that aid granted to Spain was on a 
much smaller scale than aid received by other European nations through the 
Marshall plan. Furthermore most o f this economic aid was in fact sent for the 
construction o f the military bases which themselves were useless to Spain as her 
airforce lacked heavy bombers which would have required these large military 
installations. Vinas therefore concludes that the agreements were one-sided and 
Spain's position throughout the negotiations had been weak. This was because 
Franco not only required economic aid but also needed these agreements for
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internal propaganda reasons to consolidate his position and to prove that Spain 
under his regime had become an acceptable nation to trade with. Hence Franco's 
statement shortly before the conclusion o f  the agreements: "sign anything that they 
put in front o f you." Throughout his research Vinas concentrated heavily on 
Spanish archives.
Since his research, though, a series o f  new documents relating to the US 
negotiations have become available. By concentrating on these a picture emerges 
indicating that Washington, as well as Spain, had great military and strategic 
interests in signing the Madrid Agreements; hence, US willingness to compromise 
several times during the negotiations. This is surprising given the findings by other 
investigators that Spain was forced almost by circumstances into these agreements. 
The thesis tries to develop a counter-argument which, seeks to lay the foundation 
for a new discussion on the issue.
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Chapter One
1945/46
Tripartite
Statement
Chapter 1:1945/46 Tripartite Statement
During the spring months of 1945, the war machinery of the Allied powers 
slowly ground to a halt in Western Europe. The victorious armies of the Americans 
and the British Commonwealth, with some help from French contingents, had 
liberated most of Western Europe. The nightmare of Western European fascism 
belonged to the past. Nevertheless, the Iberian peninsula was still dominated by a 
totalitarian regime. Only months before the outbreak of the Second World War, 
General Francisco Franco had established his rule over Spain. Her economy was left 
in ruins, and Franco was unable to contribute to the Axis war effort. Thus Franco 
seemingly steered his country through the Second World War along a path of 
neutrality or non-belligerency, not because he had chosen to do so, but because 
Spain's economy dictated it. The Allies had known this during the world conflict and 
remembered it after Germany collapsed. They knew that Spain had supplied Germany 
with wolfram and mercury during the war and that Spanish soldiers had fought 
under German command in Russia. However, they also knew that Spain had remained 
neutral during the vital period of the Allied landings in Northern Africa: Operation 
Torch. Spain's past was controversial, to say the least, because it provided 
diplomats and politicians with enough material to justify either isolation from the 
Western defence structure, or alternatively integration into it. The Western powers 
could choose between these two policies towards Madrid.
Two contradictory versions of her history were formulated. Those favoring 
isolation of the Franco regime saw it as another fascist nation, created through the 
Axis and totalitarian in its structure. On the other hand, those favouring integration 
of Spain into the Western structure tried to prove that Franco's association with 
Hitler was not what it seemed and really had been a diplomatic coup for the Spanish 
dictator. Francoist myth-makers claimed that the Spanish Caudillo had never been 
willing to help Hitler in his struggle against the Allies, alleging that the military and 
economic support which Hitler received from Franco had been wrung out of him. In 
exchange the Spanish dictator was able to guarantee Spain's survival. The meeting at 
Hendaye held in October 1940 had been disappointing for both Hitler and Franco, 
was projected as a clever success for the Spanish dictator. Needless to say, Franco 
promoted this argument
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wholeheartedly; after all he desperately needed Spain's integration with the Western 
Allies after the war.
Already in the spring of 1945 the US, not Britain, was the driving force in allied 
policy towards Spain. As the world war dragged on, London was losing economic and 
political influence all over the world, becoming more and more dependent on the US. 
Britain's relations with Spain were no exception. At the time Spain still traded more in 
pounds than in dollars. In 1945 almost a third of all exports from Spain went to the 
UK, compared to only a fifth which went to the US. However, these numbers do not 
reflect the real trading relationship between the two Allied powers and Spain. Britain's 
influence over Spain as the major purchaser of Spanish products was diminished due to 
the fact that there existed a large market for products all over hungry Europe during the 
postwar period. Britain could easily have been replaced by another purchasing nation in 
Europe. On the other hand, the US provided 18% of the total of Spain's imports, 
making it the most important trading partner for Spain. Britain ranked only fifth with a 
mere 4.1 % of import share.1
Undoubtedly both nations had a wide range of interests in Spain. The 
Conservatives and the Foreign Office were inclined towards international stability 
wherever Britain had substantial investments. British foreign investments in Spain were 
secure only if law, order and a sound economic environment guaranteed prosperity. 
Social justice, freedom of speech and political rights in Spain mattered to conservatives 
in Britain only if they did not endanger stability. Britain also favoured the status quo in 
Spain to protect her sea lanes and trade through the Straits of Gibraltar. This remained 
so despite the election of Clement Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, and Ernest 
Bevin's appointment as foreign minister.
The change of government in Britain occurred during the Potsdam conference 
when, on 26 July 1945, stunning news from London proclaimed a .Labour victory over
1. National Archives/Washington D.C. (NA), Civil Branch, OIR Report 4105, 19 May 1947, Present 
Economic situation in Spain.
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the Conservatives. Winston Churchill was replaced by Clement Attlee. The new Prime 
Minister was a Labour leader with distinctive conservative characteristics. He was an 
Oxford graduate and seemed very fond of his three-piece suits which he wore 
throughout the Potsdam conference despite the summer heat.
His foreign minister, Ernest Bevin had risen from the bottom of the social 
ladder and had a much more labour orientated background. Wearing thick glasses and 
weighing almost 250 pounds, he spoke with a thick working class accent which gave 
proof of his trade union background. Britain's precarious economic position after the 
war left Bevin and Attlee little room to manoeuvre. Despite pressure from Ian Mikardo 
and Francis Noel-Baker in the Commons and Attlee's proposal in the War Cabinet, 4 
November 1945, to condemn Spain, British foreign policy continued to be short term, 
economic orientated and, above all, strongly anti-communist
On the other side of the Atlantic, the administration in the US, less concerned 
with trade relations, expressed concern about Spain. In a letter, drafted by the State 
Department, dated 10 March 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt outlined to 
Norman Armour, US Ambassador in Madrid, America's policy towards Spain. The 
aging President summarized the domestic disapproval in America of the totalitarian 
regime in Spain. He wrote: "Having been helped to power by the Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany, and having patterned itself along totalitarian lines the present regime in Spain 
is naturally the subject of distrust."
The US government's opposition towards Spain did not change after Franklin D. 
Roosevelt died and was replaced by Harry S. Truman.2 As it would happen in Britain 
only months later, the war time leader of the nation who had fired on the population to 
increasing sacrifice during the military struggle in numerous and long remembered 
speeches, was replaced by a quieter character. Franklin Roosevelt was part of the 
wealthy and influential northeastern establishment, nephew to another President and
2. Truman, Harry S., The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman. Volume 1. Year of Decision 1945. Hodder 
and Stoughton, London, 1955, p.273.
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favoured by birth and education.
Harry S. Truman was none of this. He was bom in a tiny house, measuring 20 
by 28 feet in a small dusty, wind-blown market town of Lamar, Missouri. Truman had 
little time for studies and always had to work hard to earn a living, as a farmer, a 
soldier and finally as a politician. Helped by the Pendergast machine in Kansas City, he 
obtained a seat in the Senate and, fortuitously, saw the Vice Presidency fall into his lap 
during the 1944 Democratic convention. Roosevelt's death catapulted him into the 
White House on 12 April 1945. Unlike his predecessor, Truman lacked eloquence and 
his speeches were frequently interrupted by a brief silence, a mispronunciation or 
sometimes even a stammer or stutter. This quiet man from Missouri had taken his place 
in the White House and initially continued FDR's policy.
Truman, just like FDR, condemned the Franco regime in a news conference: 
"None of us [US Government] like Franco or his Government. "3 This reaction was 
only too natural. During the war the ostensibly cordial relations with Spain had been 
implemented to prevent Franco from being forced into an alliance with Germany. 
However as the war came to an end, the President came under pressure from liberal 
Congressmen like Joseph Guffey, John Coffee and Hugh de Lancey to take steps 
against Franco. It was recognized that an association with Franco was bad publicity for 
the US. Ideally, the Americans hoped, Franco would be replaced with an acceptable 
regime which would support America's policy in Europe. Unlike Britain, the US had 
fewer economic interests in Spain and thus had less concern about stability on the 
Iberian peninsula. Thus it seemed likely that the US would put more pressure on 
Franco than Britain.
However, the US military was considering Spain's strategic potential and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had made a study of US defence policy towards Spain as early as 
19 April 1945. It argued that "should our most probable enemy attempt to draw the 
nations of Europe together into a single power structure in war, Spain would be
3. Public Papers of the Presidents of the USA: Truman. Year 1945, Washington, 1961, Doc. 107.
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potentially next in importance to the British Isles in thwarting any major continental 
power from creating an almost impregnable fortress of Europe. " The study continued to 
argue that "in terms of land warfare in Western Europe, Spain is at least as important 
as Italy, if not more important, because Spain provides a [cushion] of defense space." 
And in terms of "naval and air warfare, Spain's strategic location gives a higher poten­
tial value as a base" for naval operations. The Pyrenees provided ideal defence and the 
Peninsula dominates southwestern Europe. The study claimed that "Spanish - United 
States military cooperation is of significant importance to the implementation of our 
immediate, middle-range, and long-range war plans ... from the strictly military point 
of view, ... arrangements are urgently needed in spite of pressure from other nations to 
delay our acceptance of Spanish cooperation."4 The importance of this report cannot be 
overemphasized. It summarized the military point of view for years to come. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff expressed their desire for a different base system as early as November 
1946. In a memorandum the Canary Islands were recommended as a joint long term 
base for the Navy and the Air Force.5 The Joint Chiefs of Staff were interested above 
all in the military advantages of Spain and had little concern for the political implica­
tions. If the military had any opportunity to influence relations with Spain, they would 
surely favour her integration rather than her isolation.
There were also other considerations for the US which favoured a gentle 
approach towards Spain. Due to Spain's neutrality during the war, she was able to 
supply the fighting nations with raw materials which in turn led some sections of the 
mining industry to expand. Bitumen coal, anthracite, lignite, potassium and mercury 
production had increased considerably.6 The US had to import several of these strategic
4. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72 Background Information, 19 April 1945, JCS "Study on United States 
Security and Strategic Interests in Spain".
5. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1946. Washington, 1972-1988, Vol.I, 7 November 
1946, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, p. 1112; 5 June 1946, 
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, p. 1174.
6. NA, Civil Branch, OIR Report 4105, 19 May 1947, Present Economic situation in Spain.
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raw materials. Economic developments in Europe favoured Spain in the medium and 
long term. The western European markets were slowly saturated by American products 
and the dollar gap slowly expanded. Spain offered new markets for American products 
and had a more balanced current account compared to the rest of Western Europe. As 
American economic interests expanded worldwide, stability in Spain became more 
important to American foreign policy makers. Political unrest, civil war or a 
communist takeover would jeopardize the stability of the attractive Spanish market.
However, the US administration had to face a political complication concerning 
Spain. The Joint Intelligence Committee wrote that
"there is no prospect of any form of popular rising taking place in Spain... a rising, 
caused by foreign intervention, if strong enough to avoid immediate suppression by the 
police with army backing, would almost inevitably result in the outbreak of another 
civil war... a civil war in Spain with French and Russian intervention would also be 
likely to precipitate a crisis in France."7
This assessment limited America's policy considerably, since Spain was perceived as 
vital to future attempts to hold on to the European continent against the rising 
communist threat. The US not only would not intervene against Franco but would 
eventually press France to avoid clashes with Spain lest this lead to an unstable situation 
in France itself. Washington was forced into accepting the Spanish regime and was 
determined to avoid causing general European instability.
Concerning relations with Spain, the French Government was initially willing to 
represent the feeling of its people and come down against Franco. The hatred in France 
towards the Spanish Government was dramatically demonstrated during June 1945 
when a French mob attacked a train traveling from Switzerland to Spain passing 
through Chambery. Allegedly the train carried troops of the Blue Division, in reality 
Spanish diplomatic personnel and workers were on board. In the ensuing conflict more
7. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 15 Mar 1946 
Possible Developments, JIC Memo 242.
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than 150 people were injured.
Unlike in the US, the French armed forces had little military interest in Spain. 
On the contrary, they feared that improved US - Spanish relations might lead to the 
withdrawal of US troops from Central Europe in case of Soviet attack. Furthermore, 
the Soviet military mission in Paris, under Colonel Lapkin, organized pressure through 
Spanish exiles and the French communist party on the French government. According 
to these exiles, under no circumstances should Britain and the US improve relations 
with Spain. Lieutenant Xilitzin and Captain Nobikov, both at the USSR mission in 
Paris, were permanently in contact with Spanish exiles in the hope of preventing this 
alignment.8
Spain's problem in seeking international acceptance was highlighted during the 
San Francisco United Nations conference, 25 April to 26 June 1945. On 19 June the 
Mexican delegate to the conference, a Spanish exiled anti-fascist named Luis 
Quintanilla, appealed for the exclusion of Spain from the UN on the grounds that the 
United Charter excluded all those countries ruled by regimes established with the help 
of Germany or Italy. One of the reasons for this appeal was the influence of Spanish 
immigrants in Mexico. The US delegation agreed with the Mexican proposal. James C. 
Dunn, who was to be ambassador to Spain during the early 1950's, said that the US 
was in full agreement with Quintanilla's statement. Nevertheless John Foster Dulles, 
future Secretary of State, tried to exclude Quintanilla's proposal on the grounds that the 
Spanish question was not part of the order of the day at the conference. Dulles' attempt 
came to nothing.
During the Potsdam Conference, the Soviets wanted to go one step further and 
proposed on 19 July 1945 that all relations with Franco including diplomatic and 
economic links be severed. In a joint statement, issued during the Potsdam Conference, 
the three great powers, US, Britain and the USSR, expressed their wish that Spain
8. Washington National Records Centre (WNRC), Records of the Army Staff, G-2 Intelligence, 1946, 
Spain, 12 Mar 1946, Madrid to Secretary of State.
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should not apply for membership to the United Nations given the fact that her current 
regime was founded with the help of theAxis powers, was closely associated with the 
Axis and did not posses the necessary qualifications to justify membership.9'
For the Spanish government, the delicacy of its position concerning foreign 
relations was obvious. In order to avoid similar occurrence, and knowing that there_ 
was little point in trying to improve relations with Russia, Franco embarked on a 
policy of stressing the Neutrality myth. According to this, Spain stood for the defence 
of Christianity against Communism. He tried to distance himself from his former- 
German links, claiming that his pro-German attitude throughout the early phase of the 
war had been forced upon him by Hitler. At the same time he wanted to assure the 
West that he had the capability of making democratic changes within his country. In 
the attempt to gain acceptance by foreign nations Franco decided to take seven 
measures, though most of them remained unconvincing for the West. The first was 
withdrawal from occupied Tangier. Franco mendaciously argued thatby seizing the 
city, he had prevented it from falling into German hands during the war. Secondly, 
the Fuero de los Espanoles(Charter of civil rights) was issued on 18 July 1945. In 
itself the Fuero failed to be accepted by the West as a genuine bill of rights. Salvador 
Madariaga, a former Spanish diplomat to the League of Nations and influential critic, 
described them: "The Charter of Rights is the most mendacious document ever 
penned. It guarantees every right which the government tramples upon daily... There 
is not a single article of this Charter that is not in itself an insult to the nation whose 
daily experience gives it the lie.10
Thirdly, two days after the 18 July Franco reshuffled his government in favour of 
the Monarchists and Catholics and against the Falange. It was a step in the right 
direction. An influential Spanish General had claimed that "as long as the Falange 
continues, it
9. Public Papers of the Presidents of the USA: Truman. Doc.221; Truman, Year of Decision, p.284.
10. Quoted from Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West. New York, 1961, p. 122.
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will be impossible to have cordial relations with France and Britain."11 Yet the British 
Government realized that the shuffle was a simple attempt by Franco to improve his 
image.12
The Caudillo's fourth measure was the appointment of Alberto Martin Artajo as 
Foreign Minister. The Catholic Martin Artajo was acceptable to the West primarily 
because he was not a Falangist. The fifth initiative taken by the Spanish administration 
was the creation of the Franco myth which was assiduously spread through the media 
and the diplomatic channels. Under this policy the Spanish Ambassador in Washington 
claimed to the American Secretary of State that Spain's policy during the war had been 
a result of constant pressure by the Axis on Madrid.13 A sixth action whereby Franco 
hoped to create a democratic air in Spain was the holding of municipal elections in 
Spain. These were greeted with more enthusiasm in Britain. They were initially 
described as possibly free and secret but early enthusiasm soon faded away.14 Finally, 
Franco diminished the powers of the Spanish Falange, withdrawing many of their 
privileges. The Falange, the political party of Francoism, was structured on similar 
lines as Germany's NSDAP and Italy's Fascist Party. Most of these policies were 
perceived in the West as propaganda moves by Franco.15
Despite these changes, politicians in France continued strongly to oppose 
Franco's dictatorship. Three French political parties, the Communists, Socialists and 
the Popular Republican Movement together with the French Foreign Minister, Georges 
Bidault, appealed during December 1945 to London and Washington to end all political
11. Ferndndez, Tensiones Militares durante el Franquismo. Barcelona, 1985, p.69.
12. Weekly Political Intelligence Summary (WPISL New York, 1983, 25 July 1945, N.303.
13. FRUS 1946. Vo.V, 5 January 1946, The Spanish Ambassador to the Secretary o f State, p. 1027.
14. Sheppard, "Inside Franco's Domain", in Nation. 9 October 1948, Vol. 167:
15. WP1S gives the most comprehensive documents of the British analyses. See the British position to 
the Fueros, 4 July 1945, N.300; British position to the government shuffle, 25 July 1945, N.303; 
British position to the Municipal elections, 19 September 1945, N.311; British position to the Falange 
new position, 10 April 1946, N.339.
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and economic relations with Spain. As it turned out this appeal was a disaster.
Britain rejected this call on the grounds that to do so might provoke a civil war. 
London argued that under the current circumstances the opposition to Franco was so 
disorganized that even foreign intervention made the outcome of a struggle in Spain 
uncertain. Thus a civil war would probably have led to another fascist victory and 
disaster for the Republican and Monarchist forces. In the eyes of the British, sanctions 
or political isolation would end all possibilities to pressure Franco into further evolution 
of his regime and would adversely effect the British economy which needed Spanish 
foodstuff.16
However the USSR seized upon the French proposal to express her opposition 
to Franco. From 9 January 1946 onwards, the USSR officially supported the French 
appeal to London. Vfoshington was unwilling to go this far. The US might have 
favoured more freedom of the press and liberation of political prisoners as well as the 
return of exiled politicians to Spain but this was a long way off the French proposal to 
end all relations with Spain.
Cordial relations with Spain were also increasingly seen in the US as necessary 
due to growing perceptions of the military threat of the Soviet Union. A report by the 
Joint Committee of W&r Planning in the US estimated on 8 January 1946 that "the 
Soviet economic war potential is not now adequately developed and at least for the next 
ten to fifteen years, the gains to be derived internally during peace outweigh the 
advantage of any external objective that might be attained at the risk of war."
Eventually however this period of peace was to come to an end. The US knew that "at 
the present time the USSR possesses the military means to overrun Europe". As for 
Europe's defence against a possible attack, the report readr—
"the chaotic conditions in the western European countries, the low combat efficiency of 
Allied occupation troops, the proximity of Russian forces, and the communications 
available to the USSR make it possible for the Russians to overrun western Europe at
16. WPIS. 2 January 1946, N.325.
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any time. The Russian advance might be slowed down at the Pyrenees, but only 
temporarily."17
Despite this the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that "the Soviets will endeavor 
to avoid a major conflict for the next ten or fifteen years."18 In the same study Spain 
and Thngier were listed under "areas subject to Soviet political and/or military 
aggression in pursuance of their immediate objectives". It was suspected by US policy 
makers that the USSR had an interest in establishing herself as a Great Power in the 
Mediterranean.19
A plan, which later became known as the Pincher Plan, estimated that after 70 
days of struggle in Spain, Soviet troops would reach Gibraltar and close the Straits. The 
plan reflects the grave concern of the American armed forces over Spain and the Straits 
of Gibraltar. .
The Joint Staff Planners issued another report during April 1946 which was 
concerned with "military problems deriving from concept of operations for Pincher".
France feared that military agreements between the US and Spain would give the US 
the chance to withdraw its troops to Britain and Spain in case of Soviet attack. It was 
very likely that under the circumstances France would have fallen to the USSR with 
ease. Section 37 of the report by the Joint Staff Planners made French fears of an 
American withdrawal more than simple paranoia. It read: "it appears that should the 
USSR initiate an offensive in Western Europe, our occupation forces there must be 
immediately withdrawn from the continent of Europe or withdrawn to a defensive 
position in Italy or possibly Spain."20 Earlier on the report read:
17. American Plans for a War against the Soviet Union (APWSUL New York, 1990, Vol.I "Military 
Position of the United States in the Light of Russian Policy", p.26.
18. APWSU, Vol.I, "Military Position of the United States in the Light of Russian Policy", Report b\ 
the Joint War Plans Committee, 8 January 1946, Appendix A: Memorandum for the Secretary of War 
and Secretary of the Navy, p.2/5. -
19. APWSU. Ibid., p .11/41.
20. APWSU. Vol.2, 13 April 1946, Joint Staff Planners, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Problems 
Deriving from "Concept of Operations for Pincher", p. 17.
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"The withdrawal of US forces across France into Spain also may prove feasible. This, 
too, will be largely dependent upon political considerations. It is probable that an anti- 
Communistic government will remain in power for at least the next year or two, and if 
Spain is willing to desert her position as a neutral, then the withdrawal of US forces 
into Spain would make a material contribution to any required defense of the Pyrenees. 
On the other hand, the Allies would probably be committed to the defense of Spain, 
which might well entail a substantial diversion of resources. Retention of an anti- 
Communist government in Spain would materially assist in maintaining the security of 
the western Mediterranean."21
Appendix B of the report argued that Spain "is suitable and desirable as a base for 
fighter and short-range aircraft in defense of friendly or interdiction of enemy lines of 
communication. It is not suitably located as a base for long-range bombardment aircraft 
in prosecution of the strategic mission."22 Appendix C stressed the importance of the 
Straits of Gibraltar, and thus Spain. It analyzed the Soviet pros and cons for an attack 
on Spain.23 During an invasion of the Iberian peninsula the US had two choices.
Either support Spain with troops or let Spain fall to the Russian troops. The first option 
was carefully studied in the report. A defence of Spain would have enabled the west to 
retain control over the western Mediterranean, and it would have made preparation of a 
counterattack against occupied Europe easier. Furthermore it would not have tied down 
too many troops due to the natural defence line of the Pyrenees.24 The report ended 
with a priority list in case of a Soviet sneak attack on Europe. The US would hold the 
Cairo - Suez area first and above all. Next it would have supported Spain's resistance 
against an invasion and ultimately it would neutralize Spain's fall through bases in
21. APWSU. Ibid., p.15.
22. APWSU. Ibid., Appendix B, p.28.
23. APWSU. Ibid., Appendix C, p.47.
24. APWSU. Ibid., p.49.
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Morocco.25
The French delicate military position and the fear of being left alone by the 
Americans was further increased by improving relations between the US and Spain. 
French authorities wanted to have a guarantee that the US army would not evacuate the 
front line and withdraw to Spain.
At the same time relations with Spain worsened when Cristino Garcia and nine 
other guerrillas and former members of the French Resistance were arrested in the 
Sierra Guadarrama and were sentenced to capital punishment in late January 1946. 
Cristino Garcia had fought on the Republican side in Asturias and Catalonia during the 
Spanish Civil War and subsequently had fled Spain after the Civil War. He then 
became a prominent member of the French Resistance during the German occupation. 
After France's liberation from the Nazis he returned illegally to Spain in April 1945, to 
fight against fascism. Accused of murder and armed robbery, he was soon condemned 
to death. On 17 February 1946, France, under pressure from the Communist labour 
unions and the communists and socialists in the National Assembly, asked Spain for 
clemency for Garcia. The Spanish authorities argued that Garcia was accused of 
terrorist acts against Spain and illegal entry into the country, his prominent past during 
the war mattered little to the them. Disregarding the French plea, the condemned were 
executed shortly afterwards. In return, the French National Assembly responded: "The 
National Constituent Assembly has learned with shocked sorrow of the execution of 
Cristino Garcia... The Assembly ... calls upon the French government to prepare to 
break relations with the government of general Franco."26 France and the Communist 
propaganda machinery wanted to make an issue out of the execution of these French 
Resistance fighters in February 1946 and demanded dramatic international action. 
However these were weak grounds. Spain was certainly not the only country which 
imposed capital punishment on terrorists and murderers. Garcia's intentions were
25. APWSU. Ibid., p.51.
26. Siegfried, ed., L'Annge politique 1946. (Paris, 1947), p.346.
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noble, yet they were also illegal and ruthless. Under pressure, the French government 
failed to wait for a more appropriate incident of violation of human rights in Spain and 
despite being warned by the Spanish Charg6 in Paris that a break of foreign relations 
would result in the impounding of French assets,27 the Quai d'Orsay gave in to 
pressure.
On 27 February, Bidault proposed to the governments of the US, Britain and the 
USSR {o end all diplomatic relations between Spain and United Nations member 
states. The reason to include Moscow in these talks was simple. After the first proposal 
it became obvious that Britain and the US did not welcome the isolation of Spain while 
Moscow clearly favoured the French policy. With the appeal to Moscow, the Quai 
d'Orsay hoped to force the hand of the State Department and the Foreign Office. 
Bidault, a member of the MRP, the right center party, argued that Franco had made no 
changes towards democracy. The French foreign minister therefore concluded that 
Franco's regime in Spain threatened international peace and security. As a solution he 
proposed a declaration by the four nations and a submission of the problem to the 
Security Council.28 France stood to gain from this policy. The Security Council Could 
verbally condemn Spain and thus make a rapprochement between the US and 
Spain more difficult. This in turn would guarantee an American defence of France, 
rather than a retreat behind the Pyrenees. Alternatively, the Security Council would 
force economic sanctions against Spain. This would increase the share France received 
from American aid and international trade. The French government decided to close its 
borders and seriously reduce trade relations with Spain. Embargoes were enforced.
Support for this idea could be expected from the Division for European Affairs 
of the State Department. The US had already shown some restrictions of her trade 
policy towards Spain. The Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments refused to sell
27. Public Record Office (PRO), F0371.60375, 13 February 1946, Paris to FO.
28. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 27 February 1946, The Ambassador in France to the Secretary o f State, 
p. 1043.
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military equipment of any kind to Spain.29 However, US economic interests in Spain 
made sure that the State Department would not completely abandon Spain to French and 
Soviet policy makers.
Washington was not enthusiastic about Bidault1 s proposal. However, the US had 
expressed the desire to follow a common policy towards Spain together with Britain and 
France. Either Britain or France would have to compromise. In a memorandum,
Harry N. Howard of the Division of International Organization Affairs expressed that 
the US should not discourage discussions at the UN if they arose. He did not exclude 
the possibility of ending diplomatic relations with Spain.30 Thus it seemed at first that 
the US might follow the French proposal in order to secure a common western foreign 
policy. Yet Washington was first going to try finding a compromise which would allow 
for a continuation of trade and diplomatic relations while also meeting French concerns.
It was hoped that such a compromise could be found in a public condemnation of the 
Spanish regime.
In fact the idea of a statement by the three nations seems to have had some 
support in the State Department during January 1946, after the first French appeal to 
London and Washington. Then Dean Acheson, as acting Secretary of State, had 
suggested a statement by France, Britain and the US expressing their dislike of 
Franco's fascist regime. It would have pointed towards a solution of this "internal" 
problem by a withdrawal of Franco and by establishing a caretaker government.
Acheson knew, through the British ambassador in Washington, that Britain wanted to 
avoid conversations on the Spanish problem in public altogether. Whitehall was happy 
in solving the complications through the diplomatic channel.31
29. FRUS 1946. Vol.I, 7 June 1946, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Secretariat of the Policy 
Committee on Arms and Armaments, p.840; NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1945 
1949, 852.24 FLC/2-846, 8 February 1946, Division European Affairs to Acheson.
30. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 27 December 1945, Memorandum by Harry N. Howard of the Division of 
International Organization Affairs, p. 1023.
31. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 18 January 1946, The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, 
p. 1030.
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The US charge to Spain argued against the State Department. He believed that, 
in the long run, it was best not to make a public statement as this would limit future 
flexibility of future policy. He favoured a slow evolution of Francoism bringing about 
eventual international acceptance.32 Now, after the French proposal, the US could not 
publicly oppose the general idea of a common statement but what France was 
demanding, ending all diplomatic relations, was more than the State Department was 
willing to do. Fortunately for Washington the American policy makers could play 
mediator between France and Britain.
Naturally, Britain tried to prevent the French initiative. Sir Victor Mallet,
British Ambassador to Spain, wrote to Bevin that: "A weak Government in Spain, 
whether of the Right or the Left, would pave the way for increased Soviet influence and 
pressure through the Spanish Communists. The one real merit of the present 
Government is that it doe's at least maintain order.1,33 The British Ambassador Cooper 
Duff argued in a telegram, on 2 March 1946, that the ending of diplomatic relations 
with Madrid would worsen the economic situation in Europe as a whole and in Spain in 
particular. At the time, some American policy reports like one produced by the Air 
Intelligence, feared the beginning of a military conflict between France and Spain.34
The French proposal played into Soviet hands. While Britain and the US were 
trying to get rid of Franco without too much social instability and political 
complications in Spain, the USSR was trying exactly the opposite. Another civil war in 
Spain was in Moscow's interest, alternatively, the Kremlin wanted to discourage lasting 
bonds between the West and Spain. George Kennan, then chargd in the USSR, analyzed 
the Soviet position. He claimed that the past had created a deep hatred between Russia 
and Spain. He feared that Spain offered Russia a strategic base and the possibility to
32. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 15 February 1946, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1038.
33. PRO, FO371.60375, 15 February 1946, Sir V. Mallet to Mr Bevin.
34. NA, Military Branch, ABC-Air Intelligence (12-Jun-46), 29 May 1946, Air Intelligence Report, 
Study 55.
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expand communism into France, Italy Morocco and Latin America. Ambassador Mallet 
confirmed this argument in a note to the Foreign Office.35 More realistically, Sir Frank 
Roberts, British charge in Moscow, believed that Russia was not well informed on 
Spanish affairs and was only using France as a "spearhead" to split the western allies. 
After the French proposal, it became even more obvious that Moscow was using France 
for its own mischief.36 From all this, he deduced that the USSR was hoping for 
instability, an overthrow of Franco and possibly a communist takeover.37 Once Bidault 
had made his proposal to London, Washington and Moscow, the USSR was waiting 
impatiently for the British and American reply. The Kremlin was more than delighted 
knowing that, whichever way the situation turned out, it would further Soviet plans.38 
If a strong action were to be taken, Spain would have been isolated and might have 
fallen more easily to a communist coup. If no such statement was issued, the USSR 
would have had a good chance to split the Western powers and increase its influence in 
France.
Franco and Martfn Artajo, willing to isolate Spain, were dismayed with these 
developments. The Ambassador in Washington, Juan Francisco Cdrdenas, claimed that 
even a public statement by the four nations could not move Franco a single inch.39 
Franco was willing to risk another civil war, even one inspired by foreign powers, but 
he would not peacefully relinquish his stranglehold on Spain. Expecting that the US 
feared a renewed struggle in Spain almost as much as Franco did, Cardenas painted the 
spectre of civil war and communism looming over Spain in a conversation with Paul
35. PRO, F0371.60441 A, 28 February 1946, Victor Mallet.
36. PRO, F0371.60441 A, 14 February 1946, Frank Roberts to Derek Miller; also in F0371.60441A 
3 March 1946, Moscow to FO; 9 February 1946, USSR policy to Spain.
37. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 3 February 1946, The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 
p .1033.
38. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 1 March 1946, The Charge in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 
p .1044.
39. FRUS 19466. Vol.V, 3 March 1946, The Spanish Ambassador to the Secretary of State, p. 1045.
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Culbertson, then Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.40
As a result of the French proposal, the three Western powers faced a dilemma. 
Above all they had to prove that they still stood united in their policies. Yet the French 
proposal had pressured them into taking some sort of stance against Spain or else admit 
that a rift had developed between their policies. Britain was unwilling to go along with 
the French proposal. According to London, the French Government's unilateral actions 
of closing the border and demanding a public statement condemning Franco had caused 
a crisis in foreign relations with Spain.41 The US was less outspoken in this respect but 
tacitly agreed with the British policy. France, however, was unwilling to retreat com­
pletely as this would have led to accusations by the communists that French foreign 
policy was dictated by London and Washington. Undoubtedly this would have 
strengthened the Communist Party in France. Thus the three Western powers had to 
find a compromise which would lessen the French embarrassment without jeopardizing 
Anglo - American interests.
As a result, on 4 March 1946, following the French communique, the three 
Western Powers issued a joint statement condemning the Franco regime. The uncordial 
relations with Spain were designed to bring about:
"a peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange and the establishment of 
an interim or caretaker government under which the Spanish people may have an oppor­
tunity freely to determine the type of government they wish to have and to choose their 
leaders"42
The caretaker government would guarantee political amnesty, freedom of assembly and 
of expression. Once these changes had taken place, the caretaker government would be
40. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 4 March 1946, Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Western 
European Affairs, p. 1046.
41. PRO, ADM223.225, March 1946, Monthly Intelligence Report; also in ADM223.227, May 1946, 
Monthly Intelligence Report.
42. Quoted from Whitaker, Spain and Defense, p.25.
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diplomatically recognized and would receive economic assistance.43 Nevertheless there 
were no plans for direct action interfering in the internal affairs of Spain. The statement 
offered no solution to Spain’s problems. Franco, gaining nothing from stepping down, 
would have alienated the political right and the army, if he had allowed exiles to return. 
The undoing of the Falange would have infuriated its members, making Franco's 
personal position untenable. Even the carrot offered was too insignificant to make a 
difference. The inducement of assistance in the tripartite statement mentioned no 
particulars and thus remained empty promises. The statement was as important for what 
it said as for what it omitted. There was no threat to end diplomatic relations, nor a 
proposal to put the problem before the Security Council. It was an empty compromise, 
pleasing Britain and saving France from embarrassment. Almost immediately after the 
statement Russia tried to split the western powers. The Soviet Chargd in Washington, 
Novikov, wrote to the Secretary of State that he was in full support of the French 
proposal to put the Spanish problem before the Security Council.44 If the US agreed, 
the problem might still come before the Security Council. On the other hand if the US 
disagreed a wedge would have been driven between France and the US concerning 
foreign relations with Spain.
In Spain the result was counterproductive. The tripartite statement was one of 
the reasons why large enthusiastic crowds turned to the Plaza de Oriente during the 
annual victory parade on 1 April 1946 demanding a speech by General Franco.45 The 
public support was the first sign of the success of the regime's effort to orchestrate faith 
in the Caudillo's role as sentinel of the West. The nationalist feeling in Spain was 
skillfully manipulated.
For the time being, Madrid was almost unaffected by ostracism. It is true that
43. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1941-1945 . Washington, 1950, Doc. 
182.
44. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 7 March 1946, The Soviet Charge to the Secretary of State, p. 1047.
45. Sulrez Fenrindez, Luis, Francisco Franco v su Tiempo. Madrid, 1984, Vol.VI, p. 106/7.
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she was not a member of the UN nor of any of its numerous agencies and committees 
but the economic costs of this ostracism were minor. Furthermore Franco enjoyed 
wholehearted support by Salazar's dictatorship in Portugal, which argued that no civil 
unrest should be risked in Spain by overthrowing Franco, as Spain's resources were 
urgently needed in the struggle against the East.46
On 8 March 1946, Truman's Secretary of State, James Byrnes, wrote two notes 
to the US Ambassador in France, Jefferson Caffery. The Secretary of State could not 
see why Franco's failure to give an impression of evolution abroad should bring the 
Spanish problem before the UN, nor could he see how Spain endangered international 
peace and security.47 Byrenes wanted to avoid bringing the Spanish problem to the 
UN. He realized the game Russia was playing and tried to give the French a possible 
escape route through which to avoid further alignment with the USSR. The statement 
from 4 March 1946 meant that the western powers continued their coordinated policy 
towards Spain without harming Anglo - American interests in Spain. France had backed 
down and saved her diplomatic reputation but was still exposed to Soviet pressure. Four 
days after the two notes to Cafffey, Byrnes sent him another note. In it he suggested 
that Paris, having acted under Communist pressure, could escape further public outcry 
by stressing the value of the tripartite statement.48
Across the Atlantic in Europe, the statement of 4 March seemed to the public to 
be in line with US policies. The US refrained from naming a new ambassador, granted 
no assistance and discouraged the private sector to invest in Spain. Furthermore a 
report by the Subcommittee on Rearmament asserted that US military supplies for 
foreign nations were not being sent to Spain.49 However, on deeper analysis the
46. PRO, F0371.60456, 7 March 1946, Lisbon to Ernest Bevin.
47. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 8 March 1946, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France,
- p. 1048/49.
48. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 12 March 1946, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France, p. 1051.
49. FRUS 1946. Vol.I, 21 March 1946, Report by the Subcommittee on Rearmament to the State-Wai 
Navy Coordinating Committee, p. 1145.
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statement was not in line with US policies. Washington favoured a stable government in 
Spain. The US Secretary of State, James Byrnes, generally opposed embargoes on oil 
and petrol as this would create political and economic chaos. Nor did the US accept 
Bidault1 s attack on Spain.
Bidault had argued that Spain's threat to international security was made clear in 
the Yalta and Potsdam declarations, both banning Spain from the United Nations. He 
claimed that Article 2 Paragraph 7 of the UN Charter applied to Spain and thus made it 
of UN concern. Furthermore, he maintained that a prolonged totalitarian regime in 
Spain could threaten the maintenance of peace and international security in the future 
by its colonial ambitions.50 Seemingly, France was trying to strengthen its opposition 
to Spain but, by signing the tripartite statement, the Quai d ’Orsay had proven that for 
the time being, France was willing to follow an Anglo - American policy in order to 
avoid confrontation with the two allies. Despite making waves France did not want to 
rock a boat out of which it feared to fall.
The US Administration in general and the Secretary of State in particular were 
unmoved by this new French argument. The threat of more serious border conflicts was 
dismissed by the American Joint Intelligence Committee which argued that in the 
Spanish army "as a whole, small arms and light artillery pieces are of good quality, 
well maintained and in sufficient numbers... The Army would... give a good account of 
itself in a defensive role." The Committee claimed that there had been no aggression by 
the Spanish side in these border conflicts. The Spanish army was acting purely 
defensively.51 Byrnes warned that the US would not support France in the Security 
Council. Washington was willing to follow a mutual policy towards Spain with France 
and Britain even if this required a public condemnation of the Franco regime, however
50. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 12 March 1946, The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, p. 1052
51. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec.1-8, 19 April 
1946, Joint Intelligence Committee, Memo 209, Military Situation on Franco-Spanish Frontier.
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it was unwilling to go any further.52 Thus Western foreign policy would publicly 
condemn the Spanish dictatorship but without damaging the totalitarian government.
The British realized soon after the Joint Statement that their fears before the 4 
March were justified. The ground on which the three western nations had made their 
stand was weak. There seemed to have been no border conflicts caused by the Spanish 
side. However, after the declaration exiled Communists in France increased their 
attacks across the Spanish border.53 Britain argued that “The French could scarcely 
have chosen a worse wicket on which to bat", but then cricket is not one of France's 
national pastimes.54
Additionally Westminster argued that sanctions against Spain could not be 
enforced without Portuguese and Argentinean cooperation.55 Britain would only 
withdraw its Ambassador if this brought about a solution. Clearly London would not 
follow the French proposal as pressure on Spain would strengthen Franco or result in 
chaos.56
In response to a note by the British Ambassador in Washington expressing this 
point of view, the American State Department expressed its agreement and claimed that 
a solution in Spain had to be found in talks between the three western nations.57 Given 
the weakness of the tripartite statement, this meant a continuation of Anglo - American 
policy with France following unconvinced.
The British and American policy had been aided by Winston Churchill. On 5 
March 1946, Churchill spoke in Fulton, a little town twenty miles north of Jefferson
52. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 19 March 1946, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Franco, p. 1056.
53. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 21 March 1946, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1059.
54. WPIS. 6 March 1946, N.334.
55. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 18 March 1946, The British Embassy to the Department of State "Aide 
Mdmoire", p. 1055.
56. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 1 April 1946, The British Ambassador to the Department of State, p. 1062.
57. FRUS. 1946, Vol.V, 6 April 1946, The Department of State to the British Ambassador.
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City in the rolling farm land of Missouri. Churchill claimed that:
’’From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain had descended 
across the Continent. Behind that line lie all capitals of the ancient states of Central and 
Eastern Europe... All these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I 
must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to 
Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control 
from Moscow."58
Churchill believed that what was needed was a "cordon sanitaire", a union of 
the Western Democracies, against the USSR. He upheld that the US and Britain should 
give less importance to their own international ambitions and make a united stance 
against the USSR. For Spain this meant that Britain and the US should enforce a joint 
policy. By implication, if France wanted to join this policy and stay within the Western 
alliance, she had to abandon her present policies.
Public opinion and most of the American press, however, were strongly in 
opposition and portrayed Churchill as a warmonger, poisoning the difficult relations 
between the West and Russia. Walter Lippmann portrayed the speech as an "almost 
catastrophic blunder."
Despite attempts by Truman to limit the diplomatic blunder, the emerging East - 
West conflict, as manifested by Churchill, already could be seen in Turkey. In order to 
support the Turkish government against Soviet pressure, the US Navy moved the battle­
ship Missouri to Istanbul. Britain and the US, worried about the Mediterranean, held 
military conversations about the vulnerability of allied shipping through the 
Mediterranean once Gibraltar had fallen to the USSR.59 If France wanted to join, she 
had to do so on their terms and adapt their policy towards Spain.
In fact, the Quai d'Orsay gave in and changed its policy during late March
58. Gilbert, Martin, Winston Churchill. Never Dispair 1945-1965. Boston, 1988, p. 198.
59. NA, Military Branch, ABC-Russia (22-Aug-43), 23 August 1946, Soviet Capabilities in the 
Mediterranean.
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1946. It is unclear whether this was the result of America's unmovable position towards 
Spain or simply a realization by the Quai d'Orsay that the international climate fa­
voured the Anglo - American position. It was becoming obvious that the international 
climate had made a bipolar world a reality and France had to choose between a closer 
alliance with the Anglo - American block or a precarious international independence. 
The former would limit French foreign policy and result in clashes between public 
opinion and governmental policies. Alternatively France could have moved away from 
a common western policy. . In doing so, the French government would face more threats 
from communists. France chose to compromise. Bidault now wanted to avoid the 
Spanish problem coming before the Security Council. The Soviet Ambassador to 
France, Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov, however, continued to pressure French 
foreign policy makers. Bidault turned to the US asking for suggestions on how to avoid 
this embarrassing situation.60 To achieve a cohesion of policies towards Spain of the 
three powers, France suggesting a closer coordination of diplomatic representations.61
60. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 20 March 1946, The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, p. 1058
61. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 25 March 1946, The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, p. 1061
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Despite the outcry of the press, Churchill's speech reflected the point of view of 
many policy makers in Washington, including Averell Harriman, former ambassador in 
Moscow, Dean Acheson and Secretary of Navy James Forrestal. Two weeks earlier, in 
the "long telegram", a 8,000 word message from the US Embassy in Moscow, George 
Kennan, the Charg6 d'Affaires, outlined Russia's neurotic Weltanschauung. According 
to the international doctrine of Communism, a permanent peaceful coexistence between 
communist and capitalist states was impossible. Kennan claimed that the current Soviet 
regime was "only the last of a long session of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who 
had relentlessly forced their country on to ever new heights of military power in order 
to guarantee external security for their internally weak regimes." However,the charg^ 
also claimed that Moscow was sensitive to logic and could be expected to back off if 
faced with strength.1 The implication was clear. If the US wanted to avoid a military 
conflict in the near future with the Soviet block then she had to portray enough strength 
to discourage Moscow from exploiting her weaknesses.
However the press kept hammering away at the White House and the State 
Department for their position towards the Soviet Union. The public was not yet ready 
to see Russia, the ally against Nazi Germany, as an enemy in a new struggle. It was a 
worrying time for Truman.
While Washington was deciding on its future global foreign policy, interest 
groups such as the military were able to exploit the situation. In particular for Spain 
this meant that help was given as long as publicity was avoided. For example, all avail­
able military information concerning types, production, and the current development 
stages of radars including exact technical characteristics were secretly released to 
Spain via the US Embassy in Madrid.2 In return the Defense and State Department 
hoped for better military and trade relations.
1. McCullough, Truman. New York, 1992, p.490.
2. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1946, Spain, 7 June 1946, Radar Equipment Spain 
to MA, Spain.
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Worldwide public opinion was moving against Franco. Canada publicly rebuffed 
Spain’s attempt to establish diplomatic relations.3 During spring 1946, six Communist, 
four Latin American, three Commonwealth and four other states severed diplomatic 
relations with Spain. There was also speculation that Italy might do the same.4
The foreign opposition, the international atmosphere and the resulting economic 
isolation of Spain had their effect and revolts against Franco reemerged. Workers went 
on strikes in several cities. The strongest opposition was in Asturias and Republican 
flags appeared on buildings in Gijon and Oviedo.
Even some senior officers in the army, which originally supported Franco's 
rule, drifted away. General Aranda visited foreign representatives and sought political 
asylum in the US embassy. He planned to set up a new provisional government, but 
lacked support from either Don Juan or the government in exile. His ill prepared 
attempt resulted in his arrest.5 Franco remained stubborn. His ruthless victory in the 
Civil War guaranteed his control over the country. Internal opposition to Franco was 
not enough to oust him from power. If foreign governments wanted to get rid of him, 
they had to apply stronger measures.
The first move came from the communist states. After some encouragement 
from the USSR, in April 1946, Poland pleaded to the UN Security Council to include 
the Spanish problem in the UN agenda. One week later Poland called for an end to 
diplomatic relations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, 
expressed his support for the exclusion of Spain from the United Nations and hoped that 
a change of government in Spain would bring about liberty and democracy.6 After the
3. PRO, F0371.60433, 3 July 1946. “
4. PRO, F0371.60457, 25 October 1946.
5. Fernandez, Tensiones Militares. p. 125.
6. Public Papers Secretaries General of the United Nations. Trygve Lie. New York, 1969, 
Universality of Membership, Statement in the Security Council, Lake Success/New York, 28 August 
1946, and Supplementary Oral Report before the General Assembly, Flushing/New York, 24 October 
1946.
26
Chapter 2: The UN Resolution
Polish request, the Spanish problem came before the Security Council.
Working for the US delegation to the UN, Alger Hiss, who became famous 
during the McCarthy years when convicted for perjury, drafted a paper on US policy 
for the UN. This was channeled through the Secretary of State to Edward Stettinius, 
former Secretary of State now representing the US in the UN. In this paper, Alger Hiss 
claimed that it would not damage the US if the problem came before the Security 
Council. However, the US delegation believed a vote concerning Spain’s threat to 
peace and security before the. Security Council had to be avoided. Hiss suggested that if 
the problem came to the Security Council, a subcommittee should be formed. He 
suggested that the US should support any recommendation by the Council but strongly 
opposed sanctions, changes to diplomatic practices and any other threats against 
friendly relations.7
Britain's view on this were similar to the one expressed by the US, maybe even 
more supportive of Spain. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British representative, argued 
that governmental structures were internal affairs and of no concern to the UN. Britain 
hoped that the Polish proposal would not come before the Security Council because 
Article 2 Paragraph 7 of the UN Charter specified internal affairs as being outside the 
UN influence and Article 34/35, allowing UN action to secure peace and security, did 
not apply to Spain because she lacked global importance.8
In return Oscar Lange, the Polish delegate, claimed that Spain posed a threat to 
world peace because she had an army of 600,000 soldiers, an independent nuclear 
project, a large war material industry and was harbouring 2,200 German scientists and 
Gestapo employees. These accusations would have led , under article 34, to 
condemnation and punishment, and under article 35 and 41 to the termination of 
diplomatic relations.
7. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 12 April 1946, Background Information and Guidance for the US Delegate, The 
Secretary of State to the US Representative at the UN, p. 1065.
8. WPIS, 17 April 1946, N.340.
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Unconvinced, Sir Alexander argued that all these accusations were based on 
unfounded claims.9 It was true that Spain was uncooperative in the repatriation of 
Nazis. Madrid also had tried to delay the confiscation of German state property in 
Spain.10 However, these were minor complications and were a far way off the Polish 
accusations.
On two occasions in April Edward R. Stettinius called for the formation of a 
subcommittee to deal with the problem. Soon thereafter, a UN resolution set up this 
subcommittee. Despite having suggested the idea, the US excluded herself on the 
grounds that other nations had closer links with Spain. By doing so Washington avoided 
embarrassing France and/or General Franco.
The Subcommittee concerned with the Spanish Problem was formed by 18 
delegates, representing Communist as well as Democratic states and had an Anglo - 
American proposal as starting point.11 It was to investigate whether the Spanish 
problem was a domestic one, and thus outside the interest of the UN, or if the regime 
threatened to cause an international conflict.
The discussion in the Subcommittee largely turned around two problems.
Firstly, Oscar Lange had condemned Spain under article 34 of chapter VI. However 
chapter VI of the UN Charter merely allowed recommendations. The Polish delegation 
tried however to enforce measures allowed under chapter VII. Sir Alexander Cadogan 
took pains in pointing out that in order to enforce diplomatic measures against Spain, 
she had to violate chapter VII and not simply chapter VI.
The second problem concerned Spain's position vis-5-vis international peace.
The Communist states claimed that the UN had an obligation to intervene. Western 
nations strongly opposed this. Colonel Hudgson, representing Australia, summarized 
the difficulties of the discussions: "The line between what is of international concern
9. WPIS. 1 May 1946, N.341.
10. WPIS. 3 July, 14 August, 4 September, 25 September 1946, N.349, N. 355, N.358, N.361.
11. WPIS. 11 December 1946, N.372.
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and what is of domestic concern is not fixed, it is mutable."
The Subcommittee findings resulted in the Spanish problem being covered under 
chapter VI, thus any diplomatic measures, apart from recommendation, were out of 
question. It was also decided that Franco's Government was not at the moment posing a 
threat to peace, yet it was a situation "likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security" in the future. Thus the Security Council was advised 
to recommend procedures or methods to improve the situation as under Article 36. The 
Subcommittee also suggested that the UN should condemn Spain and recommend 
ending diplomatic relations.12 The report was put on the Security Council agenda for 6 
June 1946.
In the meantime and in order to prevent further international pressure, Franco 
moved further away from the fascist state. The press, radio, and theater were placed 
under the education minister and no longer under the Falange. The Fascist greeting, 
together with the party uniforms and decorations, were abolished. The Director of 
Foreign Policy was replaced by a less fascist character. Franco also became more 
cooperative concerning the expatriation of Germans and German property in Spain.13
Strange rumours were started by Spanish diplomats about a possible Spanish - 
Soviet cooperation. Artajo informed Bonsai, the US Charge, that the USSR was trying 
to improve relations with Spain.14 US Air Force Intelligence reported that "Franco 
could be flirting with Russians" and the Secret Service reported that a Persian official 
had visited Barcelona to arrange a Soviet - Spanish friendship and non-aggression 
treaty. Allegedly, Peron was approaching the Russian Embassy in Buenos Aires to 
resume cordial relations with the USSR and to act as a mediator between Madrid and 
Moscow. Others also claimed that Admiral Moreno had left Spain for Argentina to
12. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 1 June 1946, The Acting US Representative at the UN to the Secretary of 
State, p. 1072.
13. WPIS. 28 August, 6 November 1946, N.357, N.367.
14. WNRC, Records of the Army Staff, G-2 Intelligence, 1946, Spain, 12 August 1946, Madrid to 
Secretary of State.
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investigate Spanish - Soviet relations. All these rumours remain unsupported by 
facts.15 In Britain, the Foreign Office, fearing that Moscow might recognize Franco to 
strengthen commercial links with Spain, wrote that "we might in fact suddenly be faced 
with a hostile Spanish Government in close contact with Moscow" and "many of 
Franco's supporters in the Falangist party would at a pinch be ready to accept such a 
volte-face."16 The British Charge in Moscow, Sir Frank Roberts, rejected such an 
absurd possibility out of hand and a lecture by O. A. Arturov entitled "The Campaign to 
Liquidate the Fascist Regime in Spain" ended speculations about a coming together of 
the two countries.17 Yet they had created uncertainty in the West and had been cause 
for alarm. In order not to be sidelined in the unlikely event of this rapprochement, the 
West had to show more support for Franco.
Concerning the UN, Spanish authorities argued that Spain was of no concern to 
the United Nations as the UN had no right to judge over a non-member state. Spanish 
papers claimed that the Subcommittee had been stacked heavily against Spain, Brazil 
being the only nation on it with diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.18 The 
Spanish Foreign Minister claimed that international pressure made evolution in Spain 
impossible because it caused bombings and shootings in Madrid and French guerrilla 
struggle on the Spanish border.19
In the meantime some Labour MPs in Britain came down heavily against Spain. 
Ian Noel-Baker, McNeil, and Mrs Leah Manning argued that ending diplomatic 
relations and economic sanctions would remove Spain's government and thus prevent a
15. WNRC. Records of the Army Staff, G-2 Intelligence, 1946, Spain, 11 June 1946, USMA Spain to 
War Department, also 25 July 1946, USMA Spain to War Department.
16. PRO, FO371.60441A, 4 July 1946, Hoyer Miller to various.
17. PRO, FO371.60441A, 12 August 1946, Moscow to FO; also FO371.60441A, 22 August 1946, 
Lecture.
18. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 6 June 1946, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1075.
" 19. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 19 November 1946, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1079.
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further rift between the two countries.20
The proposed radical break of all relations would inevitably hurt the economy 
and would force unpredictable changes in Spain. The West was unwilling to take this 
risk. The Government in London believed that rupture of diplomatic relations would do 
more harm than good.21 Churchill remarked from the floor of the House that: "It will 
affront Spanish national pride to such an extent that there will be a general rallying of 
Spaniards to the government of their country and to its sovereign independence." He 
was absolutely right.
Another Tory, Sir Hartley Shawcross, argued that ending commercial and 
diplomatic relations would lead to starvation and possible civil war in Spain as well as 
economic loss for Britain. He claimed that "nothing has done more to maintain Franco 
in power than the fear of foreign intervention in one way or another, the threat of 
starvation and the danger of civil strife."22
Washington too was unhappy about the way discussions had developed in the 
UN. Under point 31b the Subcommittee recommended to the General Assembly ending 
diplomatic relations with Spain. The US Representative at the UN proposed an 
amendment modifying this recommendation. However, on 18 June, the USSR vetoed 
the US modification and thus eliminated it. The report went unmodified to the First 
Committee.
The Soviet Union itself felt uneasy about the Spanish problem going into the 
General Assembly. As long as it was discussed in the Security Council, the USSR 
could use its veto at will. Once in the General Assembly this was no longer possible. 
Andrei Gromyko, the USSR delegate, had used his veto three times alone on 24 June 
1946 merely to keep the Spanish issue in the Security Council.
Poland still asked each member of the United Nations to terminate diplomatic
20. WPIS. 23 October 1946, N.365.
21. WPIS. 30 October 1946, N.366.
22. WPIS. 11 December 1946, N.372.
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relations with Spain and wanted to bar her from membership in any organ or agency 
related to the UN. Belorussia wanted to go even further and suggested a suspension of 
communication by rail, sea, air, post and telegraph.
Britain called the Belorussian position unrealistic and argued that economic 
sanctions would kindle the flames of a new civil war.23 London would welcome 
democratic elections in Spain, however, the British ambassador to Spain said that 
international pressure had actually decreased the possible success of a government 
composed by the democratic .parties in exile, the Catholics or the Monarchists.
It was clear that the UN was split over the Spanish question and Madrid tried to 
use this for its own advantage. Artajo told the British Ambassador to Spain, Sir Victor 
Mallet, that if the Belorussian proposal passed, Spain would resist to the end "and if 
there was no petrol Spaniards would ride on mules."24
An Anglo - American counterproposal to the Polish proposal only asked for 
Spain's exclusion from the UN. The two nations hoped that "Franco [would] surrender 
the powers of government to a provisional government."
Others such as Canada, India, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark favoured 
this proposal. Iceland claimed that economic sanctions could not to be enforced as those 
countries, mainly Argentina and Portugal, having to enforce them were unwilling to do 
so. India argued against ending diplomatic relations as this would not help to remove 
Franco.
El Salvador and Costa Rica argued that Spain's problem was an internal affair. 
Other Latin American nations, Guatemala, Uruguay and Venezuela, opposed this and 
pointed out that foreign intervention into Spain's internal affairs during the Civil War 
had set a precedent which had allowed Franco to establish his power. Therefore a 
renewed involvement in Spain's internal affairs to remove Franco was allowed.
France went even further. Together with Belgium and Norway, Paris argued
23. WPIS. 13 November 1946, N.368.
24. WPIS. 20 November 1946, N.369.
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that the Spanish problem was no longer an internal affair because Franco had moved 
colonial troops from Morocco towards the French border. France asked for a resolution 
disallowing the purchase of Spanish food exports as long as Spaniards were going 
hungry. Spain had to sell more food than was advisable in order to pay for vital 
imports. Britain alone bought 257 million gold pesetas worth of foodstuff. France 
buying only 12 million gold pesetas was naturally more inclined towards economic 
sanctions.
As the State Department was getting ready for the Spanish problem in the 
General Assembly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a report on 10 July 1946 which 
expressed a desire to obtain base rights for the Navy and the Air Force, the use of 
ground facilities on the Canary islands and landing rights throughout Spain.25 At first 
glance this was a strange desire as it ran counter to overall US defence policy. After the 
Second World War, the armed services were dismantling tactical bases worldwide to 
reduce costs. Consequently, the State Department contested "that this Government [US] 
is not now in a position to institute negotiations for military rights with the Spanish 
Government nor does it appear likely that such negotiations can be undertaken within 
the predictable future."26 The Department was fully aware of the diplomatic 
complications and negative impressions such negotiations would cause, specially while 
the UN was still discussing the Spanish question.
Commercial interests in the US also favoured a lenient approach towards Spain. 
Washington had to make up its mind between relaxing restrictions on trade or getting 
rid of Franco once and for all. The longer Washington waited the less interested the 
public became, yet the less cooperative the Spanish authorities would be.
On 30 October, Senator Tom Connally outlined his position towards Spain, 
before the Political and Security Committee. Washington while favouring a public 
condemnation and exclusion from the UN, opposed severance of diplomatic relations
25. NA, Military Branch, ABC (6-Nov-43), 10 July 1946, Report by JCS, JCS 570/72.
26. NA, Military Branch, ABC (6-Nov-43), 5 August 1946, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.
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and economic sanctions as this might have caused a civil war. A renewed civil struggle 
without international intervention, resulting in a renewed fascist victory would have 
added to Franco's power. Nevertheless the US would follow any UN 
recommendations.27
For three days, the First Committee of the UN discussed the Polish and 
American proposals extensively as well as eight possible amendments. Finally it passed 
a new proposal to the Subcommittee. This proposal condemned Spain and excluded her 
from the UN and its agencies. It claimed that Franco was in power due to the help of 
the Axis and had supported them during the war. It recommended an immediate recall 
of all ambassadors and Ministers and, in the near future, the Security Council was to 
take such measures as deemed necessary to improve the situation.28
On 8 December, the Subcommittee agreed to this resolution with a vote of 11-5- 
2 .29 A small change in Part 2 of the Anglo - American proposal was made, and it was 
recommended to "take individually the same attitude they have taken collectively and 
refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with the present Spanish regime."
The next day, 9 December, the Subcommittee's proposal returned to the First 
Committee which agreed upon a condemnation of the regime (no dissension) and 
decided to bar Spain from UN agencies (vote 32-5-8). The proposed diplomatic breach 
with Spain was defeated (22-22-6) and so was the French foodstuffs proposal (10-32- 
6). Instead a Belgian compromise, which included barring Spain and condemning the 
Franco regime, was struck (27-7-16) and was, according to UN regulations, put on the 
agenda of the General Assembly.30
27. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 3 December 1946, The US representative at the UN to the Secretary of State,
p. 1080.
28. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 10 December 1946, The US Representative at the UN to the Secretary of 
State, p. 1083.
29. In Favour-Against-Abstentions. Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Russia, Belorussia, Chile, France, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Poland all voting in favour.
30. WPIS. 11 December 1946, N.372.
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Initially the US opposed the Belgian compromise and disagreed with the right of 
the Security Council to take further action if no changes had occurred. Yet upon getting 
the news of the vote in the First Committee on the Belgian compromise, Alger Hiss, 
then Director of Special Political Affairs, phoned up two members of the US 
delegation, John C. Ross and Durward V. Sandifer. He told them that he and Acheson 
had agreed to vote in favour of the Belgian compromise. Hiss instructed the two 
delegates not to push for an American amendment as this would have attracted 
unwelcomed publicity. US disagreement with future actions by the Security Council 
was not to be expressed unless the resolution was considered paragraph by paragraph.
He instructed them not to pressure for a vote by paragraphs, but to vote for the 
proposal in its entirety.31
The next day the US delegation was specifically instructed to vote in favour of 
the paragraph giving the Security Council the right to take further actions against Spain 
even if a vote by paragraphs took place.32 Spain hoped in vain that the US would vote 
against the recommendation.33
Finally the Spanish problem was back on the order of the day of the General 
Assembly. On 12 December 1946, the Belgian proposal, already passed in the Political 
and Security Committee, was ratified by the United Nations (34-6-13). No member of 
the Security Council voted against the recommendation and thus future action by the 
Council members seemed likely. As the vote was taken on the entire Belgian proposal 
rather then by paragraphs, the Acting Secretary of State could inform the Chargd in 
Spain that if a vote by paragraphs had taken place, the US would have voted against 
possible measures in the future by the Security Council.34 This was not true, the
31. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 10 December 1946, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation by the Director 
of the Office of Special Political Affairs, p. 1085.
32. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 11 December 1946, Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the 
Office of Special Political Affairs, p. 1087.
33. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 12 December 1946, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1088.
34. FRUS 1946. Vol.V, 13 December 1946, Acting Secretary of State to Charge in Spain, p. 1089.
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delegation had been instructed on 11 December not to vote against this paragraph in 
order to achieve unanimity in the Assembly. However, claiming that the US would 
have voted against it gave America more room for political manoeuvres. Should the 
Security Council decide to take severe actions, America could veto them saying that 
it had disagreed against this part of the recommendation from the very beginning but 
had voted in favour for the sake of unanimity.
The text of the final resolution condemned the regime, excluded Spain from 
the UN and its agencies, branded her as fascist, and acknowledged her aid to the 
Axis during the war. It threatened with further measures by the Security Council 
and, most important of all, the resolution called for "immediate recall from Madrid 
of Ambassadors and Ministers plenipotentiary accredited there."
A lot of propaganda surrounded this last point as large parts of the public 
were under the false impression that recalling the ambassador was tantamount to 
ending diplomatic relations. This was far from the truth. An ambassador, 
representing his country's foreign policy, has the right to negotiate with the chief of 
state. In Spain the ambassadors were to be replaced by the Charge d'affairs as heads 
of missions. These were only accredited to the foreign secretary. Any of his 
messages to the chief of state had to go through the foreign secretary. Thus 
withdrawal of ambassadors meant slower communication between the two countries. 
Apart from this and the prestige value, relations continued unchanged. Diplomatic 
relations as such were never ended. The US and Britain had recognized the Franco 
regime since 1939 and continued to do so after 1946.
Clearly the December resolution had little effect. Britain, El Salvador, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Liberia withdrew their ambassadors. Thirty other nations had 
no diplomatic relations anyway and nineteen others, including the US, had no 
ambassador in Spain to begin with. Argentina, in defiance of the UN, even appointed 
Senor Radio. He claimed that "it is a glory to have relations with Spain.”35 Barely 
two years later
35. WPIS, 29 January 1947, N.378.
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the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Paraguay and Peru resumed normal 
relations with Spain.36 Bolivian - Spanish renewal of relations was briefly complicated 
by a pathetic attempt of the Spanish chargd in London to implicate the British 
Government. Spain was able to sign a Treaty of Friendship with the Philippines on 27 
September 1947.37
In Spain itself, the anti-Franco international feeling was dismissed by the state 
controlled propaganda as a "consequence of the false climate created through the 
slanderous campaign of the expatriated reds and their alike abroad."
Concerning the UN argument that the current Spanish government was forced 
upon Spain, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that "the Spanish people 
know that the regime implanted on 28 July 1936 [sic.] was not imposed through 
violence." It is difficult to explain the three years after the 18 July 1936 if one believes 
that the Franco regime was imposed without force. In a conversation between Artajo 
and Bonsai, the Spaniard argued that the UN resolution was a setback for Spain's 
evolution, including political concessions to the UK and the US. He claimed to favour 
evolution in Spain but disagreed with the way in which Spain was used by the West to 
get concessions out of the Communist states.38
At the same time Artajo assured Sir Victor Mallet on his departure on 22 
December 1946 that Spain would continue its liberal evolution.39
Franco himself explained Spain's unstable international position as a result of 
international communism. On the day of the vote in the UN committee, Franco 
proclaimed in a speech on Plaza de Oriente:
"What is happening in the UN should not baffle Spaniards. When a wave of
36. Calvocoressi, Peter, ed., Survey of International Affairs 1947-1948. London, 1952-1956, Volume 
1947, p. 124.
37. WPIS, 21 May 1947, 22 October 1947, N.393, N.414.
38. FRUS 1947. Vol.III, 2 January 1947, Memorandum of Conversation by the Chargd in Spain.
39. WPIS. 1 January 1947, N.374.
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communist terror ravages through Europe, and the violence, crimes and 
persecutions of the same order as many of you have experienced or suffered, 
preside over the live of twelve nations, than it should not baffle us that the 
children of Giral and la Pasionaria influenced in continuation the newspapers of 
the time and, secured by the system of organized censorship, found tolerance in 
the medium and support by the official representatives of those wretched 
nations. Yet it is one thing with which authority some delegates express 
themselves, yet quite another the sober aspiration of the nations. ,,4°
Franco was, as it turned out, wrong. There was at the time no difference 
between the opinions of some delegates from communist countries and the opinion of 
other nations.41
40. Quoted from, Chamorro, E., et.al..Las Bases Norteamericanas en Espana. Barcelona, p.35.
41. WPIS. 2 October 1946, N.362.
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The British economic position had continued to deteriorate after the Second 
World War. Industrial production was roughly atthe same level as before the war, 
but unlike before the war, Britain now had a large trade deficit, mainly created 
through trade with the industrial world in dollars. A dollar gap developed and 
naturally Britain was looking for trade outside the dollar area to avoid further 
widening of this gap.
Within the British trade system, Spain was no exception. In 1938 Britain 
imported Spanish goods worth £5.1 million, by 1946 this had increased to almost £12 
million. Over the same period exports to Spain only increased from £3.4 million to 
£5.9 million. Britain's trade deficit with Spain had increased by £4.3 million. As 
Spain was outside the dollar area trading in pesetas was an attractive way for 
London to avoid an increase in its dollar trade deficit. Under these conditions and 
despite having withdrawn its ambassador from Spain, Britain, was interested in a 
continuation of close commercial relations.1 Britain was willing to enforce its military 
trade embargoes on Spain only loosely. Plane engines were being sold to Madrid for 
civilian or possibly military use. There was a constant threat that America, Sweden, 
or Italy rather than Britain gained these attractive contracts.2
Whitehall strongly opposed any enforcement of economic sanctions for 
fear of losing contracts to other nations. While British fruit imports from Spain 
could have been replaced by imports from other nations, the UK needed potash 
fertilizers from Spain to cover 50% of the domestic needs and almost 100% of 
pyrites fertilizers imports came from Spain. Sanctions on iron ore would have 
severely hit Britain's building and metal industry. While Spain could have sold these 
products to other European nations, Britain could not have bought them as easily 
elsewhere. London reached the obvious conclusion that no sanctions could have 
been implemented against
1. NA, Civil Branch, OIR Report 4405, 19 June 1947, Considerations relating to a US aid program for 
Spain.
2. PRO, F0371.67878B, 31 July 1947, FO to Madrid Embassy; and F0371.67878B, 15 July 1947.
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Spain without a serious blow to Britain’s economy.3
In order to facilitate the trade between the two countries, a trade agreement was 
signed, 28 March 1947. This gave a mutual trade credit to both countries over the next 
two years with a ceiling of £2 million or the equivalent in pesetas. The exchange rate, 
£1 to 44 pesetas, greatly favoured Spain. Thus despite the condemnation of Spain by 
the UN resolution, Spain continued to have a close trading relation with the UK.
While Britain was hoping to reestablish a monarchy in Spain, some policy 
makers in the US briefly showed interest in a possible coup by the army against 
Franco. The State Department was in contact with General Juan Beigbeder Attienza 
about the possible success of such a plan. It is likely that Beigbeder's hopes were 
supported by the realization within the Spanish Army that Spain was unable to produce 
heavy war material without external help and would therefore only be able to defend 
herself for two to three weeks after the commencement of a full out invasion on Spain 
by the USSR.4 It was necessary to come to some arrangement with the West over the 
defence of Spain's territory.
General Beigbeder and Tomds Peyre, a moderate Republican, went to see 
Bonsai, US Charge in Spain, on 1 February 1947. The two Spaniards hoped to receive 
aid from the US during an uprising against Franco. The General claimed that during the 
following days a coup had a chance to succeed, but he estimated that about half of the 
conspirators would be arrested in the period of preparation and underground work.
Thus the conspirators would be weak and needed immediate support by London and 
Washington. From the very beginning the success of such an endeavour was highly 
unlikely and the US would have been foolish to support this plan on such treacherous 
grounds. The unwillingness to risk cordial relations with Franco demonstrate that the
3. PRO, F0371.67897, 3 January 1947, Memorandum by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
4. WNRC, Records of the Army Staff, G-2 Intelligence, 1947, Spain, 18 January 1947, USMA Spain 
to War Department.
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US was willing eventually compromise with his regime.5 Bonsai dispatched his opinion 
to the Secretary of State concerning the proposed coup. He made it clear that he did not 
favour a recognition of the new government before a successful removal of Franco.
Only after a successful coup, should the US recognize the new regime, resume full 
diplomatic relations, appoint an ambassador, grant economic aid and advocate her 
admission to the UN.6
The reluctance to support a coup by the Embassy had military as well as 
economic reasons. The Embassy was informed, through several unofficial contacts with 
Spanish officers in the Army, that the Spanish Armed Forces were already committed 
to the West in case of war with the USSR. Hence, there was little incentive for the US 
to change its current policy.7 Furthermore, an unstable situation in Spain would have 
endangered commercial interests and might even result in an increase of communist 
influence. This was stressed by the Joint Intelligence Committee on 21 January 1947.8 
The Committee and the opinion expressed in another memorandum (Memo 242) a year 
earlier, implied that the US would send aid if Spain's economic situation deteriorated to 
such an extent as to cause another civil war. It was feared that such a civil conflict in 
Spain might also destabilize Italy and France. This was unacceptable to the US.
Paradoxically, the worse Spain's economy performed, the more support Spaniards 
could expect from Washington. Just as in 1946, US interest in stability overruled any 
attempts to remove Franco.
Apart from the threat of civil war in Spain, other reasons suggested a more 
generous policy by Washington. In February due to a lack of air traffic control, a DC-4 
crashed near Avila, killing all eleven passengers and crew on board. A permanent radio
5. FRUS 1947. Vol.Ill, 1 February 1947, Memorandum of Conversation, Bonsai, p. 1056.
6. FRUS 1947. Vol.in, 7 February 1947, The Chargd in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1058.
7. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1947, Spain, 20 January 1947, Assistant MAA to 
Director of Intelligence.
8. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 21 January 
1947, JIC InfoMemo 242/Sec. 1.
4 1
Chapter 3:1947 Returning to Spain
station at Barajas could have prevented the disaster.9 As Spain lacked.financial means 
to provide this, somebody else would have to pay for the necessary installations.
However, the US also had to take public opinion into consideration. In 
Washington, Salvador de Madariaga, an exiled Spanish diplomat, argued during a 
conversation with State Department officials that Franco was a PR disaster for Spain as 
well as for the West. He claimed that Franco's image prohibited economic and military 
aid from being sent to Spain and made her integration into the western defence system 
impossible. Thus, Madariaga continued, embargoes on oil and cotton were in the 
interest of the West, because this would eventually force Franco to step down.10
Madariaga's argument, that Franco's regime prevented America from fully 
supporting Spain's economy and taking full advantage of her strategic position, was 
accepted by the State Department. However, overall Washington preferred the known 
evil of Franco to the unknown surprises a coup might bring.
Dean Acheson, then Acting Secretary of State, claimed that the Communists 
were actually gaining from Franco's survival in two respects. Firstly, Franco's survival 
could cause such a strong opposition as to lead to a new civil war. Secondly, Western 
relations with Franco provided the USSR with propaganda material against the US.11 
This was true but there is no doubt that Russia would have preferred a coup, economic 
unrest or a new prolonged civil war which would prepare Spain for a communist 
regime.
The result of these considerations by Dean Acheson, in April 1947, once more 
raised the question in Washington about how to react to a new conspiracy against 
Franco. Unwilling to put all eggs in the same basket, the US urged London to develop
9. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1947, Spain, 18 June 1947, MA Spain to Director 
of Intelligence.
10. FRUS 1947. Vol.in, 10 March 1947, Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Director of the 
Office of European Affairs in the Department of State, p. 1062.
11. FRUS 1947. Vol.Ill, 7 April 1947, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in London,
p .1066.
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a joint policy towards a possible new Spanish government emerging from a coup. The 
State Department proposed that after a coup, the West should establish friendly political 
and economic relations during the interim period and later grant political and economic 
aid.12 Washington was not willing to support a new government on their own, they 
wanted to have at least British support. In such a case, they might have even considered 
supporting a coup from the very beginning. Undoubtedly, France would have 
welcomed such an idea. The unstable transition period would not have risked de­
veloping into a civil conflict. .If Britain agreed, a chance to remove Franco might have 
become reality.
In the meantime, Franco countered the British attempts to restore a monarchy 
through Don Juan by granting himself the right to appoint a monarch for Spain through 
the Law of Succession.
Article 1 of this law declared that "Spain as a political unit is a Catholic and 
social State which in accordance with its traditions becomes a kingdom." Article 3 
dashed the hopes of many Monarchists: the king must be "a person of royal blood, 
having been proposed by the Regency Council and the Government together and 
accepted by two thirds of the Cortes."
The Regency Council was composed of  Cardinal Primate, the Chief of the 
General Staff, the President of the Council, the President of the Institute of Spain and 
one counselor from each of the chief vocational groups in the Cortes. Overall, it was 
clear that the power to appoint the king lay in Franco's hands.
Almost immediately, Don Juan declared the Bill void because there had been no 
consultation with him, the legitimate heir to the throne, nor had their been 
conversations with the legislature, the Cortes. Others like the Duke of Alba, Count 
Rodezno and Don Salvador de Madariaga also argued against the Bill.
Franco explained, in the newspaper Arriba on 29 April 1947, that the "Bill of 
Succession is not concerned with a restoration but with a new installation.1 Put bluntly,
12. FRUS 1947. VoI.IQ, 7 April 1947, the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in UK, p. 1066.
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Don Juan had lost his legitimate right to inherit the Spanish crown from his father. The 
Regency Council and the government would appoint the monarch and the Cortes would 
approve their choice. Franco made it clear that if Don Juan ever received the crown, he 
would get it through the grace of Franco and not through his father Alfonso XIII.
The Law of Succession had obvious advantages for Franco. In Spain it split the 
Monarchists between those accepting and those rejecting the law. Franco gained 
valuable time. In foreign affairs, the Americans realized that Franco's law of 
succession had changed little.13 Nevertheless, the law dashed British hopes of a 
restoration of the Monarchy.14 On the other hand, the Foreign Office could from now 
on hope that eventually a new monarchy would be established in Spain. Supporting a 
coup could have led to a Republican or something even worse. Britain became even 
more reluctant to support a military coup in Spain.
Under these circumstances it was not surprising that Britain informed the US 
that she was unwilling to follow a joint policy or to support a coup. While the UK was 
unwilling to risk its cordial relations with Spain, she nevertheless advised the US to go 
ahead without their support on the proposed policy towards a provisional 
government.15 Britain, unwilling to be dragged into an internal conflict, hoped for the 
establishment of a monarchy through Franco.
Economic and commercial relations with Spain help to explain Britain's 
reluctance to support the American proposal. London argued that ending trade relations 
was disadvantageous for all. Pyrite imports are just one example. If pyrites could no 
longer be imported from Spain, steel production in Britain would decrease and more 
Swedish ore of lower grade had to be bought. This meant more consumption of coal to 
melt the lower grade ore. Westminster also feared that economic sanctions would not
13. FRUS 1947. Vol.m, 1 April 1947, The Charge Bonsai to Secretary of State, p. 1065.
14. WPIS. 11 June 1947, N.395.
15. FRUS 1947. Vol.III, 19 April 1947, The Ambassador in the UK to the Secretary of State, p. 1069.
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work as some nations were not expected to cooperate.16
The Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, considered the American proposal to be 
too dangerous as leaks by the conspirators would seriously embarrass London and 
worsen strained relations with Franco. It seemed to him that the economy in Spain was 
improving and people started to accept the regime. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister 
claimed that the proposed policy would mean internal intervention in Spain's affairs and 
would give the USSR the opportunity to intervene in other parts of the world. Bevin 
wanted to avoid complications concerning Spain and join others in a common policy to 
prevent further action by the Security Council against Spain.17 He wanted to continue 
talks between Washington and London.
Britain's refusal to join the US in a common policy against Franco ended 
Washington's interest in a provisional government replacing Franco.
However, both nations agreed that Franco was a long term threat causing 
economic hardship which might eventually lead to civil unrest. After their discussion 
both Britain and America agreed that no internal action against Franco should be taken 
for the time being. At the same time, a public statement against international action was 
ruled out, because Franco could have used such a statement for propaganda reasons 
claiming that Spain had finally become acceptable.18 Washington and London were to 
continue their old policies towards Spain and encourage Franco to make further liberal 
changes without putting him under too much pressure.19
The United Kingdom had been unwilling to force out Franco due to economic 
reasons. The US on the other hand had less to lose and still hoped for Franco's 
removal. If this happened, Washington would appointed an ambassador, encouraged
16. FRUS 1947. Vol.HI, 10 May 1947, The Ambassador in the UK to the Secretary of State, p. 1077.
17. FRUS 1947. Vol.ID, 1 May 1947, The Ambassador in the UK to the Secretary of State, p. 1074.
18. FRUS 1947. Vol.ID, 20 May 1947, The Ambassador to the UK to the Secretary of State, p. 1080.
19. FRUS 1947. Vol.IE, 7 April 1947, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the UK,
p. 1066.
45
Chapter 3:1947 Returning to Spain
others to do likewise and lobbied against the UN resolution.20
In the meantime in Spain, the Law of Succession had passed, 31 March 1947, 
and was strengthened by a referendum on 6 July. The question posed to the Spanish 
people was "Do you ratify the law which makes Generalissimo Francisco Franco Chief 
of State of the Spanish Kingdom and establishes the machinery by which his successor 
will be chosen ?" It gave the appearance that Spain had become a monarchy without a 
king and that Franco would soon choose a successor. Yet it obligated Franco in no way 
whatsoever. Again, Britain claimed illegitimacy of the Bill and the referendum. Only 
Spaniards over 21 years of age, non-convicts and those not held by the tribunals were 
allowed to vote. Thus, London estimated, two million Spaniards lost their political 
rights.21 The US too realized that the referendum had changed nothing.22
The official results of the referendum claimed that 92.9% of the votes cast were 
affirmative. No physical threat was needed at the referendum, because identification 
had to be produced in order to vote; this being enough to deter most opposition. It is 
very likely that the real turnout, claimed to be over 90%, was far less. Above all in the 
cities, people did refrain from voting. An estimate of only 40% voted in Bilbao, 26% in 
San Sebastian, 40% in Navarra and 27% in Coruna. Strong evidence also points 
towards the possibility that Burgos had returned the voting forms, signed and in blank 
two days before the actual referendum.23
However, the referendum had further weakened the position of Don Juan and 
his supporters. Franco was confident enough to ask the US for cooperation. Spain 
wanted military ties with the West under an "anti-communist" headline. In an 
interview, Franco told C.L. Salzberger from the New York Times that he wanted to be
20. NA, Civil Branch, OIR Report 4405, 19 June 1947, Considerations relating to a US aid program 
for Spain.
21. WPIS. 25 June 1947, N.397.
22. FRUS 1947. Vol.ni, 9 July 1947, The Secretary of State to Embassy in Spain, p. 1083.
23. WPIS. 6 August 1947, N.403.
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part of an anti-communist alliance and enter direct and bilateral agreements with 
Western Nations.
So far Washington had done little to discourage closer relations between the two 
countries. After the 1946 UN resolution, the US could not appoint an ambassador to 
Spain, yet good relations were still desired. Early in 1947, Paul T. Culbertson was 
appointed Charge d1 affairs, replacing Bonsai. Culbertson was a lawyer from 
Pennsylvania and an official in the State Department since 1924. He had served as 
Chief of Western Europe Division of the State Department from 1944-1947. This post 
was only one step below the Assistant Secretary of State and he had good reasons to 
expect a post as ambassador somewhere. However at the time the Charge d'affairs in 
Spain was also the head of mission to Spain. The post required some diplomatic talents 
which could be found in Culbertson. Over the coming years he had to combine the 
different American interests in Spain into a coherent policy towards Franco's 
government.24
While the State Department was forming its policy towards Franco, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff became more interested in the country. The Joint Strategic Survey 
Committee informed the Chiefs that Spain was the twelfth most important nation to 
receive aid because of her significance to US national security. The report read "Italy 
and Spain are of primary importance in connection with control of the Mediterranean 
sea lanes, shortest route to the oil and processing facilities of the Middle East" and "as­
sistance should be given if possible." This reflected a crucial economic reality. The 
report also stressed military importance of Spain's geographical position thus "the 
United States desires base rights, considered essential to her security from Portugal, 
Ecuador, France and Spain. Of these base rights from Portugal and Spain are the most 
essential."25
At the same time, it was obvious to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee that
24. NA, Civil Branch, Lot File 59D108, 19 June 1951, William Dunham to Paul Culbertson.
25. FRUS 1947. Vol.I, 29 April 1947, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, p.736.
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military assistance to the present Spanish government opposed current US policy. 
Despite this the report deemed it desirable to initiate or prepare programs for US mili­
tary assistance to Mediterranean countries, including Spain. These programs were to 
cover military supplies, equipment and technical advice, above all tactical air force and 
limited naval equipment in particular.26 Naturally, Air Force and Navy interests were 
going to be the driving force behind a rapprochement with Spain.
More important than the military perception of Spain were policy changes by the 
US administration. Clearly the relations between East and West deteriorated. In 1946 
the Greek civil war was resumed and the Soviet Union caused problems in Persia and 
Turkey. Furthermore political opposition was removed, sometimes ruthlessly, by the 
communists in Eastern Europe. Meetings by the foreign ministers of the war allies 
during 1946-47 ended without an improvement of relations. In 1947 the situation 
deteriorated further and conflicts between East and West became more and more 
frequent and Europe's economic stability was called into question.
As we have seen Britain's economic position was deteriorating. In 1946/47 
Europe experienced one of the worst winters on record. Winter wheat was destroyed by 
the cold in France. Prague's electricity was disconnected for three hours every day. Ice 
caused the closure of the Kiel Canal in Germany. Britain though suffered more than any 
other country in Europe by the weather. Snowdrifts blocked highways and railroads. 
Schools and factories had to close down. The Times warned that the cold threatened the 
coal supply and in London offices were being lit by candles to save electricity.
The inevitable cutting back on Britain's armed forces and overseas commitment 
due to the extremely serious economic position of the British economy, expressed by 
the British government in a white paper in January, was brought forward. On 21 
February 1947 the British Ambassador Lord Inverchapel delivered a so-called "blue 
paper" to the State Department. This paper made it clear that Britain was no longer in a
26. FRUS 1947. Vol.I, 21 April 1947, Report by the Special Ad Hoc Committee to the State-War- 
Navy Coordinating Committee, p.725.
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position to provide military and economic support to Greece and Turkey. It was 
estimated that forty thousand troops would be pulled out of Greece and economic aid 
would cease on 31 March.
Lincoln MacVeagh, the American ambassador in Athens and later in Madrid, 
had for some time warned the State Department that Britain was pulling out troops from 
Greece. Fearing that the communists would take advantage of this situation, he again 
dispatched another note on 12 February urging for consideration of American aid to 
Greece. In the autumn of 1946, Truman had expressed his commitment to Greece 
through his Ambassador and had promised economic aid to maintain democracy and the 
independence of the Greek government. The situation in Turkey was almost as 
desperate.
Three days after the "blue paper" had been received, Truman, meeting Marshall 
and Acheson, decided to come to Greece's rescue as early as possible. However the 
global situation called for more than a simple aid bill. The US had to go into European 
politics if she did not want to see herself sidelined by Russia, it was time for a new 
American doctrine concerning foreign policy. On 7 March during a cabinet meeting it 
was discussed how far this involvement was going to go.
The Truman Doctrine, proclaimed on 12 March 1947 in a special message on 
Greece and Turkey in the House Chamber before a joint session of Congress, called for 
containment of the socialist and communist advance and guaranteed American financial 
and economic aid to all countries which were threatened by communist external powers 
or internal minorities. Truman, dressed in a dark suit and reading from an open 
notebook, asked Congress for $250 million for Greece (59% military aid) and $150 
million for Turkey (100% military aid). Congress was initially to approve a total of 
$500 million in aid for Truman's containment policy. Then the President concluded: "If 
we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world, and we shall 
surely endanger the welfare of this nation."27
27. McCullough, Truman, p.548.
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On 22 April 1947 the Senate approved the aid to T\irkey and Greece and on 9 
May the House followed. The Truman Doctrine was to guide American foreign policy 
for over twenty years and is of paramount importance when looking at US foreign 
policy in the twentieth century.
On 5 June 1947, the brainchild of George F. Kennan. Senator Hoyt S. 
Vandenberg, John F. Dulles and George C. Marshall was bom. The Marshall Plan was 
the practical result of the Truman Doctrine.
This overall change of foreign policy and the American failure to agree with 
London on a common policy towards a possible coup in Spain meant that Washington 
now sought to live with Franco. The Truman doctrine provided enough support for this 
new policy. Again the State Department tried to move Britain towards a common policy 
on Spain. Although the State Department could argue that the Truman doctrine "would 
indicate that we are prepared to shift our policy in regard to Franco and support any 
non-communist regime in Spain, including his own",28 for the time being problems 
remained at all levels. The State Department advised the service attaches in Spain not to 
request audiences, nor to receive decorations from Spain, as this might have been 
exploited in Spain for propaganda reasons.29
For the House of Representatives the problem of living with a dictator in Spain 
seemed more difficult to swallow than for the State Department. Some congressmen 
acknowledged that Spain needed money, but unlike all other western countries then 
under consideration for aid,30 it was under a totalitarian regime.
The Truman doctrine was welcomed above all by the military planners. After its 
proclamation, the military was confident enough to push for a new policy toward Spain.
28. FRUS 1947. Vol.in, 25 April 1947, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in UK, p. 1073.
29. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1947, Spain, 10 June 1947, MA Spain request 
for Policy; also WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1947, Spain, 25 April 1947, MA 
Spain to Director of Intelligence.
30. LOC, H1967, 1947, National and international movements, by Maloney.
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The Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) issued a study titled "The Soviet Threat 
against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means required to meet it" or simply "Drumbeat", 
on 4 August 1947.
The study reported that Spain had four natural invasion routes: two in the East 
and two in the West of the Pyrenees . The invasion routes along the west ran along the 
Atlantic coast through Lisbon, to Seville and finally Cadiz. The routes along the East 
ran along the Mediterranean coast through Barcelona, right south to Malaga.31
The report claimed that the Red Army was ready to attack Spain with 50 
Divisions within 90 days of an all-out invasion of Europe. It was expected that 19 
Infantry Divisions and 2 Armored Divisions would be stationed on the west side of the 
Pyrenees, 21 Infantry and 3 armored Divisions would de deployed along the East coast, 
Another 5 Infantry divisions would be stationed along the rest of the mountains. 
Furthermore, a total of 1,000 planes would take part in the attack.
The Soviet Union, the report asserted, would then initiate the invasion with 20 
Divisions in the West and 15 in the East. These would penetrate the Pyrenees within 20 
days and 40 days later reach Gibraltar. It was not expected that the USSR would use 
airborne forces though amphibious hooks might try to bypass the Pyrenees. ?2
The weak spots of the invasion through the Pyrenees, the report argued, were 
the supply lines. During the built-up period before the invasion, the army required a 
total of 51,250 short tons (1 short ton = 907kg) per day (s/t) of military supply which 
could be delivered through France.33 The problem for the Soviets would start once 
they had crossed the Pyrenees. Spain was expected to destroy its own trains and tunnels 
to slow down the Soviet advance. This together with the fact that the Pyrenees 
obstructed the USSR from bringing their own rolling stock would force the supply lines
31. APWSU. 4 August 1947, "The Soviet Threat against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means required 
to meet it: Short Title: Drumbeat", p.7.
32. APWSU, Ibid., p.31.
33. APWSU. Ibid., p.24.
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to rely mainly on roads. This meant that initially the Soviets would be limited to 35 
Divisions south of the Pyrenees and only later could all 50 Divisions be maintained in 
Spain.34
In order to supply troops attacking Barcelona for example, two roads alone 
would have to provide access for the supplies. One from Figueras and the other along 
the Tosas Pass. The former had a capacity of 3,000 s/t and the latter of 2,500 s/t. An 
average Division was expected to use 450 s/t. Thus a total of 12 Divisions could 
advance on Barcelona. The rest of the divisions stationed along the East coast would 
- have to attack Lerida. There a maximum of 8 Divisions could have been supplied. The 
supply problem was not less severe along the West coast as a single road through San 
Sebastian provided 5,000 s/t and other smaller roads a further 2,750 s/t thus supplying 
a maximum of 17 Divisions.
The study claimed that within 20 days the Soviet troops would break free of the 
Pyrenees and secure a line from Santander to Tortosa. Along this line about 57 
Divisions could be maintained during the winter if rails and roads were used. Without 
the use of railroads merely 17 Divisions could be maintained.
The report continued, saying that ten days later the invaders would reach a line 
from Avila to Valencia. It was expected that heavy fighting would be going on around 
Madrid. However, after the fall of the Spanish capital the supply problem would be 
reduced and a Division would only require 270 s/t. It was presumed that within 45 days 
the Soviets would have conquered all of Spain apart from the area south of Lisbon and 
Cartagena. Finally two weeks later, Gibraltar was expected to fall.35
By then, the study concluded, the USSR would have closed the Allied lines of 
communication along the Mediterranean and denied an Allied foothold in Europe.
In order to defend Spain, Franco controlled over 400,000 soldiers and security 
guards. The army was organized into 22 divisions, of which only one was an Armored
34. APWSU. Ibid., p.29.
35. APWSU. Ibid., p.24, p.29.
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Division with 100 tanks, including 20 German Mark IV. Over 100,000 soldiers were 
stationed abroad, mainly in Morocco. This left some 300,000 soldiers for the defence 
of Spain.
Spain lacked heavy guns and the Air Force,consisting of 350 operating planes, 
was obsolete against Soviet planes. The Spanish Navy was too small to defend itself.36 
In order to defend Spain the study recommended four possible options.
1) Granting economic aid to Spain would improve her infrastructure and 
military strength. This might have deterred an attack by the Soviet Army. In case of 
war less money would have to flow to Spain. It was recommended that from a military 
point of view this policy should have been initiated as soon as possible.37
2) The study advised that the enemy lines of communication should be 
targeted.38
3) The report proposed that the Pyrenees should be defended by 10 Divisions in 
the West and 7 in the East together with 8 Divisions along the rest of the mountains. A 
further 9 Division should be stationed in reserve and in the rest of Spain. A total of 34 
Divisions (including 22 Spanish) and 900 planes were needed to secure Spain.39
4) Finally the report foresaw that if option three failed, the Allied powers should 
try to defend the Southern tip of the Peninsula. The swamp area around the 
Guadalquivir and North of Cadiz would form the last defence in Europe. For this a 
total of 16 Divisions and 750 planes were required.40
Politically, it was not expected that Spain would join the USSR but in case of 
Spain’s neutrality, the study proposed to assemble forces in Spanish Morocco, French 
Morocco, the Azores, the UK and if deemed necessary in Spain itself. Obviously this
36. APWSU. Ibid., p. 14-16; PRO.ADM223.237, March 1946, Monthly Intelligence Report.
37. APWSU. Ibid., p.33.
38. APWSU. Ibid., p.34.
39. APWSU. Ibid., p.3/35/36.
40. APWSU. Ibid., p.3/37/38.
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might have lead to conflict with the Spanish authorities.
Thus the report concluded "from the military point of view, the United States 
should furnish economic aid to Spain as soon as feasible in order to strengthen her 
capacity for military resistance1' and presumably to secure her cooperation in case of 
war.41
In a meeting by the State Department, on 7 August 1947, it was argued that 
early economic and military aid to Spain would hold the USSR for an extra 3 to 4 
days at the Pyrenees and give enough time to rush help to Spain. It was becoming 
clear that political problems linked with this aid no longer outweighed the military 
advantages. Surprisingly, in the State Department meeting it was asserted that the 
UN resolution which was barely a year old, was no obstacle to this new policy.42
Two Weeks later the Joint War Plans Committee issued "Guidance for 
Mobilization Planning as Affected by Loss of the Mediterranean Line of 
Communications". In this study Spain was considered valuable for several reasons: she 
supplied the base areas for strategic air operations; holding Spain would deny the 
Soviet Union North Africa; the US would retain the flanks and increaseher strategic 
flexibility; and finally one could aid guerrillas in Europe through Spain.43
The Joint War Plans Committee asserted that if Spain fell and troops had 
already been committed to the Middle East, a disastrous situation would arise as 
contact with these troops would be lost. To prevent this, forces were to be deployed 
in Spain during the conflict. The report recommended that after three months of 
hostilities seven Infantry Divisions should be stationed in Spain.44
Another governmental study on the Mediterranean and the Near East claimed
41. APWSU. Ibid., p.3.
42. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1945-1949, 852.20/8-847, 8 August 1947,
Office Memorandum, William Koren (DRE) to Mr Horsey (WE).
43. APWSU. Vol.5, 18 August 1947, "Guidance for Mobilization Planning as Affected by Loss of the
Mediterranean Line Of Communications", p.27.
44. APWSU. Ibid., p.39.
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that "the Mediterranean Sea including the Straits of Gibraltar and Sicily must be 
considered as the main thoroughfare to the Middle East." Access to Southern Europe 
and North Africa "is vital to the conduct of military operations in the Mediterranean 
and Near East. "45 Later the report stressed that
"The long-term U.S. objectives in the Mediterranean and Near East area is to 
promote the national integrity and the survival as free nations of each country in 
this area, and to aid or win the respect and friendship of these countries... The 
role of the Mediterranean and Near East countries is of utmost importance in 
world affairs. Events in these countries may vitally affect the national security - 
of the United States.".
The US policy was to "encourage Spain's anti-communist attitude by all 
practicable means including her induction to the family of Western powers.1,46
In Spain, the Franco Government did not yet realize the full extend of this new 
attitude by the US military planners. However the change of policy by the US towards 
Greece and Turkey, meant that the Mediterranean was gaining in importance.47
Jose Erice, Director of the Foreign Policy of the Spanish Foreign Office, told 
Culbertson that in case of conflict Spain would join the West against the USSR. The 
Spaniard estimated that without American intervention, the Soviet Union could overrun 
Western Europe including Spain within three months. He continued saying that his 
country could help little as it lacked a modem army or air force. This meant that the 
West could not use Spain as a base.48 The implications are obvious; if the West wanted 
to use Spain as a base, Spain would have to receive aid to improve its military 
facilities.
45. NA, Military Branch, P-2 The Mediterranean and the Near East, 23 October 1947.
46. NA, Military Branch, P-2 The Mediterranean and the Near East, 23 October 1947.
47. WPIS. 19 March 1947, N.385.
48. FRUS 1947. Vol.III, 23 October 1947, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1088.
55
Chapter 3:1947 Returning to Spain
The result of the new military outlook by the Americans was a reversal of 
policy towards Spain. This shift was expressed in PPS/12 by the Policy Planning Staff 
on 24 October 1947. PPS/12 was lying the foundation for the very similar NSC 3 
decision taken in December.49
The Policy Planning Staff assessed that American policy so far had been a 
political and military failure. In the economic sphere Washington had withheld 
assistance, governmental credits and had held purchase of Spanish goods to a minimum. 
This had worsened Spanish - American trade and Spain's economic situation. The 
Policy Planning Staff now believed that Franco would not depart peacefully and the 
army had shown no signs of wanting to topple Franco. The political opposition to the 
Caudillo was split between Republicans, Socialists and Monarchists. Concerning the 
United Nations, the US delegates were instructed to minimize the discussions on Spain. 
The delegates were to vote against economic sanctions, diplomatic rupture or other 
proposals against Spain.50 The study concluded that the net result of the American 
policy so far had been to strengthen Franco, to impede Spanish economic recovery and 
to be forced to operate in an unfriendly atmosphere in Spain in case of international 
conflict.
Thus, the PPS wrote "the Staff believes that, in the National interest, the time 
has come for a modification of our policy towards Spain." The report continued 
asserting that "it is the recommendation of the Policy Planning Staff that instead of 
openly opposing the Franco regime, we should work from now on toward a 
normalization of U.S.-Spanish relations, both political and economic."
It was recommended to quietly end various commercial controls and drop 
restrictions on private trade. Furthermore, it was recommended that Spain's resources
49. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 24 October 
1947, PPS/12, U.S. Policy toward Spain, also in PPS 1947-1953, PPS No 12, 24 October 1947, US 
Policy toward Spain.
50. FRUS 1947. Vol.Ill, 24 October 1947, Mr George F. Kennan of the Policy Planning Staff to the 
Secretary of State and Under-Secretary of State, p. 1091.
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be developed in commerce and industry. Yet, the report pretended that this 
normalization was not going to strengthen Franco's regime in Spain. Needless to say 
that any normalization or improvement of relations between Spain and the US would 
strengthen Franco's grip on power. The attempt to avoid strengthening Franco was an 
afterthought of the Policy Planning Staff. Normalization was to go ahead, no matter 
what the impact on Spain was.
Other parts of the State Department generally disagreed because of political 
implications. Robert A. Lovett, then Acting Secretary of State, claimed that 
normalization with Spain was still not fully possible due to Franco. He argued that the 
State Department would still prefer an evolutionary change in Spain to either stagnation 
or a threat of a civil war.51
Lovett's justification was strengthened by strategic information on Spain. It was 
obvious that Spain's army was unable to defend herself against the USSR. A report 
argued that a coalition war between Spain and the US was very unlikely as certain 
characteristics in Spain were missing and it was assumed that Franco would only fight 
if  his position was hopeless, otherwise he would try to remain neutral.52
It was revealed that an organization in San Sebastian smuggled prominent Nazis, 
including Martin Borman, from Germany to Spain. Such reports damaged Spain's 
reputation further.53
Political considerations and a new military study temporarily reversed a desire 
for close military relations with Spain. On 8 November 1947, the Joint Strategic Plans 
Group issued the report "Broiler" which looked at a possible conflict with the USSR in 
the near future. It read:
51. FRUS 1947. Vol.Ill, 18 December 1947, The Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in Spain, 
p. 1096.
52. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 26 October 
1948, Spanish Information to President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Spain and a Third 
World War.
53. WNRC, Records of the Army Staff, G-2 Intelligence, 1947, Spain, 29 August 1947, AmEmbassy 
to Secretary of State.
57
Chapter 3:1947 Returning to Spain
"outweighing all other considerations would be the Soviet desire to concentrate on the 
seizure and neutralization of the United Kingdom and the seizure or neutralization of 
the Cairo - Suez area. Hence, at this time it seems improbable that the Soviets would 
risk the expenditure of men and material against the Iberian Peninsula. "54
In this new report, it was estimated that an attack on Spain would start 30 days 
later than expected before. This would decrease the necessity to grant economic aid to 
Spain. The report also said that "should the Soviets elect to seize Spain, the magnitude 
of the U.S. forces required to hold Spain... is far beyond U.S. capabilities to supply. 
Hence, the possible loss of Spain must be accepted as a calculated risk."55 American 
resources could not afford to aid Spain once an armed conflict had broken out in 
Europe. Thus economic aid given to Spain before a war was all Spain could expect to 
get and so became all the more urgent. Similar to the study "Drumbeat", "Broiler" 
argued that in order to deter a Soviet invasion of Spain, the US would have to give 
Spain as much economic aid as early as possible. This was in fact a confirmation of 
option one outlined in "Drumbeat". In "Broiler" options three and four, ie. military aid 
to Spain, were excluded.
There were several ways in which to get aid to Spain. Given Spain's position, 
one was for Franco to apply under the Marshall plan for aid on the grounds that 
communist guerrilla fighters and a possible Soviet invasion threatened his government. 
Nevertheless political reasons made this impossible as the Marshall plan for Europe was 
to be administered by the European nations themselves and some of them, France above 
all did not welcome Spain.
Britain, considering her own commercial benefit from American aid for Spain, 
argued exactly the opposite. The British Foreign Minister, Bevin strongly disagreed
54. APWSU. Vol.5, 8 November 1947, "Broiler", JSPG "War with USSR in 1948", p.26/27.
55. APWSU. Ibid., p.98.
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with American hesitation to extend economic aid to Spain and through the US 
Ambassador, Douglass, in London, he informed Washington about his skepticism. He 
argued that a voluntary resignation by Franco was impossible and given his refusal to 
resign, any exclusion of Spain from a recovery programme would lead to economic 
disaster in Spain and thus threaten British and other European trade with Spain and 
therefore their recovery.
Unsurprisingly, the Spanish Foreign Office stressed the same point, on 15 
November 1947. Spain's exclusion:
- "subtracts from the American [Marshall] plan a vital piece which would make a 
conclusion of the pursued objectives difficult. It does not seem logical that the 
mentioned plan could have made omission of the surplus of exports of Spanish 
products and Industry which traditionally filled the necessities of the European 
continent... For a task of urgent reconstruction of the devastated territories, 
such as the one to be realized within the next five years 1947-1951 in Europe, 
the general economic establishment of Spain with a production capacity which 
now only reaches reduced effective production, is an already prepared element 
which results absolutely essential."56
Madrid's hope to receive $50 million for agriculture, $190 million to maintain 
basic industry, $211 million for transport and $600 Million for imports was mere 
wishful thinking.
As late as 4 January 1948, Artajo expressed his high hopes:
"if the Great powers, as is expected, conserve the good political sense and 
effectively want to put into play all possible methods for the reconstruction of 
Europe, being benefited at the same time of an important market, they will soon 
give Spain facilities for its purchase of primary material and machinery, which 
will allow them to increase their production and contribute with their surplus to
56. Viiias,Angel, "El Plan Marshall y Franco", in Viiias, Angel, ed., Guerra. Pinero. Dictadura. 
Barcelona, 1984, p.266.
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a reestablishment of equilibrium in Europe. "57
It was true that Spain could aid other European economies in their recovery 
once she had received substantial aid but so could most other European countries and 
none of them carried the political baggage Spain carried.
While the US was discussing new policies towards Spain, Britain contacted the 
exiled Spanish politicians. A meeting between Bevin and Prieto took place in London, 
23 September 1947. Prieto, a right wing socialist, aimed at a centre-right government 
in cooperation with monarchists. However, very little of practical value emerged from 
this meeting and any hopes of removing Franco were abandoned by Whitehall. Forcing 
Franco to liberalize his regime had to be done through the UN.
Five Latin American countries reminded the General Secretary that more than 
five months had passed since the December resolution and the Security Council still had 
not appointed an alternative regime or suggested any other way to deal with Franco.
Poland went even further and wanted the General Assembly to recommend to 
the Security Council possible ways to remove Franco, all of which were just short of 
direct intervention. Unsurprisingly, the Communist countries supported the Polish 
proposal.
At the same time the USSR propaganda machine made Spain an issue claiming 
that the US wanted bases on the Balearic and Canary Islands. The USSR asserted that 
this showed US imperialistic ambitions as well as Anglo-American pressure on small 
defenseless states. It was argued that the USSR was no longer seeking to overthrow the 
Spanish regime but preferred its current existence for propaganda reasons.58 The 
Eastern block could comfortably point towards the improvement of relations between 
the West and Spain and claim that it gave proof of western imperialism. The USSR had 
ceded Spain to the Western sphere of influence in return for a gain of propaganda
57. Viiias, Angel, "El Plan Marshall y Franco", in Vihas, Guerra. Pinero. Dictadura. p.269.
58. The Commonweal. 3 June 1947.
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material. Discussions in the UN were well suited for these attacks on the West.
On 12 November 1947, the First Committee in the UN passed on a 
recommendation to the General Assembly. In this recommendation seven Latin 
American countries, the US and six others opposed a reaffirmation of the December 
1946 resolution.
On 17 November 1947 a Compromise Application was accepted by 36:5 with 12 
abstentions. It outlined the steps taken since 1946 and expressed confidence in the 
Security Council to take actions towards Spain whenever appropriate.59 Nevertheless, 
it posed a legal dilemma, as it did not uphold the 1946 resolution in its entirety. This 
gave more room for diplomatic maneuvering. Iceland took advantage of this and 
resumed full diplomatic relations with Spain.
As the year came to an end the relations between the United States and Spain 
visibly improved. Spain was visited by numerous Republican Representatives, including 
Karl E. Mundt (South Dakota), Lawrance M. Smith (Wisconsin) and Walter H. Judd 
(Minnesota).
In the US Administration, the Policy Planning Staff, headed by George F. 
Kennan, influenced the National Security Council concerning Spain. Forrestal recalls a 
conversation with Kennan over lunch. Kennan said that:
"our policy needed adjustment with respect to Spain and Japan. In the first 
instance, he [Kennan] felt that we should direct our representatives at the United 
Nations not to join in any further attempt to discredit the present government of Spain - 
in other words, to reverse our policy. The Mediterranean cannot be considered without 
considering Spain and the question of transit through the Straits of Gibraltar."60
Kennan saw three geopolitical interests which the USSR might have had in 
Spain. Firstly, Spain flanked France and Italy, two countries on the verge of 
communism. He feared that if Spain fell to a Communist revolution, all of Europe was
59. Calvocoressi. Survey of International Affairs 1947-1948. p. 124.
60. Millis, Walter, ed., The Forrestal Diaries. New York, 1951, p.328.
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threatened. Secondly, Spain was the key to North Africa. A defeat by Spain might 
precede closer arrangements with the Soviet block and hence threaten oil production in 
the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Thirdly, Kennan saw Spain as the springboard 
to Latin America and into the American sphere of influence. Thus, for the American 
diplomat, a loss of Spain posed a triple threat to the US, a loss of control in Europe, a 
threat to vital raw materials and eventually a threat to America. He asserted that: 
"Soviet policy has thus been a) to do all in its power to render impossible achievement 
of any permanent modus vivendi between western powers and Franco ... b) to utilize 
every possible channel for mobilizing western opinion against Franco in the hopes that 
Western governments will have to yield to pressure and take strong action to bring 
about the downfall of the Franco regime."61
Kennan, arguing that the United Nations policy had actually strengthened 
Franco, wanted to integrate Spain into the Western community.
There is little doubt that by 1948 the Franco regime was fairly stable, the army 
was supporting him and the police and security forces were satisfied. The internal 
opposition against Franco was ineffective and the exiled government of the Republic 
was disorganized. The ostracism, if it was aimed at the removal of Franco, had failed. 
Nevertheless the policy had impeded Spain's economic recovery.
Now, the US made arrangements to start a new policy towards Spain. On the 5 
December 1947, "NSC-3 United States Policy Towards Spain", based on PPS12, was 
issued. It argued that the net result of the present policy, governed by the UN 
resolution, had been to strengthen Franco, impede economic recovery and create an 
unfriendly atmosphere with Spain. NSC3 confirmed that "it is the recommendation of 
the Policy Planning Staff that instead of openly opposing the Franco regime, we should 
work from now on toward a normalization of U.S.-Spanish relation, both political and 
economic." There was to be no public announcement of the new view, in order to avoid
61. Seymour, Christopher, Ostracism: The United States and Spain 1945-1950. Princeton University, 
p.54.
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propaganda. However, the changes were real: a relaxation of the US restrictive 
economic policy and an elimination of official restrictive measures. It was hoped that 
this would create more private trade and financial assistance. From now on, Spain was 
to develop her resources and play a normal part in world trade. The US decided to 
oppose any UN resolutions against Spain and approve any resolutions favouring of 
Spain.62 Unsurprisingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their agreement with the 
military side of NSC3.63 After all, they had provided the foundation of this policy in 
their military studies conducted throughout 1947.
However, the American Charge in Spain, Culbertson still believed that indirect 
pressure by the US and Britain could slowly liberalize the Franco regime. The bad 
economic situation, Culbertson advised, should be exploited through economic assist­
ance to obtain modification and liberalization. Abrupt changes on the other hand could 
be counterproductive.64
62. NA, Civil Branch, NSC-3 United States Policy toward Spain, 5 December 1947.
63. NA, Military Branch, ABC 092 Spain 1947, 11 December 1947, JCS.
64. FRUS 1947. Vol.III, 26 December 1947, The Chargd in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1097.
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The political situation of 1947 meant that the US services became more 
interested in Spain. The Navy in particular hoped for gains due to two reasons. Firstly, 
with a permanent base in Spain costs could be cut due to cheaper repairs, refueling and 
general maintenance near their theatre of operations. Secondly, the fact that the naval 
forces in the Mediterranean were placed under an independent command, the Sixth 
Fleet, favoured an independent headquarters nearby. In the future, the Navy was to 
become the most ardent supporter of bases in Spain.
The Joint Strategic Plans Group modified its earlier studies on 11 February 
1948. It was a combination of "Broiler" and "Drumbeat". Two scenarios were 
analysed. View A assumed that due to logistical problems, the Red Army would not 
attack Spain. View B argued that Russia would invade the Iberian peninsular.1
The implication of the study was that a Soviet invasion into Spain had become 
once more a real threat. This study, named "Bushwacker", further argued that the US 
would not be able to defend Europe before at least 1952 and thus had to withdraw its 
troops to Britain.2 Given America's inability to aid Spain, economic aid became ever 
more important to prepare Spain and possibly deter a Soviet invasion.
Kennan, co-creator of the Marshall plan, expressed in a memorandum that he 
wanted Spain to be part of the Marshall plan and to receive economic aid.
The State Department expressed its partial agreement with Kennan's point of 
view and called for a normalization of relations towards Spain. Spain was to be taken of 
the "E List" by 1 June 1947, which meant that export controls on Spain were termi­
nated and normal trade relations resumed. The Department also considered it possible 
to include Spain in the European Recovery Program if the 16 other countries agreed.
Yet it was clear to the State Department that cordial relations had to wait for 
democratization in Spain and cooling down of US and Western European opinion. Until
1. APWSU, 11 February 1948, "Broiler", Joint Strategic Plans Group, "War in 1949", p.30.
2. APWSU. Vol.8, 8 March 1948, JSPG, "Plan Bushwacker", War around January 1952, p.21.
64
Chapter 4:1948 Year o f Change
. then governmental grants could not be considered.3
On 2 February 1948, Culbertson, Artajo and Erice had a conversation 
concerning an article published in the newspaper Arriba claiming that the West had 
finally seen their error on the vote in the UN. The Charge maintained that such 
propaganda did not help improve relations. Culbertson continued saying that 
governmental credits would only follow an evolution by Franco's regime towards 
democracy. Concerning the European Recovery Program, Spain's inclusion depended 
entirely on the other 16 nations which administered the funds. Naturally their attitude 
was based on Spain's democratization. Finally, Culbertson pointed out that future 
relations between the two countries were still governed by the UN.
Artajo replied that the Arriba article was only meant to help Spain get into the 
Marshall Plan. Yet as the conversation continued Culbertson noticed that Erice and 
Artajo showed no sign of understanding Spain's international image, still seen as a 
fascist police state where crimes against the state were handled by harsh military 
tribunals. On the commercial side, private credits avoided Spain due to the interference 
by the INI (Insituto National de Industria) in private enterprise, creating an unwanted 
air of insecurity. Artajo replied that if Spain evolved too soon and introduced 
democracy too early, serious unrest would break out.4
There was a clear evolution in American foreign policy. Instead of trying to 
remove Franco through punishment, governmental grants were promised for evolution. 
However if Spain wanted to be included in the European Recovery Program, serious 
changes had to take place. Instead of making these changes, Spain tried to get into the 
European Recovery Program through the back door helped by America.
After the USIS, a cultural organization, had informed London that there were 
no impediments to Spain being included into the European Recovery Program, Britain
3. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 5 January 1948, The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to the 
Chargg in Spain, p. 1017.
4. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 2 February 1948, Memorandum of Conversation by Charge, p. 1020.
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started fearing that Spain would achieve results with this policy and wanted reassurance 
from the US that the administration of the Marshall Plan lay in European hands. The 
British embassy in Washington got in contact with the Assistant Chief of the Division of 
Western European Affairs, Outerbridge Horsey. Horsey confirmed that their were no 
impediments on Spain's entry into the European Recovery Program from the American 
side but also reassured the British that it all depended on approval of the 16 nations.5 
Britain was satisfied.
Spain had to improve foreign relations with Europe to get into the European 
Recovery Program. The Treaty of Friendship between Portugal and Spain was renewed 
and Portugal promptly invited Spain to the Program. Yet Dr Jose Caeiro de Mata, the 
Portuguese Foreign Minister, was opposed by the other 15 nations. Not willing to 
risk his own precarious situation he backed down.
Apart from Portugal, Spain gained support from Latin American countries.
During the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota a Resolution 
was passed which upheld that: "the establishment or maintenance of diplomatic 
relations with a government does not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of 
that country. "6
Even France improved relations with Spain when the borders were reopening 
and Spain was allowed to buy industrial machinery from France.
The United Kingdom, France and the US also settled a long outstanding dispute 
with Spain concerning German property and the liquidation of balances and payments 
between Spain and Germany.7
5. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 16 February 1948, Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the 
Division of Western European Affairs, p. 1025.
6. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents. Washington, 1950, p. 1690.
7. British anf Foreign State Papers fBFSP) 1948. London, 1956, Part II, Vol. 151, p.295, "Accord 
between the U.K., France and the USA and Spain for the Expropriation of German Enemy Property in 
Spain and the Liquidation of Balances and Payments between Spain and Germany.", 10 May 1948, 
Article 12; Article 11 and Fiancial Protocol Article 1; Part III, Vol. 152, p.827, "Exchange of notes 
between Spain and the United States of America concerning monetary gold looted by Germany", 30 
April 1948.
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Trying to exploit these developments and in order to gain credits from the US,
Josd Felix Lequerica, former ambassador to Vichy France, was to go to Wellington as 
an inspector and counselor to the Spanish Embassy. In a conversation between 
Culbertson and de Erice in the Palace Santa Cruz, 23 January 1948, the Charge advised 
that Lequerica should delay his trip until April when Congress had finished discussing 
the Marshall Plan. This would avoid unnecessary embarrassment between the two 
governments and subsequent speculation by the press. Culbertson made it clear that he 
was prepared to grant Lequerica a visa whenever he demanded one, but that he 
preferred to wait until the European Recovery Program debates were over. Artajo gave 
in and agreed to a postponement of Lequerica's departure.8
The discussion over Lequerica's arrival in Washington reflects the position of 
the two countries. The US had concluded that Spain would be excluded from the 
Marshall Plan due to political opposition from Europe. Spain believed that the US could 
still muscle Spain into the aid program. Nicolis Franco, as ambassador to Portugal, 
was trying to get Salazar's support in these talks. The Spanish Foreign Ministry 
informed Culbertson that Holland, Portugal, Switzerland, Greece and Turkey all fa­
voured Spain's inclusion.
Legally, there was no problem to justify Spain's inclusion into the European 
Recovery Program. The Foreign Assistance Act, regulating the European Recovery 
Program, allowed the extension of aid to all countries which had signed the Committee 
of European Economic Cooperation at Paris in September 1947 and, as section 3(b) 
read, also to: "any other country... wholly or partly in Europe, together with dependent 
areas under its administration; provided such country adheres to, and for so long as it 
remains as adherent to, a joint program for European recovery designed to accomplish 
the purposes of this Act. "9
8. NA, Civil Branch, Lot File 59D108, 15 March 1948, Culbertson to Department of State.
9. Selected Hearings held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations Senate.Vol: 
Foreign Economic Assistant Program Part I, 2 March 1948, Washington, 1972-1976.
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In respect to Spain, it could have been argued that she was indispensable to 
accomplish the success of the Act. Few countries in Europe accepted this thesis. In the 
US, Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department, argued that Spain had not 
signed the agreements with the other sixteen nations in Paris and it was really up to 
them to let Spain in. The State Department would not push the issue even though it 
would welcome Spain's inclusion.
Lewis W. Douglas, Ambassador to Great Britain, supported Bohlen. He argued 
that it had not been Washington's decision to exclude Spain from Paris but Bevin's and 
Bidault's. The ambassador backed his argument by claiming that the UN resolution 
could be understood in such a way as to exclude Spain. For Douglas, as for Bohlen, all 
depended on the other European countries. The American diplomat in London said: 
"There are two sides of the coin. One is assistance which we are prepared to give these 
nations and the other side the extent to which the participating countries extent an 
invitation."10 Douglas claimed that "it was their club. We do not choose the 
membership."
In Washington, Congress had mixed feelings. Senator Alben Barkley 
(D/Kentucky) believed that, as it was American money, the US had a right to decide 
where it would eventually go. After all, he considered that in the future the US might 
change its policy towards Spain and then necessary funds would have to be found 
elsewhere. Senator Elmer Thomas (Oklahoma) went further and claimed that Spain was 
already invited under section 3.
Another Democratic Senator argued that Section 3 showed that "we could invite 
Spain in if we wished to, we would not want to do so, regardless of the effect on this 
other bunch of countries." Republican Senator Dewey Smith from Missouri speculated 
that the US had avoided diplomatic complications when Ambassador Douglas had
10. Selected Hearings held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations Senate. 
Vol: Foreign Relief Assistance Act 1948, Lewis W. Douglas, 12 February 1948, Washington, 1972- 
1976.
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opened the door to Spain, knowing that Europe would not accept her. The State 
Department, in talks with Spain, could blame Europe for not letting her in and avoid 
complications with Madrid. At the same time relations with the European Recovery 
Program countries would not be put under strain.11
In Madrid, the situation was clarified to Artajo at another meeting with 
Culbertson, 8 March 1948. Culbertson expressed the favourable feeling of the State 
Department that Spain should be included but could not admit so publicly. Artajo 
mentioned the coming discussions in Paris, 15 March 1948, which might still have 
resulted in Spain's incorporation into the European Recovery Program. Culbertson 
politely ignored the statement by Artajo, who in return insinuated bilateral agreements 
between their two nations. The Spanish minister claimed that Spain had really more 
interest grants from the US than in the Marshall plan. In an earlier conversation 
Culbertson had expressed that the impediment for such a governmental grant lay partly 
in the intervention by the INI in the market. Knowing this, Artajo now claimed that the 
INI was only a crisis measure which would be removed as early as possible, so that 
nothing stood in the way for American grants.12 Culbertson did not rule out 
governmental grants, but it was more likely that Spain would obtain private credits and 
credits from the Export Import Bank.
The interview, between Artajo and Culbertson, was important for Spain. Madrid 
had avoided US damnation by abandoning past governmental economic intervention and 
started liberalizing her economy. In return Madrid hoped for economic aid.
After the conversation Artajo noted that: "the North American opinion has 
difficulty in understanding the Spanish position. In this sense it is convenient to start 
remembering that it is not reasonable to mix the internal problems of each country with
11. Selected Hearings held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations Senate. 
Vol: Foreign Relief Assistance Act 1948, 12 February 1948, Washington, 1972-1976.
12. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 9 March 1948, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1026.
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the international relations."13
On 9 March, Culbertson fired off a telegram to George Marshall, Secretary of 
State, describing the meeting with Artajo held the day before. The answer came two 
weeks later. America's policy was unmoved by Artajo's arguments. No credits were to 
be extended, nor was Europe going to be pressured into accepting Spain in the 
European Recovery Program.14
After receiving Marshall's letter, Culbertson speculated that Spain really wanted 
to be part of the European Recovery Program, despite Artajo's claim that Spain 
preferred bilateral relations with the US. The Charg6 thought that Spain had only 
turned away from the European Recovery Program because Madrid knew that France 
and Britain would never let the totalitarian regime into the program. The American 
diplomat said that Spain would blame the US and Britain for the failure to be included; 
the former because it did not pressure Europe; the latter because it acted out of 
selfishness. Culbertson also told the Secretary that Franco believed that Spain was too 
important for the US to be ignore.15
From the State Department's point of view, Spain was not a great loss to the 
West and diplomatically it was much easier to have limited relations. The military point 
of view was different. Shortly after the Artajo - Culbertson conversation, the military 
wanted to know about the progress of diplomatic relations with Spain. James Forrestal, 
Secretary of Defence, phoned up Norman Armour, Secretary for Political Affairs and 
former Ambassador to Spain. Forrestal, worried about the military situation, wanted to 
know if relations were improving. Norman Armour gave Forrestal the economic side of 
the arguments, asserting that commercial relations were not improving due to the strict
13. Vinas, Angel, "El Plan Marshall y Franco", in Vinas, Angel, Guerra. Pinero. Dictadura. 
Barcelona, 1984, p.277.
14. FRUS 1948. Vol.DJ, 23 March 1948, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain, p. 1028.
15. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 24 March 1948, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1028.
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control imposed by the INI over foreign trade.16
While the State Department in Washington was downplaying the military aspects 
of Spain, the Embassy in Madrid was not. Culbertson believed that military 
considerations should overrule diplomatic ones. According to him, Spain's military 
strength had to be improved urgently with US aid. On top of that Spain's economic 
isolation was slowing down Western recovery. Thus Culbertson suggested that normal 
relations should be resumed. He wanted to accelerate Spain's inclusion in the West 
through her integration into the European Recovery Program and suggested that 
Washington should stress the economic advantages for Europe's recovery from Spain's 
reintegration.17
Culbertson was influenced by the deteriorating East-West relations. On 20 
March the USSR walked out of the Allied Control Council, the body officially charged 
with governing Germany. Reports of Red Army troop movements and comments by a 
Communist politician in Berlin had increased fears that a Russian military move against 
Berlin was imminent. Civil servants in the State Department speculated that a fall of 
Berlin would start an avalanche of communist takeovers in Europe. Under these circum­
stances, a military conflict in Europe could not be ruled out and Spain's resources 
would have helped.
Shortly after the conflict over Germany, a meeting between representatives of 
the State Department and the Air Force took place. Major-General Samuel E.
Anderson, USAF, claimed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had discussed the use of three 
airfields in Spain which should be constructed and equipped for the heaviest US 
bombers. The State Department pointed out that public opinion would be appalled if the 
US helped Spain militarily, but saw no objectives to finance and equip airfields for civil 
aircraft. Anderson backed down and informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that securing
16. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 26 March 1948, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation by the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, p. 1030.
17. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 29 March 1948, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1031.
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base rights at the moment was politically inadvisable as was furnishing military aircraft 
but, from his point of view, there were no objectives to civil aviation programs.18
Secretary of Defense Forrestal sent two officers to Winthrop Williams Aldrich, 
the Chairman of the Board of the Chase National Bank of New York, to discuss 
financial loans to improve Spanish airfields. In this meeting Aldrich showed enthusiasm 
for the idea. Promptly, a meeting between a Colonel of the Spanish Air Force, a 
representative of the civilian airline Iberia and the Chase National Bank was organized. 
During these talks it became clear that the Spaniards hoped to obtain these credits 
without giving securities in return. The Bank on the other hand insisted on gold
N
coverage for the loan. Thus the meeting broke up without compromise.
The Sate and Defense Department encouraged these private loans but made it 
clear that they were not willing to intervene. The Bank realized the government's 
concern and sought a possible solution. Their representative in Washington, Mr 
Schermerhom, got in contact with the two Departments on 22 June and said that the 
loans would be granted if gold securities were deposited or if the State or Defense 
Department guaranteed them on national security grounds.
Hickerson, representing the State Department, took the easy way out. He put the 
responsibility on the National Defense Department arguing4hat such guarantees should 
be extended only if the Department of Defense thought that they were needed to pro­
mote safety in international aviation. Forrestal, representing the Defense Department, 
was put under pressure. The whole idea to guarantee credits to Spain for civil aviation 
was a disguise for the improvement of Spanish airfields for future military use.
However, public opinion would be appalled if this would have emerged. In the end this 
fear proved to&much. The Defence Department did not issue the necessary guarantee 
and the credits were not extended.19
18. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 29 March 1948, Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the 
Division of Western European Affairs, p. 1034.
19. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 22 June 1948, Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European 
Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, p. 1039.
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Similar military interests existed in Britain. The British Chiefs of Staff grew
\
increasingly interested in Spain's military potential. On 16 April 1948 in a meeting by 
the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Templer stressed Spain's strategic importance 
for the defence of the sea lines of communications and the military value of the Spanish 
armed forces for the West. Despite realizing the difficulties of a dual relationship, 
military advantages versus political complications, he encouraged the idea of a general 
agreement with Spain.20 The Joint Planning Staff too acknowledged that if Spain'was 
to be excluded from security pacts then the effective defence of the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean would be greatly lessened. The diplomatic problem was realized but a 
modus vivendi with the Spanish military authorities had to be found.21
One month later, 26 May 1948, the Joint Planning Staff in Britain finished its 
report on Spain. Britain’s minimum strategic requirements on the Iberian peninsula, the 
report claimed, were Spain's successful resistance to any aggression by the Soviet 
Union. To achieve this Madrid had to be assistaJ* training and organizing her armed 
forces and obtain military equipment. It was recognized that this would lead to 
unwanted propaganda and thus the policy was abandoned.22
The Chiefs of Staff were dissatisfied with this conclusion and Major-General 
Ward asked for a new approach.23 Shortly afterwards the Chiefs of Staff discussed 
strategic aims in Spain again and concluded that Spain was of first importance if the 
Rhine line was overrun by Soviet troops, as this would threaten the lines of 
communication through the Mediterranean. It was assumed that in such a case Spain 
might remain neutral unless relations improved.24
20. PRO, DEFE4.12, 16 April 1948, COS Committee Minutes. ______________ _______
21. PRO, DEFE6.5, 16 April 1948, COS Committee Joint Planning Staff.
22. PRO, DEFE6.5, 26 May 1948, COS Committee Joint Planning Staff.
23. PRO, DEFE4.13, 7 June 1948, COS Committee Minutes.
24. PRO, DEFE5.12, 8 September 1948, COS Committee Minutes, Short Term Strategic Aims in 
Europe at the Outbreak of War.
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In addition to strategic military considerations, the UK was concerned about 
flight security to and from Gibraltar.25 To secure air travel in Spain, loans for modem 
- air traffic control equipment had to be granted. However, these looked alarmingly like 
military credits and thus were kept to a minimum and in the private sector.
The Chase National Bank seized one of these opportunities. Mr Barth, the Vice 
President of the Bank, arranged for a loan of $10-15 million to the Spanish Foreign 
Exchange Institute for cotton and the construction of an ammonium nitrate plant. The 
loan required a 105% gold collateral.26
When it became obvious that Spain was excluded from the European Recovery 
Program27, the Joint Strategic Plans Group issued a new position, called "Crankshaft". 
The US was now willing to grant Spain "limited supply of small arms, ammunition and 
POL [petrol, oil and lubricants] for the first 6 months [of a conflict and] subsequently 
limited support for 20,000 guerrillas". This included small arms, ammunition, limited 
communications equipment and demolition equipment.28
Shortly afterwards the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the study "Halfmoon". The 
US now thought that a stance along the Rhine was possible.29 However, Spain and 
Britain continued to guard the flanks of American troops and possibly cover an Ameri­
can withdrawal.
In the meantime the debate in Congress about the European Recovery Program 
had finished and Spain sent Lequerica to Washington. He was able to gain strong 
support in Congress and organized the mutual interests of several groups in American
25. PRO, F0371.73379, October 1948; PRO, F0371.79782, 31 May 1949, RAF rescue team in Spain.
26. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 20 October 1948, Memorandum of Conversation by William B. Dumham of 
the Division of Western European Affairs, p. 1057.
27. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 2 April 1948, Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy In Spain, p. 1035.
28. APWSU. Vol.7, 11 May 1948, JSPG, "Crankshaft".
29. APWSU. 26 May 1948, JCS, "Halfmoon", p.63.
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politics into an effective Spanish Lobby.30
In this task, Lequerica was aided by Charles Patrick Clark, who was member of 
several Congressional committees and government agencies and claimed to have 
influence with the Government. One of Clark's most influential moments came when he 
reported on 10 November 1949 after a trip to Spain, about freedom of worship for 
Protestants under Franco. He referred to Max H. Klein, the President of the American 
Chamber of Commerce, saying that "Protestantism is not a problem in Spain... 
Confining myself to Barcelona, where I usually live, I can be quite definite in saying 
that the Protestant community is not persecuted and they are free to worship according 
to their beliefs." Klein himself though was a Catholic and a foreigner in Spain.31 It is 
unlikely that he was a good source of information concerning freedom of worship for 
Spaniards.
As 1948 was an election year in the US, Lequerica joined the preelection 
lobbying. In Congress, five interest groups came together united by their pro-Spanish 
inclinations. The groups were Catholics, Anti-Communists, Republicans, trade 
orientated Congressmen and finally the military. The Lobby that emerged was very 
strong as the interest groups were bipartisan, supra-sectional, supra-economic and 
supra-religious in appearance and hence not clearly identifiable as a lobby.
The Catholic lobby was composed of men like Pat McCarran, Joseph 
McCarthy, Alvin E. O'Konsky and Keogh but above all Dr Joseph F. Thoming. They 
identified with Spain because of the deep rooted Catholic base in Spain. Education by 
the Church, Holy Crosses at Schools and Universities and a strong link between the 
Government and the Church were well-known aspects of the Franco Regime.
The Anti-Communist lobby grew alongside McCarthyism, the_ColdWar and 
subsequently political scandals such as Alger Hiss' conviction for peijury, the
30. PRO, F0371.79706, 20 June 1949, Embassy Washington.
31. Lowi, Theodore J., "Bases in Spain", in Stein, Harold, ed. American Civil-Militarv Decisions. 
Alabama, 1963, p.679.
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Rosenberg's executions and Oppenheimer's withdrawal of security clearance. The most
\
outspoken Republicans in the lobby were Senator Thft, Charles Patrick Clark, Zablocki 
and later Senators McKellar, Owen Brewster and Bridges.
The economic lobby can be broken down into three subsections, cotton, wheat, 
and oil interests. Spain required cotton for its textile industry in Catalonia, at the same 
time Southern States were looking for new cotton markets to sell their surplus. The two 
interests fitted like hand in glove. Spain still required wheat imports. The harvest of 
1947 was particularly unsatisfactory.32 Thus Spain opened a possibility to satisfy the 
overproduction of wheat in the Northwestern states. Finally the oil companies saw a 
structural and financial advantage in oil refining in Spain.33 Congressmen from these 
three areas, ie. Southern cotton states, Northwestern wheat states and oil producing 
states, hoped for better commercial relations with Spain.
The last component of the Spanish Lobby were military experts including 
Admiral Richard L. Conolly. They saw Spain as a vital country for future bases 
because Italy and France only provided treacherous grounds due to their unstable 
political situations. Even Stanton Griffis, future ambassador to Spain, accepted this. He 
told Forrestal over breakfast, 26 May 1948, that he "finds it difficult to understand how 
we can talk about the control of the Mediterranean at one end and ignore the other 
points, now that we have no Ambassador in Spain."34
Despite this, military necessities in other parts of the world meant that Spain had 
to be left on its own in case of a Soviet invasion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued on 26 
August 1948 that the "defense of Spain will be provided by Spanish Forces".35 At the 
moment the military establishment was happy selling surplus military material to Spain
32. WPIS, 1 October 1947, N.411.
33. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1945-1949, 852.6363/1.2648, 26 January 1948, 
Spain Petrol Import Requirements 1948, Embassy of USA to Secretary of State.
34. Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p.445.
35. APWSU. Vol. 10, 26 August 1948, JCS, "Joint Outline War Plans for Determination of 
Mobilization Requirements for War Beginning 1 July 1949", p. 186.
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which could be used by Franco for his national defence. In January 1948, the surplus 
sale of military transport planes DC-3 was taken into consideration.36 In February 
1948, the State Department even approved the sale of Grumman Torpedo Bombers.37
These policies and the actions of the Spanish Lobby could not fail to be noticed 
by the American public and many liberal minded people strongly opposed this.
Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior under FDR and Truman, attacked 
Lequerica, writing that he and other Spanish diplomats had insulted Washington by 
giving a dinner in honor of the Japanese blow against the United States at Pearl 
Harbour.38 He accused Lequerica of trying to manipulate American politics when he 
was lobbying for Dewey at the Republican Nomination Convention in June 1948.39 Yet 
his strongest accusation concerned the Spaniard's role during his appointment to Vichy 
France. There Lequerica was assumed to have instructed others: "let no member of the 
embassy hold out his hand to a North American." Ickes ended a series of articles, 
bearing such provocative titles as "Heil Lequerica" and "Von Lequerica", with the 
following suggestion: "upon Lequerica's visits to the State Department, he should be 
greeted by Senor Don Dr. Pat McCarran y Shea and an honor guard with a Fascist 
salute and a 'Heil, von Lequerica !",4° Lequerica was indeed an objectionable 
character. In 1952 the American journalist Drew Pearson, who had written hostile 
articles about Lequerica for some years, revealed him as the head of the Spanish 
Lobby. Lequerica, losing his nerve, punched Drew Pearson on the nose who 
subsequently sued him successfully for assault.41
36. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1945-1949, 852.24/1-1548, 15 Jan 1948, 
Memorandum, Mr Reinstein to Mr Thorp
37. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1945-1949, 852.24 FLC/2-1048, 10 February 
1948, Department of State to US Embassy.
38. Ickes,"Heil Lequerica", in New Republic. 15 January 1951, Vol. 124.
39. Ickes,"State Department Siesta", in New Republic. 23 May 1949, Vol. 121.
40. Ickes,"Von Lequerica", in New Republic. 8 June 1951, Vol.125.
41. PRO, F0371.102022, 22 August 1952, Washington.
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Lequerica was not the only one from the Spanish embassy staff in Washington 
to be verbally abused by the American press. Pablo Merry de Val, the counselor of the 
Spanish Embassy, was accused by Ickes of going from party to party, socializing with 
Senators, Representatives and the social elite of Washington, always trying to further 
the Spanish cause.42
Ickes also attacked Propper de Callejdn. Propper had been First Secretary in 
Vichy France to Lequerica. He then became Consul in Rabat and French Morocco at 
the time of Operation Torch. He was a good friend of Lequerica's and was not trusted 
by the Allied authorities. The Free French labeled him "persona non grata" and refused 
him as counselor. Yet now after the war, he came to Washington to assist Lequerica.
Ickes wrote "What is not good enough for Paris is good enough for Washington. "43 
Ickes saw America as the silent partner to "whitewash the bloody hands of Franco."
Unimpressed by such criticism, the State Department lifted all embargoes on 
Spain, ended all quotas and established free trade between the two countries.
Spain had found its supporters in American politics and was using these 
connections successfully. In March 1948, Myron C. Thylor, the Presidential 
Representative at the Vatican, paid a visit to Franco at the Pardo Palace. Soon 
afterwards a proposal was put forward by Representative Alvin E. O'Konsky, an ardent 
Catholic supporter of the Spanish Lobby, to include Spain in the European Recovery 
Program. It was accepted by the House of Representatives on 30 March 1948 with a 
vote of 149:52.
The unfortunate timing of the meeting between Myron Thylor and Franco, and 
the vote in the House, created the impression that the amendment had presidential 
approval. This was not true. The passing of the proposal was due to the world situation, 
such as the threat of communist influence in the next Italian election.
42. Ickes, "State Department Shell Games", in New Republic. 8 August 1949, Vol.121.
43. PRO, FO371.79706, 27 October 1949, Foreign Office; also Ickes, "State Department Siesta", in 
New Republic. 23 May 1949, Vol. 121.
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This situation had inclined many Representatives to vote in favour of Spain. The 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, including the proposal concerning Spain, passed the 
House. Artajo convinced several European states to speak out for Spain, trying to influ­
ence the US administration but in vain.
The decision of the House to include Spain in the Program forced the Senate, 
under the President's threat of using his veto, to call for a Joint Congressional 
Conference Committee which promptly eliminated the clause concerning Spain.
One nation to offer help was Argentina. On 9 April 1948 the two countries 
signed a four year agreement, the Franco - Peron Protocol, concerning financial and 
economic matters. The credit granted to Spain was increased from pesos 350 million to 
1750 million (around £110 million). Argentina could offer Spain agricultural products 
but no oil, cotton or machines. In return for this credit, Argentina was allowed to buy 
Spanish goods, gain interests in Spanish industries and receive a free trade area in 
Cadiz.
The agreement between Argentina and Spain convinced many Latin American 
countries that the UN December resolution was not working and that it handicapped 
their trade and commerce compared to Argentina's. Brazil, together with six other 
nations, decided to send a ship to the 700th Spanish Navy Anniversary exercises.44
Portugal was another of Franco's supporters. At the Paris Conference in 1948,
Dr Jos6 Caeiro de Mata, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, argued that if the Marshall 
Plan was to include Germany, an aggressor state, then Spain "of 28 million people with 
great agricultural and mineral resources and commanding positions in the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean" had to be included as well.45 It was becoming clear that some 
countries in the Western sphere were unhappy about the UN's resolution.
In order to prevent international pressure on the developing relations between
44. PRO, ADM223.256, October 1948, Monthly Intelligence Report; and ADM223.257, November 
1948, Monthly Intelligence Report.
45. PRO, ADM223.250, April 1948, Monthly Intelligent Report.
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Spain and these countries, the Western Nations in the Security Council refused to 
debate a Russian proposal on the Spanish dilemma, 25 June 1948.
However the US was not prepared to go the other way and support Spain. 
Washington decided that it was best to avoid publicity. The Secretary of State wrote:
"What reason and endeavor cannot bring about, often time will".46
A Latin American proposal, supporting Spain, split the US delegation in the 
General Assembly. Truman and Acheson were ready to go along but the old New 
Dealers Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt and Benjamin V. Cohen as well as John E Dulles 
tipped the scales towards neutrality. Similar to the Russian proposal earlier, the US 
avoided making a stance.
The clash of opinions was reflected in the publication "Forum". On one side 
stood the argument that normal relations with Spain should be resumed given the fact 
that even Axis nations were now receiving aid. It was also pointed out that Spain had 
already received a cotton credit from the Export Import Bank of $13 million barely four 
months after Spain's Civil War, thus setting a precedent. On the other side, appointing 
an ambassador to Spain showed approval, something nobody in the West wanted to do 
just yet.47
In August, Lequerica, trying to exploit the transition of US policy towards 
Spain, had a conversation with John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European 
Affairs, and Theodore Achilles, of the Western European Affairs Office. Hickerson 
claimed that Spain remained unchanged in politics and economics. He acknowledged 
that the December resolution was based on weak grounds. Yet the State Department 
saw it as very difficult to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority in the UN to repeal the 
resolution unless Spain showed more cooperation. Lequerica replied that the present 
resolution before the UN, which was identical with the December resolution, would fail
46. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 28 July 1948, The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Offices in 
the American Republic, p. 1045.
47. Carter Greenhouse, Inez French, "Should we reestablish Relations with Spain ? Pro - Con", in 
Forum. December 1948, Vol.110.
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to receive the 2/3 approval.48
It was clear that ostracism of Spain had been a failure. After the 1947 resolution 
had failed to get 2/3 of the votes, four Latin American states had appointed 
ambassadors to Spain. In 1946 2/3 had voted against Spain, in 1947 only a majority 
voted against Spain, and in 1948 a majority voted in favour of Spain. Thus the problem 
was still not solved. The 1946 resolution was de facto dead but could not be overruled 
by another resolution.
Many countries still opposed the Franco regime in bilateral relations. Mr Bevin 
expressed his opposition towards Spain and said that "moral and material values of our 
western civilization" forced the exclusion of Spain under Franco from the western 
cooperatives such as the OEEC.49 Yet soon Britain's position with regards to Spain 
would be coming under pressure, as international relations between East and West 
deterioratofeven further.
The crisis in Czechoslovakia caused by communist infiltration was resolved by a 
coup d'etat in February 1948. The loss of Czechoslovakia, one of the most advanced 
industrial states in East Europe, to communism induced the Pentagon towards a policy 
of military bases to guarantee state security of western nations. The US still had the 
base structure of the World War in place and could use it to prevent possible 
communist coups. This affected relations with Spain.
Paul Culbertson was by now well established in Spain. He was invited to go 
mountain goat hunting in the Picos de Europa as a state guest during the month of 
September. His brother William C. Culbertson, a prominent lawyer in the US , was 
even doing legal work for the Spanish Embassy.50 On 13 June 1948, Paul Culbertson 
looked at what Spain should do in order to become economically acceptable. It was a
48. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 25 August 1948, Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Division 
of Western European Affairs, p. 1047.
49. Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1947-1948. p. 128.
50. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 20 July 1948, Theodore C. Achilles to Paul Culbertson.
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long list and covered topics such as exchange rates, treatment of foreign capital 
investment and state control over industry.51 It was clearly a long way before Spain 
could meet these demands. Economically, Spain suffered from inflation and over- 
regulation. Many Spanish businessmen claimed that foreign credits given to Franco 
would be poured into a bottomless pit because of government intervention.52
The State Department continued to call for a political, economic and military 
integration of Spain and an overall normalization of relations. It suggested that "the 
primary objective of the United States policy towards Spain at this time is the rein­
tegration of Spain, politically, economically and militarily, into the free western 
European community of nations through the progressive normalization of Spanish 
relations with those countries and with the US."
Politically, US policy was still governed by the UN resolutions. It was asserted 
that Spain would only be included in the European Recovery Program if she gained 
international respectability.
The statement concluded:
"we believe, therefore, that the most desirable course of action for the present is 
to avoid international pressure on Spain and to continue our efforts to emphasize 
the need for political liberalization, ... We can concurrently encourage private 
trade with Spain and private investment on a purely business basis, and we can 
develop informal contact between Spanish and US military authorities, provided 
in all cases our political line is made clear."53
Obviously, the State Department favoured some governmental changes in Spain 
but Franco was not necessarily excluded from possible future regimes. A liberalization 
of the Spanish government would be rewarded economically and financially.
Modem military technology naturally influenced American foreign policy. Air
51. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 13 June 1948, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1037.
52. "Spain: Useful Ally for US ?", in IJS News & World Report. 22 October 1948, Vol.25.
53. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 26 July 1948, Policy Statement by the Department of State on Spain, p. 1041.
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warfare had grown in importance, making air bases vital. In the light of developments 
in Czechoslovakia, it was planned that a ring of US air bases around the USSR should 
be created to deter Communist expansion.
Even though political complications in Spain made this impossible for the time 
being, civil aviation could provide the Trojan horse to improve airfields in Spain for 
future military use. Thus the Secretary of Defense, Forrestal, encouraged US 
companies to grant credits to Spain for improvements of airports, and the Secretary of 
the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, advised the National Security Council, 20 May 1948, 
that a plan for the defence of Europe should be flexible enough to include Spain,
Germany and Austria in the future.54
There was a real threat, as expressed by John D. Hickerson that Spain might get 
the impression that the Pentagon and the State Department were speaking with different 
voices and thus allowing Spain to sit back and wait for military necessities to overrule 
diplomatic considerations. The service attaches in Madrid were to be instructed to give 
the impression of harmony with their civilian colleagues.55
But just how valuable was Spain militarily for the US? It was true that Spain had 
many war veterans but these had fought a low-level technical war.56 The Spanish 
General Staff knew that her armed forces could not defend the Pyrenees against the 
Russian army. Thus Spain's present defence line was not the Pyrenees but the Rhine.
This was, of course, music to the ears of American military planners.57 In a 
conversation with Colonel Dasher, General Vigon asked the US military attach^ for 
aid. In the current international climate, Spain urgently required anti-tank weapons.
Vigon stressed that the military value of the Spanish army was being wasted, as Spain
54. Truman, Harry S., The Memoirs of Harrv S. Truman. Vol.ii Years of Trial. Suffolk, 1956, p.260.
55. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec.1-8, 9 August 
1948, John D. Hickerson to Alfred M. Gruenther.
56. "Spain: next ally for America ?", in US News & World Report. 27 July 1951, Vol.31.
57. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1948, Spain, 16 August 1948, Jack D Neal to 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
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could not contribute to the Western defence system without military aid.58 In return 
Vigon was willing to send troops north of the Pyrenees. However, this issue was more 
complicated than the Spanish General was willing to admit at the moment. Nevertheless 
it was clear that good relations with Spain allowed the US Army to purchase cheap raw 
materials.59
The Pentagon had good reason to support better relations with Spain. Forrestal 
inquired in a letter to Marshall, 30 October 1948, how the international climate had 
changed. He did so hoping to increase the Defense Department's allocation from $15 
billion to $17.5 billion. Marshall's reply, drafted by Under-Secretary Lovett, claimed 
that not at lot had changed, but that nevertheless it was crucial to rearm Western 
Europe. Marshall might have opposed the ban on ambassadors, but he did not favour 
sending aid to Spain because of the complications this might have caused with other 
countries.
Despite political restraints, during September and October 1948, a number of 
influential American politicians, businessmen and officers visited Spain. Senator Chan 
Gurney, movie-tycoon Eric Johnston, Democratic Leader and Coca-Cola manager 
James A. Farley and the Presidential Representative to the Vatican, Myron Ihylor, as 
well as Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, who replaced Vandenberg as Director 
of the CIA were among various groups visiting Spain.
Businessmen in the US were becoming more interested in Spain. As the US 
economy grew more raw-material dependent, copper, tin, lead and other materials 
which could be found in Spain had to be imported. Many of the mines producing these 
raw materials were government-owned and Franco discouraged the export of these 
materials with a variety of policies.60 All exports and imports had to be licensed with
58. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1948, Spain, 17 July 1948, MA Spain to 
Intelligence Group.
59. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1948, Spain, 1 July 1948, MA Spain to Director 
Intelligence.
60. PRO, F0371.73342, 1948, Travellers in Spain; and F0371.73343, 1948 Forced exchanges.
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the government. Other restrictions on foreign trade included limitations of 25% of 
foreign investment in any one Spanish company and also on profit repatriation by 
foreign investors. All these protective measures were exposed to constant pressure from 
the State Department.
The American government wanted to make it easier for banks to grant credits to 
Spain and expand into the Spanish market selling American surplus products. The 
Texas Oil Company, for example, had decided in 1948 to grant Spain a loan for $50 
million to purchase modem refining equipment.61
Nevertheless as long as Spain's-govemment could freely interfere with its 
economy, foreign banks and multinationals were cautious in granting credits, 
sometimes demanding high guarantees for investing in Spain. The Chase National Bank 
loan of $25 million for example required a 100% guarantee in gold to be sent to 
London and remain there for the 6 month period.
Otherwise, trade was conducted on a short term base. Despite this, foreign 
commerce, above all military related, flourished. Portugal exported 25,000 kg of 
military optical equipment. Greek entrepreneurs were selling substantial amounts of 
ammunition to Spain. Britain started to sell aircraft testing machinery and Rolls-Royce 
plane engines, despite the ban on export of military material. A Dutch company sold 
Spain military engines. Companies were now asking for a review of the export ban so 
that they could seize export contracts in Spain. Before long Spain bought five River 
class frigates from Britain. ICI exported 19.5 tons of dinitrophenol which, mixed with 
shellite, was used in HE (High Explosive) shells. 175 tons of gelatine dynamite were 
bought by Spain and discussions concerning two corvettes, 60-80 planes and loans for 
state-owned Iberia were in progress.62
While businessmen saw financial opportunities in Spain, politicians in Europe 
still opposed close cooperation. Paul Henry Spaak, the Belgian Prime Minister,
61. PRO, ADM223.257, November 1948, Monthly Intelligence Report.
62. PRO, F0371.733201/73321/73322, January to December 1948.
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expressed his opposition to close relations with General Franco and Robert Schuman , 
French Minister for foreign affairs, assured Spain's exclusion of the Western Union 
defence organisation.
It was clear that Western Defence was no longer directed against a German 
threat but against a Soviet invasion. The Pact of Dunkirk between France and Britain in 
1947, against a German aggression, was expanded in 1948 into the Treaty of Brussels.
The Benelux states joined. Eventually in 1949 under Truman's guidance, the 
Vandenberg resolution was passed to form NATO. The West was closing ranks against 
the Soviet block. -For these countries it was paramount to continue a united foreign 
policy.
The three Foreign Ministers Marshall, Schuman and Bevin from US, France 
and Britain respectively, held a meeting in order to try to coordinate their policies 
towards Spain. Marshall, disguising the strategic importance of Spain, claimed that it 
was crucial to consider Spain's importance for Europe in the political and economic 
sphere. The French and British ministers agreed that the people in their countries 
opposed relations with Spain and that both would try to play down a vote in the UN on 
Spain. Should the Polish resolution come up, both countries would vote against it.63
The two western countries France and Britain, which in 1946 differed the most 
in their policy towards Spain, had come to an agreement to keep Spain out of the 
political and economic integration of Europe.64
On 9 October 1948, General Marshall at a press conference said that he no 
longer favoured the ban on the appointment of ambassadors to Spain but he would not 
initiate its removal either.
Spain had to offer something to the US if she wanted to improve relations with 
Washington against the objections by France and Britain. In November, Erice told the
63. FRUS 1948. Vol.Ill, 4 October 1948, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 
p. 1053.
64. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 11 October 1948, The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative Jacob 
K. Javits, p. 1055.
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American Embassy that economic aid could be exchanged for bases on the Canary, 
Balearic Islands and on Spain's mainland.65 This was an attempt to split the western 
countries and get the US once again asking for Spain’s military support.
US Senator Chan Gurney, the chairman of the Congressional Commission on 
the Armed Forces, visited Spain, 29/30 September 1948, and had a private audience 
with Franco. On his return he described the relations between the US and Europe, 
including Spain, as positive. He went even further and claimed that "all those who are 
resisting Communism must understand that it is in their interest to bring Spain into the 
United Nations."
In a meeting, 5 October 1948, held between Chan Gurney, Forrestal and the 
other three Secretaries of the Armed Forces, Royall, Sullivan and Symington, Gurney 
asked for "complete reestablishment of all relations between Spain and the United 
States."66
In the international environment, Spain had already become acceptable. Many 
countries all over the world had signed trade agreements with Spain by the end of 1948. 
On 23 June 1948, a Sterling payment agreement was signed between the UK and Spain 
facilitating money transfers between the two countries.67 Within the UN, Spain’s 
position also improved. The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in the UN had 
decided that Spain should be included in the International Convention on Economic 
Statistics. This was done in direct conflict with the UN resolution of 1946.
International relations improved without liberal reforms in Spain. Municipal 
elections in Spain were conducted in an undemocratic way.68 The only party to stand in
65. FRUS 1948. Vol.m, 17 November 1948, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1063.
66. Lowi, Theodore J., "Bases in Spain", in Stein, Harold, ed’, American Civil-Militarv Decisions. 
Alabama, 1963, p.676.
67. BFSP 1949. Part II, Vol 154, p.398, "Sterling Payments Agreement between the UK and Spain", 
23 June 1948.
68. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 29 June 1948, Memorandum of Conversation by William B. Dunham of the 
Division of Western European Affairs, p. 1040.
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these elections was the Falange. It was claimed that more than 75% of eligible voters 
turned up to vote, electing 80% Falangist representatives.69 The validity of these 
numbers was called into question.
Some foreigners in Spain, writing in 
American journals, thought that it was surprising how freely people could talk as long 
as they were not specific or talked to a large audience. There were no longer book 
burnings and Marx's works could be found in the Madrid Public Library. Bookstores 
were selling copies of Garcia Lorca's poems for which he had been shot by the Guardia 
Civil during the Civil War.
Yet these changes had come slowly. Despite the claim by the Vatican's 
mouthpiece "Quotidiano" that Protestants in Spain were not suppressed, the reality was 
different. In 1947 youths of the Catholic Action had damaged Protestant places of 
worship in Madrid and three Protestant chapels had been closed, accused by the 
authorities of propaganda activities. Between 1947 and 1949 another ten Protestant 
churches in Spain were closed, one of them had its furniture seized permanently. 
Protestant Church magazines, recreative gatherings and benevolent societies were 
banned for Nattack[s] on the spiritual unity of the nation". Local Catholic priests 
sometimes stole furniture from Protestant churches but went unpunished. Even worse, 
in June 1948 in the Province of Jaen, a group of 30 to 35 young men belonging to 
Catholic Action and the Falange stormed a Protestant church shouting "Viva la Virgen" 
and started beating up the congregation and destroying the interior. The Spanish 
authorities promised investigations but little came of it.70
The Monarchists, trying to replace Franco, were however outmaneuvered by 
him when he held a meeting with Don Juan on 25 August 1948. It was agreed that Juan 
Carlos, son of Don Juan, should go to Spain for his education. Franco had successfully
69. FRUS 1948. Vol.III, 23 November 1948, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1063.
70. PRO, F0371.73341, 1 January 1948, 24 June 1948; FO371.79809, 27 April 1949, Protestant 
Churches.
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gained some of the Monarchists to support his regime.71
Other Monarchists, together with the Spanish Socialist Party in exile, 
representatives of the trade unions, the CNT, the UGT, the Izquierda Cataluna, the 
Alianza Democracia, still expressed their hopes to receive support from France, Britain 
and the US. They based their argument on the tripartite note of March 1946,72 and 
together issued a statement demanding the removal of Franco.73
Yet a break between Monarchists and Republicans became inevitable when Don 
Juan agreed to send his son Juan Carlos to Spain for his education. In return Franco 
granted political amnesty to the monarchists. The "ABC", the monarchical press, was 
granted freedom of press. The time to oppose Franco had passed.
Satisfied with the way things had turned out, Franco exposed his thoughts on 
international affairs in an interview with the Newsweek reporter Edward Weintal. The 
dictator said that before any agreements between the US and Spain could be accepted, 
the Spanish people themselves had to desire them. The Caudillo blamed the British for 
the not perfect relations between Spain and the US. As for the question of liberalization 
within his own country, the Generalissimo argued that each country was different and 
thus needed a different regime and for him the current domestic climate prevented 
liberalization of his regime.74 Spaniards had to wait for his death before experiencing 
liberalization.
71. FRUS 1948. Vol.Ill, 21 September 1948, The Ambassador in Portugal to Secretary of State, 
p. 1050.
72. FRUS 1948. Vol.Ill, 28 September 1948, The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 
p .1051.
73. FRUS 1948. Vol.Ill, 8 October 1948, The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, p. 1054.
74. Edward Weintal interviewed Franco, "Franco on the Record", in Newsweek. 22 November 1948, 
Vol.32.
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The fear of a world conflict which had led to the creation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization also greatly influenced future relations between the US and Spain. 
On 8 March 1949, the Senate analysed Spain's strategic value. Senator Connally said 
that Spain was much more important than Italy and concerning American - Soviet 
relations, he stated that "it looks to me like we are in a rather ridiculous position to say 
'Good Morning Mr Stalin. How do you do? Have a seat. Have a cigar.' and old Franco 
has to pass on the other side of the street." Senator Fulbright, usually liberal, 
acknowledged that Spain was the best base of all from a military point of view.1
The USAF and the RAF had reached an agreement on uses of British bases 
during 1948. The geographical position of Great Britain allowed the USAF to disperse 
bases outside the reach of the Red Army, while continuing to be within striking 
distance of the USSR. James Forrestal, the Secretary of Defense, had claimed that 
over-concentration of bases, whether army, navy or air, courted hot war. Naturally, 
further dispersion of bases to Spain would be beneficial. On top of that a lack of 
suitable bases along the Mediterranean meant a possible loss of the Middle East 
countries in case of war. Thus it was concluded that bases were needed in either French 
Morocco or Spain, the USAF favouring the first, the Navy the latter.
Worldwide, and specifically in the Mediterranean, the US Navy aimed for 
strategic bases and mooring rights, which would keep costs and political difficulties, 
created by the dependence on British bases, to a minimum.
The 6th Fleet had to operate from Gibraltar, Malta and Suez. This arrangement 
created political problems with the Royal Navy and increased maintenance costs. A 
naval base in Spain would cut costs. Therefore it was only too natural that the US Navy 
wanted to maintain good relations with Spain. Admiral Richard L. Conolly, the 
Commander of the Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean 
requested to pay a courtesy call on Spanish ports. Nevertheless the State Department,
1. Selected Hearings held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations Senate. Vol: 
The Vandenberg Resolution and North Atlantic Treaty, 8 March 1949, Washington, 1972-76.
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fearing unnecessary propaganda by the Spanish authorities, blocked this request until 
September.
Before official military visits, Major General William H. Turner from the 
USAF secretly visited Madrid in order to make sure that Spain would not blow these 
military exchanges out of proportion and thus irrevocably damage US prestige in 
Europe. After the successful conclusion of the trip the State Department was willing 
to go ahead with Conolly's visit and from 3 September to 8 September 1949, a US 
naval squadron under Admiral Conolly and some British ships visited El Ferrol in 
Spain.2 Shortly afterwards, the Admiral visited Franco in Madrid. This visit was to test 
both Franco's reaction and public opinion in Europe and the US. The result was 
satisfying for the US as Franco did not use the visit for propaganda reasons, nor did it 
cause diplomatic outcry in other European countries. The Department of Defense was 
now prepared to push harder. After his visit Admiral Conolly told the House Armed 
Service Committee that "the strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula is uniquely 
evident." During the same month several members of the Armed Services 
Committee visited Madrid. The new Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson even 
contemplated going to Spain himself, clearly showing US military interest in Spain.3
It was obvious that the military planners in Washington had accepted the 
disadvantages of the Franco regime. The very nature of NATO gave Spain hope of 
escaping isolation once and for all. The fact that Portugal was included strengthened 
this belief. On radio Franco described Spain's importance by comparing NATO 
without Spain to an omelette without eggs, 4 April 1949. Yet most NATO member 
states in Europe, while hoping to come to an arrangement with Spain, did not want her 
to be part of the Organization.
London recognized that the US and Latin American countries had a growing
2. PRO, F0371.79666, August 1949, Spain: Political Summary; and FO 371.79700, 5 September 
1949.
3. PRO, FO 371.79700, 27 September 1949, Visit of US Secretary of Defense Mr Johnson to Spain; 
confirmed by his and McCarren's office.
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desire to bring Spain into the Western sphere. Even France improved relations with 
Spain. The French radio stopped referring to Spain as totalitarian and stopped hand-outs 
and free broadcasting time to Spanish Republicans. Paris, by falling out with London 
over commercial policies to Spain, had gained an advantage and had secured the sale of 
86 Jumo aero-engines ahead of the British company Vickers - Armstrong.4 The 
strained relations between Britain and Spain meant that the UK was losing profitable 
contracts in Spain. It was only too natural that the British Ambassador in France Sir 
Oliver Harvey urged the French Foreign Minister Schuman to formulate a new 
common foreign policy towards Spain.5
In the UK, the Chiefs of Staff improved treatment of Spanish service attaches.
Ignacio Martel, the Spanish Naval Attachd in London, expressed his desire to visit a 
British aircraft carrier and to takeoff in a plane. The Foreign Office feared that by 
granting his request too quickly, they might invite more serious pleas for information, 
yet not to do so would counter the decision by the military planners in Britain. Thus a 
compromise was reached and instead of going to the carrier, Commander Martel 
received information about Britain’s post-war organization of civil defence.6
In the US, Senator Pat McCarren and Alvin E. O'Konsky demanded in April 
1949 to reject the United Nations exclusion of Spain and to expand the Marshall plan to 
the whole of the Iberian peninsula.
Before the Spanish problem reemerged in the UN, the State Department wanted 
to know the position of the NATO countries. Whatever happened, Washington wanted 
NATO countries to form a united front in the talks on the Spanish question. Concerning 
the stance of the NATO nations, two problems had to be analysed. Firstly, the member 
states' position towards Spain's participation in special UN agencies and secondly their
4. PRO, FO371.79702, 14 January 1949, British Embassy; and F0371.79702, 29 September 1949, Mr 
Walmsley.
5. PRO, F0371.79702, 25 August 1949, Sir O'Harvey Ambassador Paris.
6. PRO, F0371.79815, 5 September 1949; F0371.79815, 11 October 1949, Rennewed application; 
F0371.79815, 9 November 1949.
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position towards full membership of Spain in the UN.
London and Paris wanted to avoid the whole topic if possible. The two 
European nations would have tolerated a US abstention vote concerning the resumption 
of full diplomatic relations and might even have supported Spain's participation in 
special agencies. But what mattered most to them was that the US made it clear that 
Spain would not become a member of the European Recovery Program.
Belgium would have supported the US in a move to resume full diplomatic 
relations and would have welcomed Spain in the UN. The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden and Denmark would probably have abstained in both eases because of recent 
pressure by the US on these countries but would not be pleased. Luxembourg had been 
very reserved on this topic, but the US expected her to approve of Spain's inclusion 
into agencies but abstain on a vote concerning resumption of full diplomatic relations.
After the study of European opposition to Spain, the State Department 
concluded that it had underestimated the Spanish problem in Western Europe. Thus the 
Department recommended that Washington should continue its quiet policy of stressing 
the Communist threat. US prestige with NATO countries was not to be endangered for 
Spain's sake.7
The conclusion influenced the delay of sales of aircraft engines to Spain. The 
US air attachd in Madrid warned that this policy was rendering the Spanish air force 
useless. In 1944 Spain still had over 800 planes. In 1949, due to a lack of spare parts, 
she only had 300 left and pilots were not getting nearly enough training.8
In a meeting of the State Department, John Hickerson, in charge of the 
European section, stressed that the American military establishment attached great 
importance to the sale of aircraft engines to Spain. Dean Rusk, who was then in the 
Office of UN Affairs and would become Secretary of State in the 1960s, countered that
7. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 19 January 1949, Memorandum by G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the 
Director of the Office of European Affairs, p.721.
8. PRO, F0371.79777, 18 June 1949, Memo by Air Attachd J.W. Monk in Madrid; F0371.89568, 28 
January 1950, Annual Report on Spanish Armed Forces.
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the UN was against the sale and if it was postponed, the April meeting of the UN 
would be more relaxed. It was thus agreed to postpone the sale until after the April UN 
Assembly Session.9
In the meantime, Culbertson brought mixed news from Madrid. He observed 
that all Spain needed to be accepted by the West were superficial political changes. 
Franco might for example grant limited amnesty, modify the censorship or relax the 
police to gain international respect. The Charge had also realized that Franco gave little 
importance to Spain's relations with other Western European nations. The Spanish 
dictator was convinced that he would not gain anything from liberalizing his country as 
long as the nations in Western Europe were ruled by socialist governments. The 
American Embassy in Madrid speculated that Franco's aims were to reverse the 
December resolution and to reach a bilateral agreement with the US.10
If what Culbertson wrote was true then pressure by Vfoshington alone might 
have pushed Franco to make changes. It had to be put bluntly before him that if he 
made a move towards a more liberal state, his country would gain economic aid, 
military support and full diplomatic relations. However, this would have created a 
conflict with the American policy towards Europe, which was aiming at downplaying 
the Spanish issue altogether.
It was discussed how the US delegation to the UN should reconcile these 
positions. The study of the Policy Planning Staff during October 1947 had called for a 
normalization of relations with Spain. During January 1948, the President and the NSC 
had approved this policy. Thus no further pressure was to be applied towards Spain.
The US delegation to the UN was therefore instructed to support any views expressing 
the feeling that the 1946 resolution against Spain had come to nothing. Nevertheless, in 
order to avoid complications with America's European allies, the delegation was not to
9. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 9 February 1949, Record of the Daily Meeting of the Under Secretary of State, 
p.725.
10. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 14 February 1949, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p.727.
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initiate any policy which might have created a disunion with Western Europe. Under 
these circumstances, the US delegation was instructed to decrease the importance of the 
Spanish problem.11 This policy was communicated to several other US Embassies 
worldwide.12
These instructions split the US delegation in two. Mrs Eleanore Roosevelt said 
that even anti-Communist groups in Western Europe would criticize the US for bowing 
to military interests. Benjamin V. Cohen, another New Dealer, and John F. Dulles 
agreed with her. Nevertheless, Dr Philip C. Jessup, another US delegate, was opposed 
to their points of view. For him the US was not bowing to military interests but to the 
simple fact that the 1946 resolution had been ineffective.13 In the end the argument of 
the State Department prevailed. The delegation had to play down the Spanish Question.
If a vote became unavoidable, the US should cast theirs to include Spain into special 
agencies and to return ambassadors to Spain. In spite of this reversal of policy 
compared to 1948, the delegation was to claim that the US had not changed its position 
towards Spain.14
When accused of supporting a dictator, Charles Bohlen, Counselor of the State 
Department, argued that the US had no sympathy for Franco but that Washington was 
not prepared to take the responsibility for a renewal of Civil War in Spain.15 Wash­
ington even allowed Spain to file applications for credits through the Export Import 
Bank for the first time since the end of the war.
Soon thereafter, pressure by European nations caused a new change in US
11. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 1 March 1949, Suggested U.S. Position on Spain at the April Session of the 
UN General Assembly, p.731.
12. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 24 March 1949, The Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Missions, 
p.734.
13. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 13 April 1949, The US Representative at the UN to the Secretary of State, 
p.737.
14. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, SD/A/C1/213, p.737n.
15. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 28 April 1949, Memorandum of Conversation by the Counselor of the State 
Department, p.740.
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instructions to the delegation. On 20 April 1949, Acheson informed the delegation that 
they should now abstain in any vote concerning the resumption of full diplomatic 
relations or on amendments to the 1946 resolution.16
Publicly Secretary Acheson claimed in a press release, 11 May 1949, that the 
US would abstain from a vote in the UN on the Spanish question in order to leave the 
decision to other countries which had more important interests in Spain. He explained 
that the US was tom between resuming full diplomatic relations and the undesired 
gesture of goodwill which would follow the appointment of an ambassador.17 This 
.statement was welcomed by European allies but caused Spain's diplomats to turn away 
from the State Department towards relations with the Service Chiefs. Clearly Spain's 
interests were better represented by the American military than by the State 
Department.18 Franco affirmed this in a conversation with an Italian businessman. The 
Spanish dictator claimed that relations with Truman were much less important than 
contacts with the American General Staff.19
With the reverse of instructions for the US delegates Acheson had not only 
alienated Spanish authorities but also came under pressure at home. He had already told 
a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 5 May 1949, that 
Washington would honor the UN resolution but pointed out that the US had never 
ended relations with Spain.
Senators McCarran and McKeller asked Acheson why the US, despite the 
governmental decision from 1947, still had no friendly relations with Spain, to which 
the Secretary pointed to the UN recommendation. McCarran then claimed that he had 
never voted in favour of a UN which would enslave US foreign policy. In return 
Acheson agreed to Spain's importance and acknowledged that it had been US policy to
16. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 20 April 1949, The Secretary of State to the US Mission at the UN, p.740.
17. Secretary Acheson, "US Spanish Policy", in US Dept. State Bulletin. 22 May 1949, Vol.20.
18. PRO, F0371.89479, 27 January 1950, Annual Review for 1949, Mr Hankey.
19. PRO, F0371.89492, 23 March 1950, V. Mallet, Rome.
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reintegrate her into the western community. To McCarran's question whether Spain 
was essential for the full success of NATO, the Secretary replied that "it is very impor­
tant. The pact can be successful without it; it can be stronger with it."
From Spain's point of view it was clear that the Spanish Lobby had made 
progress through contacts in Washington. Only the opposition of the President and the 
political implications highlighted by the State Department had to be overcome.
During May 1949 when the First Committee was discussing for a third time the 
Spanish Question, a new Polish proposal was handed in. This document accused the 
Anglo - Americans of improving their relations with Spain. It also recommended 
ceasing all exports of arms and strategic material and instructed nations to refrain from 
signing agreements or treaties with Spain. Obviously it ran counter to the instruction 
and interests of the US and other Western nations. Thus it was quickly rejected on the 7 
May. A counterproposal by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Peru was handed in. This 
proposal outlined the failure of the 1946 resolution and aimed at giving "member states 
full freedom of action as regards their relations with Spain." On 9 May it was discussed 
in the General Assembly. On 11 and 16 May the two proposal came up for a vote in the 
General Assembly, both failing to get the necessary majority. The Polish vote was 6:40 
and the vote on the Latin American proposal was 26:16.20 All NATO countries, except 
Denmark and Norway, supported or abstained.
Despite receiving more votes in favour than against, the final outcome of the 
vote on the Latin American proposal did not achieve the necessary 50% of all possible 
votes nor the two third majority of all votes cast and was thus turned down. Yet Spain's 
supporters in the UN had grown in numbers. In 1946 only six nations had voted for 
Spain. 1947 saw an increase to sixteen; now, three years after the December Resolution 
condemning Spain, twenty-six states supported that country.
The economic situation in Spain remained dire. Despite improved commercial 
relations with European nations and an increase of trade, Spain's domestic economic
20. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, Polish Proposal A/Cl/452 and Latinamerican proposal A/Cl/450, p.742n.
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position did not improve notably and had to face another serious crisis during 1949. A 
drought had caused serious problems for wheat farmers. To cover the necessities, 
Madrid was forced to turn to the foreign market. The British Vice-Consul in Melilla 
assured the Foreign Office that in the area of Malaga and Torremolinos the economic 
conditions had not been worse since 1932. Lack of rainfall also meant that not enough 
electricity was produced, which impeded industry.21 Barcelona had only 6 hours of 
power per week and the textile mills in Catalonia had to introduce a two day working 
week. The rail system was in disarray. Sometimes on crowded routes, travelers had to 
crawl through windows to get aboard and the transport fares consisted of the official 
price plus black market costs. The black market also drove up olive oil prices from 6 
pts per liter to 20 pts. The Rastro, the famous Madrid flea market, was full of stolen 
and smuggled goods. The market of demand and supply was undermined by rules, 
registrations and restrictions on the one side and smuggling, crime and the black market 
on the other.22 This endangered payment for Argentinean imports and finally lee/ to 
the collapse of the Franco - Perdn Protocol. Under this protocol Spain had received a 
total of pesetas 11 billion and had returned only 300 million in goods. As the gap grew, 
authorities in Buenos Aires became more and more nervous. Finally Argentina decided 
to end exports to Spain. The conflict between the two nations was over the perception 
o f the protocol. For Spain the trade agreement was a political agreement, for Argentina 
it was an economic one. After its collapse Spain faced a food shortage. In order to feed 
the country, Franco required at least an extra 500,000 tons of wheat. The payment for 
these imports were initially financed through a $25 million loan of the Chase National 
Bank. A deposit in gold was required and Spain had to pay 5% interest on the loan. It 
was hard to see how Spain would be able to pay back this loan without US aid, as in
21. PRO, F0371.79719, January 1949, Monthly Economic Report; also F0371.79729, 7 December 
1949, Effects of the drought on the food situation; and F0371.79729, 21 July 1949, Vice-Consul, 
Melilla.
22. Alvarez del Vayo, "Franco Spain: ERP or Bust", in Nation. 20 November 1948, Vol. 167.
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trade so far she had never exported more than $50 million annually to the US.23
The situation was so desperate that the American Embassy in Spain claimed that 
the Spanish economy was about to collapse. The drought from September to January 
had been a staggering 40% below the average rainfall. Culbertson predicted in 
February that this would result in poor crops and lack of electricity. The Charge feared 
that this could lead to disaster which was not in the interest of Britain, France or the 
US. Thus he recommended that the Export - Import Bank should negotiate loans and 
that the US should increase trade and investment in Spain.24
The State Department in Washington had its economic policy towards Spain 
under study since January 1949. Following Culbertson's description of Spain's 
economic collapse, Willard Thorp, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, sent a memorandum, 25 March 1948, to Under Secretary of State Webb in 
which he recommended normalizing relations with Spain. He wanted the US Embassy 
in Spain: "to inform the Spanish authorities that the Department no longer objects in 
principle to the filing of applications with the Export Import Bank for exporter credits 
or direct loans to Spanish agencies or enterprises." On 11 April, Truman approved 
Thorp's memorandum.25 Two days later, Acheson sent the instructions to Culbertson.
"It is realized in [the] view reported [on the] economic situation [in] Spain [that] 
assistance from [the] Ex - Im Bank could be very helpful." The Export Import Bank 
would consider Spanish applications on the same financial grounds as those from other 
countries. It was not an assurance of credits for Spain because there were still many 
impediments. The State Department believed that before any credits for Spain would be 
financially sound, she had to abandon her currency policy, barriers against foreign
23. PRO, F0371.79738, 11 February 1949, Grant by Chase National Bank.
24. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 17 February 1949, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p.729.
25. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, p.735n.
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capital and INI's influence on the economy.26 It did not take long for US newspapers 
to speculate that applications for credits from Spain would be approved.27
Promptly on 17 May, Andres Moreno, Chairman of the Banco Hispano - 
Americano, talked to representatives of the Export Import Bank explaining that Spain 
needed $600 million for consumer goods, $675 million for capital investment and $200 
million for cotton, soy bean oil and wheat. The Bank rejected this on the grounds that 
Spain lacked repayment securities. Spain's food supply was about to collapse. In 
desperation, Andres Moreno had four more meetings in May with the Export Import 
Bank managers. He asked for a minimum credit of $200 to $300 million and pleaded 
for a mission by the Bank to Spain. The Bank believed a mission to be premature and 
thought that considerable investigations had to be conducted beforehand. On the other 
hand, the Bank mentioned that credits for cotton from the US might be extended to 
Spain. This would naturally secure US exporters large market shares in Spain against 
Egyptian and Brazilian competition.28 On the other credits, the American Bank 
continued to believe that Spain lacked the ability to repay and Truman personally did 
not favour loans by the Export Import Bank to Spain.29
A paper by the State Department explained why Spain was not a member of the 
Marshall plan. It argued that western countries were against close Spanish - American 
relations due to internal pressure in these countries and fear of growing USSR 
propaganda on the subject. And as long as Spain was not a member of the Western 
European defense arrangements, the US could not enter bilateral agreements 
undercutting the rest of Europe. The conclusion of the report was that Spain's political,
26. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 13 April 1949, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain, p.735; also 
PRO, F0371.79739, 23 April 1949, State Department views on American loans to Spain.
27. NY Times. 3 May 1949; Wall Street Journal. 4 May 1949.
28. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 May 1949, Exim Bank discussion on Spain; also PRO, 
F0371.89479, 27 January 1950, Annual Review for 1949, Mr Hankey.
29. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 20 May 1949, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain, p.744; also 
PRO, F0371.79739, 3 June 1949, Washington Embassy to London.
100
Chapter 5:1949/1950 The Policy Changes
economic and military integration into Western Europe was desired but that changes in 
Spain had to precede this.30
That same summer, Culbertson decided to leave Madrid in early August 1949 to 
join the Spanish elite in the holiday resort of San Sebastian. There he expected to be 
closer in contact with the administration than in the capital which traditionally emptied 
during the hot summer months.31
He had become enchanted with Spain. His reports turned more pro-Spanish as 
time went by. In a memorandum dated 22 June 1949, he claimed that democracy in 
Spain was only possible in the far future because Spaniards had always been very 
individualistic. He claimed that "the present Spanish regime is no worse than its 
predecessors" and condemned the current American economic policy towards Spain. As 
for Franco’s evolution, the Charge wrote, "Franco takes no measures of an 
evolutionary character, and without evolution revolution is possible. ”32
Culbertson's report had little effect in the US. A memorandum was sent to the 
Secretary of State which suggested that the US should continue her policy in the UN 
regarding Spain.33 In a conversation between Bevin and Acheson, the British Foreign 
Minister expressed the same view as his American counterpart, trying to avoid the 
Spanish topic as far as possible.34
However, in the State Department, an official wrote that Spain's "present 
political quarantine is an impediment to realistic U.S. planning on a global, European 
or even Atlantic scale." Hoping that under Franco a middle class might develop, some
30. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 25 May 1949, Paper Prepared by the Foreign Assistance Correlation 
Committee, p.748.
31. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 16 August 1949, Culbertson to Ted Achilles.
32. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 22 June 1949, The Charge to the Secretary of State, p.750.
33. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 2 September 1949, The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to 
the Secretary of State, p.756.
34. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 14 September 1949, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 
p.758.
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in the State Department suggested a program of assistance to be extended to Spain. At 
the same time information was to be exchange^5 Indeed soon thereafter the US 
Information and Educational Exchange Program, USIE, intensified and extended its 
activities in Spain.36
Nevertheless, the President was unmoved. Truman stated in a press conference, 
2 June 1949 that he would not favour a loan by the Export - Import Bank to Spain.37 
On 13 July 1949, Acheson expressed himself against the loan and referred to it as a bad 
credit risk. The very next day President Truman described Spanish - American relations 
as not friendly. Before loans from the Export Import Bank were to flow to Spain, 
certain monetary changes in Spain had to take place.38 Truman was not alone. The 
Acting Secretary of State Webb agreed in a meeting that no loans should be granted to 
Spain.39 Yet McCarren continued his efforts in Congress. Former Secretary for 
Interior Harold L. Ickes wrote that McCarran was trying to "raid the United States 
Treasury in behalf of Generalissimo Franco". For Ickes, McCarran had disgraced the 
US Congress and he called him an "undesirable member of Senate" and a "socially 
retarded".40 The $50 million loan to Franco, so Ickes accused, was only to maintain 
the Spanish "trigger-happy" soldiers in luxury.41 In early April, McCarran1 s 
amendment to the Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill was eliminated in the Senate. Spain 
failed to receive credits from the US government.
There was also some pressure on the Sate Department by prominent people in 
the US not to grant credits to Spain through the Export Import Bank. These included
35. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 28 September 1949, S.Bradford to War Adams.
36. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 5 October 1949, Note by Williams.
37. Public Papers of the Presidents of the USA: Truman. Washington, Doc. 113.
38. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 18 October 1949, Thompson on Spain.
39. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 7 June 1949, Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, p.750.
40. Ickes, "Senator McCarran and the ECA Bill", in New Republic. 1 August 1949, Vol. 121.
41. Ickes, "State Department Shell Game" in New Republic. 8 August 1949, Vol. 121.
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Leonard Bernstein, Alfred Einstein, Rita Hayworth, Thomas and Heinrich Mann and 
Orson Welles.42
Madrid continued its efforts to secure financial aid. The Conde de Marsal, a 
wealthy and influential businessman from Madrid with close ties to the government, got 
in contact with the State Department. He wanted to submit four or five projects totaling 
between $50 and $60 million. The American Director of the Office of Western 
European Affairs, Achilles, argued in this conversation that there existed trade and 
exchange rate problems due to excessive control by the INI. As an example he gave the 
Barcelona Traction Company, owned by foreign shareholders, which had been declared 
bankrupt despite making profits.
The Conde de Marsal replied saying that Spain would prefer money coming 
directly from the US rather than being included in the Marshall Plan. He justified 
government intervention in the economy claiming that economic hardship had forced 
these policies upon Spain.43
In the US, the Spanish Lobby increased its activity. In April 1950 the Spanish 
government contracted the very respectable law firm Cummings, Stanley, Truilt and 
Cross as its American counsel.44 The Lobby had sought members working closely with 
ITT and oil companies. The California Texas Oil Company had been in contact with the 
Empresa Nacional Calvo Sotelo, an offspring of the INI, to negotiate a project of 
refineries near Cartagena.45 The Lobby was also in close contact with people in the 
wheat and cotton industry. In September it successfully brought McCarren and Admiral
42. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 10 January 1950, Letter "Spanish Refugee Appeal of the 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee".
43. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 1 November 1949, Memorandum of Conversation by Williams B. Dunham of 
the Office of Western European Affairs, p.763; further information in NA, Ciivil Branch, Lot Files 
59D108, 4 November 1949, H.Arey, Vice-Chairman, Ex-Im Bank, Conversation with Conde de 
Marsal.
44. JFD Papers, Box 50, 26 April 1950.
45. PRO, F0371.79739, 7 July 1949, Note on American - Spanish commercial relations.
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Conolly to Spain.46
Lequerica had initially concentrated on improving relations with the Republican 
party and therefore after the reelection of Truman, he was sidelined by the Democratic 
government. With no alternative he concentrated on Congress. The State 
Department wanted him to leave the country but he was already too well dug in.
James J. Murphy, a Democratic Representative from New York, visited Spain and 
called Franco a "very lovely and lovable character." The Democratic Senator Chavez 
from New Mexico declared while on a trip in Europe that Spain should receive 
military and economic help to aid Western European security. During early February 
of 1951, John F. Kennedy, then Democratic Representative for Massachusetts, visited 
Spain and met several Spanish officers including Major-General Jose Ungria Jimenez 
and Major-General Martinez Campos.47 Joseph L. Pfeifer, Democrat from New York, 
had told the press that Spanish-American relations were "a matter not simply for the 
United States to settle. It is in the last analysis a question for Spain and the Spanish 
people to settle. "Thomas Gordon and Clement Zablocki, both Democrats from 
Illinois and Wisconsin respectively, supported Pfeifer's statement. It is clear that 
these Democrats in Congress did not agree with the policy of the Truman 
administration.
Senator Owen Brewster, on 10 March 1950, pointed towards Spain's role 
during Operation Torch and outlined a report by Max Klein, a prominent member of 
the Chamber of Commerce in Spain, on religious freedom, as proof of Franco's 
relatively liberal government.
James Richards, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had 
visited Spain together with other Representatives including Mr Keogh, a supporter of 
the Spanish and Catholic cause in Congress. The two had been the unfortunate victims 
of a robbery of $5,000 while traveling on a train from Barcelona to Zaragoza.
46. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 10 March 1949, Suanzes to Culbertson.
47. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 8 February 1951, AA Spain to
Army Chief of Staff.
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Embarrassingly for the two the thief also decided to take all their trousers, leaving them 
with little to wear during the meetings in Zaragoza.48 Despite this unfortunate 
experience on their trip, James Richards had become an ardent supporter of Spain and 
pointed out that some countries receiving aid from the US were just as totalitarian in 
nature as Franco's regime. All this sudden interest in Spain was the result of the 
Lobby. It gave McCarran the hope of pushing through a new $50 million loan program 
to Spain under the Economic Cooperation Act.
The barrier that was going to complicate McCarran's efforts was the fact that 
the President took the ultimate decision whether a nation would qualify for aid under 
the European Cooperation Administration.
On the Spanish question in the UN, the Spanish Lobby strongly opposed the 
abstention vote in May 1949. A booklet by the Madrid Diplomatic Office published in 
1949 called for a rectification of the UN 1946 resolution. It stressed Spain's opposition 
to Communism and pointed out that Spanish Francoism, unlike Fascism or Nazism, 
was based on Church and Army as well as Party. The authors of the booklet also 
wrote: "Spain's neutral position [during the war]... decisively favoured the Allies."49 It 
was a blunt propaganda publication trying to justify Spain's selfish actions of the 
past.50 It neatly summarized the Franco myth.
Naturally, this did not convince in Washington. Dr Lloyd V. Berkner, Special 
Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chairman of the Foreign Assistance Correlation 
Committee, reexplained the decision to leave out Spain in military assistance programs 
over the past. This was done, he analyzed, because "greater damage would be done to 
the morale of Western Europe by creating a condition to which certain countries in 
Western Europe [France and Britain] ... would gravely disagree." He claimed that 
despite strong trade links "Spain is not an integral part of the North Atlantic Pact."
48. PRO, F0371.79706, 6 October 1949, Washington Post.
49. Diplomatic Information Office, Spain and UN accusations, p.40.
50. Diplomatic Information Office, Spain and UN accusations, p.8-57.
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Overall it was for Berkner just an adding up of implications and the result was "with 
respect to our total security position... there would be a greater loss because of the 
influence of providing aid to Spain on the other countries"51
However, Acheson was told by his man in Madrid that US policy towards Spain 
had to change. Culbertson analyzed that Franco was not going to step down due to the 
economic situation. He claimed that the Monarchists had not enough power to force 
Franco down because they feared an interference with their property. As for the armed 
services, Culbertson thought that they would be willing to stage a revolt if they believed 
that a restoration would come about but fear of the unknown held them back.
Culbertson believed that only strong support by the US for the government in exile and 
other opposition groups would break the deadlock.52 Culbertson concluded that only a 
change of the December resolution and favourable relations with Franco could bring 
about changes within Spain.53
International events underlined this interpretation. The fall of China to 
Communism in September 1949 increased the pressure of the emerging Cold Wir and 
thus made Spain's military cooperation more urgent.54
At the same time as the political question of Spain was coming under 
reconsideration in Washington, the military continued their quest for Spain's 
integration. In a report on military aid priorities, Spain was listed m the third most 
important category out of seven. It had become as important as Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal and Sweden. Yet the program also said that aid could only be granted to Spain
51. Joint Hearings held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Armed Services Senate. Executive Session, 11 August 1949, Washington, 1974.
52. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 9 November 1949/ 30 December 1949, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary 
in Spain, p.766/768.
53. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 3 October 1949, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p.759.
54. Olive Holmes, "New Pressure may alter US Policy on Spain" in Foreign Policy Bulletin. 20 
January 1950, Vol.29.
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if the political orientation of Western Europe changed.55 Spain was assumed to be a 
potential ally in case of war against the USSR.56 In particular the US Navy was hoping 
strongly to gain bases somewhere in the Mediterranean to establish a permanent 
headquarters for the Sixth Fleet.
The US was also looking for new markets on which to sell surplus products. 
Spain offered a very attractive option had it not been for certain domestic trade 
limitations.57
Trade with the US could have been expanded if the Spanish government 
removed its control over the economy. The Import Export Bank wanted to use credits 
as a quid pro quo to soften Franco's hard line on foreign investment.
There was a trend to interpret the restrictions on military trade with Spain rather 
loosely. The State Department for example justified the export to Spain of Jeeps 
without four-wheel drive as legal because they were not classified as arms and thus re­
quired no license.58
On the political side, Mr John Kee, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, expressed his criticism on the December resolution. The withdrawal of 
Ambassadors had not weakened Spain and a reestablishment of full diplomatic relations 
should have brought benefits. Mr Kee said that this should be done through the United 
Nations. Senator Hickenlooper argued that Spain was an easy place to get aid from in 
case of war, easier than any communist country like Yugoslavia.
Acheson continued to argue strongly against this:
"If anyone believes that Franco will be a loyal and true ally, all he has to do is to study
55. FRUS 1949. Vol.I, 18 August 1948, Report by the SANACC Subcommittee for Rearmament, 
p.259.
56. FRUS 1949. Vol.I, 1 June 1949, Basic US Security Resources Assumptions, p.339.
57. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 452.00/2-2651, William Dunham 
from Sterling Surrey, Spain 1949.
58. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 752.56/5-2650, 26 May 1950, 
Acheson to London Embassy.
1 0 7
Chapter 5:1949/1950 The Policy Changes
the situation in the last war. There never was a situation where anyone went overboard 
to declare his undying fidelity to two people as Franco did to Hitler and Mussolini. He 
was their ally from hell to breakfast and back again, and he never did anything for 
either of them during the war that was not wrung out of him, and he never did anything 
for us that was not wrung out of him, and he never considered any problem except 
from the point of view of his own self interest... by making love to this fellow you are 
not going to get bases from this fellow anymore than Hitler did."59
For the Secretary of State US policy could not change without a notable change 
in Spain as well as a change of public opinion in favour of Franco.60
Acheson held on to a policy which no longer was popular or realistic. Some 
American businessmen were already contemplating selling military items to Spain and 
making a profit by doing so. In March the State Department authorized the export of 42 
military planes. In October a merchant named Ceasare Sabatucci filed for a permit 
worth $400,000 for US surplus airplane engines which he wanted to sell on to the 
Spanish army for more than $700,000, giving him a profit of $300,000.61 The Dutch 
company Phillips was selling radar fire control equipment to Spain. Britain was losing 
export markets in Spain because she was unable to prevent patents being bought and 
exported to Spain by third nations. While Britain refused to sell 200 Merlin engines, 
France seized the opportunity and supplied them with 200 Jumo engines and Germany 
sold 150 BMW 132A aero engines to Spain. Likewise UK's Land Rover was not 
allowed to be exported to Spain while the US was selling 200 US Jeeps which Franco 
proudly presented in military parades. France helped Spain build nine destroyers at El
59. Selected Hearings held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations Senate. 
Vol: Review of the World Situation 1949-1950, Acheson, 10 January 1950, Washington, 1972-1976.
60. FRUS 1949. Vol.IV, 31 October 1949, Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain, p.762.
61. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1945-1949, 852.24/10-2649, 26 October 1949, 
Department of State Acheson to Embassy Madrid; also PRO, F0371.89565, 27 March 1950, Chancery 
Washington.
108
Chapter 5:1949/1950 The Policy Changes
Ferrol.62 By the beginning of 1950 trade restrictions with Spain were easily bypassed 
and trade relations became a scramble for lucrative export opportunities to Spain.
Britain was using the "end-item" criterion when deciding on exports, ie. who 
would in the end use the item and not who in Spain paid and received the item in 
question. The US and others did not use the "end-item" criterion, giving them an edge 
over British exporters. Even so, the State Department Munitions Division initiated a 
review of export restrictions to Spain hoping to relax them even further.63
Trade relations generally improved. Raw cotton exports to Spain reflect the 
development of the relations between the US and Spain. In 1945, Spain imported 66% 
of its cotton from the US, 18% came from Brazil and 6% from India. Over 1946 
relations between Spain and the US worsened as Spain was ostracized and by the end of 
the year only 44% of Spain's raw cotton came from the US, 43% came from Brazil and 
7% from India. This meant extra costs for Spain and thus the total of raw cotton 
imports fell to 61% compared to 1945. At the end of 1946, the UN had passed the 
resolution and American trade with Spain fell dramatically. In 1947 Spain imported less 
than 2% of its raw cotton from the US. Brazil made up more than 40%, India around 
40% and Egypt 14%. The total imports of raw cotton had fallen to less than half 
compared to 1945. In 1947 the US exported less than 1% of its original exports of raw 
cotton to Spain. After 1947, relations improved with Spain and so did the cotton trade. 
In 1948, the US had regained 8% of cotton imports to Spain. Brazil made up 53% and 
India and Pakistan made up for 24%. As American imports increased so did Spain's 
total amount of cotton imports. In 1948 Spain had increased cotton imports to 136% of 
its 1947 level. In 1949 the trend continued, the US now made up 31% of Spain's cotton 
imports. Spain imported twenty-four times more cotton in 1949 than in 1947. Brazil
62. PRO, F0371.89564, 5 January 1950, FO Minute by Mr Lawrence; 20 January 1950, J.W.Russell; 
25 January 1950, Chancery Madrid; F0371.89565, 25 April 1950, British Emabssy, Washington; 
F0371.89566, 2 May 1950, FO Minute by Mr Young; 17 May 1950, Chancery Madrid.
63. PRO, F0371.89565, 13 April 1950, Sir O'Franks, Washington; F0371.89566, 15 May 1950, 
Chancery Washington.
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only made up 43%, Egypt 12% and India and Pakistan 7%.64 In 1950 the US had 
regained its first position, making up 52%, while Brazil only made up 20% of all of 
Spain's raw cotton imports.65
Commercial relations between Spain and other European nations also improved. 
By 1948 Britain had seen her 16% (1932) market share of the Spanish automobile 
sector drop to only 1.2%. Yet in 1950 this had increased to an amazing 35%. In 1948 
France had imported goods worth 19 million pts and exported to Spain 64 million pts. 
One year later this trade had increased to imports of 129 million pts and exports worth 
132 million pts. Italian owned Fiat constructed a factory near Barcelona after the 
Spanish government had increased foreign permitted capital participation in some 
companies from 25% to 45%. International air travel too expanded. British Airways 
and Pan Am now flew to Barcelona three times weekly from London and New York, 
respectively. Air passengers increased from an average monthly 20,500 in 1949 to 
27,000 in April 1950.66
As the year 1949 came to an end, Secretary Acheson was receiving more and 
more reports urging him to reconsider his position towards Spain. Artajo's visit to 
Rome during the last days of 1949 implied that the Italian authorities would not object 
to a reversal of the UN 1946 resolution.67 In the US, many Congressmen encouraged 
Acheson to take action. Congressmen Buchanan (Pennsylvania). Chatham (North 
Carolina), Colmer (Mississippi), Green (Pennsylvania), Poage (Texas) and Richards 
(South Carolina) all supported Spain. The Secretary was advised in this point by his 
counselor Kennan, who told him that the Spanish problem had been exaggerated and
64. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 452.006/12-450, 4 December 1950, 
Consul Barcelona to State Department.
65. NA, Civil Branch, OIR Report 6211 Analysis of Spanish Foreign Trade, 9 March 1953.
66. PRO, F0371.89524, Monthly Economic Report, January, March, May, August, 1950; also 
F0371.89526, 19 March 1950, Hankey, Madrid.
67. PRO, F0371.89492, 5 January 1950, Sir V. Mallet, Rome.
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change was possible.68
Finally,_on 18 January 1950, the Secretary of State wrote to Connally, the 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the US would abstain 
in the Political Committee or vote in favour of the resolution "in the interests o f 
harmony and of obtaining the closest possible approach to unanimity in the General 
Assembly on the Spanish problem." He continued saying that "in our view, the 
withdrawal of Ambassadors from Spain as a means of political pressure was a 
mistaken departure from the established principle. It is traditional practice, once a 
state has been formally recognised, to exchange Ambassadors or Ministers and is 
usually without political significance." For the US, the prestige of the UN was clearly 
more important than the ban on ambassadors. Opposition to Spain in the UN had 
decreased dramatically and it was time for a change. As a justification the Secretary 
pointed towards the 9th International Conference of American States in Bogota 
which had passed a resolution reading: "the establishment or maintenance o f 
diplomatic relations with a government does not imply any judgement upon the 
domestic policy of that government." Acheson concluded that the US should continue 
to try to get Spain to change and to integrate her into the West where she belonged, 
but full relations were nevertheless to be resumed. The new policy towards Spain 
would open up new possibilities for American business. Government credits would 
be granted for specific and economically justifiable projects only.69
This argument was to become the official stance of the administration. Spain 
was still to be excluded from Mutual Defense Assistance Program. She had to 
democratize before aid would be sent. As the program was administered through the 
European nations, Spain was excluded. Given European feeling, Spain's integration 
would weaken the "collective effort to safeguard and strengthen democracy" in
68. FRUS 1950. Vol.Ii 6 January 1950, Memorandum by the Counselor to the Secretary of State, 
p. 127.
69. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents. P. 1690, also in FRUS 1950. Vol.ID, 18 
Jan 1950, The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
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It was asserted by Washington that to approach Spain would worsen her relations with 
the rest of Europe. Furthermore, a military bilateral agreement between Spain and the 
US would inevitably increase French fears of an American withdrawal behind the 
Pyrenees and thus decrease their willingness to fight.70
While some Congressmen welcomed this new approach to Spain. Others like La 
Follette expressed their concern. He wrote that "if it [the letter to Connally] was made 
in an attempt to quiet critics of the recently announced policy on Formosa we think the 
price is too high."
The American press, while generally accepting the necessity to change the UN 
1946 resolution, was almost evenly split in their feelings towards Spain. Out of a total 
of 33 US editorials only six, including the NY Times and the Daily Worker, disagreed 
with Acheson's position towards a vote in the UN. Eleven wrote that change was 
necessary but still made it clear that they did not like the Spanish regime. Seven wrote 
that a change of the UN resolution did not mean cordial relations with Spain. Only the 
Herald Tribune and eight others expressed that relations with Spain should be cordial in 
the future.71
In Moscow the outcry against the US new position was natural. Pravda claimed 
that Franco’s "talents as a torturer and hangman attract to him the sympathies of the 
American imperialists" and warned that "the imperialists are arming Spain." The paper 
Red Fleet saw Acheson throwing Franco a "Life Saver" and it was claimed that "US 
Secretary of State Acheson had stated that the American Government has proposed to 
Franco to begin negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, commerce and 
navigation."72
London and Paris showed themselves alarmed at the changes of the US policy to
70. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1950, 17 April 1950, Why Spain is not included in the 
MDAP.
71. PRO, F0371.89496, 9 February 1950, Press reaction to Mr Acheson's Letter.
72. PRO, F0371.89496, 11 February 1950, Moscow Press.
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Spain. On 20 January 1950, Britain declared its unwillingness to vote against the 
December resolution and France followed suit. These were hollow threats. Interest in 
improved relations with Spain had grown in both nations.
One month earlier, the Foreign Office in London reviewed her policy and wrote 
that "as a general principle it is the view of United Kingdom Government that 
accreditation of an Ambassador to a foreign government implies neither approval nor 
disapproval of that government." Yet Spain's particular situation was complicated by 
the UN resolution from 1946.73 South Africa for example accused Britain of practicing 
an unrealistic policy by accepting full relations with Peking but not with Spain.74
London was well informed about Acheson's letter to Connally. For the Foreign 
Office this letter only confirmed that the US saw no alternative to Franco and that 
"Spain is a part of Western Europe which should not be permanently isolated from 
normal relations with that area."75 The logical conclusion would be new discussions in 
the UN concerning the Spanish problem.
In February the UN General Secretary, Trygve Lie, admitted that he had been 
wrong on the stance against Spain. He now believed that it was better to talk about a 
crisis than to ignore it.76 This was a similar argument as the one outlined at the Ninth 
International Conference of American States in Colombia two years before. This did 
not mean that the General Secretary favoured Spain's full integration into the political 
system of the US and Western Europe. For him such a step was only possible if certain 
political changes took place in Spain.
Nevertheless, Acheson's letter to Connally gave hope to Spain and new attempts
73. PRO, FO 371.89500, 20 December 1949, UK Policy towards Spain.
74. PRO, F0371.89500, 13 January 1950, The South African Government's views on UK policy 
towards Spain.
75. PRO, F0371.89496, 19 January 1950, Acheson to Connally; also F0371.89496, 31 January 1950, 
FO Minute, Mr Lawrence.
76. FRUS 1950. Vol.II, 25 February 1950, Memorandum of Conversation by the Deputy US 
representative on the Security Council, p.227.
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were made to obtain credit facilities. Mariano Yturralde, Director General for 
Economic Affairs of the Spanish Foreign Office, got in contact with Herbert E. Gaston, 
Chairman and President of the Board of Directors of the Export Import Bank. The 
Spaniard was trying to push for specific credits for fertilizer plants and for phosphate, 
lead and zinc mining machinery.77
While these credits were being discussed, new military considerations greatly 
favoured Spain's good relations with the US. The National Security Council report,
NSC68, called for a more aggressive foreign policy with respect to a use of conven­
tional forces against the USSR. This implied that West Germany had to be incorporated 
into NATO and NATO had to secure its Southern flank. Spain's vital importance was 
highlighted again and it was stated that her geographical position meant that she 
controlled the main oil trading lines. NSC68 claimed that the USSR could conquer 
Europe within just days of the outbreak of a conflict. It had been drafted by Paul Nitze 
under the direction of Dean Acheson and with help from the Defense Department. On 7 
April 1950, it was delivered to the President and on 25 April it was discussed in a NSC 
meeting at the White House.78
The coming problems in Korea and the first successful explosion of a Soviet A- 
bomb made a change of policy necessary. Soviet nuclear capability which had not been 
expected to be achieved before 1954, made NSC plans before NSC68 obsolete. The 
fact that the US had lost her monopoly meant that her nuclear threat no longer offset 
the threat of the Red Army in Europe. The threat of a conventional war would again 
become a reality, once the USSR had built up its nuclear stockpile and delivery 
systems. A military invasion of the Red Army could no longer be answered by nuclear 
strikes. Whole new plans for the use of conventional forces had to be worked out.
For Spain in particular this was good news. All over Europe she was gaining
77. FRUS 1950. Vol.Ill, 24 January 1950, Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office 
of Western European Affairs, p. 1555; also PRO, F0371.89479, 27 January 1950, Annual Review for 
1949, Mr Hankey.
78. McCullough, Truman, p.771.
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ground with military planners. The Chiefs of Staff of most NATO countries agreed on 
the necessity for military bases in Spain. Portugal had even advocated getting Spain into 
Western European defence planning. Now the military consideration of Europe and the 
US became the same. Yet Europe continued to have more interest in political 
implications which relations with Spain would bring about. Closer relations with Spain 
might have resulted in communist political gains in France and Italy. In Washington 
bilateral agreements between Spain and the US were discouraged by the State 
Department. The Department feared that such bilateral agreements ran counter to US 
commitments in Europe to NATO by implying a defence of the. Pyrenees rather than 
the Rhine. The Office for Western European Affairs decided for the moment to follow 
the policy of Europe.79
The military planners disagreed with this. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chief 
of Staff, argued that not enough importance was given to security and strategic aspects. 
He claimed that France and the Low countries were unable to defend themselves 
against the USSR, thus Spain had to be secured as an ally in case of war. Spain was 
still considered to be the last US defence line on continental Europe during a 
conventional war. Bradley wrote "if a major war occurs before the Western Powers 
have the capability of successfully defending France and the Low Countries, the 
situation may well develop in such a manner that Spain would become the last foothold 
in Continental Europe." For military logistics, Spain presented the key between the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for either bilateral 
agreements or integration of Spain into NATO and the Western Union Treaty.80 It was 
considered at the time that Spain was incapable of any effective offensive action or even 
of defending herself against an attack by modem troops. This was due to obsolete war
79. FRUS 1950. Vol.Ill, 15 April 1950, Memorandum by the Country Specialist in the Office of 
Western European Affairs, p. 1558.
80. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 3 May 1950 
Memo JCS to Secretary of Defense, also in, FRUS 1950. Vol.HI, 3 May 1950, Memorandum by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence, p. 1560.
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material, insufficient modem training and generally the archaic military concepts 
employed by the Spanish armed forces. The Spanish soldiers had to be retrained to 
handle modem equipment and officers had to be taught modem warfare theory.
Furthermore, it was asserted that Spain had to improve its highways and railroads to be 
fully effective in case of war.81
The US military attach^ in Madrid received a very detailed questionnaire from 
Washington on Spain's war material. This was expected to be used in the future for 
military orders by Spain. Military cooperation improved. On 4 May 1950, the US 
military authorities in Germany allowed German technical specialists to go to Spain and 
to help out in the production of fine steels, high explosives and synthetic gasoline.
From 6 to 9 May 1950 one American cruiser and three destroyers visited Palma de 
Majorca.82 Yet political reasons complicated these approaches by the armed forces and 
shortly afterwards the Department of the Navy decided that "for political reasons no 
further naval visits to Spain should be planned for the balance of this year."83
The military was nevertheless convinced that "from a national security point of 
view, Spain is as important to the United States as several of the countries in the North 
Atlantic Pact."84
Undoubtedly this put pressure on the State Department in Washington. On one 
side military considerations were in favour of improved relations with Spain, on the 
other cooperation with European allies was not guaranteed despite their military inter­
ests in Spain. Dunham from the State Department recommended that the Spanish 
problem should be put on the agenda for Acheson's visit to London. Hopefully this
81. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1950, 31 May 1950, Numerical Strength and Effectiveness 
of the Spanish Armed Forces.
82. PRO, F0371.89496, 25 January 1950, Mr Harkey, Madrid; F0371.89497, 11 May 1950, US 
warships visit to Palma de Mallorca.
83. NA, Military Branch, Classified Correspondence of Secretary of Navy Francis P. Matthews, 
1949-1950, 11 May 1950, James Webb to Matthew.
84. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72 Background Information, 11 January 1950, J.H.Bums to Admiral 
Soures.
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would lead to cooperation with France and Britain in a joint policy towards Spain. 
London agreed.85 In these talks it became obvious that the State Department was 
willing to give in to military interests. Dunham argued that the political and economic 
situation in Spain was due to history and not to Franco and that these conditions 
required the rule of a strong regime. He claimed that Franco was tolerated and no 
political change would take place without a military conflict or a serious deterioration 
of the economic climate. Dunham speculated that if the Spanish economy was to 
continue to worsen then a breaking point might be reached which would result in riots. 
Initially he still expressed his fear in a Communist threat to Spain but after further 
discussions he abandoned this. The Foreign Office noted that Dunham had been under 
pressure from the Pentagon to improve relations with Spain and to get London to 
approve such a policy.86
Political considerations by the State Department in Washington had given way to 
military arguments. Their representative in Madrid argued that the US should study 
"the Spanish problem from a practical, even selfish, point of view." For Culbertson the 
policy to eliminate Franco was unrealistic and hoping for an economic collapse was 
futile. Thus evolution, he asserted, was only possible through acceptance of the regime. 
The Chargd wrote: "So long as we spit in the eye of the guy who has it in his power to 
bring about evolution, we can expect little progress."87 _ ,
On 6 June 1950, General Bradley was asked in an Executive Session of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Senator Vandenberg if he believed that the 
President should have the possibility to increase the number of those in receipt of the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The General answered that it was up to the 
Committee to decide on that issue but he also pointed out that he did not believe that
85. PRO, F0371.89497, 6 April 1950, US Policy towards Spain.
86. PRO, F0371.89497, 4 May 1950, US Policy towards Spain: 22 June 1950, US Policy towards 
Spain.
87. FRUS 1950. Vol.III, 20 June 1950, The Charg6 in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1563.
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Spain would hold out very long if she was attacked by Soviet troops. General Bradley 
and the Joint Chief of Staff though believed that despite Spain's geographical position 
and its exclusion, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program had a sound military basis 
and supported the strategic concept for the defence of the North Atlantic area. He 
argued that the reason why Spain was excluded and the US military was not pushing 
hard for a change of Spain's position was because "it would be a great pity and it would 
be very discouraging to the French" if the "French were ever to get the impression that 
we intend to fall back of the line of the Pyrenees and stand there?"88 At this moment 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped that the State Department would no longer oppose close 
relations with Spain but would wholeheartedly concentrate on improving relations 
between America's European allies and Spain.
On 8 June 1950, the Secretary of Defense issued NSC 72. It argued that because 
France would now or during the next several years be defendable, the US and allies 
should "take proper steps to assure that Spain will be an ally in [the] event of war." The 
paper outlined the military advantages of Spain and it recommended that the State 
Department should assure that Spain would be militarily accessible and cooperation 
would be unproblematic. The State Department should also overcome possible 
objections by France and Britain.89
At first glance this seemed strange because if France was defendable by NATO 
troops, the importance of Spain was greatly diminished as a last foothold in Europe. 
Nevertheless, if France was now defendable, a bilateral agreement with Spain would 
not create fear and suspicion in other NATO countries about a withdrawal from central 
Europe. Bilateral agreements would no longer offend European allies and had become a 
possibility. The State Department used this argument to encourage its European allies to 
improve relations with Spain.
88. Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Vol.II 81st Congress 1st 2nd Ses. 
1949-50, 6 June 1950, Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Statement by General Bradley, Wash­
ington, 1976/77.
89. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72, 8 June 1950, Secretary of State.
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For Washington, any bilateral agreement with Spain required sufficient funds to 
attract interest in Madrid. This question came up in Congress. On 19 June 1950, the 
Senate discussed the Amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Program which was 
to give the President the right to provide "military assistance to any other European 
nation whose increased ability to defend itself the President finds contributes to the 
preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area". Trying to limit 
political complications with its European allies, the State Department in Washington, 
represented by George Perkins, wanted to limit the President's power and thus decrease 
the likelihood of a rapprochement with Spain in two ways. Firstly, military assistance 
should only be granted to "other free European nations” and secondly the President 
should only do so "after consultation with the governments of other nations which are 
members of the North Atlantic treaty".
The second amendment was passed but it was made clear that the President was 
to consult and consult only before making his own decision. Discussions on the first 
proposal were more complicated. "Free” might have included Finland, Sweden and 
Switzerland but would have put Spain and Austria in a borderline case and would 
almost definitely exclude Yugoslavia. "Non-Communist" was also dismissed because it 
clearly excluded Yugoslavia. "Non-fascist" was also dismissed because as Senator
«*r. J .t-
Gurney pointed out "we must have every friend we can get." There seemed to be only 
one possibility left, leave the proposal out altogether, let the President make the final 
decision.90 This the Senate decided to do and thus tacitly sided with the military and 
against the State Department. The only serious barrier left hindering economic aid to 
Spain under the bill was the President's personal opinion.
90. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Vol.II 81 Congress 1st 2nd Ses. 
1949-50, 19 June 1950, Mutual Defense Assistance program, Sec 408(c) Amendment, Washington, 
1976/77.
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On 21 June 1950, George F. Kennan told Mr Cannon, a Counselor to the State 
Department, that the USSR would not invade Spain because Spain was ideal for 
guerrilla resistance and thus Soviet supply lines would be stretched over the limit. If 
this was so, Spain had little interest in joining the US in military plans. Kennan claimed 
that "no political concessions made now to Spain will bring us some sort of a military 
gratitude, or, indeed anything other than new excess of Falangist arrogance."1 This 
reluctance to approach Spain by policy planners in Washington was swept away that 
very same month.
On 25 June 1950, the Korean War broke out. Under the leadership of Kim-Il- 
ju n g , the troops of North Korea overran the sparsely defended border of South Korea 
and rushed towards the capital Seoul. Political circles in Washington already wanted to 
change American foreign policy but had lacked the popular support to do so. The 
military budget had been increased in 1949 to $15.9 billion but NSC68, a decision on 
national security, demanded an increase to as much as $50 billion. Congress had been 
reluctant to support this policy. Korea changed all that. The military got its way and 
overseas bases grew in numbers. In 1949 the US had 258 bases in Canada and Europe. 
Four years later in 1953 there were 446. The same can be observed worldwide, 582 
bases in 1949, 815 in 1953.
Naturally, relations with Spain were affected by this. Senator Harry Cain from 
the Armed Forces Committee, visited Spain and held friendly conversations with 
Franco and Artajo. He wanted to assure Madrid's support in case of war.2 However, 
political considerations still weighed heavily. After pressure from the Pentagon, the 
State Department argued, on 30 June that "politically, Spain is considered by many 
important elements to be alien to the underlying purposes of this policy. Any action by 
the US to bring about the participation of Spain would cause dissension and controversy
1. NA, Civil Branch, Lot File 64D563, 21 June 1950, George F. Kennan to Mr Cannon.
2. PRO, F0371.89497, 17 August 1950, US Spanish Relations.
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among our allies, thus weakening rather than strengthening the collective effort. "3 
The Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, stressed that France and the Low 
Countries were unable to defend themselves against an attack by the USSR, thus Spain 
had to be won over as an ally in case of conflict. In order to assure this, Spain had to 
be integrated either through NATO, the Western European Union or bilaterally. 
Acheson believed that the Secretary of Defense had based his argument on the theory 
that "the NAT[0] countries could not... defend France and the Low Countries 
successfully in event of Soviet attack" and thus he countered in his response, NSC 
72/1, that the whole NATO planning had been based on the assumption that no conflict 
would occur before 1954 and that NATO was meant to prevent and not to win a war. 
He concluded that agreements with Spain would weaken the collective security of 
Western Europe and French and British opposition had to be overcome first.4
Many in the State Department disagreed. Already in May a paper on Spanish 
policy by William Dunham and James Wilson argued:
"In the light of the intensification of the "cold war", the potential military 
importance of Spain... [has] increased in importance to such a degree that the 
security interests of the U.S. and the NATO nations now require that a 
program... should be put into effect, despite political objections, in order to 
provide at least for indirect Spanish cooperation within the western European 
strategic pattern."
Only in December 1950, after China's involvement in Korea threatened UN 
defeat, was this allowed to be forwarded from the State Department to the National
The US Army had already concluded that "In view of the wide disparity 
between requirements for forces and the current Western European plans for providing
3. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72 Background Information, 30 June 1950, State Department.
4. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/1, 3 July 1950, Secretary of State, also in FRUS 1950. Vol.m, 3 July 
1950, A Report to the NSC by the Secretary of State.
Council.
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them... it is wholly unrealistic to expect success in the initial defense of Western - 
Europe." The memorandum continued recommending that "the NATO powers...
[should] avail themselves of the military potentials of Spain and Western Germany."
This was against French political interests, which strongly opposed a German 
rearmament and an American - Spanish military agreement.5
Political considerations concerning other NATO countries had to be tested.
In a conversation between the US Army Attache and the British Military Attache in 
Spain it became clear that the British War Office was in favour of military 
cooperation with Spain but that the Labour Government was not, nor were the French 
authorities. It seemed unlikely that an Anglo - American military cooperation with 
Spain would emerge.6
In meantime pressure to improve relations with Spain in Washington increased.
The Korean crisis and McCafthyism created a political atmosphere under which it 
was difficult to oppose anti-communism in foreign policy debate.
On 27 July 1950 the Mutual Defence Assistance Act assuring aid to Europe 
was signed. Four days later, 31 July 1950, Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson wrote 
a memorandum to Truman. He made clear that under the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Act, Public Law 621, section 408(c) a total of 10% of the funds to countries in 
Europe could be spent in other European nations given three conditions. Firstly, the 
right could be exercised only "in the event of a development seriously affecting the 
security of the North Atlantic area." Secondly, the strategic location of the nation 
must make it "of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area."
Finally, the money should only be spent after "consultation with the Governments of 
the other nations which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty". Ultimately the 
decision lay with the President, who had to consider that the increased ability of 
such a nation to defend itself would
5. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1950, 1 November 1950, Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, 
U.S. Army.
6. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1950, Spain, 14 September 1950, Attach to 
Department of Army.
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"contribute to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and 
is vital to the security of the United Sates.”7 This opened the possibility of granting 
money to Spain.
Another possible source of funds for Spain was the Export Import Bank. The 
Bank decided in July 1950 that Spain could be in a position to receive credits for 
agricultural and fertilizer projects.8
A third source of financial support came from Congress. For the third time, 
McCarren and Owen Brewster proposed in August 1950 a $100 million credit to Spain. 
McCarran, who eventually received the "Grand Cross of the Order Of Isabella the 
Catholic" for his efforts to improve Spanish - American relations, had organized a 
secret meeting in his office at the Senate Building, which included several military 
officers of high standing.
McCarran's third attempt had been worked out better than the previous ones. 
The administrator Paul G. Hoffman was "directed" to lend money to Spain. Hoffman 
would issue notes for these funds and turn them over to the Treasury. In return the 
Treasury would issue the cash for the notes to Hoffman. He would then turn the cash 
over to the Export Import Bank for delivery to Spain. The Export Import Bank would 
only handle the mechanical details while the European Cooperation Administration 
would administer the loans.
With this system, McCarran had provided the most difficult step, the creation of 
finances for the Spanish loan. All the Administration had to do was put the existing 
money to work in Spain. Nevertheless, this last action had to be done with the 
President's approval. McCarran had no control over this final step but he had good 
reason to believe that the government would grant the money to Spain.
The procedure to apply for a loan under the $62.5 million appropriation was as
7. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1950, 31 July 1950, Lowis Johnson to President; also in, 
FRUS 1950. Vol.HI, 31 July 1950, Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense to the President, p. 1572.
8. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 11 July 1950, Perkins to Secretary of State.
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follows. A Spanish company seeking a loan would try to get an endorsement by the 
Spanish government through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This would be 
transmitted to the Foreign Minister and then passed on to the Export Import Bank. The 
Bank would make a decision and pass all applications together with the decision to the 
European Cooperation Administration. One of the problems was that neither the Bank 
nor the European Cooperation Administration saw all applications for the credits, as the 
Spanish Ministry had first choice.9 This complicated the whole issue as the Spanish 
Ministry was headed by Suanzes, who was also the creator of the INI. One could 
expect that many applications for credits by private investors would be turned down, 
not because of economic reasons, but due to a lack of connections at the ministry.
The Senate approved the credit by 65:15 on 1 August 1950 thus dealing a blow 
to the Administration, and the House approved a reduced credit of $62.5 million. 
Despite Truman's opposition to both credit proposals, on 25 August, Congress agreed 
that Spain was to receive $62.5 million and thus became the only country to receive 
credits from the European Cooperation Administration without having a bilateral 
agreement with the US. 1
Acheson and Truman both expressed their disproval but this loan proposal was 
more carefully constructed. It was attached to the first General Appropriation bill and 
thus had to be accepted or rejected in full by Truman. A rejection by the President 
would have sent a misleading message to Europe, implying that the US Government 
was no longer willing to bear the costs of defending Europe. Thus once the General 
Appropriation bill had passed Congress, Truman was forced to sign it, given the strong 
anti-communist feeling and the Korean conflict.
Any attempt by the Administration to risk a veto over the bill would have failed 
and any stronger attempts to lobby against it would have opened the Administration to 
accusations of being soft on Communism.
9. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives: Mutual Security 
Program. Perkins, 18 July 1951, Washington.
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On top of that the Portuguese dictator Salazar had publicly expressed his desire 
to get Spain into NATO. He said, 10 August 1950, that the "peninsular collaboration is 
basic for Atlantic solidarity. The geographic frontier of Portugal is the Pyrenees." If 
Spain had to remain outside NATO, Salazar hoped that the US would at least grant 
assistance.10
Despite Portugal's interest, the campaign for Spain's inclusion in NATO had to 
wait until the complications with Germany had been dealt with. Compared to Spain, 
Germany had far more military potential for the Western Defence structure, yet for 
obvious reasons many feared a German remilitarization. Thus "the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
agreed that General Bradley should approach the Secretary of] Def[ense] with the idea 
of obtaining his concurrence to withholding action on this matter [Spain's integration 
into NATO] for the present, possibly until the West Germany situation was cleared 
up."11
Only a few Congressmen were deeply offended by the McCarren proposal. 
Representative Howard W. Smith from Virginia said that the loan was "an almost 
ridiculous situation where an attempt is being made to write foreign policy on the floor 
of the House of Representatives." This was correct but the Administration saw a way 
out.
On 6 September, Truman signed the credit pointing to the fact that he was now 
authorized to grant aid to Spain but that he was in no way obliged to do so. The same 
day he said: "Money will be loaned to Spain whenever mutually advantageous 
arrangements can be made with respect to security, terms of repayment, purpose for 
which the money is to be spent, and other appropriate factors, and whenever such loans 
will serve the interest of the United States in the conduct of foreign relations." It was 
not only going to be a quid pro quo, but a deal would be struck only if political
10. FRUS 1951. vol.IV, 23 January 1951, The Ambassador in Portugal to the Secretary of State, 
p.776.
11. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 18 August 
1950, Memorandum on JCS 1821/14 [United States Policy toward Spain].
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skepticism by Western Europe, especially France, could be accommodated. For the 
White House the problem seemed only minor.
However, at the American Embassy in Madrid things looked rather differently. 
On the same day, Culbertson after hearing the news from Washington, informed the 
State Department about his position regarding the new law. He stated that "since the 
President and the Secretary of State have clearly announced the Administration's 
opposition to the credit, the Congress has by its action rather effectively taken out of 
our hand the conduct of one of the most important political factors in our relations with 
Spain." As for his personal position Culbertson argued "the Congress has certainly 
made a first-class liar out of me." The chargd had been telling Spain that evolution had 
to precede credits. Now that credits had been made available, changes could no longer 
be expected. The Embassy in Spain believed that Franco would do nothing until aid 
flowed to Spain.12
In the US, Acheson, unconvinced by the military arguments, claimed that "the 
Spanish army is not well equipped, it is not well trained and it is not in a position to do 
it [defend against a Soviet attack] and I am sure the Spanish would not tight for 
anything except their own country."13
The State Department conducted a study on Spain's strategic importance to the 
West and came up with a conclusion which challenged the military point of view. It 
argued that "a dollar spent in Spain, will in general, yield a smaller economic return 
than one spent in any other western country." It continued to claim that "in the absence 
of foreign aid, the military contribution of Spain would be negligible." Infrastructure 
such as the railways had made no progress since the war. Spain had fewer locomotives, 
freight and passenger cars than in 1945. Wear and tear of the Spanish rail network was 
estimated at two to three million cross-ties annually. Yet in 1947 only 1 million and in
12. FRUS 1950. Vol.m, 6 September 1950, The Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, p. 1573.
13. Selected Hearings held in Executive Session before the Committee on Foreign Relations Senate. 
Vol: Review of World Situation 1950, Acheson, 28 November 1950, Washington, 1972-76.
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1948 1.5 million new cross-ties were laid. The network was actually shrinking. The 
State Department considered that Spain's only contribution could come from its natural 
mineral resources. Spain possessed one of the world's most important mercury, pyrites 
and potash deposits. The report claimed that "the conversion of Spain into a base of 
Western military operations would be less expansive [than integration into Western 
Defense], but there would still be a need for considerable U.S. assistance."14 A similar 
report on Spain argued that "any unilateral US efforts that could be construed as efforts 
to include Spain in its over-all plans would be strongly resisted by the people. This 
would resu lt... in the loss of considerable public support for Western European 
integration and would jeopardize the successful achievement of US policies."15 After 
these studies it was clear that the State Department favoured Germany's integration into 
the Western defence structure over Spain's.
Considering commercial relations between Spain and the US, it was obvious that 
trade with America had replaced British exports and imports. Spain's main imports 
were: petrol 12%, cotton 11%, and fertilizers 9%. In return she exported mainly cotton 
manufactured goods 12%, oranges 12%, olive oil 7% and canned food 7%.In order to 
understand the importance of trade relations between Spain and other countries, we 
must look at Spain's main trading partners with regard to these main products.
She imported most oil and petrol from the West Indies and Arabia. The 
fertilizer imports, mainly from Chile, Belgium, Germany and French Morocco, were 
diversified enough to give no bargaining power over Spain. However, more than half of 
all raw cotton came from the US, making her dependent on the US for its raw cotton 
imports.
Spain's cotton products went 21% to Spain's overseas possessions, 15% to the 
UK and 9% to Egypt. Oranges went to France 39%, UK 18% and the Netherlands
14. NA, Civil Branch, OIR Report 5324.1, 10 October 1950, Strategic significance of Spain to the 
West.
15. NA, Civil Branch, OIR Report 5324.2, 9 October 1950, Political significance of Spain.
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11%. None of these two products made Spain dependent on the buying nations. 
However, 44% of all olive oil exports went to the US, making Spain again vulnerable 
to US pressure.
Spain also exported mining products which could have been processed in Spain 
to strengthen her economy.16 Yet to do so Spain needed foreign capital. Naturally the 
$62.5 million credit was welcomed in Spain.
Yet after studies by the State Department and because of his personal 
opposition, Truman spoke out against issuing these loans to Spain. McCarran was 
fuming. He claimed that the President was acting unconstitutionally and against a 
clearly expressed directive from Congress. But to force the President's hand an 
impeachment proceeding would have been necessary. In fact the President was not at 
all acting unconstitutionally. While he was obliged to make the necessary funds 
available, he was nevertheless under no obligation to actually extend them to Spain.
Shortly before Christmas, 21 December 1950, the Spanish Embassy in 
Washington wanted to obtain funds. Serrano Suner, then Under Secretary of Industry 
and Commerce, and the Marquds de Nerva, the Commercial Attachd, got in contact 
with the State Department to discuss a loan to Spain. The loan was under the Export 
Import Bank but did not fall within the newly passed credits. For this particular credit 
the Bank wanted 3.5% interest over 20 years, while the Spaniards argued for 2.5% 
over 25 years. There was also a complication over the range covered by the credits. 
The Bank was willing to support cotton, tractors, and fertilizer imports.17 Serrano 
Suner, however, wanted the credits for com, wheat, and petrol imports.18 Suner knew 
tfiat apart from the $62.5 million appropriated funds, other credit applications by Spain 
to the Export Import Bank were possible and what mattered most were the conditions
16. NA, Civil Branch, OIR Report 6211, 9 March 1953, Analysis of Spanish Foreign Trade.
17. PRO, FO 371.107717, Turner, Madrid.
18. FRUS 1950. Vol.m, 21 December 1950, Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs, p. 1579.
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attached to these credits. Spain could afford to wait as development were clearly going 
her way.
This was also true in the UN. Spain's ban from Specialized Agencies of the UN 
had serious consequences for the UN. The Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IMCO) could not guarantee the safety of Spain's ships, thus passengers 
traveling on them were under greater danger. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
had it more difficult to control the spread of major diseases while Spain was excluded 
and there was a lower health standard on ships and planes traveling to and from Spain.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) could not force Madrid to sign
» \
the Chicago convention and therefore Spain's standards of air traffic control and 
aerodrome maintenance were lower than in other countries.19 These were but a  few 
reasons why the 1946 resolution was unpopular.
On 7 August 1950, the Dominican Republic requested that the Spanish problem 
ought to be put on the UN agenda for the Committee on Politics and Security. Peru and 
Bolivia joined in the request and drafted a joint resolution recommending the revocation 
of the 1946 resolution.20. In short succession El Salvador and the Dominican Republic 
drafted two proposals along similar lines.21 The US had urged them forward as she 
was not willing to initiate discussions on this topic.
Pravda accused Washington of trying to get Spain into the UN and NATO.22 
The USSR claimed that US policy towards Spain demonstrated that she no longer 
respected human rights. Washington dismissed this criticism saying that the US hoped 
for an end "of external pressure" so that "Spain would, in its own way, take steps 
which would enable it to reenter the family of nations." This was further underlined
19. PRO, F0371.89503, 24 August 1950, FO Minutes by Mr Lawrence.
20. PRO, F0371.89503, 23 August 1950, Peru and Bolivia: Joint Draft resolution.
21. PRO, F0371.89503, 6 September 1950, El Salvador: draft resolution; 16 September 1950, 
Dominican proposal of draft resolution.
22. PRO, F0371.89497, 10 October 1950, Pravda 6 October 1950.
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with a decision by the Supreme Court which declared the Falange a totalitarian party 
and thus prohibited visits by its members.23
At the same time Washington was lobbying Western nations for the Spanish 
cause in the UN. Portugal needed no convincing. The Foreign Minister, Dr Paolo 
Cunha, urged the North Atlantic Council to include Spain in NATO for strategic 
reasons.24 The Netherlands and Denmark were also supporters of Spain's cause. 
Belgium and Luxembourg wanted to cooperate with France and Britain.25 It became 
therefore paramount for the US. to lobby Britain and France into a position favourable 
to Spain.
The French Ambassador in London made it clear that he wanted France to 
abstain in the coming vote but it was of utmost importance to his country that the three 
western allies should cooperate.26 As London was wavering under US pressure and 
thus did not give a clear lead to France, Paris decided to come down on the American 
side and vote in Spain's favour.27
In July the UK wanted to abstain on a vote but under US pressure and after the 
reaction by Latin American and other European nations London reconsidered.28
The British Chargd in Spain drafted a 16 page letter outlining his opinion that 
Britain should abandon her old policy to Spain and end the 1946 resolution. In London, 
the Foreign Office was divided on the issue. Some supported the Charge, others argued 
that the British public disagreed with such a rapprochement to Spain and thus rejected
>
23. PRO, F0371.89497, 26 October 1950, Hanky.
24. PRO, F0371.89503, 16 September 1950, Dr Cunha in Council.
25. PRO, F0371.89501, 8./8./10./15. August 1950, Dutch, Luxembourg, Denmark, Belgium attitudes 
to the Spanish Questions.
26. PRO, F0371.89501, 4 July 1950, FO Minute by Mr G.P. Young.
27. PRO, F0371.89501, 8 August 1950, French attitude to amend the 1946 UN resolution.
28. PRO, F0371.89501, 4 July 1950, FO Minute by Mr G.P. Young.
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the idea.29 This argument was discredited when unions like the National Union of 
Manufacturers encouraged better relations with Spain for economic reasons.30
On 6 September 1950 the issue was discussed in the British cabinet and it was 
decided that the UK delegation to the UN should abstain in the vote on the 1946 
Resolution. Furthermore there was to be no change of general policy towards Spain.31
Since the Foreign Office had initiated serious conversations concerning the 
Spanish Question, France had started to abandon her policy to vote in favour of Spain. 
Despite US pressure, France would follow Britain. One day after the British cabinet 
decision, the French Ambassador in London M. Massigli informed the Foreign Office 
that his nation would follow Britain's policy in the UN.32
After a wave of several draft proposals from Latin American countries, a joint 
draft recommending the revocation of the 1946 resolution was issued.33 This was the 
one which the Political Committee started to discuss on 27 October 1950.
During the three days from 27 to 30 October it became clear that there was 
overwhelming support for Spain. During the first day thirteen nations spoke in favour 
of Spain. Poland, opposing a review of the resolution, avoided defeat only by 
adjourning the vote for several meetings. During the next days only three Latin 
American states (Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay), the three Soviet delegates (Ukraine, 
Bylorussia, USSR), three Eastern European states (Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Yugoslavia) and Israel (a total of ten states) made their opposition to the draft proposal 
known. 28 other statements supported the draft.34
29. PRO, F0371.89501, 18 July 1950, Hankey, Madrid; 6 August 1950, Ernest Davies reply to 
Hankey's letter; 8 August 1950, Sir W. Strang to Hankey's letter.
30. PRO, F0371.89501, 31 August 1950, National Union of Manufacturers.
31. PRO, F0371.89503, 11 September 1950, FO Minute by Mr Mallet.
32. PRO, F0371.89502 15 August 1950, Conversation Mallet - Lebel; F0371.89503, 7 September 
1950, FO Minute by Sir W. Strang.
33. PRO, F0371.89503, 3 October 1950 Draft Resolution; 7 October 1950 Draft Resolution.
34. PRO, F0371.89505, 27./28./30. October, 1 November 1950, Sir GJebb, UK delegate at UN.
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On 31 October 1950 the UN Political Committee, in its fifth meeting, decided to 
hold the final vote. The result was 37:10 with 12 abstentions in favour of the draft and 
it was passed on to the General Assembly.35 On 4 November 1950, after a vote on 
each paragraph and finally in its entirety, the UN General Assembly with a vote of 
38:10 with 12 abstentions adopted the draft passed by the First Committee.36 The US 
had voted in favour throughout.
Two days later, the Spanish newspaper ABC  wrote that this was Spain's "final 
victory in the last battle of the Civil Whr." Artajo made the most out of the reversal of 
the 1946 resolution. In a speech to the Cortes in December he claimed that since 1945 
Spain had been a victim of communist propaganda. According to him, Western Powers 
had foolishly tried to appease the Soviet Union and by doing so had sold out Spain. He 
gloated that the West had finally realized that Spain had been right all along, the Soviet 
Union was a threat and appeasement had to stop.37
The truth was far from it. In 1946, the UN had made a vital mistake. It had 
attached diplomatic relations to a moral issue, making it impossible to separate them.
The change of attitude in favour of Spain was due to Arab and Latin American 
countries, changing their point of view between 1946 and 1950. In 1946/47, the Arab 
League was neutral towards Spain but by 1949 and 1950 they had reversed into a pro- 
Franco stance. The Arab vote in favour of Spain in the UN was in return for Spanish 
support against the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Furthermore, in 1946 only 
six Latin American countries voted for Spain, four years later 16 countries, out of a 
^otal of 20, did so. They based their reversal on two grounds. Firstly, diplomatic 
relations did not mean an ipso facto acceptance of the regime and secondly they were 
deeply upset with the economic gains by Argentina which had continued her
35. PRO, F0371.89506, 31 October 1950, 30th meeting of ad hoc Political Committee.
36. FRUS 1950. Vol.ffl, 31 October 1950, p.l577n.
37. PRO, F0371.89509, 20 December 1950, Hankey.
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ambassadorial relations.
The vote by the US in favour of Spain made the administration vulnerable to 
attacks from the left. President Truman, probably influenced by new documents 
revealing Nazi investments of $200 million in Spain, stated that it would be a "long, 
long time" before the US resumed full diplomatic relations with Spain. This greatly 
confused policy makers. Did it mean that the President, despite his nation's vote in the 
UN, did not favour the end of the 1946 resolution and circumstances had pushed him to 
approve it anyway? Truman's statement was only a personal statement and cannot be 
seen as the official position of the President. The State Department had a far more 
realistic approach and already in May 1950 had considered several candidates for the 
post of ambassador to Spain. The State Department had previously discussed with 
Truman the possible appointment of H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Undersecretary of 
State, Hersgel V. Johnson, Ambassador to Brazil, John C. Wiley, Ambassador to Iran, 
Mark Ethridge, a prominent publisher with experience at the UN and finally Robert M. 
LaFollette, former Senator.38 Truman, knowing that full relations would be resumed 
shortly, had simply made a diplomatic blunder.
Culbertson in Madrid was particularly upset with Truman's "long, long time" 
statement. It came as a blow because it looked as if a split of policies between the 
White House and the State Department had occurred. The official US position in Spain 
and on Spanish affairs at the UN had been undermined. It seemed that the State 
Department was eager to normalize relations with Spain while Truman was not.39 
Nevertheless behind the scenes Truman realized that his statement had been a 
diplomatic mistake and on 13 November, the President was again considering who to 
appoint as ambassador to Spain.40 Slightly more than a week later the question was
38. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 9 May 1950, Achilles to Thompson.
39. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 7 November 1950, Culbertson to H. Freeman Matthews.
40. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 13 November 1950, Memo of Conversation with President.
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settled in favour of Stanton Griffis, who promptly accepted.*41
Trying to lessen the embarrassment of Truman's statement, the State Department 
did not inform London about the final decision and Homer Byington, Director of the 
Office for Western European Affairs, told the Foreign Office that the two front runners 
were Stanton Griffis and possibly George Garret, Ambassador in Dublin.42
Only a couple of days later, Propper de Callejdn from the Spanish Embassy 
inquired if Griffis was going to be appointed ambassador to Spain. Byington wanted to 
avoid further embarrassing the President over his statement and despite having been 
informed of Griffis' appointment, informed Propper that no instructions had been given 
to him from the White House and thus he was unable to confirm the rumour.43
Griffis, bom in Boston in 1887, was a New York investment banker, who had 
served in the past as ambassador to Egypt, Portugal and Argentina. He also headed the 
1948 UN Relief for Palestine Refugee Committee. He was thus well suited for the job 
as he had links to Argentina and the Arab world.
Griffis cunningly took a holiday after his official nomination, 27 December, to 
decrease the continuing embarrassment by the President caused by his claim that a long 
delay would precede the resumption of full diplomatic relations. Truman told Griffis: 
"That's a great idea and exactly what I want. I don't want you to go for the present* so 
soon after what I said a few weeks ago. I have been a little overruled and worn down 
by the [State] Department."44
When Griffis finally presented his credentials at the Pardo Palace, Franco tried 
to make the most of the propaganda. A gilded carriage drawn by six white horses and 
escorted by the Moorish Guards was provided.
Britain and France were also in no hurry to appoint an ambassador to Spain, and
41. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 21 November 1950, Dunham to Culbertson.
42. PRO, F0371.89507, 1 December 1950, Burrows conversation Byington.
43. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 4 December 1950, Byington Memo of Conversation.
44. Lowi, "Bases in Spain", p.691.
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various complications arose. The British appointee ambassador, Sir John Balfour, was 
an admirer of the Portuguese Dictator Salazar and had supported British neutrality 
during the Spanish Civil War, but the Foreign Office was less enthusiastic about 
relations with Spain than Balfour. While the British Chiefs of Staff had urged the 
Foreign Office to relax the restrictions on the activities by the Spanish service attaches 
in London and to resume the visit of British Navy ships to Spain, the Foreign Office 
rejected both suggestions on the grounds that the timing would be inopportune. The 
Office argued that the new Ambassador to Spain had to be appointed and present his 
credentials to Franco, before policy changes could take place.46
JNor was Madrid in a hurry to improve relations with London. An article in 
“Arriba”, the government controlled paper, accused British officials of forging 
Spanish currency.47 Furthermore, during December 1950, Franco stimulated the 
campaign by the Falange against Gibraltar. The Foreign Office considered counter­
balancing this renewed campaign by delaying the appointment of an ambassador. The 
realization that this would do little more than worsen relations with Spain and the fact 
that Falangist agitations soon stopped, made London abandon the plan.48
The Foreign Office was hoping that Franco would appoint the Duke of San 
Lucar, former Spanish charge to London, to the post of Ambassador to Great 
Britain.49 Franco however appointed Fernando Castiella. Fernando Castiella was a 
member of the Falange and had won an Iron Cross while fighting in the Blue Division.
In 1941 he had written a book "Spanish Demands" in which he claimed colonial 
territories from Britain and France. The Foreign Office bluntly refused to accept him as
45. PRO, F0371.89506, 6 November 1950, Minister de Crouy conversation with P. Dixon.
46. PRO, F0371.89508, 6 December 1950, Chiefs of Staff Committee.
47. PRO, F037L 89500, 1 March 1950, Arriba article, reported by Hankey.
48. PRO, F0371.89508, 15 December 1950, FO minutes Mr Tbmkins; FO371.89509, 19 December
1950, FO minutes Mr Mallet; 20 December 1950, Hankey. __
49. PRO, F0371.89507, 15 November 1950, Hanky - Erice conversation.
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Ambassador.50 Instead, Miguel Primo de Rivera, brother of the founder of the Falange 
Josd Antonio, was appointed by Madrid for the post. This was only slightly less 
controversial.51
Relations with the US moved in a more favourable direction. The Security 
Council policy decision, NSC72/1, had revised US policy towards Spain. The State 
Department analyzed the implications of this document. It was clear that Spain was of 
strategic and military importance considering the volatile international situation. 
However, for the time being the State Department considered participation in the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Program and/or NATO impossible. It was recommended 
that the US should improve Spain's position without creating political controversies and 
her military potential was to be developed immediately by granting military equipment 
in return for air and naval bases. It was also hoped that now, as the situation in Korea 
was deteriorating, Congress would want to increase its commitment to Spain, maybe 
even so far as to integrate Spain into NATO or the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program. It was obvious that this would cause problems with other NATO countries. 
Though hope existed that these also had changed their policy towards Spain due to 
Korea.52
Under these circumstances it was natural to want to learn more about Spain's 
strategic potential and military requirements. In September four Spanish Officers, 
Brigadier-General Aguirre and one member of each of the three military services, were 
flown to Frankfurt to attend maneuvers of the US Army in West Germany. This was an 
attempt to find out more about logistical needs of the Spanish military.53 In October a 
study of Spain's topography to develop intelligence on military geography was made.
50. PRO, F0371.96154, 7 February 1951, Summary of Events in Spain for January 1951.
51. PRO, F0371.96154, 28 February 1951, Summary of Events in Spain for February 1951.
52. FRUS 1950. Vol.in, 25 November 1950, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs to the Secretary of State, p. 1577.
53. PRO, F0371.89576, 21 September 1950, Hankey, Madrid.
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Previous studies were almost ten years old and out of date for strategic planning at 
operational and tactical level. The study, expected to take between 18 and 24 months, 
concentrated on strategic areas of the Iberian Peninsula and of great importance to the 
US Defense Department.54
Nevertheless, all this was done knowing that Germany had priority over Spain. 
The US had to wait until Germany was remilitarized and integrated into NATO before 
pushing for Spain’s integration. On 13 December 1950, the Director of the Joint Staff 
was reminded that "by previous action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated that the 
question of German rearmament should be given priority and that the question of 
including Spain in the defense of Europe should not be pushed until the German 
question had been settled." Nevertheless, as the military commission had accepted the 
paper relating to Germany's rearmament, it seemed time to "take up the paper on our 
policy toward Spain."55
54. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1950, Spain, 17 October 1950, War Department 
to Department of Army.
55. NA. Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 13 December 
1950, Memo for Director JS.
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On the other side of the globe, US troops in Korea met disaster when the 
Chinese poured thousands of troops into a gap left by Americans. In two weeks the 
Chinese regained almost all of North Korean and defeat could no longer be ruled out.
In the free world, governments feared more aggressive communist policies.
As the Korean conflict deepened, the British mission in Madrid believed that 
Washington would improve military relations with Spain. The British Chargd Hankey 
expected that an American review of Spanish port facilities by the US Naval Attache 
was the initiation of a change of policy. This was not at all welcomed by other 
European nations,in particular by France, Greece and Italy.1
As the British correctly feared, the US was at the time reviewing its policy 
toward Spain. On 12 January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to the 
Secretary of Defense, concerning NSC 71/1. It argued that so far Spain did not want to 
join NATO because France was unable to defend herself. As this strategic aspect was 
changing and a stance in Europe against the Red Army became a possibility, Spain was 
expected to change her position and "under the circumstances, there should be little, if 
any, hesitancy on the part of Spain to join NATO.” The memorandum continued 
claiming that Spain's participation in NATO would not per se mean a withdrawal 
behind the Pyrenees of US forces. Rather it would mean an allocation of a defence task 
to Spain to "make a significant contribution" to overall Western defence. For the time 
being, the Joint Chiefs of Staff lacked the information on Spain's military capabilities to 
pursue this point and thus asked the Department to channel its diplomatic activities 
towards obtaining this information. "Military association between NATO and Spain, or 
as a minimum between the United States and Spain, should be effected immediately... 
As soon as the German participation question is settled, the United States [should] 
propose to NATO that authority be given for the military agencies of NATO to
1. PRO, F0371.96169, 10 January 1951, Hankey, Madrid.
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establish military association with Spain."2
Shortly afterwards, on 15 January 1951, the Secretary of State gave an outline 
of the new policy towards Spain. In this justification, NSC 72/2, the Secretary of State 
considered Spain to be of geographical importance and thus had to be integrated into 
the planning for the defence of Western Europe and the Mediterranean. America's 
ultimate aim was to get Spain into the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and NATO. 
Acheson claimed that the longer the US waited to approach Madrid, the more likely it 
would become for Spain to remain neutral in a conflict and the more the US would 
have to pay. Acheson claimed that it was indeed possible to eliminate the political 
disadvantages of Spain's incorporation into Europe. He asserted that, at the time, Spain 
had no offensive and only limited defensive value. In order to use military bases in 
Spain, new storage and repair facilities, radio and navigational equipment, port 
facilities, railroads, highways and telecommunications were needed. NSC 72 had 
encouraged closer political ties with Spain. In order to achieve this, NSC 72/2 argued 
that the US should "develop the military potential of Spain's strategic geographical 
position for the common defense of the NATO area. All action in this regard should be 
guided by the potential considerations set forth in NSC 72/1." Thus US policy should 
aim at defending France. It was clear that eventually, the US would approach Spain for 
long-range bomber bases and for naval facilities. In the meantime, technical advice was 
to be granted to Spain. The Secretary stressed that the American authorities should 
emphasize in all discussions concerning Spain that the aim was not to liberate but to 
defend Europe. To do so, one required bases in Spain for which the US would allow 
the sale of military equipment, air navigational aids and other electronic equipment. 
However, under NATO, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and the European 
Recovery Program, NATO countries still held priority over Spain.
The Secretary recommended that the US should make a complete survey of
2. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 12 January 1951, JCS Memorandum to Secretary of 
Defense, on NSC 72/1.
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Spain's requirements and capabilities, mutually exchange information, consult with 
Spain's defence planners and give technical advice. In order to avoid international 
complications, Spain had to improve relations with other NATO countries above all 
with France and Britain. The ultimate objective was Spain's inclusion into NATO or an 
agreement, acceptable to NATO, securing Spain's participation in the Western 
Defence.3
On 18 January 1951, Acheson outlined why US policy had changed towards 
Spain. He claimed that Spain had to be part of the Western European structure and as 
Franco's position was strong there was no alternative but to talk to his government.
The State Department, still worrying about political implications, wanted to 
know how Europe would react to the new approach to Spain by the US. Portugal was 
still favouring Spain's participation in NATO.4 The Netherlands had also shown more 
interest in Spain and in December a Dutch naval squadron including the carrier "Karel 
Doorman" had visited Valencia.5 The British Government was unhappy with the 
developments as the Labour Party was no longer united on this topic. Attlee wanted to 
avoid discussions in the'Commons altogether.6 A purely military bilateral agreement 
between the US and Spain, excluding Britain, was also unwelcomed by the Foreign 
Office as it would indicate that the US was getting Spain into NATO through the back 
door without the consent of Western Europe. The British Embassy in Madrid was 
aware of the American military plans in Spain and assumed that the US was looking 
after her own interests and not those of Europe.7 The British Chargd in Spain, 
discouraging US plans, claimed that Spain's army could only be mobilized with
3. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/2, 15 January 1951, Secretary of State; also in, FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 15 
January 1951, Draft report by the Secretary of State to the National Security Council.
4. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 23 January 1951, The Ambassador in Portugal th the Secretary of State, p.776.
5. PRO, F0371.96154, 4 January 1951, Summary of Events in Spain for December 1950.
6. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 24 January 1951, The Ambassador in the UK to the Secretary of State, p.778.
7. PRO, F0371.96203, 21 February 1951, Hankey, Report by Brigadier A. Murray.
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difficulties and transportation/supply lines to the Pyrenees ran along roads and railways 
which would not be able to deal with the increased volume in case of war.8
France too was opposed to the new US policy to Spain. While Gaullist elements 
favoured full NATO-membership for Spain, most National Assembly deputies elected 
in 1946 were still anti-Franco. Bidault and the official French policy were still strongly 
opposed to Spain's integration into NATO, bilateral agreements between the US and 
Spain, or agreements based on those with Turkey and Greece.9
Back in Washington, despite the disagreements with France and Britain, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff welcomed NSC 72/2 as a "significant advance in thinking by the 
State Department over the position taken by it in [NSC] 72/1." The only disagreements 
between the two Departments now concerned Spain's inclusion into NATO and some 
other minor points. .The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed small changes to two points, one 
in the analysis the other in the conclusion of NSC 72/2.10 The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
informed the Executive Secretary of the NSC "that the United States [should] now 
propose the acceptance of Spain as a member of NATO” and if this was not possible, 
US military planners should enter talks with Spain directly.11
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley agreed with NSC 
72/2's main conclusions. He too believed that Spain's exclusion threatened Europe's 
security and, given the right military guarantees, Spain might make her armed forces 
available for the defence of Europe.12
On 29 January, the Secretary of Defense issued his reply, NSC 72/3. According
8. PRO, FO371.96203, 24 January 1951, Hankey.
9. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 25 January 1951, The Charge in France to the Secretary of State, p.780.
10. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 23 January 1951, JCS to Secretary of Defense, on NSC 
72/2.
11. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 29 January 1951, Memorandum for the Executive 
Secretary of NSC.
12. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 23 January 1951, Memorandum by the Chairman of the JCS to the Secretary 
of Defense, p.783.
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to George C. Marshall NSC 72/2 overcame the political complications expressed in 
NSC 72/1. He wanted to make clear under point 7a) that "the military potential of 
Spain's geographical position" had to be developed "urgently" rather than be delayed 
due to political consideration. He asserted that negotiations concerning bomber, fighter 
and naval operational bases should not wait until plans for these bases were complete. 
Therefore the US should not approach Spain "eventually" but should do so without 
delay and with the expectation of gaining a military commitment from Spain. The 
Defense Secretary further rejected the idea of simply permitting "the sale of military 
equipment", he wanted to "provide" military assistance to Spain. He agreed that 
negotiations were to be conducted through the Embassy, but not exclusively so. He 
recommended that the negotiations be conducted "in close relation between officials of 
the Department of State and Defense." Finally, NSC 72/3 tried to amend NSC 72/2 by 
stressing the importance of an "early" achievement of the ultimate objective, getting 
Spain into NATO.13
The Secretary of State reacted positively to these proposals. Yet he argued that 
military assistance to Spain should only be granted in accordance with the final aims in 
respect of US policy towards Spain, ie. under paragraph eight, military assistance 
should only be granted once Spain actually had contributed forces to the defence of 
Europe. This assistance was seen as a strong bargaining position and should not be 
given away before agreements had been signed. In respect to the enforcement of policy 
through close cooperation between the two Departments, the Secretary of State wanted 
the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree at a later date on a 
single State Department mission to Spain. The reason for this was to present an 
undivided negotiation front, thus eliminating any attempts by Spanish officials to split
13. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/3, 29 January 1951, Secretary of Defense, based on NSC 72/2; also in, 
FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 29 January 1951, Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense to the Executive 
Secretary of the NSC, p.782; further information in FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, (undated) January 1951, 
Memorandum prepared in the Department of Defense, p.785.
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the US negotiations team into factions.14
The result of these communications between the two Departments was NSC 
72/4. On 1 February 1951, the NSC senior staff finished its discussion on the 
controversy between NSC 72/2 and NSC 72/3. The first six points of NSC 72/2, which 
formed the justification of the new policy, were dropped altogether and NSC 72/3 
prevailed. The resulting document NSC 72/4 did not allow the simple provision of 
"military assistance to Spain" but made this aid subject to consistency with other 
objectives. These were introduced into NSC 72/4 by the Secretary of State and read: 
"Any MDAP assistance given to Spain should be given under such terms and 
conditions as to advance and not retard Spanish participation in NATO. The 
Spanish Government would doubtless prefer a purely bilateral relation with the 
United States under which Spain received United States aid and the United 
States received certain rights from Spain without involving Spain in any 
obligations for the defense of Western Europe. This result should be avoided 
and aid should be given only if we are satisfied that by so doing we are 
advancing Spain closer to participation in NATO."
The primary objectives of US policy toward Spain were thus to develop urgently 
the military potentials of Spain's strategic position for the defence of the NATO area, 
to assist in the improvement of relations between Spain and Western European nations 
and to eventually obtain early Spanish participation in NATO.
This had replaced the claim that the contribution of Spanish troops to the 
integrated defence forces should be presented as a necessary step to Spanish admission 
to NATO and as a basis for the establishment of military assistance under the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Program. The same day NSC 72/4 was approval and became 
governmental policy.15
14. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 30 January 1951, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs to the Secretary of State, p.787.
15. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4, 1 February 1951.
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NSC 72/4 was divided into two sections. Section one was concerned with the 
immediate objectives of US policy towards Spain and section two with the ultimate 
objectives. Section one called for development of Spain's potential for the common 
defence of NATO and thus made clear that Spain was not to be defended on its own but 
was part of a common defence of Europe. It urged the US to approach Spain for long- 
range bomber, fighter and naval bases in return for military assistance and technical 
advice, it also suggested that the US should assist Spain in improving her relations 
towards other NATO countries, and hoped that after discussions with France and 
Britain, the US could form a common policy of western nations toward Spain.
Section two listed two ultimate objectives governing all relations with Spain. 
Firstly, Spain was to be included into NATO as early as possible and secondly the US 
should if  possible avoid bilateral agreements with Spain.16
Shortly afterwards, the State Department granted more funds to the USIE, 
representing American culture in Spain, for more personnel and material. At the same 
time instructions were sent to the USIE to induce people and authorities in Spain to 
promote US policies and to reduce Spain's isolation from international institutions like 
NATO, OEEC and UN.17
On 6 February 1951, Acheson informed the designated Ambassador to Spain, 
Griffis, about his delicate mission. Griffis had been confirmed on the first day of 
February and was planning to arrive in Spain on the 20 of the same month. He was to 
stay at Ramdn de la Cruz 5, with the Embassy close by on the Paseo de la 
Castellana.18 Griffis, arriving in Cadiz by boat with two large limousines,19 was 
welcomed by an American Export lobby in Spain which had organized a reception
16. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 1 February 1951, Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 
p.789.
17. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, February 1951, Country Paper for Spain of USIE.
18. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 4 January 1951, John W. Jones to Stanton Griffis.
19. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 31 January 1951, William B. Dunham to John W. Jones.
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buffet for some 100 VIPs. However, more than 1,000 turned up to greet the 
ambassador. Short of food and drinks it was not the best start to show American gener­
osity to Spaniards.20
Concerning talks with Franco, Griffis was instructed to point out that 
propaganda attacks on international institutions like NATO, OEEC and UN had in the 
past worsened relations between Spain and Europe and that Washington disliked them 
vehemently. Griffis should not miss the opportunity to outline certain economic 
problems in Spain, including the 25 % investment limit on foreign capital, the 
restrictions on conversion of profits from Spain to US dollars, the loss of confidence 
after the Barcelona Traction incident, the export - import controls and the multiple 
exchange rate system. All of these discouraged foreign investments in Spain.21 Griffis 
also had to make clear that if Franco wanted to improve relations with the US he could 
only do so by improving relations with Europe. He was to make it clear that the US 
was committed to NATO countries first and Spain second.22
In a meeting of officials from the State Department, the Pentagon and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the State Department asked for the Department of Defense to aid in 
working out further instructions for Ambassador Griffis.23
Before this was done, on 12 and 13 February Britain and France respectively 
were informed about some of the instructions given to Griffis.24 Four days later the 
State Department asked for their position.25 Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador in
20. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 27 February 1951, Griffis to William B. Dunham.
>
21. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 6 February 1951, The Secretary of State to Spain, p.791.
22. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4, 5 June 1951, Progress Report, also in, CD 092 Spain 1951, 9 
February 1951, D. Acheson to Stanton Griffis, also in, FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 9 February 1951, The 
Secretary of State to the Ambassador-Designate to Spain, p.795.
23. NA, Civil Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 15 February 1951, Memorandum for the Secretary [of 
Defense] by J.H. Burns.
24. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4 Progress Report, 5 June 1951.
25. PRO, F0371.96182, 20 March 1951, FO Minute Mr Young, Timetable.
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Washington, found the changes of policy regrettable. He feared that Franco would use 
them for propaganda reasons and more importantly, to drive a wedge between the 
Anglo - French and American policy towards Madrid.26 The American Ambassador in 
London, Gifford, contacted George P. Young, head of the Western Department of the 
Foreign Office who argued along similar lines. Ambassador Sir John Balfour in Madrid 
feared that splitting the Western powers was exactly what the Spanish Foreign Ministry 
was trying to do. He could only hope that the Spanish Ministry would be embarrassed 
if it tried to play off Britain versus the US. Yet Balfour already knew Griffis and he 
feared that "with his sanguine temperament Mr Griffis will find it difficult to remain 
passive for long."27 Already there were renewed problems between British Gibraltar 
and the Falange. At the same time the Spanish press was publishing anti-British 
articles. Arriba supported Argentina's claim for the Falklands and Guatemala's claim 
for British Honduras.28 The British Chargd Hankey in Madrid argued that military 
support for Franco would increase the activities of the fifth column in Spain in case of 
war.29 Gifford himself assumed that if the US acquired bases in Spain then the ultimate 
objective to include Spain in a common defence of the West and NATO would have 
become an impossibility. He believed that Spain would avoid multilateral agreements if 
she entered bilateral arrangements with the United State and thus bypass opposition in 
France and Britain. He asserted that bilateral agreements would increase the rift 
between the US on one side and France and Britain on the other. This would make a 
common policy towards Spain impossible.30
In a conversation in Washington between Dunham from the State Department
>
and Jamieson from the British Embassy these fears by the Foreign Office were
26. PRO, F0371.961841, 13 February 1951, Sir O. Franks, Washington.
27. PRO, F0371.96172, 4 March 1951, Sir J. Balfour, Madrid.
28. PRO, F0371.96154, 4 April 1951, Summary of Events in Spain for March 1951.
29. PRO, F0371.96181, 16 February 1951, Hankey, Madrid.
30. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 8 March 1951, The Ambassador to the UK to the Secretary of State, p.805.
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summarized to the State Department. The Foreign Office disagreed with the new turn 
in Washington and pointed towards the fact that relations between Spain and NATO 
involved more nations than just Spain and the US. Britain also feared that if the Spanish 
problem came before NATO, agreements on Germany's remilitarization would be 
slowed down. Naturally, from a defensive point of view, Germany was a front line 
country with more military potential and thus had to be given priority.31
In March, Dunham had a conversation with the Counsellor of the British 
Embassy in Washington, Burrows and the Ambassador. The Counsellor preferred that 
the US should not enter into talks with Spain over a possible inclusion into NATO and 
Sir Oliver Franks told the State Department that he believed that Griffis should not 
contact Franco at all before further consultation between Britain and the US had taken 
place.32 Dunham was unwilling to give in and could only assure the British that Griffis 
had been instructed not to touch on Spain's relations with NATO before the US had 
consulted with Britain.33
The British position was the result of a far more important political 
consideration. Public opinion and scarce economic resources in Britain meant that 
London would have been sidelined in a rapprochement to Spain. Gibraltar's strategic 
importance would have decreased if the US gained naval bases in southern Spain.
Pravda even suggested that Gibraltar was to be transferred to the US.34 Britain was 
certainly in favour of improving relations with Spain. In spring 1951, the First Sea 
Lord went to Spain and soon afterwards official naval visits were resumed.35 However,
l  --------------------------------------------------------
31. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 17 February 1951, Memorandum of conversation by William B. Dunham of 
the Office of Western European Affairs, p.798.
32. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 1 March 1951, Memorandum of Conversation by the Deputy Secretary of
State for European Affairs to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, p.799.
33. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 1 March 1951, Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of
Western European Affairs, p.799.
34. PRO, F0371.96182, 28 February 1951, Chancery Moscow on Pravda 17 February 1951.
35. PRO, F0371.96206, 6 April 1951, FO Minute Mr Young.
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London was not interested in a collective rapprochement to Spain. The Foreign Office 
knew that Britain, unlike the US, would benefit little from an economic or military 
improvement of relations with Spain. Thus it was advisable to hinder such a 
development.36 In an attempt to get Washington to reverse its policy, London lobbied 
for its cause. During the coming months, the Italian Charge in London received 
confidential information through the Foreign Office concerning US - Spanish relations. 
Italy in return supported Britain's arguments.37 The Foreign Office also discourage 
Portugal from raising the Spanish issue in NATO meetings, claiming that the military 
built up of Western Europe had priority over Spain's. In the OEEC Britain argued that 
Spain's membership was undesirable because "owing to the generally low level of its 
resources, the contribution which Spain might make to OEEC would of necessity be a 
very limited one." .London argued that for Spain joining the OEEC would mean a 
reversal of her monetary and fiscal policies, something which the Foreign Office 
considered to be unlikely and that therefore links should be discouraged.38
Given previous French opposition to the Franco regime, it is strange that the 
Quai d'Orsay was much more open towards talks between Griffis and Franco than the 
Foreign Office. The truth was that French opposition to Spain was concentrated in the 
French National Assembly while the Government and the Ministries were more open 
minded. This is reflected when a vote by the French Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
National Assembly opposing the appointment of an ambassador was overturned by the 
French Government deciding to promote M. Bernard Haridon from the post of charge 
to ambassador to Spain.39 A statement by the French Ambassador Massigli to London, 
expressing his concern with US policy to Spain, has to be seen as a diplomatic
36. PRO, F0371.96181, 16 February 1951, F. Hoyer-Miller, Deputy on NAT.
37. PRO, F0371.96183, 5 April 1951, FO Minute Mr Young.
38. PRO, F0371.96195, 12 March 1951, FO Minute Mr Falla.
39. PRO, ADM223.297, February 1951, Monthly Intelligence Report.
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gesture.40 At the same time, Jean Marc Boeger from the French Foreign Office 
informed the American Ambassador that Griffis should go ahead with talks with 
Franco. Quai d'Orsay was unwilling to bum any bridges with either of its Western 
allies. It hoped for top security in these talks, fearing that disclosure would lead to 
political repercussions but was not strongly opposed to the talk.41
When Britain realized that France did not strongly object to discussions of a new 
policy by the Western allies towards Spain, London backpaddled and suggested that 
discussions between the three nations should take place as soon as possible.42
While this was going on, Secretary of State Acheson told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the House Military Affairs Committee on 16 February 1951: 
"The importance of the association of Spain in the defense of Western Europe I think is 
clear. I think it is also clear that relations of this country, and I hope of other countries, 
with Spain are now entering a new phase". For the Secretary there seemed to be little 
doubt about Spain's strategic value.43 Military necessities had overruled Acheson's 
previous political considerations for Spain's integration.
If Acheson was implying that Spain should receive military aid, many on the 
right would have opposed him. Rearming Spain would mean less resources for France 
and Germany. Yet in Europe, France was the backbone of Western Defence. The 
Rhine and not the Pyreneese were to be the final stance, thus resources going to Spain 
were better employed in ten new German Divisions as far as fighting the Soviets was 
concerned.44
In spite of this, the Chief of Staff of the USAF repeated on 23 February that the
40. PRO, F0371.96181, 16 February 1951, FO Minute Sir W.Strang.
41. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 11 March 1951, The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, p.806.
42. PRO, F0371.96181, 22 February 1951, Hoyer-Miller, NATO.
43. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4 Progress Report, 5 June 1951.
44. Ernest Lindley, "Should we rearm Spain ?", in Newsweek. 5 December 1949, Vol.34.
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US urgently required base rights in Spain.45
There was another military consideration which covered neither strategy nor 
logistic distribution of war material. The Defence Department analyzed the dependency 
by the US on several raw material imports worldwide. In order to meet the full mobili­
zation requirements the National Stockpiling Program was set up. Internal production in 
the US, Mexico and Spain were the sole sources for four raw materials which the US 
required. Celestite imports from Spain were needed for signal flares, tracer ammuni­
tion, filler for paints, rubber and plastics. Fluorspar acid was required to built 
ceramics, flux (a substance mixed with metal to promote fusion), and hydrofluoric. 
Fluorspar was demanded for flux to manufacture steel, cast iron and ferro alloys. 
Finally and most important of all, Spain was required for mercury, vital for explosives, 
chemicals and electric apparatuses. Some of the worlds largest mercury reserves were 
situated in the south of Spain.46
The State Department realized that Spain's production of raw materials could be 
boosted by American capital investments. Lead production could have been increased 
by almost 100,000 tons, worth almost $40 million, with an investment of only slightly 
more than $4 million. $3.75 million would have increased pyrites production by 
1,640,000 tons worth $20.5 million. $1.25 million would have increased tungsten 
production by 4,700 tons, worth $20.2 million. The same amount invested in mining of 
zinc would have increased production by 70,000 tons, worth $10.9 million.47
Despite these considerations and due to the reaction of the British diplomats, 
Washington decided to back down and Griffis was instructed not to talk about detailed 
military questions. He was also told to avoid any talk about Spain's relations with
45. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 23 February 
1951, JCS 570/163, Air Force Base Rights Requirements in Spain.
46. FRUS 1951. Vol.I, 12 October 1951, Study by the Department of Defense and the Office of 
Defense Mobilization.
47. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 852.00/2-2552, Embassy to State 
Department Memorandum.
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NATO and bilateral agreements with the US.48 Griffis was informed by Acting 
Secretary of State Webb that Spain would be willing to accept either bilateral or 
multilateral agreements. The US would prefer multilateral ones but in coming months 
bilateral agreements were all that seemed possible. Before more detailed instructions 
could be given to Griffis, the State Department had to consult with London and Quai 
d'Orsay.49
On 7 March the Griffis - Franco talks received the green light to go ahead
despite further disagreement from Britain and France.50 At the same time Washington
wanted to make sure that the damage done to Anglo - American relations was
minimized through further talks with British diplomats. The same day, during a dinner
in London, Miss Willis, a young and inexperienced diplomat working at the US
Embassy, stressed the importance of utilising Spain's military potential and confessed
that Washington's immediate objective was the acquisition and utilization of air and
naval bases in Spain. She even revealed that the US would enter bilateral talks with
Spain while continuing to consult with France and Britain. After dinner Theodore
Achilles, in charge of the Western European Division and more experienced than Miss
Willis, had to reassure the Foreign Office representatives somewhat when he showed
himself to be more critical towards the Griffis - Franco talks and Spanish - American
relations in general.51
In Madrid Sir John Balfour had a meeting with his American counterpart.
During more than one hour Stanton Griffis outlined Spain's importance for Western
Europe. Instead of reassuring Ambassador Balfour, Griffis created the impression that 
>
he was in fact challenging part of his own instructions from Washington concerning
48. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 2 March 1951, Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs, p.801; PRO, F0371.96182, 7 March 1951, Mr Steel, Washington.
49. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 6 March 1951, The Acting Secretary Of State of the Embassy in Spain,
p.802.
50. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4 Progress Report, 5 June 1951.
51. PRO, F0371.96182, 7 March 1951, FO Minute, Mr "Young.
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Spain's relations with NATO and bilateral talks with the US! The two Ambassadors
were obviously not getting on with each other. Balfour had previously commented on
his fears about Griffis sanguine character endangering the delicate situation of Spain's
position in foreign relations. Now he added: "Mr Griffis showed himself to be even
more impervious to reasoning than I had expected."52 Some days later Balfour was
again outraged by the American's "naive persistence" and he wrote: "Mr Griffis struck
me as a tired man... he may well find it difficult to stay the course."53 Even
Washington seemed concerned about Griffis' over-enthusiasm and tried to stop Griffis
from further complicating the issue.54
Under instructions from Washington to improve relations and despite opposition
from Paris and London, Franco and Griffis held their first official talks on 14 March.
Franco did most of the talking while the American Ambassador listened patiently.
Nevertheless, Griffis must have briefly mentioned US policy to cooper ate militarily
with Spain and possible US use of Spanish air and naval facilities because Franco was
pleased to talk about the topic and discussed it at great length. The Caudillo guaranteed
concessions concerning religion, something which was vital for Truman. Then he
touched military matters. Expressing his disbelief that France could be defended, he
thought that America's best option was granting aid directly to Portugal and Spain. The
Caudillo expressed his willingness to join the US on terms similar to those of NATO,
should the appropriate aid be granted. This would tie Spain into NATO defence against
hostilities versus any NATO country. Even without such an agreement, he said that
Spain would be willing to send troops north of the Pyrenees after they had been 
> <<properly armed and supposedly trained. 3 The dictator said that "should Spain be
52. PRO, F0371.96182, 10 March 1951, J.Balfour, Madrid on Balfour - Griffis talks 9 March 1951.
53. PRO, F0371.96182, 13 March 1951, J. Balfour, Madrid.
54. PRO, F0371.96182, 20 March 1951, FO Minute Mr Young.
55. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4 Progress Report, 5 June 1951, also in, FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 15
March 1951, The Ambassador in Spain to the Secretary of State, p.807.
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sufficiently armed then he would send troops north of the Pyrenees to fight in a 
common front."56
As for American Bases in Spain, Franco told Griffis that they would be a real 
possibility if they were mutual bases and if in case of war they were under Spain's 
command. He also expressed his interest in a bilateral agreement with the US. The 
Caudillo left Griffis with the belief that he could be guided along any lines the 
Americans wished for as long as "aid to Spain [was] in proportion to aid given other 
countries." Griffis and Washington did not forget that it was crucial to approach France 
and Britain correctly if the policy towards Spain was to be successful.57
On the 16 March, Homer M. Byington from the State Department informed the 
counselor to the British Embassy Bernard A.B. Burrows about the Franco - Griffis 
conversation. On the same day the French authorities were informed in a similar way. 
What the Americans decided to omit was the part of the conversation which concerned 
possible bases in Spain which Franco was willing to grant to the US. Slightly later, the 
Embassies and the Representatives at NATO were informed about the talks, yet in all 
cases the US carefully avoided the topic concerning bases. The reason for this 
omissions is clear. The State Department wanted at least to keep the appearance that a 
bilateral military settlement between Spain and the US had not even been considered 
during the talks.58
On the same day as Britain and France were informed about the conversation 
between Griffis and Franco, the State Department requested the view of the Department 
of Defense on the talks with France and Britain over Spain. Tbgether the two 
departments were to work out the tactics to successfully implement NSC 72/4.59 It
56. Marquina, "Aspectos relevantes en las negociaciones entre Espana y los Estados Unidos", in 
Buhigas, Bases v Reducciones. Madrid, 1987, Franco to Griffis, March 1951, p. 11.
57. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4 Progress Report, 5 June 1951, also in, FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 15 
March 1951, The Ambassador in Spain to the Secretary of State, p.807.
58. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4 Progress Report, 5 June 1951.
59. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/4 Progress Report, 5 June 1951.
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was hoped that neither France nor Britain would make a public statement opposing 
these talks as this would show a split of opinion in Western policy towards Spain.
Four days after the talks between Franco and Griffis and two days after Britain 
and France had been informed a version of the conversations was somehow leaked to 
the Associated Press and received publicity worldwide. It had been America's attempt 
to avoid this publicity. Now Britain and France were forced to express their regret on 
the unilateral approach by the US towards Spain publicly. Naturally this did not 
enhance the relations between the three Western powers.60
In pace with the military talks, economic relations between the US and Spain 
continued to improve. In February 1951 Spain received the right for the first $12.2 
million under the $62.5 million credit. The credit was used to buy 60,000 bales of 
cotton and its conditions were favourable to Spain. The credit had to be paid back 
within 18 months at only 2.75% interest. The rest of the credit from the Export Import 
1 Bank could be used to buy cotton, wheat and even machinery, provided applications 
were filed for particular projects.
During the same year the US improved her trade position with Spain of military 
equipment in relation to Britain. There was an exchange of airforce officers between 
the US and Spain to discuss a deal concerning eight F-84 and two training planes, T-33.
In April several USAF Thundeijets flew from Germany for flight demonstrations in 
Seville and Madrid. After these demonstrations, a representative of the Spanish 
company Ramdn Escario informed the British company DeHavilland that he had serious 
doubts about doing business with the British company. Straight away Ambassador 
Balfour encouraged a flight show by DeHavilland Comets to limit the commercial 
repercussions of the USAF demonstration.61
In his over-enthusiasm Ambassador Griffis again went further than Sir John
60. NA, Civil Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 30 March 1951, Memorandum of Conversation, Mr 
Burrows (British Embassy) - Mr Byington (WE), similar letter from French Ambassador Bonnet on 19
March 1951; also PRO, F0371.96183, 30 March 1951, FO Minutes Mr Morrison.
61. PRO, F0371.96172, 9 May 1951, Sir J. Balfour.
1 5 4
Chapter 7: NSC72I6 Spain's Realignment
Balfour in the attempt to accommodate Madrid. During a dinner talk of the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Barcelona, he advocated technical and financial assistance 
for Spain in return for relaxation of restrictions on foreign capital in Spain. He also 
stressed Spain's strategic importance, a topic which had great appeal to the Spanish 
press.62 In another talk to the American Chamber of Commerce, this time in Madrid, 
Griffis requested help for Spain "not so much for the benefit of Spain as for the benefit 
of the United States Government itself. " He even urged the firms represented at the 
meeting to bring pressure on Congress and on President Truman so that relations 
between Madrid and Washington would improve.63 Griffis was not even deterred when 
a journalist in a press conference in Barcelona caught him in a series of political 
blunders. Griffis referred to the people of Eastern Europe as satellite people and the 
nations as write-offs. According to him Russia had destroyed the independent spirit of 
Poland. This did not make Griffis a popular man in European politics. More 
importantly in the eyes of the State Department, he over-emphasized Spain's strategic 
importance for the US. Despite his later regrets, such statements naturally lec/ to 
increased demands by authorities in Spain.64
Unlike Griffis, the State Department wanted to be far more subtle in pressuring 
France and Britain into improving relations with Spain. Griffis' approach not only 
created a bad atmosphere between the three western allies but also made military 
concession by and political changes of Spain less likely.
The State Department was aware that Spain's economy was not yet liberated 
enough to encourage private companies to invest heavily. An American report, dated 1 
February 1951, to the House of Representatives was very pessimistic about Spain's 
economic situation. It argued that the INI was pushing out private enterprises. The 
construction of a steel factory for example had been planned by the authorities in 1950.
62. PRO, F0371.96172, 16 May 1951, Sir J. Balfour.
63. PRO, F0371.96172, 19 June 1951, Mr Murray, Madrid.
64. PRO, F0371.96172, 11 June 1951, Sir J. Balfour.
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However, the factory was to be unprofitable and bankrupted other smaller, private 
profitable enterprises. Projects like these meant that liberals in the US could challenge 
the loan by the Export Import Bank to Spain.
It was true that after the collapse of the Franco - Perdn agreement, Spain needed 
credits to finance imports. The $62.5 million credit could have helped during some 
months. Yet many feared that the credits would be poured into state projects which 
added little to the solution of the problem.65 One had to conclude that the Export 
Import Bank had to administer-the credits very carefully so as to avoid the problems 
which might arise.
In April, Griffis sent his impression of Spain's economic situation to 
Washington. The Ambassador confirmed that Franco was firmly in power and that his 
death or removal would only destabilize Spain. He argued that the economy could put 
an end to Franco only if the army was willing to oust the dictator, which he considered 
highly unlikely. Militarily, Griffis claimed that Spain was unable to defend herself 
because despite the willingness of Spaniards to fight, they lacked arms to do so 
properly. Thus, he asserted, military aid and a military mission were urgently 
required.66
Military considerations in Washington played an important role. The U.S. Army 
was convinced that "Spanish military capabilities are so promising that they can be 
substantially improved for possible employment in the European Defense plans 
economically and more rapidly than any other European continental power"67 and "at 
no greater cost and fester than any other major continental European nation."68 Senator 
McCarthy supported this view in debates in Congress. He claimed that "the defence of
65. LOC, H 1868, 1 February 1951, No.8.
66. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 24 April 1951, The Ambassador in Spain to the Secretary of State, p.814.
67. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 25 April 1951, G-2 to C/S.
68. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 24 June 1951, Deputy Army Chief 
of Staff, G-2 to U.S. Army Europe.
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Europe should be... revised so as to provide for utilization of the military and other 
resources of Western Germany, Spain, Turkey and Greece.”69
More serious military considerations were not as clear cut as McCarthy's 
political opinion. On 13 April the International Security Affairs Committee argued that: 
"the military capacity of Spain to make a contribution to Western European defense 
would require the support of the Spanish people. It might be difficult to obtain the 
support if it appeared to the Spanish people that United States interest in Spain extended 
only to expenditures on behalf of the Spanish military establishment and disregarded the 
welfare of the Spanish people themselves."
The Committee recommended carrying out the $62.5 million loan by issuing the 
notes to the European Cooperation Administration for purchase by the Secretary of the 
Treasury and thus make credits more available.70
The International Security Affairs Committee argued that in order to implement 
NSC 72/4 further economic aid was required. Yet the document itself was not specific 
on this aid. The Financial Year (FY) 1952 did not include any budget allocations for 
Spain apart from the possibility to use part of the $850 million credit for Europe. 
Furthermore, the $62.5 million credit was to expire by the 30 June unless the European 
Cooperation Administration was extended into FY 1952. By now, out of the $62.5 
million only $17 million had been approved. Unless the money was extended for one 
year, there existed a real possibility that there would be no credits available for Spain 
during the coming FY. This would mean the necessity to issue grants to help implement 
NSC 72/4 because, the International Security Affairs Committee argued, military 
improvements depended heavily on the transport network, ports and airfields in Spain. 
There was no current estimate of how much credit was to be required but it was 
obvious that possible credits had to be created so that the government could draw upon
69. PRO, F0371.96183, Mr B.A. Burrows, Washington.
70. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1951, 13 April 1951, International Security Affairs
Committee.
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them whenever necessary. In conclusion, the International Security Affairs Committee 
reported that the $62.5 million credit of the Export Import Bank should be extended 
into the FY 1952 and Congress should increase the credit limit. If grants had to be 
issued to Spain, they should have been treated in the same way as those to 
Yugoslavia.71 Truman approved this report on the 23 April 1951.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had also concluded in a study on 13 April 1951 that 
France and Britain still opposed US policy towards Spain. Clearly the Korean war had 
moved them little in this respect. Despite this the Joint Chiefs of Staff report suggested 
that "measures should, therefore be immediately initiated by the United States to make 
Spain one of our military allies." The reason was simple: "a coalition of Western 
Powers to fight communism in Europe would be greatly strengthened by the inclusion 
of Spain"72.
In a memorandum for the Chiefs of Staff, 25 April 1951, it was argued by the
US Army that Spain's armed forces had many trained soldiers, a unity in general staff
and the troops were not divided by Marxist theories. Its only disadvantage, the US
Army argued, was that it lacked modem weapons,73 and there the US could help out.
In another project it was even estimated that Spain would be able to defend the Spanish
Pyrenees line or at least delay the enemy's advance by about two weeks.74
In a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, the Services disagreed over American policy
towards Spain. The Army wanted to introduce the Spanish problem to the Standing
Group of NATO and thus extend discussions with France and Britain. This would have
decreased the political complications but would have made bilateral agreements less 
>______________________________________________
71. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 13 April 1951, Memorandum by the International Security Affairs 
Committee.
72. FRUS 1951. Vol.I, 13 April 1951, Study prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Supplementary 
Study on the 15 January 1951 Review of the Current World Situation and Ability of the Forces being 
maintained to meet the United States Commitments.
73. WNRC, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 Spain 1951-52, 25 April 1951, Memo for Chief of 
Staff.
74. WNRC, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 Spain 1951-52, Project 6188 and, 10 April 1951.
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likely. The Navy and Air Force argued that if the problem came before the Standing 
Group, complications would arise. The two services argued that NSC 72/4 clearly 
called for negotiations between the two countries and at the moment this could only be 
done unilaterally with Spain. The Army believed that cooperation with Madrid would 
only be possible after France and Britain accepted Spain's usefulness for NATO. The 
Navy and Air Force once again countered that NSC 72/4 had dealt with that problem 
by deciding that the US would grant aid in return for contributing to the defence of 
Spain.75 The disagreements between the three services is not surprising. The Navy and 
Air Force stood to gain more out of a deal with Spain than the Army which predicted 
complications in military cooperation.
In either case military requirements in Spain included an improvement of 
Spain's infrastructure and thus credits had to be made available. In order to facilitate 
these, the Chairman of the Export Import Bank, Gaston, wrote to the American 
Embassy in Spain clarifying the form of acceptance of credit applications under the 
$62.5 million credit. Credit applications, analyzed on individual merits, had to be in the 
interest of the US and Spanish economy, above all the private sector. The Bank 
favoured applications for the mining and agriculture sectors. According to Gaston, the 
most often committed mistake in applying for credits was that the Spanish industry did 
not file for specific programs. By April 1951 only five credits adding up to $17.2 
million had been approved: $5 for cotton, $3.5 for fertilizers, $3 for tractors, $0.7 for 
fertilizers by the project of the Sociedad Iberica Nitrogeno and $5 million for wheat. 
Some of these were not even taken up, such as credits for cotton and fertilizers. Instead 
credits for insignificant parts for tractors had been used. Other credit applications had 
been rejected due to the size, lack of alternative funds, lack of knowledge or lack of 
economic justification. In return the Bank proposed credits for more wheat, cotton,
75. NA, Civil Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec.1-8, JCS 1821/31 
Draft, April 1951.
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fertilizer, and other sectors.76
Later the same year, Griffis told the Acting Secretary of State that the fault for 
the delay of credits under the Export Import Bank was not only due to Spain's lack of 
correct applications but also due to the US slow process of granting credits to small and 
medium sized projects.77 The Acting Secretary replied that this was due to the failure 
by Spaniards to apply for specific programs.78 Whatever the case, the fact that credits 
under the $62.5 million appropriation were only slowly forthcoming, complicated 
military considerations.
Initially after NSC 72/4, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to send Admiral 
Carney, Commander-in-Chief of the USNF Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean to 
contact Spanish military authorities in order to obtain US flight, stop and transit rights 
over Spain. Carney was also to have asked for free access to and use of military bases 
in Spain, Spanish Morocco and Spain's Islands. These bases would have been used to 
control the Strait of the Gibraltar and for antisubmarine warfare. The Admiral was to 
conduct "initial military discussion of an exploratory nature with Spanish military 
authorities." However, since the passage of NSC 72/4, there had been nervous talks 
between France and the US on 13 February, 19 February and 11 March. Similar talks 
had been held six times with the British between 17 February and 29 March. Under 
these circumstances the State Department wanted to hold further talks with France and 
Britain before Admiral Carney's visit to Spain. The Department of Defense did not 
want any delays and planned to go ahead with the visit.79
The Foreign Office in Britain was very much opposed to the new approach by
>
the US to Spain. On the other hand a study by the British Joint Planning Staff, part of
76. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 23 April 1951, The Chairman of the Export Import Bank to the Embassy in 
Spain, p.844.
77. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 8 December 1951, The Ambassador Griffis to the Secretary of State, p.855.
78. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 12 December 1951, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain, 
p. 856.
79. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 1 May 1951, G.C. Marshall to Secretary of State.
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the Chiefs of Staff, pointed in exactly the opposite direction. Similar to US plans, 
theBritish study recognized Spain's strategic value. It was claimed that Germany's 
rearmament made a change of policy towards Spain possible. However, Spain was not 
to be included into NATO due to political implications. Concerning the other 
alternative, a bilateral agreement between the US and Spain, the British Joint Planning 
Staff hoped that France and Britain would be able to enter simultaneously a secret 
contract with Spain, allowing the use of facilities. The downsides o f such an 
agreement were: firstly, a diversion of American military arms to Spain, away from 
the rest of Europe. Secondly, the risk that Spain and Portugal might permanently enter 
the American sphere. Finally, that the problems caused would weaken NATO's 
defence concept in general.
The Joint Planning Staff saw two options - either to abandon any military 
association with Spain, hoping that pressure on Washington would make them back 
down or to agree with the idea of bilateral agreements between the US and Spain. The 
report clearly outlined that the former option carried a high risk in that sofar 
Washington had not been willing to give in to European concern and there was no 
indication that it might do so in the future. Thus London risked being sidelined and cut 
out of a deal. The report read: ''It is clear that the Americans are intent on reaching a . 
military understanding with General Franco, it would therefore be useless to oppose 
the American pact as our opposition would only harm Anglo/American relations."
Thus the report recommended that "to reduce the dangers to us inherent in a
 bilateral agreement we should associate ourselves with the agreement so as to obtain
the maximum advantages from it."80 Unfortunately the Foreign Office chose not to 
follow the military recommendations and decided instead to become sidelined.
On 23~ April, a directive went to Admiral Carney. After George C. Marshall's 
encouragement, Carney was instructed to conduct initial military discussions with
80. PRO, DEFE6.16, 24 April 1951, Report by JPS.
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Spain, to form the basis for future military cooperation.81 US military requirements 
were long-term rights in Spain to base and rotate air groups. These rights were to 
include Cadiz, Madrid, Barcelona, Seville and three other airfields. The Navy was to 
seek anchorage rights in Barcelona, Algeciras, Cartagena, Ceuta and four other ports. 
Arrangements for his trip were being made through the Senior Military Attachd in 
Madrid and the American Ambassador to Spain was to be kept informed about 
developments. Admiral Carney was instructed to avoid publicity.82
Two weeks later the service attaches in Spain organized aerial photographs of 
Valencia, Thrragona, Cullera, Sagunto, Barcelona, Badalona and other coastal areas.83 
These were to help future negotiations and to clarify the sites identified for military 
bases.
Spain was very much interested in purchasing military equipment for their 
armed services. Lequerica informed Acheson that Spain wanted to purchase fourteen 
fully equipped and armed F-51D fighter planes of which two should be for training 
purposes.84 The State Department dealt fairly quickly with the Spanish proposal. Spain 
could only get these fighter planes through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act if the 
President was willing to grant them. As this was very unlikely, Spain was told to forget 
about the purchase.85 In June the Spanish Air Minister General Gallarza visited the 
Secretary of Air Finletter.86 Another visit by Lieutenant-General Camilo Alonso Vega,
81. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 1 May George C. Marshall to State Department.
82. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 23 April 1951, Draft Directive to C-in-C, USNF, East 
Atlantic and Mediterranean.
83. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 10 May 1951, AA Spain to 
Department of State.
84. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 752.5622/5-2851, Lequerica, 
Ambassador to Acheson.
85. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 752.5622/6-1451, John C. Ellitt to 
William Dunham.
86. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 22 June 1951, Memorandum for 
the Executive.
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Director General of the Spanish Civil Guard was planned for August.87 Military 
relations were improving and economic considerations were closely linked to these.
During the first half of 1951, rising prices in Spain had led to strikes in 
Barcelona during early April and to other worker and student riots. To provide social 
stability, Spain needed economic aid. After clarifications in Washington, loans were 
made more accessible to Spain. By May 1952 Spain had received the following credits 
under the $62.5 appropriation: $17 million for cotton, $7.5 million for the railways,
$7.25 million for wheat, $4.7 million for mining, and $17.5 for several other projects 
and raw materials, leaving $10 million.88 All these credits were granted between the 
beginning of 1951 and 1952. Thus it took almost half a year to extend the first credit 
but then they were granted freely.
Between 1949 and 1951 Spain had also received private credits from US banks.
The Chase Manhattan had granted Spain $42 million and the National City Bank had 
given Franco $20 million for agricultural machinery and food.
This was crucial because Spain lacked the financial capacity to improve in the 
agricultural sector. Less than 1% of the total government expenditure went into 
agricultural improvement in 1950. These credits for Spain were also of some 
importance to the American industry. In the US, the export surplus had fallen from 
$6.2 billion in 1949 to $3.6 billion one year later and new markets were vital to US 
exporters.
Spain was one such possible market. On 7 June 1951, the State Department, 
issuing NSC 72/5, argued that in order to achieve the objectives of NSC 72/4 certain 
changes had to be made concerning economic and military assistance. The Department 
agreed that the development of Spain's military potential was no longer to be governed 
by political considerations. Thus US officials should no longer have to emphasise that
87. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 28 July 1951, Letter Camilo Alonso 
Vega.
88. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives: 
Mutual Security Appropriations for 1953. Washington, 1952, p.535.
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the primary role envisaged for Spain was supporting the defence of Europe. The State 
Department even agreed to "provide military assistance and the necessary and 
appropriate economic assistance to Spain". Here the State Department had gone one 
step further than in NSC 72/4. Now Spain was not only to receive military assistance 
but also economic assistance as long as this was compatible with two restrictions. 
Firstly, "any assistance provided to Spain should be guided by the simple principle that 
the NAT countries have priority for our aid and for material under the NAT, MDAP 
and ERP." Secondly, "any military or economic assistance given to Spain should be 
given under such terms and conditions as to advance and not retard Spanish 
participation in NATO etc." NSC72/5 suggested that the Defense Department should 
continue to release "through the Civil Aeronautics Administration, either directly to the 
Spaniards or through the United States air lines operating in Spain, as much as possible 
of the air navigational aids and other electronic equipment which the Spanish 
Government requested last June during the negotiation of the Civil Air Agreement." 
Nevertheless, the State Department continued to argue that it was important to "reach 
agreements with ... NATO on Spanish participation and thereafter to initiate 
discussions with the Spanish Government." Compared to NSC 72/4, the State Depart­
ment had watered down the attack on Spain's attempt to gain bilateral agreements. The 
only other changes in NSC 72/5 were minor differences in immediate objectives, 
ultimate objectives, guiding considerations, political and administrative ways to achieve 
objectives.89
Shortly thereafter, on 19 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to change NSC
*
72/5. This was due to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg's belief that NSC 72/5 gave the 
impression that if Spain was not to be included in NATO and no alternative 
arrangements could be made with NATO members then no alternative mutual defence
89. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/5, 7 June 1951, State Department.
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arrangement would be concluded.90 It was proposed that point 2a) should read "to 
obtain early Spanish participation in NATO" instead of as "early as possible" and point 
2b) "to conclude alternative mutual security arrangements"91 instead of trying to avoid 
bilateral agreements.
On 27 June 1951, the NSC senior staff issued NSC 72/6 as a response to the 
State Department's proposal. The changes were dramatic, political considerations no 
longer governed the development of Spain's military potential. The paper no longer put 
an emphasis on defending rather than liberating Europe. Spain's inclusion into NATO 
was no longer a long-term aim but fell under the section of immediate objectives. The 
paper even argued that if Spain's integration was delayed, alternative mutual security 
arrangements should be proposed. The paper suggested that military and air aviation 
aids were to be granted by the Defense Department. Although the NSC still considered 
NATO to have precedence over Spain concerning military aid, NATO no longer had 
priority if aid for Spain would be "facilitating the acquisition by the United States and 
its allies of strategic materials of use in their mobilization efforts." American 
negotiators could now approach Spain for military bases disregarding European opposi­
tion. The NSC staff had decided not to go along with the State Department's proposal 
that before initiating discussions with Spain concerning its inclusion into NATO, 
agreements had to be reached with other NATO countries.92 This paper, NSC 72/6, 
was approved by the President Truman on 28 June 1951 and became US policy.
Nevertheless, on 23 June, five days before NSC 72/6 had become US policy, 
the Secretary of State had informed Griffis that US policy to Spain was still governed 
under NSC 72/4 which meant that before Spain would receive any further credits it had
90. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72 Background Information, 19 June 1951, Vandenberg to Secretary of 
State.
91. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 19 June 1951, JCS to Secretary of Defense.
92. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6, 27 June 1951, Revision by Senior NSC Staff of NSC 72/5, also in, 
FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 27 June 1951, Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council.
1 6 5
Chapter 7: NSC72/6 Spain's Realignment
to grant base rights to the US.93
International considerations were changing and further talks had to be held by 
the US with France and Britain. Washington hoped that London was ready to enter 
military talks with Spain.94 After the first negotiations on 15 June with foreign 
diplomatic representatives to the US, the Secretary of State wrote to the Embassy in 
Spain: "We shall inform Brit[ain] and Fr[ance] that the US Gov[emmen]t believes in 
order to carry out our NATO responsibilities it will be necessary for us to make 
bilateral arrangements with Spain to secure base facilities." The same day both the 
French and British embassies were informed about this.95 On 21 and 22 June more 
talks were held between the US and the two European nations. This time the military 
aspects came under scrutiny. Admiral Sherman and McGuire E. Perkins of the State 
Department outlined the US position to the British Air Chief Marshall Sir William 
Elliot. The British could not help feeling that the State Department had been pushed 
into an uncomfortable position by the Defense Department.96 The next day the two 
Americans met with the French General Murtin to inform him likewise.
Shortly afterward^ France and Britain compared the information given to them 
by the State Department. It became clear that France had received less specific 
information about the planned US bases and airfields. This was probably done by 
Washington because the authorities there knew that the French were concerned about a 
withdrawal of US troops behind the Pyrenees in case of war. Britain on the other hand 
had received no information that the US saw little need to issue a tripartite statement 
before signing agreements with Spain. Once again this was the most important issue for 
London and by not being informed of this through Perkins and Sherman, the US had
93. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 23 June 1951, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain, p.849.
94. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 14 May 1951, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs to the Secretary of State, p.816.
95. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 September 1951, also in, FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 18 
June 1951, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain.
96. PRO, F0371.96184, 22 June 1951, Mr Steel, Washington.
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hoped to avoid complications with Britain. After this exchange of information, Britain
and France decided to delay the talks between the US and Spain so that they would not
take place during the first days of July 1951.97
Yet already on 25 June Matthews and Perkins from the State Department had
cleared Sherman's visit to Spain. He was not to depart later than 15 July and was
instructed specifically to discuss base facilities. His talks were to be followed by a small
group to continue the negotiations. This group was to include high-ranking officers
from the Navy and Air Force.98 Griffis in turn was told that he should inform the
Spaniards that the talks from 14 March 1951 would be resumed.99
After being worn down by Sherman and Marshall and after approving NSC
72/6, in early July 1951 Truman authorized the visit by the Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Sherman to Spain. The decision to send Sherman or Carney was not made
until the last days of June and finally came down to a personal preference by
Ambassador Griffis who after all was to coordinate the negotiations.100 The
Ambassador had urged the State Department to send Sherman and not Admiral Carney
for personal reasons. In fact, Griffis had already invited Sherman when the Admiral
was in Europe during April 1951.101 Yet at that time political objections had still
overruled military advantages and therefore the State Department had discouraged
Sherman from going to Spain. Now, after NSC 72/6, the considerations were reversed
and nothing stood in the way of the visit.
In the meantime and as agreed with France, on 29 June the British Embassy
expressed its desire for the Americans to delay their planned bilateral talks with Spain 
_>  ______________________________
97. PRO, F0371.96184, 27 June 1951, FO Minute Mr Young.
98. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 3 July 1951, Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to the 
Secretary of State, p.825.
99. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 September 1951.
100. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 25 June 1951, Memo "Conduct of Base Negotiations with 
Spain".
101. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 7 June 1951, Griffis to Perkins.
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in order to give the British Cabinet more time to reach and express publicly its 
opinion.102 This was a  trap by London to delay the talks indefinitely. Mr Homer 
Byington, Director of Western European Affairs, assured the British Embassy that the 
US would wait until H.M. Government's view was received before the bilateral talks 
would be resumed.103 Yet as we have seen Sherman's visit had already been approved 
by the State Department and only needed Presidential confirmation to go ahead. In fact 
Sherman had been instructed not to leave for Madrid later than 15 July. Byington was 
clearly unaware about the Anglo - French attempt to delay the talks.
Britain was in no hurry to make its view known and time was running out. 
Finally on 6 July the Americans informed the British Embassy that talks were to be 
resumed with Spain. The US could no longer wait for H.M. Government's view.104 If 
Britain wanted to make her policy known, she had to do so quickly. For the US this 
mattered little as under NSC 72/6, Washington had decided to go ahead with bilateral 
talks whatever the position of her NATO allies.
Ambassador Balfour in Madrid urged London on to make its policy known. He 
knew that Sherman had gone on a trip to the Far East for one week, would then return 
briefly to Washington for final instructions before finally departing for Madrid around 
the 17 July.105
Under this pressure, the British cabinet and France finally issued a statement. In 
an aide-memoire on 10 July 1951 and in talks with the American Ambassadors, the two 
European nations made clear that they opposed close relations with Spain. They 
admitted that Spain had strategic value but claimed that material and morale 
considerations were more important. They saw unilateral action by the US ase a severe
102. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 September 1951.
103. PRO, F0371.96184, 30 June 1951, Mr Steel.
104. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 September 1951; PRO, F0371.96184, 6 July 
1951, O. Franks, Washington.
105. PRO, F0371.96184, 7 July 1951, Balfour, Madrid.
j
1 6 8
Chapter 7: NSC72/6 Spain's Realignment
shock for most NATO countries, suffering severe strain on their morale because of a 
possible American withdrawal to Spain. On the material side, Europe saw more urgent 
needs elsewhere, above all in West Germany. In their note France and Britain agreed 
that the impossibility of keeping negotiations secret would complicate the whole 
matter.106
This mattered little as NSC 72/6 overruled European opposition concerning 
Spain. Accordingly Acheson informed the British Ambassador on 12 July 1951 that the 
US had considered the opposition from London and Paris but nevertheless had decided 
to go ahead.107 As we have already seen the decision to go ahead with the talks had 
been taken long before Britain and France had voiced their concern. Despite the French 
and British aide-memoire, Dean Acheson, George C. Marshall, General Bradley from 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sherman and President Truman reconfirmed their 
decision to go ahead. In order to reduce complication, Griffis was instructed to keep the 
visit as quiet as possible. The talks were going to touch on general use of air facilities, 
overfly rights, airplane basing and the use of ports.108
The Foreign Office and Quai d'Orsay in return stepped up the pressure on their 
Governments and it was decided by both countries to issue another aide-memoire to the 
State Department stressing the seriousness of the situation.109
Rodolfo Llopis, Secretary-General of the Spanish Socialist Party in exile
desperately tried to help the two European countries in preventing Washington from
resuming bilateral talks with Franco's regime. He claimed rather unconvincingly that
sections of the Spanish Army and the Spanish Monarchists were about to present an 
)
106. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 September 1951, also in, FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 
8 July 1951, The Ambassador in the UK to the Secretary of State.
107. PRO, F0371.96185, 12 July 1951, 0. Franks, Washington.
108. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 September 1951, also in, FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 
12 July 1951, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain.
109. PRO, F0371.96185, 13 July 1951, Aide-Memoire to State Department.
o
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ultimatum to Franco in September if the US gave no support to the Spanish dictator.110 
It took no political genius to realize that this attempt to stop the talks was a last desper­
ate undertaking.
All these attempts were in vain. NSC 72/6 had settled that matter. Sometime 
after the issuing of NSC 72/6, the National Security Council argued that NSC 72/6 
would provide greater military flexibility, additional dispersion of troops and permit 
continuity if other bases were to be temporarily unusable. The new policy also 
guaranteed a larger counterattack, control of Gibraltar and the West Mediterranean, 
thus increasing the security of the lines of communication.111
On 19 July 1951 Truman confirmed that the policy towards Spain had been 
changed due to advice from the Department of Defense. He made it clear that he had 
done so reluctantly. "I don't like Franco and I never will, but I won't let my personal 
feelings override the convictions of our military men."112
110. PRO, F0371.96185, 9 July 1951, Mr D. Healey.
111. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72 Background Information, Recommended Action by NSC.
112. Public Papers of the Presidents of the USA; Truman. 19 July 1951, Washington, 1961-1966.
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The US realized that Spain's Generals, such as Juan Vigon, were very 
optimistic about bilateral talks. A year earlier they could not have expected more than 
some aid in case of war between the US and the USSR, now they not only expected 
military aid but Spanish soldiers could go to the US for military training.1
Washington knew that a bilateral agreement with Franco would stabilize his 
regime removing the army as a possible source of internal opposition to him and 
improving Spain's economic position and military strength.2 For Washington, the time 
had come to consider Spain's military potential and find out how much aid was 
required.
Several studies were being made. The U.S. Navy considered the area between 
Cartagena and Valencia as well suited for its purposes. The USAF did not. For the 
Navy the area, compared to French Morocco, was 600 miles closer to the USSR and it 
was easy to protect. It was well suited for submarine warfare. The USAF rejected it on 
strategic grounds. Next, the triangle El Ferrol - Lugo - Vigo, in northwest Spain, was 
being considered. It had a good harbour in Vigo. Yet the port at Ferrol, Franco's birth­
place, was obsolete and Lugo lacked a decent airport. The Cadiz - Huelva - Seville 
triangle, on the other hand, had great advantages. It was also along the Atlantic coast, 
helping transatlantic shipment. Thus it was considered by the Navy and the USAf as an 
attractive option. The USAF was also looking for air bases elsewhere. An USAF 
officer said:
"The Madrid airport is 230 miles from the sea over some of the damnedest
country and the worst railways and roads in Europe. It is also 2,300 feet above
*
sea level. And all the fuel-storage space you see here now wouldn't keep a
squadron of B-47's in the air for a single day's operation. It's a fine field in the
1. NA, Military Branch, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 
Spain 1951-52, 13 July 1951, Department of Defense to Deputy 
Chief of Staff.
2. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 28 June 1951, Ambassador in Spain to the 
Department of State, p.822.
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wrong place. Wfe'd rather have a poor field in the right place."
The Air Force had considered 350 airfields and showed most interest in the area 
Cadiz - Huelva - Seville.3 This area was supposed to be the last to fall on the continent 
in case of a Russian invasion and it was still close enough to be within the bombing 
range of the industrial areas of the Soviet Union. Further studies would concentrate on 
this area.
In the meantime, on 5 July 1951, Secretary Louis Johnson sent a letter to the 
Executive Secretary of the NSC. He pointed out that US policy towards Germany and 
Spain, NSC 71 and 72 respectively, were to be acted upon by the National Security 
Council as a matter of urgency.4
Throughout the summer of *>1, the Armed Forces fired at Congress argument 
after argument in favour of Spain's integration into Western defence policy. General 
George C. Marshall, then Secretary of Defense, argued that Spain, Turkey and Greece 
would increase the strength of the Mutual Security Program.5 Marshall repeated his 
argument before a Committee Hearing of the Senate.6 Before Congress Admiral 
Donald B. Duncan, the Deputy Chief Naval Operations, claimed that Spain was 
important for the defence of Europe and the Iberian Peninsula was an important factor 
in the anti-submarine warfare.7 Lieutenant-General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, argued that Spain had considerable value for air
3. "Spain Dollar-Hungry Fortress", in US News and World Report.
31 August 1951, Vol.31.
4. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72 Background Information, 5 July 1950,
Louis Johnson to Executive Secretary, NSC.
5. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of ----- ---------------
Representatives: Mutual Security Program 1951. 29 June 1951, 2
July 1951, Washington.
6. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Commit­
tee on Armed Services Senate: Mutual Security Act 1951. 27 July 
1951, Washington.
7. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
Representatives: Mutual Security Program 1951. 21 July 1951,
Washington.
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and naval bases.8 It was also pointed out that Spain could mobilize two million men at 
a  cost which was around 1/3 of the price of a US GI soldier.9
Yet not all officers were as eager as these. General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman 
of the Joint Chief of Staff, told the Foreign Committee that he would like to see Spain 
in NATO but that there were political implications.10 The Army Chief of Staff General 
J. Lawton Collins admitted that Spain was important from a military point of view but 
he believed that adequate defence could be upheld without her. He realized that Spain 
had a large standing army but it was obvious that this army was armed and trained for 
low technical wars.
In the House, two criticisms against closer relations with Spain, were constantly 
brought forward. Firstly, the political implications for other commitments such as 
NATO and secondly the usefulness of the bases themselves. More opposition came 
from civilian leaders. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs, claimed that bringing Spain into the European Cooperation Administration 
would agitate Europe against Spain and complicate America's military aims.11 In 
Britain, the Foreign Secretary, Herbert S. Morrison, told the House of Commons, on 
25 July 1951:
"we have expressed to them [Authorities in Washington] that the strategic 
advantages which might accrue from associating Spain with western defense 
would be outweighed by political damage which such an association might
8. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
Representatives: Mutual Security Program 1951. 31 July 1951, 
Washington.
9. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 13 July 1951, The Ambassador in Spain to 
the Secretary of State, p. 830.
10. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
Representatives: Mutual Security Program 1951. Bradley 13 July 
1951, Washington.
11. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of 
Representatives: Mutual Security Program. Perkins, 18 July 1951, 
Washington.
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inflict on the western community of Nations."
Manuel Estrada, the former Chief of Staff of Spain's Republican Army, argued 
that because Spain was so far from enemy centers it was hard to be hit by air-strikes but 
also hard to hit the Soviet centers from Spain and that they were useless anyway due to 
Spain's infrastructure. Furthermore, Estrada said that an agreement with Spain would 
demoralize troops in France and Central Europe because of the fear that US troops 
would withdraw to the Iberian peninsula. He concluded that Britain and North Africa 
were easier to defend and better suited to recapture Europe.12
For the US military planners, the problem with bases in Spain concerned their 
use in case of conflict. Would Franco be willing to give away Spanish sovereign rights 
and would a post-Franco government revoke these rights? Could the Spanish airfields 
be used or was a major restructuring of the airport facilities and infrastructure 
necessary?
There were enough Congressmen and Officers who argued against these fears to 
allow support for negotiations. Senator Harry P. Cain from Washington said that Spain 
and NATO were impossible to separate. He saw Spain, similar to Britain, as an 
enormous airfield which could also provide vital naval port facilities.
Carlton Hayes, former ambassador to Spain, recommended strongly to 
include Spain in the Western defence, extend foreign aid and treat the 
Mediterranean nation similar to the Latin American countries. He predicted that "the 
force of circumstances in the world at large will make increasingly for betterment of 
relations between Spain and the United States."13
Other military considerations related to Spain’s armed forces. Senator Tydings 
said Spain's great national army could be used for mutual security of Europe. In a 
cabinet meeting, 31 January 1951, General Eisenhower had told Truman that he could
12. Manuel Estrada, "Spain: Military Liability", in Nation, 
vol. 169.
13. Hayes, Carlton J.H., The US and Spain: An Interpretation. New 
York, 1951, p.172.
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use Franco's 20 Divisions or so for Europe's defence. Later the same year, July 1951, 
Colonel Shipp, Army attachd in Spain told a Senate Committee that a Spanish private 
received only $5 and a colonel $100 a month. Spanish soldiers were cheap compared to 
their American counterparts. Colonel Tower, Air Force attachd in Spain, praised 
Spanish pilots for their past achievements but pointed out that they lacked training with 
modem equipment. Furthermore, the attachd speculated that a Spanish pilot would cost 
only a fifth of an American pilot in Europe.14
In March 1951, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
had concluded that Spain's potential would greatly add to Europe’s defense. Thus on 4 
April, the Senate asked for a revision of Europe's defence considering Spain's military 
and natural resources.
In order to gain military concessions from Spain, more financial resources had 
to be made available. McCarran claimed that loans under the Export - Import Bank 
were insufficient. This put considerable pressure on the State Department. He might 
have been a "little out of line", as he later admitted, nevertheless he wanted to go ahead 
without considering the rest of Europe.
In February 1951 NATO members had been informed about the new US 
approach to Spain and both France and Britain strongly disapproved of the new turn of 
things.
Apart from some extremists such as R.A. Butler, Britain rejected close links 
between NATO states and Spain. The Foreign Office feared for commercial interests 
and for the military value of Gibraltar. The French feared for their strategic position in 
French North Africa which would be threatened by US bases in Spain. Crucial for 
France was the possibility that the US would retreat behind the Pyrenees and across 
the Channel in case of a Russian attack, thus leaving France undefended. Furthermore, 
a treaty with Spain might withdraw American military aid from the rest of Europe, thus
14. Selected Hearings held in Executive Session before the Com­
mittee on Foreign Relations Senate. Vol: Foreign Economic Assist­
ance Program, Col. Tower, 12 July 1951, Washington.
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leaving it defenseless.
\
All these oppositions were to be intensified by meetings of Air Force Minister 
Gonzalea Gallarza with Thomas K. Finletter, USAF, and General Omar N. Bradley in 
Washington. Above all London and Paris disagreed with Admiral Forrest P. Sherman's 
visit to Spain. Admiral Sherman's analysis of Spain's strategic value and his tragic 
death are important to the understanding of the final arrangements between Madrid and 
Wellington. It is with this in mind that one has to take a closer look at Admiral 
Sherman's past and at the events during his trip to Europe in 1951.
Sherman was not an unknown in Spain. His son-in-law Lieutenant-Commander 
John Fitzpatrick was appointed Assistant Naval Attachd to Madrid in 1947, shortly after 
military studies in Washington had highlighted Spain's strategic value. The very same 
year, Dolores Sherman, wife of the Admiral, visited Spain on a trip to see her daughter 
and son-in-law. She was not only introduced to Spain's hospitality but also to several 
Spanish high-ranking officials. In February 1948, Admiral Sherman, after having been 
appointed commander of the Sixth Fleet, visited Spain. He visited the Spanish Navy 
and several officials and took part in the training of the Sixth Fleet. The speed with 
which Sherman's wife and then Sherman himself visited Spain implies that John 
Fitzpatrick's appointment to the post in Spain was made in order to establish contacts in 
Spain and at the same time to avoid Sherman's visits being blown out of proportion by 
Spanish propaganda.
Forrest P. Sherman was bom on 30 October 1896 in Merrimack/New 
Hampshire. He graduated second out of 199 of the class 1918 at Annapolis, the famous 
navy college. Upon graduation he was given an evaluation which ended "Above all, 
Sherman knows his job; when he is given a thing to do he finds out all there is to "be 
found about it and the job is well done."
Francis P. Matthews, who succeeded John Sullivan as Secretary of Navy, 
described Sherman as shy in manner but driving himself very hard. Admiral Sherman 
was described by his own roommate and traveling companion Admiral Arleigh Burke 
as very open and talkative. He considered the Admiral to be a remarkable man with
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extreme drive.
Early in his career, Forrest P. Sherman developed an interest in naval aviation. 
He became an aviator of the Navy in December 1922. Twenty years later, May 1942, 
he was given the command of the CV "W&sp" an aircraft carrier in the Pacific. On 15 
September 1942 the Wisp was hit by three torpedoes and Sherman had to order the 
abandoning of the ship. Despite this setback, he became Deputy Chief of Staff to 
Admiral Nimitz. In 1946 Sherman outlined the threat of a Soviet advance on Europe 
and the Middle East. This analysis contributed to the Truman Doctrine and the program 
of aid to Turkey and Greece in early 1947. In December 1947, he was appointed to 
take charge of the US Naval Forces Mediterranean.
When Denfeld, then Chief of Naval Operations, spoke out against Truman over 
the cancellation of the US Navy super-carrier programme, the President forced him 
out. After Truman consulted with Nimitz, Sherman was appointed CNO on Nimitz's 
recommendation. He started the CV Forrestal, nuclear carrier, programme. Himself a 
student of naval history and believer in containment, Sherman realized that the US had 
to achieve control of the sea to allow forward deployment of the fleet. This, he 
asserted, was to be achieved through naval aid to allied nations. He also saw that it was 
necessary to make Britain realize that her Navy would only play a second role in 
policing the sea. Under Sherman, the Navy broke the USAF monopoly on nuclear 
capability when in February 1950 the AJ-1 Savage, a carrier based plane, was armed 
with nuclear bombs in the Atlantic.
In only two years as Chief of Naval Operations he had repaired relations 
between the Navy and other US military services, improved relations of NATO navies 
as well as their relations with l^avies from non-NATO countries. He had also laid down 
a healthy ground for a shipbuilding program. Sherman also wanted to solve the 
command problems of NATO forces in Europe with Britain. He hoped-that the army 
would be placed under General Eisenhower, the overall Navy under Admiral William 
M. Fechteler and the Mediterranean should be controlled by Admiral Robert B. Carney 
and a British Admiral.
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In Europe, Sherman saw two strategic choices for the US: "to accept the 
necessity for deploying forces overseas - troops, ships and aircraft - and to fight 
overseas if necessary”- or alternatively ”to withdraw, abandon our allies, and later to 
fight alone. I believe that the first course offers the greatest prospect for survival."
Sherman realized that NATO's southern flank would be vulnerable without 
friendly relations between Spain and NATO. He concluded that it was necessary to win 
Spain's support in case of war. In May Sherman had an excellent idea about how to 
improve Washington’s bargaining position with Madrid. He wanted to start negotiations 
with Lisbon to obtain military bases on mainland Portugal. This would have put 
enormous pressure on Spain to conclude similar agreements with the US. When he 
asked the State Department if this was possible, George Perkins informed him that 
indeed it did not violate the Treaty of Friendship, nor the Non-Aggression Pact between 
Spain and Portugal but that due to the negotiations concerning the Azores bases, the 
suggestion was not practical.15
After the outbreak of the Korean war, Sherman and Admiral Carney, the 
Commander in Chief US Naval forces in North Europe and Mediterranean, were 
strengthened in their believe that the US needed bases in Spain, both for its Navy and 
Air Force. In order to avoid publicity, Sherman had toyed with the idea of sending 
Admiral Carney to Spain in civilian clothes to start the talks.16 Yet this idea was 
abandoned. Instead, Sherman pressured Truman to agree on a visit by himself to Spain 
in order to outline a proposal for US bases.17
> One could expect that there would be little opposition from small minorities in 
Spain to Sherman's visit. In fact these remained without any influence on future
15. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 18 May 1951, George 
Perkins to Admiral Sherman.
16. Welles, Benjamin, Spain: The Gentle Anarchy. New York, 1965, 
p.287.
17. Love, The CNO. p.209-231.
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negotiations. This was no surprise as Spaniards had heard that the US helped anti­
communist states and thus many hoped for economic help from the US.
US military requirements in Spain were spelled out again. The USAF was 
interested in peacetime air rights or bases to rotate air groups between Madrid, 
Barcelona and Seville. In the long run they hoped to gain bases at Cadiz, Cartagena and 
on Palma de Majorca. The Navy wanted port facilities near Wencia, Malaga and 
Alicante. Both branches also desired guaranteed use of bases in case of war.1*
A Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations visited Spain 
from 12 to 14 July. The Senators met with Ambassador Griffis, the Marques de Prat, 
Foreign Minister Martin Artajo and General Franco himself. The day this 
Subcommittee departed Spain, Admiral Sherman left Washington in a DC-6B together 
with his wife Dolores Sherman and his son-in-law.19
Upon arrival, on 16 July, Admiral Sherman and Ambassador Griffis talked to 
General Franco and the Marques de Prat from the Foreign Ministry. Sherman outlined 
the problems concerning the deployment of the air force for the defence of Europe and 
the vital control of the Mediterranean. He also mentioned the problem of evacuation of 
civilians in case of war with the Soviet Union, a problem which was to be handled 
outside the agreements due to diplomatic reasons. Overall the US required transit 
permits, air operating and naval anchorage rights. Sherman argued that military 
cooperation required surveys of installations, exchange of military information, mutual 
consultation, technical advice, use of air fields and assistance towards the training of
Spanish soldiers. Franco in return showed more interest in material aid than in rights,
>
permits or cooperation. He was concerned about the equipment of the Spanish army and 
saw the need to advance Spain militarily and economically. The Spanish dictator 
pointed out that there was the chance of a Portuguese - Spanish treaty, an obvious
18. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 11 July 1951, US Military 
Requirements in Spain.
19. PRO, F0371.96190, 24 August 1951, Mr Steel, Washington; Love,
The CNO. p.231.
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attempt to put Washington under pressure. He even had the nerve to tell Sherman that 
France might join the USSR in an attack against Spain.20 Naturally, the Spanish 
dictator was hoping to create an atmosphere of military urgency which would force the 
American Government to act.
Despite the usual Spanish hospitality extended towards diplomats and tourists 
alike, Sherman emerged from the talks with Franco pale and very tired. Maybe 
Sherman was tired from the eastward flight across the Atlantic and the insufficient rest 
before the meeting with the Spanish dictator; more likely he had simply become another 
victim of Franco's long and tiring monologues which, for the Spanish dictator, 
constituted his diplomatic skills. These presentations by the Spanish dictator were, 
according to Adolf Hitler, worse than a visit to the dentist. Despite this experience that 
evening the Admiral attended a reception and went to bed late.21
The next day, 17 July 1951, Forrest P. Sherman met General Vigon together 
with several military attaches. Initially, they talked about the similarities between the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Spanish High General Staff. Then the topic was changed 
and Vigon said something along the following lines: "It is difficult for me to understand 
why the French oppose the arming of Germany and Spain, which is definitely in the 
interest of the common defense... Many of my friends in the French Armed Forces 
have indicated that they do not feel that way." Sherman pointed towards the historical 
experience of France with Germany and thus one had to assume that French people 
feared a rearmed Germany. The American continued:
"On the other hand, it is more difficult to understand, why they oppose the 
> arming of Spain. I feel that two factors will tend to reduce this opposition in 
France, as its forces, and those of other Western European nations develop a 
strong military posture, (1) the confidence in the prospect of successful defense
20. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 16 July 1951, Memorandum of Conversation 
by the Chief of Naval Operations, p.832.
21. Love, The CNO. p.231.
1 7 9
\~napter a ;  J J O i  The Sherman -  Franco ThJks
s.
will counteract panic and the desire for neutrality and*(2) as French Armed 
Forces receive more arms, they will be more willing to see other countries 
receive some also."
The conversation between the two Generals moved towards the threat posed by 
the USSR. Sherman asked for an "indication of the needs of the Spanish Army" in case 
o f war. Vigon pointed out that Spain needed artillery, and transportation for the army; 
guns, electronic equipment including radar and sonar for the Navy; and everything that 
is needed for an Air Force. Despite this confession on Spain's lack of modem Air 
Force, Juan Vigon claimed that Spain had good personnel in its Air Force. Sherman 
explained to Vigon that with every programme that would require an additional 
expenditure of funds, he had to go before the Congressional Committees to justify it in 
great detail. It was an obvious sign to Madrid that the US would not launch itself head 
first into relations with Spain. Vigon countered that discussions in Congress would stir 
considerable publicity which would develop further opposition in other European 
countries. The Spanish General obviously favoured a back door approach. Sherman 
replied:
"I have had many discussions on matter[s] of this nature, and I want to assure 
you that I am quite cognizant of the need to be discreet. I also want to assure 
you that I am a very discreet man, and you can talk to me freely and openly 
about any matters you desire, and I will not violate your confidence."
The conference ended with many warm and friendly adieux.22 For Sherman, 
th^ meeting with Vigon was more pleasant than the one with Franco. That same day, 17 
July, Sherman had attended two other receptions. One of them was a relaxing Garden 
Party at La Granja Palace, the other was more formal.23 After these two encounters
22. NA, Military Branch, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 
Spain 1951-52, 17 July 1951, Forrest P. Sherman to Vigon accord­
ing to Military Attach .^
23. Welles, Spain Gentle Anarchy, p.287.
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had concluded, he wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform them about the talks with 
the Spaniards. Sherman believed that Franco had indicated an agreement in principle. 
He speculated: "It is my estimate that we can get the operating arrangements we desire 
but that we will be asked for considerable military and economic aid. "24 Sherman had 
finished his job in Spain within only a few hours. Over coffee he confessed to one of 
the American service attaches that he had to hang around Madrid so that the public 
would not get the wrong impression.25 -
On 18 July, Sherman saw Franco again, this time briefly. Then the Admiral 
departed for Paris. During the two hour flight Sherman talked to the American Air 
Attach^ in Madrid about Spain, the Mediterranean, NATO and the Middle East. Once 
in Paris he described the conversation with the Spanish dictator to General Eisenhower. 
The next day, Sherman left for London where he again outlined his talks to the 
American personnel. The Americans together with the British Chiefs of Staff supported 
the US base negotiations with Spain.
For a variety of reasons, Ambassador Griffis too left Spain for a fortnight after 
the talks between Sherman.26 He was therefore able to inform others in the State 
Department personally about the talks and at the same time escape the criticism by 
France and Britain for initiating the talks with Spain.
On 21 July, shortly after midnight, Sherman flew from London to Naples for a 
round conference with Admiral Carney and other local officials. At around 7.30 am the 
plane together with Admiral Sherman, his wife, and four other passengers landed safely 
in Naples. The Shermans were rushed downtown to the Excelsior Hotel. There they 
occupied suite 123, After a short time refreshing himself, Sherman received some local
24. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092,
Spain (4-19-46), Sec.1-8, 17 July 1951, Sherman, Spain to JCS 
Washington.
25. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092,
Spain (4-19-46), Sec.1-8, 23 July 1951, Memo by Charles M. Spof- 
ford.
26. PRO, F0371.96186, 28 July 1951, J. Balfour, San Sebastian.
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Italian dignitaries at 9.30 am. Half an hour later Sherman gave a press-conference in 
the Hotel lobby. He was still tired from the plane flight to Naples. Shortly after one 
o'clock he lunched in the Hotel and spent the rest of the afternoon in his room relaxing. 
At 8.00 pm he and his wife left the hotel and took a car to Pompeii to see an opera. 
Sherman was in "good spirits, at ease and relaxed” but he left the opera rather tired 
looking. He and his wife returned to Naples where they had dinner at an open-air 
restaurant on the Bay of Naples. In the car on the way back to the Hotel he fell asleep. 
Slumberous and tired, the Admiral reached the Hotel at around 3.00 am. He went 
straight to bed.
Early the next morning, Sherman got up. At 10.00 am he told US Major Smith, 
in charge of his trip arrangements, that he had spent a good night and wanted to leave 
at 11.00 am to catch the plane half an hour later for Madrid. Then suddenly at 10.40 
am Sherman was overcome by the stress of the previous week. He felt bad and lay 
down on the bed in his hotel room. Forty minutes later it was obvious that Sherman 
showed symptoms of heart difficulties and exhaustion. Nevertheless, Dr Burkhardt, a 
medic who was at hand, tbld Mrs Sherman not to worry, her husband was simply 
overworked and needed a little rest before leaving for the US. But Sherman did not 
recover. During October 1950, Sherman had had his annual physical examination and 
his doctor had already warned him that about his low blood pressure. At ten minutes to 
one an oxygen tent was required. Admiral Carney stepped out to the balcony and 
contemplated actions which had to be taken in case of Sherman's death and the possible 
consequences this might have in general. At 1.05 pm Admiral Sherman fell unconscious 
anci suffered another two heart attacks before eventually dying. He was only 54 years 
old.
Major Smith accompanied the Admiralicorpse to the USS Mount Olympus 
where he was piped over side at 3.30pm just as the plane carrying Mrs Sherman to 
Spain passed overhead. The plane stopped in Madrid where John Fitzpatrick boarded
1 8 2
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Sherman was praised by the Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall: "The 
Department of Defense and the US Navy in particular, has lost an outstanding leader.” 
The Chief of Staff of the USAF, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg added: "In Admiral 
Sherman the United States has lost one of its most brilliant military minds.” The 
President claimed "He was one of this country's ablest officials, counting all those in 
the civilian, as well as military fields."2* In a broadcast he was remembered as "a war 
casualty just as much as if he had been killed in battle. He worked himself to death.”29 
The newspaper "Colombia Citizen" wrote on the 23 July: "Last week he concluded a 
successful mission to Spain which is expected to end that country's isolation from the 
western defense program. "30 Unfortunately Sherman's death meant that the friendly 
personal relations he had formed in Madrid were lost and future talks with Madrid were 
somewhat chillier than before. This would, as we shall see, lead to many complications 
during the negotiations.
Two days after Sherman's official talk with Franco, on 18 July, Acheson had
declared in a press conference that the US guaranteed the defence of any NATO
country and still saw NATO commitments as the most vital agreements for US defense
policy. "There will be no change in this procedure. In other words the North Atlantic
Treaty is fundamental to our policy in Europe, and the closest possible cooperation with
our NATO allies will remain the keystone of this policy." Acheson continued by
referring to the Sherman visit: "Any understanding which may ultimately be reached
will supplement our basic policy of building the defensive strength of the West" and "if 
>
Western Europe is attacked it will be defended - and not liberated." His statement was a
27. Forrest P. Sherman Files, DoD, 27 July 1951, Sequence of his 
death.
28. Forrest P. Sherman Files, On his Death.
29. Love, The CNO. p.228-232.
30. Forrest P. Sherman Files, 23 July 1951, Colombia Citizen.
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confirmation that he had acted against French and British opposition and now tried to
\
reassure them.31
The British and French were informed three days after the talks about the 
meeting between Franco and Sherman. France only pointed out that an agreement 
dating back to 27 November 1912 provided for demilitarization of the Spanish zone in 
Morocco and French control over foreign relations of both the Spanish and the French 
zones, thus any base agreements between the US and Spain had to be limited to 
mainland Spain.32
The Americans argued that a possible arrangement with Spain would not mean 
that the US had any plans to retreat behind the Pyrenees, nor that it would reduce 
American military aid to the rest of NATO.
General Omar H. Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it 
simply "the more of us we can put together to build up a collective defense the better 
off we are going to be." The Senate, strongly influenced by McCarthyism, had passed a 
proposal, 4 April 1951, supporting this view: "Consideration should be given to the 
revision of plans for the defense of Europe, as soon as possible, so as to provide for a 
utilization of the military and other resources of West Germany and Spain on a 
voluntary basis."
In the meantime the Spanish military was deeply impressed by Sherman's visit.
General Munoz Grandes confessed to a reporter that "Admiral Sherman came to Spain
in 1951 and gave us his hand when the rest of the world had isolated us. It does not
matter that this served America's convenience. What matters is that he extended his 
v
hand. We will never forget that... It is no matter whether you offer us $400 million or
31. Secretary Acheson, "US begins Conversation on Spain's Role", 
in US Dept. State Bulletin. 30 July 1951, Vol.25, also in Ameri­
can Foreign Policy Basic Documents, p. 1695, also in FRUS 1951. 
Vol.IV, 18 July 1951, N.387, also in, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 
September 1951.
32. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 September 1951; 
PRO, F0371.96185, 19 July 1951, Mr Hayter.
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$40 million if the will to help us is there. With your good will we can solve our 
problems" and Munoz Grandes continued "it is more a question of psychology than 
price."33
Just before Sherman's visit to Spain, three credits under the $62.5 million 
appropriation to the Export Import Bank were extended. This was timed to make 
Sherman's visit easier. In May 1951 Spain received $5 million for wheat and, $3.5 
million for coal and another $2.25 million for wheat. The latter two credits at 3% 
interest , had to be repaid over 20 years starting 5 years after being extended.34 These 
were very generous terms.
Despite the success of the Sherman visit to Spain, complications remained in 
Washington. Even the military establishment was divided in its opinion on Spain. The 
Army tended to continue to doubt Spain's value due to her badly equipped army which, 
even if  in numbers impressive, lacked modem equipment and training. The Navy and 
the USAF had split opinions on the usefulness of ports and airfields. So Admiral 
Norman Finletter reported, 27 March 1952, to Congress that bases in Spain were not 
essential for US defense plans. He argued that the possible three B-29 airfields were 
only good for letdown stops or when France had fallen and all three required extensive 
logistical improvements. As for the ports, the Admiral argued that Cadiz was too close 
to Gibraltar to add anything new, El Ferrol was too small and finally the ports at 
Cartagena and Mahon were not needed because of existing facilities on Malta and 
North Africa.35
Francis T. Williams, the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European
>
Affairs, told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the US was sitting between 
two chairs. On one side the opposition by European states on the other the fact that
33. Welles, Spain Gentle Anarchy, p.60.
34. Press Release "Spain Receives Credits" in US Pep State Bulle­
tin. 30 July 1951, vol.25.
35. NY Times. 14 August 1951
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there was no political alternative in Spain to Franco.36
Just like the US press was still divided in 1951 over relations with Spain, so was 
most o f Europe and its press, above all countries near the Iron Curtain. The Dutch 
press gives a good example. The Het Vrije Volkt a Socialist paper claimed "Spain's 
territory is indispensable to the defence of the Wfest. The Spanish people should have 
their place in the community of nations. But this is not the same as dealing with 
Franco." The de Ttfd, a left wing Catholic paper wrote that Western European nations 
willing to cooperate with Portugal should also cooperate with Spain. The de
\
\b lkskrant, a Catholic labour newspaper claimed that "It is... beyond dispute that 
Western Europe itself is becoming stronger through Spain's integration... The military 
motives must prevail. ” The Algemeen Handelsblad with its liberal tendency wrote that 
i f  the United States is determined to continue its policy towards Spain, Wfestem Europe 
will only be able to ultimately reconcile itself to it on the basis of Spain's 
democratization. The right wing Catholic paper de Maasbode said that "the European 
nations o f the Atlantic community should follow Washington's example and ameliorate 
their relations with Spain'to such an extend that... they will be able all together... to 
save the civilization of the West."
Radically opposed to this was the independent socialist paper Het Parool. It 
claimed that "the idea that everyone who is an anti-communist should be greeted with 
open arms is only acceptable when there is a war on... As long as there is hope, 
however that war can be prevented (and that is the aim of the NAT) we can not be 
indifferent as to who are our allies." This argument could spiral off into questions 
whether the US and the USSR were at war already or not and if not whether an alliance 
with Spain would prevent a conflict through deterrence. The article continued "being an 
anti-communist is not sufficient reason to be admitted into the circle of those who have
36. FRUS 1951. VoI.IV, 18 October 1951, Francis T. Williamson in 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, p.837.
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chosen democratic freedom as their political principle. *37
Even the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, Mr Wrong, argued against 
Spain's integration into the Wfestem defence system. He claimed that Spain's inclusion 
into NATO might lead to popular risings in Britain and France and weaken 
commitments by these two countries towards NATOi38
Whatever the opinion in Europe, Canada or the American press, the talks 
between Franco and Sherman had been very successful for the American administration
and made it possible to send two study missions to Spain in order to gather more
\
information about the economic and military situation. These two studies were to form 
the basis for further talks and thus deserve detailed analysis.
37. Netherland Information Service,Edward M. Earle Papers, Box 
26, 9 August 1951.
38. FRUS 1951. Vol.I, 27 July 1951, Memorandum of Conversation by 
Joseph Chase of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secre­
tary of State.
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In early August, as a direct result of the talks between Franco and Sherman, a 
Joint Military Survey Team (JMST) and an economic study group were authorized by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that JMST was to be 
made up of a team of 6 officers: two each from the Army, Air Force and Navy.
The mission was to be headed by an Air Force officer and was to include around 30 
supportive staff The Secretary of Defense approved this plan. On 22 August, the 
military team arrived in Spain.2 Air Force Major-General James W. Spry headed the 
Temporary Military Survey Team in Spain with instructions to survey Spanish air and 
maritime facilities which might meet U.S. requirements. It was pointed out that the 
primary interest of the US was to acquire air transits and anchorage rights.
Nevertheless, under no circumstances was Spain to be encouraged to demand large 
military aid, as this would lead to complications with other NATO countries.
Spry pointed out in the New York Times, 31 August 1951, that any new credit 
or aid for the military or economy in Spain would be in addition to other aid. He 
obviously wanted to make clear that the talks with Spain in no way diminished the 
military assistance by the US to NATO countries which were getting nervous at the 
development of the relations between Spain and the US.
In London the Foreign Office feared that Washington was willing togrant 
economic as well as extensive military assistance which would alter the military picture 
in Europe.3 It was speculated that Madrid's demands for more aid were a direct 
result of Admiral Sherman's visit to Spain because he had handled Franco clumsily and 
given him reason to believe that more could be wrung out of Washington.4 London 
had good reason to feel betrayed. The American Ambassador in London and the State
1. Special Plan Division Records-(SPDR), 14 December 1951, Director Strategic Planning to Director 
CNO.
2. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 7 Sep 1951.
3. PRO, F0371.96189, 11 August 1951, US policy towards Spain.
4. PRO, F0371.96189, 23 August 1951, FO Minute, Frank Roberts.
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\Department had told Westminster about a limited mission by Admiral Sherman to Spain 
when in reality they had known that Sherman had instructions to talk about military 
matters with Franco. The Foreign Office initially assumed that this had been a personal 
blunder by Sherman.5 As the Spanish authorities had great interest in keeping up the 
appearance of a rapprochement between Madrid and Washington, weakening French 
and British opposition, the Marques de Prat told Miss Ursula Branston, Head of 
Research at the British Embassy in Madrid^that agreements with the US could be 
signed within two to three months.6
In order to avoid being sidelined, the Foreign Office urged closer cooperation 
with the French Foreign Ministry which naturally was as alarmed about the new 
developments as London was.7 Yet the two European nations were unable to stop the 
two American study missions from initiating talks with Spanish authorities.
On 24 August, Spry visited Vigon to outline his mission. Following the meeting 
he sent Vigtfa two letters. The first summarized his mission to Spain, a written 
confirmation of the conversation held on 24 August. The second asked for commitment 
and contribution by Spain to the defence of Western Europe.8
In return, on 30 August, Spry received a letter by Vigrfn in which the Spanish 
General pointed out that bases in Spain would convert her into a belligerent nation 
therefore she needed logistical assistance to defend herself. He pointed out that the 
bases in peacetime would be under exclusive Spanish command and would only be of 
temporary nature until the USSR threat dissipated. Overall, the letter encouraged the 
establishment of Air and Navy bases and implied general cooperation but made no 
commitment to the overall defence of Western Europe and only mentioned Spain's
5. PRO, F0371.96189, 26 August 1951, FO Minute, Mr Young.
6. NA, Civil Branch, 12 September 1951, Memo of Conversation.
7. PRO, F0371.96189, 28 August 1951, FO Minute, Mr Butler.
8. WNRC, Army Intellience, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 17 September 1951 Report on the 
Activities of the JMST in Spain.
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willingness to defend certain strategic islands in the Mediterranean.9
Parts of JMST had arrived in Spain on 22 August, The first week was spent in 
taking up contact with Spanish and American authorities in Spain. On 29 August the 
JMST was increased to its full strength by the arrival of officers from EUCOM,
European Command. Further lunch meetings and written correspondence with the 
Spanish authorities followed. From 4 to 7 September, the JMST conducted a survey of 
potential air and naval base sites in the area of Wencia. The following week the team 
surveyed the area of Barcelona and Bilbao, including the Ebro valley. From 17 to 22 
September the most important regions of all, Seville, Cadiz and Malaga were surveyed. 
Finally, the team looked at sites near Cartagena, Alicante and Almeria. The heads of 
the services would usually leave with the rest of the survey team for the studies in the 
different areas but would return to Madrid within a day or two. In Madrid they would 
communicate with the Spanish authorities while the survey team inspected the sites.
During the first week in October the Navy, Air Force and Army conducted miscella­
neous surveys for the development of an overall airfield complex in Spain. From 6 to 
31 October the three parts of the JMST, still staying in Spain, combined their material 
and drafted the final report.10
The Air Force Group of JMST had shown a special interest in the Valencia - 
Huelva area, to locate strategic bombers, the Barcelona - Ebro area for fighter 
bombers, and in the Central Plateau for interceptors and long-range fighters.11
The Navy Group of JMST had also worked out their requirements in Spain by 
early September. These were naval anchorage rights at Algeciras, Alicante, Malaga and 
Cartagena, escort facilities at Barcelona, Cadiz and El Ferrol and most importantly off-
9. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 30 August 1951, Letter Vigon to Spry; also in Army 
Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 17 September 1951, Report on the Activities of the 
JMST in Spain.
10. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 12 September 1951, Report on Activities of Army 
Group JMST Madrid, Spain.
11. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 17 September 1951, Report on 
Activities of the JMST in Spain
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loading facilities for aircraft and an airstrip. These last facilities were likely to be 
situated at Cadiz but Cartagena and Wencia were by no means ruled out. Further 
studies had to be made.12
The Spanish High General Staff informed General Spry in September that he 
should also survey Spanish Morocco for possible bases. Nevertheless, the Navy had 
shown little interest in Morocco and it was decided that no such survey should be 
conducted in Morocco. The decision was influenced by complications over Morocco's 
position regarding foreign policy arising out of the Spanish - French agreement from 
1912 under which foreign policy of Spanish Morocco was to be handled by France. The 
US was aware that the talks had not been welcomed in France and thus wanted to avoid 
further complications.
Brigadier-General Frank S. Besson, who had replaced General Conley of JMST 
Army in early September, sent a letter to General Barron, Spanish Central General 
Staff and stressed that before Spain was to receive aid, the armed forces had to draw up 
TO&Es^that is a "table of organization and equipment^to determine the exact needs of 
the Spanish forces. Initially the US wanted to sent military material for training 
purposes only. In the second phases US material was to be granted for defensive 
purposes. It was therefore vital to determine Spain's needs.13
This came up in a conversation between Colonel H.H. Fisher, member of 
JMST, and Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Alonso of the Spanish Army, on 5 September. 
Fisher avoided making any commitment on military aid to Spain because he knew that 
the Spanish forces had done little planning on the mobilization requirements and thus 
were themselves in the dark about their exact needs.14 The American knew that Spain's
12. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 17 September 1951, Report on 
Activities of the JMST in Spain.
13. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 3 September 1951, Frank S. Besson to General 
Barron, also WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 17 September 1951, 
Report on the Activities of the JMST in Spain.
14. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 5 September 1951, Memo for Record.
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forces needed general training, heavy equipment, production guidance and technical 
advice to be converted into a modem force.15 To meet these requirements, specific 
demands had first to be made by Spain. An American study concluded on 1 September 
that Spain could not even survive a short defensive war due to its weak national 
economy. It was estimated that in order to fully mobilize her forces, Spain needed some
18,000 submachine guns, roughly 90% more than Spain currently possessed. Spain 
only had twenty-one 40mm anti-aircraft guns but required more than 450. The Spanish 
armed forces also needed lighter AA-guns and anti-tank guns. Furthermore, the army 
only possessed eight Italian 305/17 howitzers and thus lacked a serious heavy artillery. 
Finally, Spain needed huge deliveries of ammunition for rifles, for all types of mortars 
and for anti-aircraft guns.16 In the meeting between Martin-Alonso and Fisher, the 
Spaniard claimed that the army already possessed TO&Es but as only one copy existed 
it would take some time to prepare the necessary reproduction. Considering that 
Martin-Alonso did not even posses a firm figure for Spain's divisional strength, it is 
very likely that the Spaniard was bluffing. At the time, no TO&Es existed for Spain's 
armed forces.
The very next day, 6 September, Colonel H.H. Fisher met Lieutenant-Colonel 
Luis Garrera-Rollan. The Spaniard presented a TO&E for a single Spanish Infantry 
Division. The Americans believed that this had been drawn up after the meeting held 
the day before. It seemed that the Spanish Staff had worked furiously throughout the 
night to prepare the TO&E and it had copied the exact same structure as the U.S.
TO&E presented as a sample the day before. The Spanish Staff clearly wanted to avoid 
any unnecessary delays.
On 7 September 1951, the senior navy member of the JMST, Campbell, had 
lunch with Admiral Estrada. Campbell outlined the port facilities required by the US in
15. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 21 September 1951, H.H.Fisher Memo to Deputy 
Assistant Chief of Staff.
16. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 1 September 1951, Inttelligent Estimate of Spain’s 
Existing Armed Forces.
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Spain and in return offered training to Spanish officers. Estrada mentioned his worries 
about the dated equipment used aboard ships of Spain's navy.17
The very same day General Besson received a memorandum from the Spanish 
Brigadier-General de Soto. The Spaniard claimed that Spain's war production could 
produce most necessary war material if technical aid was given. Yet General de Soto 
admitted that Spain would nevertheless be unable to produce heavy artillery, tanks, 
radars, etc. despite modernization. He urged that training had to be given to two tank 
companies and to two tank troops. Spain also required recoilless guns, bazookas, anti­
air batteries, artillery, radar, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines and clearing mine 
equipment. Furthermore, ammunition and equipment for airborne units was needed.18 
The Americans offered technical aid and training, urgently required by Spanish soldiers 
but most Spanish officers seemed more interested in military end-items for prestige 
rather than for real military use.
After most of the initial study had taken place, General Spry met General Vigon 
at the end of September. Vigon assured the American that Spanish troops would fight in 
the Mediterranean area in case of war. This implied that Spain would occupy and 
defend islands in the Mediterranean but the Spaniard did not mention a commitment of 
Spanish troops north of the Pyrenees. Naturally Vigon demanded in return that Spain 
would receive the necessary military equipment to meet its military requirements in 
wartime.19
On 2 October, Spry had another meeting with General Vigon. The Spaniard 
accepted another US military mission which was to be established in Spain in return for 
military equipment. Furthermore, he was hoping that German radar equipment was 
sent. The General was concerned about US "offensive aviation near Madrid". These
17. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 64D563, 2 November 1951, AmEmbassy Madrid to Department of 
State.
18. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 7 September 1951, Aid required to modernize the 
armament of the Army.
19. NA, Militaray Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 29 September 1951, Memo from Spry to Griffis.
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would undoubtedly be targeted by the USSR bombers. He however admitted that in 
case of war, the USSR would attack Madrid with or without airfields, thus making it 
clear that there was little hope for Spain to remain neutral.20
After these meetings with Vigon, on 15 October, General Spry held a 
conversation with Franco. The meeting which lasted about 80 minutes was a friendly 
chat. They started talking about the internal situation in the Soviet Union. Franco 
mentioned the rumour that the French Ambassador to the USSR was cooperating with 
the USSR and could not be trusted. The Generalissimo also pointed out that Spain could 
not at the moment join NATO but that he would welcome bilateral agreements with the 
US. He asserted that Spain would require military assistance as well as help for her 
munition industry. He welcomed the interpretation by the US military which, according 
to him, looked towards the future while the State Department neglected long-term 
developments completely. Finally, Franco stressed Spain's geographical position and 
the strategic value Morocco would have for the West against the USSR.21
In order to assist JMST throughout its studies and inspections in Spain, several 
military training circulars had been released to Madrid during this period. These TCs 
not only covered such specific military information as "TC3 Organization and 
Employment of 280mm gun", "TC12 The Panoramic Telescope" and "TC13 The Fuze 
[Fuse] Mine" but also more important strategic studies such as "FM110-5 Joint Action 
Armed Forces" and "FM30-25 Counter Intelligence".22
During Fall 1951 and while JMST was still in Spain, a group of five US Army 
officers visited Spain. The trip was designed to enhance bilateral goodwill and to assess 
Spain's army. The brief report read that the Spanish army was similarly structured as
20. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 3 October 1951, Memo from Spry to Griffis.
21. WNRC, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 Spain 1951-52, 15 October 1951, General Spry 
Conversation with Franco.
22. WNRC, Army Intelligence, Project Decimal File, 1951, Spain, 17 September 1951, Report on the 
Activities of the JMST in Spain.
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the US army but lacked the necessary equipment for a modem army.23
The more extensive final report by the JMST was completed at 12:00 on 31 
October and passed on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Colonel Tibetts, USAF. It was 
more than 350 pages long. Tibetts, with this report in hand, left Spain on 4 November 
for Washington where the study was to be scrutinized.24
The JMST (Spain) report argued that Spain would welcome an early exploitation 
of facilities in Spain without joining NATO. It suggested obtaining facilities as "a quid - 
pro quo before granting any military or economic assistance program for Spain.M It also 
recommended that all future negotiations with Spain should be continued under 
considerations of NSC 72/6 and that a permanent Joint US military mission to Spain 
was to be established. The report also favoured a single US governmental agency to 
organize all US agreements with Spain.25
The report consisted of one main conclusion and seven annexes (annex a to 
annex g). The reports of the Army (annex a), Navy (annex b) and Air Force (annex c) 
as well as Spain's request for military assistance (annex d) are still classified due to 
national security reasons. All other parts are declassified; ie. the main part, Spain's 
participation in the defense of Western Europe (annex e), means of accomplishing 
required developments in Spain (annex f) and the resume of conferences and letters 
between JMST and Spanish officials (annex g).26 The team had surveyed Spain's air 
and naval facilities and talked to the Spanish Government about air operations, transit 
privileges, deployment of US aircraft and rights to overfly Spain. In the field of the 
Navy, they had discussed anchorage rights, the use and improvements for air and naval
23. NA, Military Branch, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 Spain 1951-52, 9 October 1951, 
Report on Spanish Visit by 5 officers.
24. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 12 November 1951, S.G.Conley to Chief of Staff; further 
information in NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 15 February 1954.
25. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec.1-8, 31 October 
1951, Report by the JMST (Spain).
26. NA, Civil Branch, Lot File 64D563, 2 November 1951, AmEmbassy Madrid to Department of 
State.
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facilities and other army facilities.
Spanish requests from the US were divided into three categories according to 
their priority. The first group covered military material needed for immediate training. 
Spain asked for recoilless rifles, bazookas, mortars, tanks, 120mm AA-guns, 150mm 
artillery, radar, mines, rockets and ammunition. The total costs of for this was about 
$10 million. The second group covered more weapons off all types ranging from 
105mm artillery to fire control equipment enough to arm six division. In the final 
group, Spain asked for complete equipment for its forty divisions.
The report declared that Spain's position was not pro-NATO, rather she was 
inclined towards a bilateral agreement with the US or at least a continuous liaison with 
Washington. There seemed to have existed some complication concerning Spain's 
commitment to sending troops outside Spain in case of war. Vigon had claimed that 
Franco had agreed to defend Mediterranean islands. Nevertheless, Minister of Air 
Major-General Gallarza argued that Franco would not permit Spanish troops to fight on 
French soil. He was not happy about committing troops in the Mediterranean while 
Vigon preferred to send troops north of the Pyrenees.
The report by JMST concluded that the Spanish government was in favour of 
US military rights in Spain, and thus Madrid should be approached to obtain airfields, 
ports, petroleum storage and ammunition depots. In order to get these military rights 
US military assistance was to be given to Spain. It was already considered that such an 
approach might cause complications if Spain refused to be bought. The report by the 
JMST advised that the Department of the Army should supply a limited amount of 
training equipment to ease relations.
 The study also outlined the requirements of the three services including
construction of facilities and securing rights of way for pipelines, roads, bridges, etc. 
The costs were to be met in dollars, pesetas, pounds and lira.
It was argued that the conflict over logistic responsibilities between the three 
armed forces should be solved as quickly as possible and a single US agency should be 
established to conduct the negotiations. Finally the report read that any aid to Spain
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should be based on a quid pro quo, even though this was not a very desirable 
situation.27
Annex c of the JMST report, concerning the US Air Force, was partly repeated 
in a study titled "planning for the base development of Spain". In this study it was made 
clear that the USAF wanted to station six medium bomber wings at San Pablo, Moron 
de la Frontera, Los Palacios, Manijas and Los Llanos; three fighter wings at Getafe,
San Juijo and Muntadas; and one strategic reconnaissance wing at Torrejon. It was 
recommended that the administration for these bases should be organized at Barajas. 
Copero, near Seville, would hold an air depot. Initial studies had put more emphasis on 
fighter planes but later this had been changed in favour of bomber planes. The report 
confirmed that all air bases in Spain lacked adequate parking areas, taxiways, fuel 
storage, and distribution facilities. Nevertheless, most had adequate housing, hangers 
and administration buildings.
The survey team had estimated the base construction and improvement costs as 
follows:
Thblada $60m; Copero $60m; Moron $44m; Jerez $44m; San Pablo $42m; Los Llanos 
$40m; Torrejon $37m; Tudela $35m; San Juijo $27m; Alcala $24m; Manises $23m; 
Muntados $23m; Getafe $19m; Barajas $5m. In comparison, the bases in Morocco 
constructed in 1951 had costed a total of $200 million during the FY 1952 and required 
an annual expenditure of roughly $45 million. During the construction phase 4,500 
people had been employed.28
It was expected that US personnel in Spain would number 16,100 near Seville, 
9,200 in the Madrid area, 7,300 along the Ebro valley, 6,000 near Valencia and 4,700 
in the rest of Spain (total: 43,300).
The report stressed the problems concerning transportation, distribution
27. WNRC, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 Spain 1951-52, 20 November 1951, Analysis of the 
Joint Military Report on Spain.
28. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 12 May 1953, Air Base Expenditure Abrouad.
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facilities, lack of construction material, labour and locally produced items required for 
the construction of the bases. It is clear that these considerations ultimately decided the 
sites of the bases. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bonbright stated this in a 
letter, 21 November 1951. He suggested that due to financial reasons the US was to 
avoid a major reconstruction of Spain's railroad, road and communication system by 
concentrating bases in two areas, Cadiz and Barcelona. He argued that bases close to 
ports and thus easy to supply, were cheaper than existing alternatives. Therefore it was 
better to construct new military facilities near the coast than to improve existing 
airfields in the inland.29
Even so in peacetime the USAF requirements could only be met through a 
newly constructed pipeline, air transportation and additional vehicles for the squadrons 
in charge of transportation. It was known that in case of war the lines of 
communication would be over-saturated. In order to avoid jamming up the roads, 
depots should be created at the end of each line of communication reaching from 
Madrid to the coastline bases. These depots were to hold a 60-day supply level.
Seville, the main USAF base area, would hold an initial supply of 29,800 tons 
and 10,200 barrels of aviation fuel. During a military conflict Seville would be supplied 
with 5,150 tons of supplies, 443,939 barrels of fuel, 11,500 barrels of motor fuel and 
1,300 barrels of diesel. These had to be delivered along roads from Cadiz (estimated 
supply capacity 4,000 tons/day), Cordoba (4,000 tons/day) and Huelva (2,000 
tons/day). Madrid would store 2,400 tons of supplies and 51,200 barrels of aviation 
fuel. During a war, the capital would receive monthly 643 tons of supplies, 144,100 
barrels of aviation fuel, 6,600 barrels of motor fuel and 700 barrels of diesel. These 
could be delivered from Albacete (4,000 tons/day), Valencia (3,000 tons/day), Granada 
(3,000 tons/day), Salamanca (3,000 tons/day), Burgos (3,000 tons/day),
Oviedo/Coruna (3,000 tons/day) and Seville (2,500 tons/day). Valencia would need 
monthly war supplies of 500 tons, 63,000 barrels of aviation fuel and 1,900 barrels of
29. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 21 November 1951, Bonbright to Williamson.
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motor and diesel fuel. Similar figures applied to the supply requirements of Albacete 
and the bases in the Ebro valley. The logistic problem was considerable.
In order to deal with these wartime needs a system of pipelines and petrol 
distribution was recommended. A 280 mile long 6" pipeline was to connect Seville and 
Madrid and a 60 mile long 10" pipeline was to connect Cadiz with Seville. 
Furthermore, the pipeline system was to supply Getafe, Los Palacios, and Moron. 
The costs for this petrol storage and distribution system was estimated at $27.75m; 
$10m alone for the pipeline connecting Madrid to Seville.
Yet this was not enough. Major problems were foreseen with transportation by 
road and rail thus more transport by air was required. It became important to use the 
airports located near the seaports. The logistic problems were paramount in the selec­
tion of the base sites.
The report specifically claimed that there would be no problem in finding 
enough Spanish workers for construction work at the site of the bases as long as 
these were close to cities. It was considered that labour was in abundance in almost 
all areas where constructions were to take place. Spanish construction was 
considered good craftsmanship and very labour intensive, but lacked technology and 
materials such as steel, paints, lumber and electrical and plumbing materials. Despite 
lack of modem material, construction costs were only 10%-30% of the costs in the 
US. To lay one square yard of runway in Spain cost $2.20, in the US it was $12. One 
hospital bed in Spain could be created for $1,221 compared to $17,280 in the US. One 
gallon of fuel storage required $0,076, in the US $0.10. One square of concrete road 
in Spain was worth $1.80 but $6.70 in the US. One cubic yard of earth was moved 
in Spain for $0.24 and for $0.75 in the US.
One of the problems which the report outlined was the inefficiency of Spain's 
petrol industry. This industry was ruled by the monopoly of the "Compania 
Arrendatoria Monopolio Petroleos Sociedad Anonima" or CAMPSA. The only other 
institution to store petrol in Spain was the Spanish Navy. CAMPSA controlled a total 
of 18 tankers with an average capacity of 7,180 tons. 15 ports had facilities for these
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tankers, the largest was Barcelona with 641,800 barrels storage capacity. In total Spain 
could store between three and nine million barrels. Furthermore, CAMPSA had 70 tank 
cars with an average capacity of 5,000 gallons but the majority of these had been on the 
road for twenty years or more. It was claimed that all of CAMPSA's trucks, storage 
capacities and distribution network were needed to meet Spain's requirements. Thus an 
increase of demand created by petrol consumption at the bases made it necessary to 
increase the number of vehicles and storage capacity in Spain. This implied the 
construction of the pipeline system.
Another consideration was Spain's lack of aircraft industry. The largest 
company, Construcciones Aeronlutica S.A. had only factories in Getafe, Madrid, 
Seville and Cadiz. It was capable of producing around 300 outdated transport and 
medium bomber planes. Aeronautica Industrial S. A. based in Cuatro Vientos produced 
some 180 small trainer planes and the company Hispano Suiza based in Seville 
produced 200 Mel09. The lack of critical materials, manufacturing licences, engines 
and modem tools meant that the planes still had design predating 1945.30 This of 
course meant that Spain was not able at the moment to produce spare parts for modem 
fighter and bomber planes. Thus these would have to be imported from elsewhere.
Upon receiving the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff swiftly commented on it.
S.G.Conley, from the US Army, informed the Army Chief of Staff that he believed that 
Spain would fight in Europe if her armed forces received the necessary military 
equipment.31 It became clear during the discussions that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
favoured most of the administrative recommendations made in the report. These 
referred to the creation of a Joint Military Liaison Group or JMLG Spain, later called 
JUSMG, Joint US Military Group. It was recommended that JMLG was to be . 
composed of 13 officers and eight other supporting staff. The new group was to provide
30. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 12 December 1951, USAF "Planning for the Base 
Development of Spain".
31. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, S.G. Conley to Chief of Staff.
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data to the Joint Chiefs of Staff just as JMST had done. Furthermore, it was to establish 
Spain's military needs and to evaluate US training, economic and military aid to 
Spain.32 Yet JMLT, or JUSMG, was not to be placed under JAMAG, the Joint 
American Military Assistant Group, based in London. JAMAG played a similar role in 
Western Europe as JUSMG was to play in Spain. It would have been only natural to 
combine the administration of the two to cut red tape. The reason why the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff decided against this, was because Spain had expressed little desire to join 
NATO and the Western European powers likewise had expressed little interest in Spain 
joining NATO. Thus to avoid political controversy with Europe JUSMG was to be fully 
independent, reporting to the American Embassy in Spain and then to Washington 
directly.33 As had been recommended in the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed 
that further negotiations were to be conducted under NSC 72/6, restrictions governing 
JMST were to be lifted, a negotiation team under a USAF officer was to be set up and 
the Ambassador to Spain was to be placed in charge of the coordination of JUSMG.
Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with some other points of the report. It argued 
that it was premature to send training equipment to Spain, it gave no comment on 
Spain’s remark about a possible integration of Franco's nation into NATO, and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff was unwilling to see the negotiations as a quid pro quo. The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff believed that negotiations were to be based on general reciprocity and 
trust, rather than on hard bargaining.34
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also wanted to know how prices for improvements of 
inland bases compared to costs of newly constructed coastal bases. This had not been 
done directly by the JMST. Nevertheless, the JMST report, by favoring coastal bases, 
gave a clear priority to the geographical position over the convenience of established
32. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 24 November 1951, Proposed Military Liason Group 
to Spain.
33. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 14 December 1951, JCS on Report by JMST.
34. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec.1-8, JCS: On 
report, 31 October 1951, Report by the JMST (Spain).
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bases.35
The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that "the English Channel and the Pyrenees 
Mountains are both formidable terrain barriers and have similar importance as military 
obstacles to enemy attacks." Nevertheless the Spanish Ambassador in Washington was 
not in favour of withdrawing troops to the Pyrenees in case of conflict. On 1 October, 
Lequerica, Charles P. Clark, Colonel Andrew Samuels (Pentagon) and Frank C. Nash 
from the State Department held a conversation in which the Spaniard claimed that he 
would prefer to see a war fought on the Rhine or Elbe or even further East if possible 
and with Spanish troops included rather than one fought in Spain.36
Apart from the geographical value of the Iberian peninsula, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff claimed that Spain could also help "to fill the vital need for immediate 
augmentation of Europe's military manpower." At the same time the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff argued that "Spain's contribution of military power to the NATO cause might be 
sufficient to advance the defense of Western Europe east of the Rhine, thus insuring a 
more willing German participation in that defense. "37
Throughout the period of the survey, other NATO countries in Europe worried 
about the improvement of the military relations between Spain and the United States. 
This complicated matters. For example a planned trip by the team to the Pyrenees was 
canceled to avoid difficulties with France.38 On similar grounds an offer to survey 
Morocco was waived.
During August five Spanish Army officers were flown to the US to attend
35. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091, Spain, 1951, 14 December 1951, Report of the JMST (Spain) by 
Deployment Branch.
36. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 1 October 1951, Memorandum of Conversation, Frank 
C. Nash, Lequerica, Charles RClark, Col. Andrew Samuels; also Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 1 
October 1951, Memo of Conversation.
37. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 7 September 
1951, JCS Memo to Secretary of Defense.
38. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 10 September 
1951, JCS to USARMA, Madrid.
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military courses and another eight were expected during October.39 On 26 September 
the Sunday Times claimed that "the first cadres from the Spanish Army and Air Force 
are expected in Germany before the autumn to be trained in the operation and 
maintenance of US military equipment" this "precedes the shipment of military supplies 
to General Franco".40
On 27 September, it was confirmed to a British representative in a 
conversation with the State Department that 30 Spanish personnel were going to be 
trained in Germany. The American claimed that this was not special treatment for 
Spaniards but was part of an old program which was open to many nationalities.41
Despite this assurance, the incident caused outcry by the British Foreign Office. 
Shortly afterwards, General Omar N. Bradley informed the Secretary of Defense that 
"no plans exist for the training of Spanish military personnel in the American Zone of 
Germany. The Commander in Chief European Command has no knowledge of alleged 
statements."42 The project was canceled.
The UK was willing to accept the new US policy with Spain as long as no 
military end-items were sent to Spain.43 France had similar concerns. The two 
countries hoped that they would be able to use other NATO countries as a leverage 
against Washington. But after a study of the position of other NATO members it 
became clear that only Norway and Denmark supported London and Paris. Italy and the 
Benelux countries fell in line with US policy due to economic reasons. Whitehall and 
Quai d'Orsay concluded that they could only oppose Washington in private
39. PRO, F0371.96188, Chancery, Madrid.
40. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain, 26 August 1951, Sunday Times.
41. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 27 September 1951, Memorandum of Conversation, Mr
Jamieson, Second Secretary to Mr Dunham, WE. -
42. NA, Military Branch, CD 092 Spain 1951, 12 November 1951, Omar N. Bradley, Chairman JCS
to Secretary of Defense.
43. PRO, F0371.96191, 3 September 1951, FO Minutes, Mr Dawbam.
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discussions.44
Diplomatic pressure by London and Paris had forced Acheson in Washington to 
assure the British and French diplomatic missions that they would receive more 
information about US intentions in Spain and that the ensuing talks between the two 
countries would receive low publicity.45
This did not reassure the British Foreign Office and it was suggested that the 
UK could take part in the negotiations with Spain if it was considered essential to 
assure the use of Spanish military facilities in case of war.46 Sir John Balfour in 
Madrid opposed this suggestion as it might have leJ to demands by Madrid on 
Gibraltar. He feared that in return for base rights Spain would want to participate in the 
administration and political life of the colony.47
British fears were confirmed after a conversation between Erice, Director- 
General of Foreign Policy, with a British official in Spain. The Spaniard claimed that 
he was confident about the progress in Anglo - Spanish relations over Gibraltar and 
over an agreement between the two nations.48 Erice hoped that Spain could link the 
two issues. It was clear for the British Foreign Office that there could be no deal 
between Spain and the UK because there was no vital military advantage, there would 
be problems concerning Gibraltar and Washington would not welcome Britain 
complicating their talks with the Spanish authorities. Thus the UK opposed Spain's 
integration into NATO, a bilateral military agreement between the US and Spain, or 
one with Britain.49
Not even the Chiefs of Staff showed military interest in improved relations with
44. PRO, F0371.96191, 11 September 1951, Chancery Rome.
45. PRO, F0371.96191, 14 September 1951, O.Franks, Washington.
46. PRO, F0371.96192, 5 November 1951, O. Franks, Washington.
47. PRO, F0371.96192, 1 November 1951, Balfour, Madrid.
48. PRO. F0371.96192, 19 November 1951, 0. Franks.
49. PRO, F0371.96192, 9 November 1951, FO Minute, G.P. Young.
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Spain. The military planners feared that the American - Spanish agreement would lead 
to renewed demands by Madrid concerning Gibraltar. Extensive military assistance for 
Spain by the US would furthermore lead to diversion of weapons away from NATO 
countries. The Joint Planning Staff argued that any military agreement between 
^fcshington and Madrid should be limited to the use of ports, bases and overflight 
rights, exchange of military information and granting obsolete equipment. In the long 
term the military planners were not against Spain joining NATO as long as "no 
question of the rendition of Gibraltar to Spain can be discussed. "50
On the economic side political considerations could not be ignored. The other 
American study group to go to Spain was the Temporary Economic Survey Group 
under Dr. Sidney C. Sufrin. During a visit to Paris in September Sufrin realized that 
France had no interest in the American economic program for Spain. The French 
Government was itself concerned with economic difficulties due to US congressional 
reduction of the aid programme for Western Europe. It was feared in Paris that if Spain 
was to receive economic aid, even less dollars would remain available for France.51 
Sufrin's mission too was to provoke international opposition.
Sufrin was an academic at Syracuse University in the state of New York. By 
1951, he had published two books "Labor Policy and the?>usiness Cycle" in 1943 and 
"Union l/aees and labor*s famines" in 1950. In 1952 he would publish a 62 page study 
titled "TheEconomy of Spain". His mission was to lead a group which was to analyze 
the projects financed under the $62.5 million loan, to look for future projects and 
possible applications and finally to study Spain's economy and requirements for possi­
ble future economic aid.52
He was not well suited for this assignment as he lacked leadership as well as 
diplomatic skills. He had a conflict with the American diplomatic mission itself when
50. PRO, DEFE6.19, 26 November 1951, Report by JPS.
51. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 25 September 1951, Dunham to John W. Jones.
52. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 2 August 1951, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain.
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he got in contact with two diplomats of the Embassy concerning certain questions about 
the Congressional debates on the Mutual Security Act. The Embassy sent a cable to 
Washington which Sufrin thought appeared to portray him as the only one who had 
failed to grasp the technicalities of the debate and which furthermore had mistakes in 
the technical language. Sufrin was outraged with the two diplomats. Ambassador 
Griffis had to settle the dispute between the two sides.
Next Sufrin made a blunder out of a meeting with the Duke of Alba. The 
Spanish Ambassador had returned from London and Sufrin invited him to a buffet. The 
American expected the Duke to arrive with four or five members of the Foreign 
Ministry but was horrified when he turned up with more than 25. Naturally food and 
drinks had not been prepared for so many and consequently ran out. Upon arrival the 
Duke de Alba greeted Sufrin with a handshake and a slap on the back. When Sufrin 
wanted to return the friendly slap on the back his hand got caught in his pocket and, as 
he forced it out, he lost control and hit the Duke, who had in the meantime turned 
away, on his backside. During another meeting with Spanish authorities one of the 
economists working with Sufrin lectured the Spaniards on the Marshall Plan despite 
having received instructions not to mention it at all.53
The State Department worried about Sufrin's ability when the Spanish 
authorities appointed nine subcommittees to assist him during his research and he 
remained unable to free himself from their influence. This despite the fact that he had 
been instructed that the study "should be prepared on a confidential basis in view of its 
relationship to and effect on negotiations for military facilities."54
Sufrin failed to free himself and his team from the influence of the men from 
INI who, during several trips, stuck to the American team like "leeches". This failure 
meant that he could not gather the necessary material he wanted and was unable to 
produce a new and interesting analysis of Spain's economic situation and prospects. In
53. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 25 October 1951, Sufrin Diary, Part 6.
54. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 1 November 1951, Policy.
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the end he relied heavily on an earlier study by the State Department. Furthermore his 
inability to keep information away from the Spanish authorities meant that once the 
negotiations started Madrid knew more about the American interests than Wellington 
had desired.
The final report, passed to the European Cooperation Administration on 20 
December, consisted of thirteen chapters analyzing among others: national accounts, 
foreign trade, industrial sectors and infrastructure.
Despite these setbacks, Dr Sidney Sufrin realized that the Spanish economy was 
"being held together by bailing wire and hope."
In a lecture to the Law Faculty of Madrid University in December he was more 
specific. He feared that foreign currency investments in Spain would overdevelop 
industry compared to agriculture. Spain lacked general machinery, a modem electric 
power grid and a healthy infrastructure. Before these were improved, substantial new 
industrial investments would increase the strain on Spain's economy and would create 
an even more unbalanced economy. In the long term this capital rush, if not properly 
channeled, would hurt Spain's economy and would lead to inflation. On the other hand 
investments in the form of raw materials were good. Sufrin pointed out that Spain had 
to reorientate her trade in order to prosper. Spain was selling products for sterling 
while it was importing in dollars. The American suggested that Spain should increase 
her mineral exports to the US to decrease this balance of trade deficit with the US.55
In the report by Sufrin to the Mutual Security Agency, he asked for at least 
$150 million a year for raw materials, transport and power supply to Spain. The report 
estimated that Spain’s GNP could be increased by 3-4% during the first year alone. He 
estimated that aid for irrigation and fertilizers would increase agricultural output by 
20% alone.56
Sufrin pointed to Spain’s backwardness in agriculture. Only 0.5% of farms used
55. PRO, F 0371.102022, 29 December 1951, Murray, Madrid.
56. NY Times, 4 January 1952.
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tractors, 90% of the grain was still sown by hand. Out of 13,500 tractors registered in 
Spain some were 30 years and older. He estimated that Spain needed at least 40,000 
imported tractors to make up for this.57
He asserted that the industrial production could be increased in Spain by 10- 
15% with US technical aid and advice.58 Further problems came from the electricity 
industry. Spain, claimed Sufrin, had enough electricity but lacked the power net to 
transport it from areas of supply to areas of demand. There was no national power grid. 
He believed that technical assistance would solve the electricity problem, by allowing 
the distribution of electricity.59 Sufrin described the railroads as ’’terrible". Spain's 
infrastructure was hopeless. She lacked rails, roads or airport facilities to overcome the 
mountainous transport routes through her interior, only the port areas were acceptable.
RENFE, the Spanish railways, was a disaster. Before the Civil War, Spain had
3,000 steam locomotives. By the end of the internal conflict, Spain only had 2,000 left. 
Over the next years Spain was slowly building up the number of locomotives. In 1941 
there were 2,40060 and by 1950 there were about 3,400. Nevertheless old trains were 
not being replaced. Out of the 3,400, roughly 500 were in repair and some were almost 
100 years old.61 A very similar development can be observed for railways wagons.62 
Only 400 were for heavy freight and merely 700 for petrol. Trains were getting 
obsolete and this had created in 1950 a total of 471 reported derailments. A high 26.5 
cars per train ratio meant that the average speed was only just above 10 km/h, about 6 
mph. Yet on average a locomotive traveled 104 km per day thus was on average more 
than 10 hours in service. The conclusion was that Spain's trains were stretched to the
57. Sufrin, Sidney, Economy. NY, 1952, p,18f.
58. Sufrin.Economv. p.22.
59. Sufrin, Economy, p.25.
60. NA, Civil Branch, R&A Report 532, Notes on Spanish Railways Rolling Stock.
61. Sufrin.Economv. p.36.
62. NA, Civil Branch, R&A Report 532, Notes on Spanish Railways Rolling Stock.
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limit.63 A traveler through Spain reported on one of his train journeys that when the 
cars went off the rails his Spanish neighbour groaned resignedly without paying too 
much attention - "What? - Again?"
Spain's banking system was also in disarray. Finance was done nationwide on 
tacit and unofficial agreements - often handshakes rather than official contracts - sealed 
business decisions. Banks required no legal minimum reserves and their was no fixed 
debt for the government. Informal governmental pressure required banks to hold 40% 
of their securities in government bonds thus providing the government with cheap loans 
by creating artificial demand for bonds in excess of the market. The banks naturally 
passed the extra costs of these bonds down to the people, borrowers as well as 
savers.64 Sufrin believed that these practices had come about due to the uneven 
industrial developments over the past.
The only favorable point was that Spain slowly developed into the sunny tourist 
coast of Europe. In 1950 a total of 38,000 tourists came to Spain; one year later
750,000 and for the year 1952 a total of 1.5 million were expected.65 Naturally these 
tourists brought foreign currency with them and helped develop commercial areas along 
the coast.
Sufrin strongly argued against the damaging interference of the government in 
the economy. Iron ore is a good example to show how this affected the economy as a 
whole. The fixing of the multiple exchange rates in December 1948, discouraged 
exports of iron ore and artificially stimulated trade of particular commodities. This was 
done by paying exporters less in pesetas for dollar valued exports than they would 
receive for other exports; a dollar worth of iron ore did not have the same value in 
pesetas as a dollar worth of olive oil. Spain had only a small internal consumption of 
iron ore and with the introduction of multiple exchange rates, which discouraged iron
63. Sufrin, Economy, p.36.
64. Sufrin, Sidney, "Outlook in Spain", in Foreign Policy Bulletin. 1 Mar 1952, Vol.31.
65. Sufrin, Economy, p.58.
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ore exports, naturally production of iron ore fell. Yet it fell to such a large extent that it 
created a domestic lack of iron ore because of the loss of economies of scale. Thus 
prices of iron ore increased. Other industries in Spain were now faced with high iron 
ore prices. A liberalization of the exchange rate would have increased exports, 
recovered economies of scale and thus increased production as well as productivity of 
related industries. This would have created more foreign currencies for imports as well 
as removed iron ore scarcity in Spain.
Sufrin saw the problem in over-regulation. INI believed that a move from an 
agricultural to an industrial state could not be achieved by private enterprise, thus the 
government had to engineer it. In the light of this interpretation, Spain's economic and 
trade policy had been determined by one man, Juan Antonio Suanzes, the head of the 
INI. Sufrin expected foreign investment to flow to Spain once the maze of regulations 
had been removed.66 Yet even Suanzes^removal in 1951 as Minister of Trade and 
Industry, and a split of the ministry between Manuel Arburua and Joaquin Planell did 
not improve the situation. Sufrin dismissed the possibility of INI solving the economic 
problem.67
Liberalization of production, of ownership, of exports and imports would have 
encouraged foreign investments. As long as these were limited to 25-40% and as long 
as cases like the Barcelona Traction bankruptcy were possible, foreigners stayed away.
Barcelona Traction, partly a Canadian company, was declared bankrupt despite 
bringing in profits in 1948. This had been due to the strange exchange rates which 
distorted foreign capital gains and foreign capital investments.68 The fact that the case 
was not referred to arbitration, but the assets were transferred directly to the industrial 
group of Juan March, complicated the matter.
According to Sufrin, trade could start paying off Spain's debt but only if the
66. "Spain: A military partner ?"~in Business Week. 14 July 1951.
67. Sufrin, Sidney, "Outlook in Spain", in Foreign Policy Bulletin. 1 March 1952, Vol.31.
68. Sufrin, Economy, p.43.
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peseta was freed. Otherwise aid granted by the US would have deteriorated into 
meaningless gifts.69
He also warned that Spain would be unable to digest large foreign investment 
without counterproductive inflation. If a deal was struck with Spain, the US had to 
improve railroads, roads and the electricity network as well as military facilities. 
Therefore great sums of foreign capital had to be spent. This in turn would lead to 
inflation of prices for basic goods, such as food, clothing and housing, unless aid would 
also increase the supply of consumer goods. Sufrin recommended that imports of goods 
- were necessary to offset inflation.
Spain's economic situation was still desperate. Low rainfall over three years 
1948-1950 meant that the reservoirs were at less than 10% of their full capacity. A lack 
of water meant lack of electricity and lack of irrigation.
In Catalonia, factories had to close due to lack of electricity. In order to avoid 
social disorder, the Falangist syndicates forced employers to pay workers whether they 
worked or not. This created financial losses for many companies. Despite this policy, 
unemployment rose from 1947 to 1950 by 43%. The state had to enlarge its welfare 
expenditure to create a social net for the poor. This in turn lead to an increase of 
inflation. In 1949, inflation was under control at 6.5%; in 1950 it rose to 18% and in 
1951 it had increased to 30%.
The agricultural output index for 1948-1950 was 78.4 compared to 1953-55. 
During February/March 1950, the US sold 85 million pounds surplus stocks of potatoes 
at 1 cent per 100 pounds. At the beginning of 1951 Spain was still on the verge of 
economic collapse. It needed a long term economic solution.
1951 brought some improvements. In February 1951, the first $12.5 million 
credit under the McCarran credit was granted. Rain in Autumn 1951 filled the 
reservoirs to 2/3 of their capacity and solved the electricity and irrigation problems.
The potato production doubled, dried fruits and olives harvests tripled. Tomatoes,
69. Sufrin, Sidney, "Outlook in Spain", in Foreign Policy Bulletin. 1 March 1952, Vol.31.
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cotton and tobacco increased between 12% and 40%.
Due to the conflict in Korea, tungsten and mercury prices advanced. One ton of 
tungsten was sold at $2,300 in 1950, one year later it was purchased at $4,740. Now 
Spanish producers demanded a minimum price of $4,970. Mercury rose from $55 per 
flask to $200. This led to frustration and anger in the US Congress. For Spain it meant 
the first trade surplus in the postwar period. Only due to monetary growth of 12.6% in 
Spain, creating inflation, and an increase of expenditure abroad by the Franco regime 
on military equipment did Spain's balance of trade deteriorate during 1952. The 
economic prospect improved. A $50 million long term debt to ITT for the 1945 
nationalization of Telefonica could be paid back 8 1/2 years before schedule in 1952.
In 1951 real national income increased by 17.6% and throughout the year 
Spanish industry was helped by US credits. In August/September 1951 the Export 
Import Bank had granted $18 million for an electric power station, steel and fertilizer 
plants and for RENFE. Furthermore a good harvest in 1951 combined with better trade 
and diplomatic relations with Portugal, Latin America and Arab Nations were good 
news for Spain.
However problems remained. Francis Williamson, Deputy Director of the 
Office for Western European Affairs, informed the House of Representatives on 18 
October 1951 about the situation Spain. He saw two complications. Firstly the 
opposition by European states and secondly the fact that there was no alternative to 
Franco. He argued that NATO countries opposed the American rapprochement to Spain 
because the Spanish army could not fight efficiently without substantial military aid 
which would have meant less military aid for NATO. France was afraid that a military 
arrangement between Spain and the US would imply a withdrawal of US troops to 
Spain in case of war. At the time of Williamson's appearance before the House,
General Spry was still in Spain and therefore the Deputy Director of the Western 
European Office of the State Department could claim that currently the US was not
interested in acquiring bases but in simple usage of bases.70
The Assistant Director of the Mutual Security Agency, John H. Ohly told other 
State Department employees that the negotiations with Spain were going to be closely 
linked with the $100 million aid which already had been appropriated for Spain. On 21 
November, he requested the State Department to send him information about the 
loans.71
The very same day, Mr Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, informed Ohly that NSC 72/6 essentially provided guidance for the 
$100 million aid. Under NSC 72/6 the money was to develop the military potentialities 
in Spain for Europe's defence, assist Spain in improving relations with NATO countries 
and obtain early participation of Spain in NATO or help conclude mutual security 
arrangements between the two countries. He also confirmed that all military aid to 
Spain was still under political consideration. Bonbright also informed Ohly that US 
officials should stress that Spain's role was to defend not liberate Europe. It was clear 
that NATO countries were still given priority under NATO, the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Program and the European Recovery Program. Bonbright claimed that one 
should avoid base agreements in exchange for aid without Spain's commitment to 
Europe's defence. This policy was to be discussed with France and Britain to inform 
them and hopefully reach a common policy. In the meantime the US would approach 
Spain for long-range bomber and naval operation bases and facilities in return for 
economic and military aid as long as this did not conflict with other restrictions. In the 
meantime, the US was to release air navigational aids and other electronic equipment to 
Spain.
Finally, Bonbright made it clear that the negotiations with Spain would 
determine what facilities the US would seek in Spain, what aid would be given and
70. LOC, (82) HFo-3 Selected, 18 October 1951, The Situation in Yugoslavia, Italy, and Spain.
71. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1951, 21 November 1951, John H. Ohly to State 
Department Member of MAAC.
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what tactics were to be employed. "Economic aid... is one of the most important means 
available to us... and... is essential to the success of our military program in Spain 
including the ultimate use of Spanish forces in the common defense." He agreed with 
the JMST report and favoured a single group composed by representatives from the 
Departments of State, Defense and the European Cooperation Administration which 
would control all aspects of the negotiations. He believed that the first action to be 
taken was to define US requirements in Spain and to establish the negotiations group.72
While discussions in the State Department continued, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
came under time pressure to include Spain into the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Before 
negotiations or economic aid was to be granted to Spain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to 
decide on the volume and-composition of military aid.73 Freeman Matthews, the 
Deputy Under-Secretary, raised this problem on 7 December 1951 at the State 
Department while a Joint Chiefs of Staff representative was present. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff representative pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still considering the 
report by the JMST which had been handed in on 2 November. Bonbright called 
attention to the January deadline when a new Mutual Security Agency plan had to be 
sa lt to Congress.
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 could allow this as it was to "promote the 
foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic and technical 
assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and 
collective defenses of the free world." The President had a maximum of $5,028 million 
for the FY 1952 for European "countries which are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty 
and for any country of Europe (other than a country covered by another title in this act) 
which the President determines to be of direct importance to the defense of the North
72. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1951, 21 November 1951, Mr Bonbright, EUR to Mr Ohly.
73. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 27 November 1951, Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for European Affairs to the Deputy Under Secretary of State.
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Atlantic area".74
In order to administer the fund, the Mutual Security Agency had been set up. It 
replaced the Economic Cooperation Administration and was "designed to sustain and 
increase military effort, including production, construction, equipment and materiel."
As had been requested by the International Security Affairs Committee, the 
Mutual Security Act included a $100 million assistance approved by Congress for 
Spain. Nevertheless there was no compulsion to use this fund and it had not been 
requested, sought or favoured by the President.75 There used to be a clause in the 
Mutual Security Act which called for an approval by NATO countries when credits 
were to be extended to non-NATO countries. This would certainly have meant that 
Britain and France could have blocked any credits to Spain. This clause had been 
eliminated during Fall 1951 and shortly afterwards Congress appropriated the first $100 
million in aid for Spain.
It was necessary above all to get Truman to approve the idea of loans for 
Franco. Ambassador Griffis continued to support Spain wholeheartedly during his last 
weeks in office. His biased support for Franco during his short stay in Madrid as 
Ambassador and his advanced age (65 years) made him take retirement in early 
1952.76 When President Truman said that he was not very fond of Spain, Griffis went 
as far as to explain away the comment by his head of state, claiming that Truman had 
based it only on the unfortunate delay of the talks between Spain and the US.77
The policy he represented in Spain had not been uncontroversial. Many liberals 
expressed their disapproval with the new US turn. The New York Times wrote, 30
74. BFSP 1951. Vol. 158, p.961, lOOctober 1951, "Mutual Security Act of 1951".
75. FRUS 1951. Vol.IV, 21 November 1951, Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense 
Assistance, Department of State to the State Department Member of the Military Assistance Advisory 
Committee.
76. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 December 1951, Griffis to President; 28 December 1951, 
Dorsey G. Fisher to William B. Dunham; 2 January 1952, Griffis to William B. Dunham.
77. PRO, F0371.102017, 19 February 1952, Mr Burrows, Washington.
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x August 1951, that: "Once upon the time there were three big, bad fascists- Mussolini, ~
\
Hitler and Franco. Wfe fought a Wforld W&r to kill two of them and destroy all they 
stood for, now we have made an ally of the third." Statements like these made it 
difficult for Truman to lend Spain a hand.
In light of the new developments, on 18 July 1951 Franco reformed his 
government to gain international approval. A shuffle of the cabinet favoured the 
monarchist supporters. The Industry and Trade Minister Juan Antonio Suanzes, who 
was greatly disliked by the American authorities, was replaced by Joaquin Planell and 
Arburua. At the same time Franco released 250 imprisoned demonstrators. He was 
using the interest of the US in Spain for propaganda reasons. In this he was helped by 
several politicaLblunders by the Americans.
Paul A. Porter, the Director of the Mutual Security Agency, publicly announced 
the beginning of talks for an economic aid agreement with Madrid. Spain claimed that 
an agreement would be "a pact of mutual aid based on equality of rights" and "the 
objective of alliance is to insert the strength and resources of Spain within the anti­
communist system of defense for which aim the United States will aid our [Spain's] 
economy, industry and army."78
Congress too came to Franco's help. A Special Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs composed by Clement Zablocki, Edna Kelly and Chester 
Merrow toured Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy and Spain from November to 
December 1951.
In its report the Representatives wrote that "Congress has demonstrated 
foresight by recognizing that Spain belongs in the western community of nations and by 
providing appropriations for aid to Spain." The Subcommittee believed that "the United 
States must use its influence in uniting the efforts of all nations whose objectives are 
mutual security and the establishment of a just and lasting peace. ”79
78. NY Times. 4 January 1952
79. LOC, H2641, No.6, also 11576 H.rp. 1834, also included in LOC, H2287, Report 7 April 1952.
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In the meantime, the military and economic surveys by Sufrin and Spry were 
being used by the agencies concerned in making detailed preparations for negotiations 
with the Spanish Government to conclude bilateral arrangements.
The Joint Logistics Plans Committee constructed an extensive study on 
American expenditure covering Spain's necessities. The railways were to receive $15.2 
million, mainly to repair the tracks and for 200 locomotives and 10,000 cars. It was 
estimated that the demands by the US Navy would cost $12 million for the off-loading 
dock and facilities near Cadiz, $46 million for the naval air base at Rota and $1.1 
million to modify liquid fuel storages. The total cost for the Navy requirements added 
up to almost $60 million. The Committee worked out that the US Air Force demands 
were expected to cost roughly $330 million.80
Apart from its own economic and military considerations, the US had to think 
about Spain and Spaniards' loyalty in a world crises. Washington would have been 
humiliated if another Civil Wir would have broken out against Franco after granting his 
government aid or after having established bases in Spain. If Franco was about to fall 
from power, would the US wait and hope for the best or would she actively support 
him? Fortunately for the US, this scenario was unlikely to happen in a country which 
still remembered a bloody civil war. Yet even if a conflict in Spain was out of the 
question, a conflict in Europe was not. How would the Spanish population react when 
bloodshed was unavoidable? Would they turn against Franco and support Soviet troops 
as liberators or would they fight on Franco's side? These questions had to be given 
serious considerations in Washington. At the same time the US had to ask herself, how
 -much power Franco would be willing to give up. His regime was based on nationalism
and Franco’s propaganda had for years hailed Spain’s independent past. Above all it 
had created the Franco myth which claimed that the Generalissimo had cunningly 
avoided any commitment to Hitler. Would he suddenly change and submit to the
80. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 29 December 
1951, Joint Logistics Plans Committee.
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Sufrin's report on the economy asked for aid to Spain over a five year period.
_ \
He recommended that aid should be $130 million during the first year and then $79,
$66, $37 and $13 million in the following years. The report estimated that the initial aid 
would increase Spain's industrial product by 6-8% and the agricultural by 12-20%.
Sufrin wanted a split of the aid into economic aid around $70-$80 million and the rest 
$50-$60 million as military aid. He suggested that out of the $130 million, some $20 
million should go towards military-related industries like a power grid in Seville, steam 
generating stations, and highway repairs. $15 million would be spent on the railroads.
$95 million should be granted to other industries. Sufrin claimed that the aichwas 
required "to put the Spanish economy on a firm enough basis so that it will be able to 
support a growing US and Spanish military machine with all the incidental positive 
adjustments to the civilian economy."1
Sufrin also recommended certain limitations on the Spanish Government to 
prevent inflationary effects. "To protect against [inflation] it is suggested that 
arrangements be made with the Spanish Government... to... restrict the money 
supply,... the building o f  unnecessary structures and the production of luxury goods."
In addition he wanted a package of $4 million worth of essential goods to be sent to 
Spain as soon as possible after military agreements had been reached. The American 
academic hoped that this would provide for the needs of the poor and help control 
prices. He also favoured a restrain on money supply on the banks and the government 
and a control of mortgages in order to come to grips with possible inflationary effects.
Sufrin's report was similar to a report by the Western European Affairs branch 
of the Department of State from March 1951. Sufrin did have a look at this report 
before he departed for Spain and must have found inspiration in it.2
On 7 April 1952, the House of Representatives was presented with another
1. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 December 1951, Griffis to President, Summary and 
Comments on the Sufrin Report.
2. FRUS. 1952-54, Vol. VI, Part 2, 2 January 1952, Memorandum by Edgar J. Beigel of the Office of 
Western European Affairs, p. 1778.
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report on Spain prepared by a Congressional subcommittee. It outlined Spain's 
economic situation. It stressed the different rates of exchange of the peseta and claimed 
that Spain's purchasing power was still only about 50% of its pre - Civil Vfai level. 
Inflationary financing of public spending had resulted in a spiraling of prices and in a 
shortage of food and consumer goods. Furthermore, the vertical syndicates were con­
trolled by the Government. This prevented the development of a free market.
In October 1951, Spain's total national debt stood at 63 billion pts or roughly a 
third of GNP. On top of that came foreign credits in dollars of around $145.5 million 
(Export Import Bank: $62.5; Chase:$30; City Bank: $30; ITT: $14; Societd de Banque 
Suisse: $9 million), in Italian lira equivalent to roughly $5 million, pesetas 3.6 billion 
from Argentina and $76 million from other nations.
Annual spending of the government was financed roughly 84% through receipts 
and 16% through borrowing. The unadjusted (for receipts in pts) government deficit 
had increased from 320 million pts in 1948, to 893 million in 1949, to 1,364 million in 
1950, to 1,655 million in 1951 and was almost 2 billion in 1952. Spain faced liquidity 
problems.
The Subcommittee, which drafted the report, recommended tax reforms for 
Spain. It was asserted that luxuries had to be taxed more, some of the many loopholes 
had to be closed and the regressive tax system was no longer to rely mainly on property 
tax but more on income tax.
It was considered that disturbances in Spain were no longer political or 
Communist inspired but were mainly economic and social riots. Compared to other 
dictatorships, Spaniards enjoyed little restraint on their freedom of speech and often 
expressed criticism towards the government. Yet freedom of worship was another 
matter. At one point in Barcelona, Protestantjwere not allowed to bury the dead and 
had to seal the bodies in vaults in a wall and, as we have seen before, foreign churches 
were not sufficiently protected against vandalism.
Shortly after the Subcommittee had presented its report, the House o f  
Representatives was told through the State Department that Franco was willing to fight
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north o f the Spanish border and would welcome the use by US troops of Spanish ports 
and air fields.3 The Spanish General BarnSn had only expressed his concern about the 
possibilities of US troops permanently based in Spain. Communist propaganda wanted 
to make an issue out of this concern, claiming that Barron was concerned about Negro 
soldiers in Spain when in fact concern was generally towards any foreign troops in 
Spain.4 It was argued in Congress that despite the opposition by France and Britain, the 
US should not-waste the advantages Spain had to offer. Thus the report concluded that 
in order to oppose the communist threat Spain and the US should join forces in the 
form o f a mutual security fact as soon as possible.5
On the other side of the Atlantic relations between Spain and the European 
NATO members had not improved. No European representative at the Ninth North 
Atlantic Council apart from Dr Paulo Cunha, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, argued 
in favour of Spain's inclusion into NATO.6 Britain was still concerned about Gibraltar 
which was still "of great strategic value to the United Kingdom." In November 1951 
Franco had made some comments to The Sunday Times which were as absurd as they 
were offensive. He basically wanted to lease out Gibraltar to Britain in return for 
Spain's sovereignty over the colony - not an attractive bargain for London.7 The 
religious problem in Spain continued to unsettle Britain. In March fifteen young men 
stormed a religious service in Seville and injured the pastor and two ladies while 
burning some bibles and prayer books.8 Protestants were still banned from importing 
foreign bibles and prayer books. They were denied the right to contract civil marriages
3. LOC, H2287, Report, 7 April 1952, No.l.
4. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1952, 18 January 1952, Garrsison B. Coverdale, Negro Troop 
Unit in Spain.
5. LOC, H2287, Report 7 April 1952, No.l.
6. PRO, F0371.102017, 3 March 1952, Nigel Ronald, Lisbon.
7. PRO, F0371.102017, 19 March 1952, Mr T. Smith, Colonial Office.
8. PRO, F0371.102060, 20 March 1952, Balfour, Madrid.
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in foreign owned churches and the Spanish authorities were .obstructive to Protestant 
worship in general.9 Westminster was also worried about the diversion of military aid 
by the US from NATO countries to Spain. On political grounds the British Government 
was opposed to Spain's inclusion in NATO but it did not oppose granting military 
advice, training equipment and obsolete equipment as long as this did not decrease the 
amount of military material available for NATO countries and for Germany's 
remilitarization.10
France had similar concerns.11 Both nations feared that the American Defense 
Department had increased its interest in Spain and was now willing to grant Spain 
military end-items as well as dollars in return for a base agreement. London, and Paris 
even more, feared that this would mean less military help for NATO and a possible 
withdrawal of troops stationed in Central Europe.12 Washington realized this 
diplomatic concern and, When the time came, secretly instructed the head of JUSMG, 
the military team conducting the military talks with Spain, to "insure that in any 
discussion there will be no indication of a possible course of action to withdraw United 
States forces from Germany and France to Spain in the event of war."13 These 
international issues were further complicated when the Mutual Security Agency stressed 
the necessity for free trade unions and free enterprise in Spain. These considerations 
could not be ignored in Washington.
Given the difficulties of the job and the diplomatic complications, the head of 
the negotiations team for Spain under the Mutual Security Agency was to be a person 
with exceptional diplomatic skills, business experience and prior European Cooperation
9. PRO, F0371.102060, 12 February 1952, Balfour, Madrid.
10. PRO, F0371.102017, 18 February 1952, FO Minute, Mr Cheetham.
11. PRO, F0371.102011, 9 January 1952, Balfour, Madrid; 2 October 1952, Madrid, Chancery; 
F0371.102014, 3 April 1952, FO Minute.
12. PRO, F0371.102022, 1 February 1952, Sir Christopher Steel, Washington.
13. NA, Military branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 22 March 1952, Term of Reference for the Joint U.S. 
Military Group (Spain).
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Administration background. On top of these professional skills, he should have been 
almost unknown to the public in order to avoid publicity.14 If the State Department 
wanted to avoid losing the initiative to the Pentagon it had to come up with a suitable 
candidate and this was obviously not easy.
After the Sufrin report, the State Department also worried that it might lose 
control over its policy towards Spain for other reasons. If limited economic aid for 
Spain was the result of "a concession to the achievement of specific military objectives" 
then the State Department could see itself easily sidelined. Clearly it was considered 
important, even by the State Department, to link military and economic aid, just like 
Sufrin had recommended. Spry had reported that it was better and probably also easier 
to get Spain to grant bases and overflight rights under bilateral agreements rather than 
through NATO.15 Nevertheless, this carried the risk that the State Department would 
be swept aside by military considerations during these talks.
Military cooperation between the two countries increased. From 4 to 9 January 
1952, 16 Spanish Naval Officers embarked on two American ships, the Thrawa and the 
carrier F.D. Roosevelt, to observe the Sixth Fleet exercise in the Mediterranean.16 31 
ships of the US Fleet including the carrier FDR visited several ports in Spain. This was 
the largest naval visit to Spain since the end of the Spanish Civil War.17
On 14 January 1952, Secretary Acheson told Congress in a report that what 
"Admiral Sherman took up with Franco was our desire to have anchorage rights in 
Spanish harbours, landing rights on Spanish airfields and over-flight rights". It was 
clear that some of the airfields in Spain required extensive work before they could be
14. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 7 January 1952, Acting Special Representative in Europe to the 
MSA, p.1781.
15. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 9 January 1952, Counselor of Embassy in Spain to William B. 
Dunham, p. 1782.
16. Strategic Plan Division Records, US Navy, Annual Report 6th Fleet, 14 June 1952, C-in-C 6th 
Fleet to CNO.
17. PRO, ADM223.297, February 1952, Monthly Intelligence Report, Naval Intelligence Division; 
also in F0371.102047, 17 January 1952, Balfour, Madrid.
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used by large USAF bombers. Acheson outlined that in return Spain "would like 
equipment which is very hard to come by at this time. They would like things of that 
sort. This is a matter of working out an arrangement and I think that can be done. We 
will go ahead with it." The Secretary agreed that Spain would add to the depth of the 
defence of the Atlantic area but made it clear that this was not the central issue at stake 
with Spain.18
Shortly afterwards, on 16 January 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed 
Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett to establish a Joint US Military Group Spain 
(JUSMG). JUSMG was to start military negotiations and decide how to use the $100 
million appropriated for Spain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to split the available 
$100 million for Spain as follows, 15% for the US Army, 13% for the Navy and 72% 
for the Air Force.19 During the first year of the construction programme in Spain, the 
USAF hoped to station three medium Bomber Wings and one Reconnaissance Wing in 
Spain. Construction of Air Force bases at Torrejon, San Pablo, Moron, El Copero and 
Matagorda would be initiated. At the same time, new air depots and POL storage 
facilities near Matagorda, Seville would have to be constructed. During the same period 
the Navy hoped to buil/ the off-loading dock and fly-away strip near Matagorda as well 
as add to the existing storage facilities. The army hoped to improve roads and railroads 
near the area of Matagorda and Seville.20
The Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined long term US military requirements in Spain. 
These were based on a note by the Secretaries of the Services, dated 7 January 1952. 
The requirements included air bases for peacetime rotation and a wartime ten wing 
detachment. In order to do this the following airfields had to be improved: Thblada
18. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Vol.2, 82nd Congress, 1952, 14 
January 1952, Report by Secretary of State, Washington, 1976/77.
19. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 23 January 
1952, JCS 1821/63; also in Condit, Doris M., The Test of War. Washington, 1988, p. 355.
20. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 9 June 1952, Notes on first year construction program in 
Spain.
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(costs to improve facilities in millions: $54), JMuntados ($41 for one facility and $13.5 
for a smaller field), Los Llanos ($38), San Pablo ($38), Moron de la Frontera ($30), 
Ibrrejon ($24.5), San Juijo ($21), Getafe ($13), and Barajas ($2.5). Furthermore a HQ 
near Madrid was to be built ($9.5). The total costs of these USAF projects came to 
$285 million. The US Navy wanted an aircraft support dock near Cadiz for $11.8 
million and a logistics base near Rota. The costs of the latter was expected to be $45.8 
million, plus the costs for the connection between Rota and Cadiz $0.8 million. The 
Navy also wanted anchorage rights and port repair facilities, subterranean storage 
facilities (mostly fuel storage at El Fenol $1.1 million and munition storage at 
Cartagena $0.3 million). As a bonus the US hoped to gain access to an amphibious 
training area. More importantly the US Army wanted all facilities required to make full 
use of the military bases. This included improvement in rolling stock worth $7 million 
and POL terminals and a pipeline system worth $20 million. On top of that the US 
Army required additional facilities to secure US operations. Therefore air defence 
installations had to be bought, worth $25 million, and the necessary improvements to 
Spain's facilities for all o f the above had to be authorized. Generally speaking, the US 
wanted to develop Spain's military potentials at a total cost of around $400 million.21 
Tb assure flexibility, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to include a statement that the US 
also had the right to demand additional facilities as might be considered necessary in 
the future. In the short term, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to enter forthwith 
negotiations with Spain on the military aspect and to lift previous restrictions, as under 
the limited approach agreed by Truman, Acheson, Marshall and Sherman. In order to 
conduct negotiations at the military level and to coordinate them with the Mutual 
Security Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to dispatch a Joint US Military Group 
(JUSMG) under an Air Force officer. This military team was to operate under the US
21. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1952, 7 January, Note by the Secretaries.
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Ambassador in Spain.22
In return, the State Department agreed that combined economic and military 
negotiations should start as soon as possible. It wanted to seize the initiative over the 
negotiations by agreeing prior to the departure of the negotiations team on the topics 
which were to be covered during the talks.23 It therefore stressed that military plans 
had to be defined before they could be endorsed.
The State Department also wanted to avoid any complications with NATO 
countries arising out of the negotiations with Spain. Acheson argued that it was "the 
best way to leave the Spanish matter... the way it isnow, by having military 
cooperation worked out between the United States and Spain, rather than trying to bring 
it into the whole organization [NATO]."24
Economic aid was to be the carrot for military negotiations. As for the exact use 
of the $100 million aid, it had not yet been determined but the Mutual Security Agency 
and the State Department were convinced that the loan would be a benefactor to the 
Spanish economy. It was feared that Spain might come to see the $100 million already 
appropriated as a minimum rather than a maximum of aid. The State Department 
argued that the US should not hesitate in disappointing the Spaniards over their false 
assumption.25
Theoretically, the $100 million appropriated for the Mutual Security Agency 
fund could not be used directly for the construction of military facilities in Spain as this 
would have been against the purpose of the Mutual Security Agency. Nevertheless, the 
chairman of the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee mentioned that counterpart
22. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol. VI, Part 2, 24 January 1952, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, p. 1785.
23. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 28 January 1952, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, p. 1788.
24. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 82nd Congress, 1952, 15 January 
1952, Greek - Turkish Protocol, Washington, 1976/77.
25. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, William B. Dunham, Office Western European Affairs to 
Counselor of Embassy in Spain, p. 1793.
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funds, created through the purchase of dollar commodities for the Spanish economy,
\
could be used for these military constructions. The system with the counterpart funds . 
worked as follows. The Spanish Government would deposit pesetas into an account, 
some in advance, as a counterpart for American economic and technical assistance. The 
American government would be able to draw money on this account to pay for peseta 
expenditures in Spain and could thus use them for the planned military constructions.
This meant that the currency generated through Spain's purchase of goods in the US 
could be indirectly used for military purposes. The Mutual Assistance Advisory 
Committee^ approved the military aid to Spain and on 2 February it gave a rough 
estimate on how to break down the $100 million aid: $40 for commodity purchases 
which would generate counterpart funds; $25 for the purchase of military training 
equipment; $15 for materials for the railroads; $20 million for the munitions industry 
and strategic materials.26
By now, January 1952, it was clear that the initially planned $57 million of 
military end-items for Spain, as perceived in 1951, were not available for quick 
delivery due to the great demand created worldwide by the Korean conflict.27
This was the reason why the Joint Chiefs of Staff was informed by the Mutual 
Assistance Advisory Committee, on 4 February 1952, that the $100 million for Spain 
should be divided as the Mutual Security Agency had suggested.28
It was clear that Spain would receive military aid. Yet as for military end-items, 
hardware deliveries to NATO were given priority. Spain would only receive modem 
military equipment once it made a commitment to support NATO.29
26. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 2 February 1952, Memorandum of the Mutual Assistance 
Advisory Committee to all Members of the MAAC, p. 1797.
27. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1952, 8 January 1952, Spanish Military Defense Assistance 
Programs.
28. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 4 February 
1952, to JCS by MAAC.
29. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 6 February 1952, Memorandum by the Deputy Director of 
Office of European Regional Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, p. 1798.
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The State Department wanted to reconsider aid plans for military end-items and 
minimum training equipment. The Department feared that if  the current plans for the 
negotiations were not reconsidered, Spain's hopes would be raised and Madrid would 
ask for more military items and thus complicate negotiations even further. This could 
also delay and decrease aid to NATO countries. The Department would not have 
objected if military end-items granted to Spain were insignificant The State Department 
asserted that if Spain received large amounts of military aid political complications with 
NATO would come about and military end-items delivery to Spain would have to be 
delayed until Spain was committed to the defence of the Wfest. In general, the State 
Department was not opposed to the delivery of military end-items to Spain for training 
' but wanted to make sure that the amount of aid granted was clear from the beginning of 
the negotiations.
Fearing European opposition the Secretary of State, Acheson, informed the 
Secretary of Defense, Lovett, that his Department was not in agreement with the
Department of Defense on entering negotiations with Spain under the current plan
\
outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Acheson asked for a decrease of minimum base 
requirements and US personnel stationed in Spain. He asserted that if this was not 
possible, two problems would arise. The gradual increase of the implementation of a 
programme of the considered size would dislocate Spain socially and economically.
High inflation and conflict between natives and US personnel would create difficulties 
in the country. Acheson argued that a second problem would arise due to the lack of 
military information passed on to the American Ambassador in Spain concerning the 
required military facilities in Spain. It had been agreed that the ambassador was to 
conduct the later stages of the negotiations and therefore, argued the Secretary of State, 
had to be kept informed about the earlier developments. However, the Department of 
Defense, concerned about the national security of this large military project, wanted to 
keep US military demands out of the reach of the State Department and thus the 
American Embassy in Madrid. By scaling down the project, Acheson hoped that the
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Pentagon would make more information available. Seeking this information, the 
Secretary argued that the ambassador should be informed on all military requirements 
before talks could go ahead7 so as to coordinate them properly during the later stage.
Acheson agreed with Lovett that the negotiations should get underway as soon 
as possible after Lincoln MacVeagh, future ambassador to Spain, had presented his 
credentials to Franco, presumably around the middle of March. Until then, he 
deemed it necessary to reach an agreement between the two Departments. This he 
considered of utmost importance.30
Included in his letter, Acheson sent Lovett a proposal by his Department on 
US military requirements in Spain. This proposal agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
demands in almost all respects apart from the size and composition of deployment of 
air wings in Spain and the demand of concessions from Spain for the US Army to 
secure future US operations. Nor did Acheson favour the possibility o f asking Spain 
in the future for additional facilities not outlined in the military report. Most 
importantly though, the Secretary was not interested in developing Spain's military 
potential to the maximum, like the Joint Chiefs of Staff had demanded.31
The State Department knew that Spain had carefully studied biateral agreements 
and US aid programmes to other European countries. Spain was folly aware of the 
kind of assistance which was going to Spain's neighbours. The Counselor of the 
American Embassy in Spain believed that given this fact, military talks were not going 
to be easy unless the US was willing to spend more than just SlOOmillion in Spain. The 
Counselor, John W. Jones, hoped that if this money was not going-to be enough to 
provide facilities in Spain, the US could always use the $5 billion base construction 
funds of the Department of Defense. The Counselor also recommended that technical 
assistance should only be granted in fields which were covered by economic assistance.
30. FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 11 February 1952, Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense,
p. 1800.
31. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 11 February 1952, US Military Requirements in Spain,
included in N.840, p. 1804.
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That meant that advice oirthe textile industry in Catalonia and Mutual Security Agency 
funds for cotton, as well as insecticides and advice on how to combat the olive fruit fly 
should be locked together. Jones claimed that the delay of talks was due to the failure 
by the military to adhere to NSC 72/8. According to Jones, NSC 72/8 had opened the 
question of US military policy towards Spain and had led to a split of the economic and 
military talks which in turn was exploited by Franco and had delayed the negotiations 
by a year. Jones also believed that the State Department should not tell the Department 
o f Defense nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff how much defence support was to be demanded 
from Spain.32
In the meantime two new reports by the Joint Logistics Committee to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommended spending the $100 million differently. They wanted to 
spend $50 million, rather than $40 million, for commodities and $18 million, rather 
than $20 million for technical advice, military investments and the Spanish ammunitions 
industry. The $15 million for the Spanish railways remained unchanged. This would 
have created a total of $83 million, instead of only $75 million, of counterpart funds. 
The rest of die money wotild go towards military end-items, $12 million, and for 
strategic material $5 million. These $17 million were scaled down from $25 million. 
The military end-item aid to Spain was to be split up: 55% for the Army, 25% for the 
Air Force and 20% for the Navy. The suggested changes meant that an extra $8 million 
were available in counterpart funds, which could be spent on the construction of 
military facilities. The $83 million in counterpart funds were to be spent as follows:
$78 million for base constructions and $5 for the Mutual Security allocations. The base 
constructions costs, adding up to $390 million over three years (annual costs of $130 
million), were to be covered during the first year by the counterpart fimds of $78
32. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 14 February 1952, Counselor of Embassy in Spain to William B.
Dunham, p. 1804.
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million and $52 million by the Department of Defense.33 The reason for these new 
proposals was to create enough counterpart funds to finance the base construction 
programmes during the first year.
Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the USAF member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed 
the Secretary of Defense that the Joint Chiefs of Staff favoured the above given 
distribution of military end-items to Spain. He also informed him about the newly 
suggested breakdown of the $100 million into $83 million for counterpart funds, of 
which $78 million would be used for base construction. As advised, the rest of the 
counterpart fund would be spent for strategic materials production, the munitions 
industry and general economic developments. This was exactly what the Joint Commit­
tee had recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff some days earlier. Nevertheless, 
\fendenberg also suggested that if Spain disagreed with the arrangements concerning 
counterpart funds, the Department of Defense would have to bring up more than the 
$52 million for the base construction as the projected $72 million created through the 
counterpart funds would no longer be available.34
The same day, 15 February 1952, the Department of Defense under the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Program started planning how to spend the possible $55 million 
military end-item program during FY 1953. This study was based on the assumption 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staffs proposal on how to split the $100 million aid would be 
rejected. It suggested that $0.7 million would go into electronics and communications 
aid, $3.4 million would be spent for artillery and fire control, $15.2 million for 
artillery ammunition and the remaining $35.8 million would purchase tanks and combat 
vehicles. As a result Spain was to receive 155 tanks, 54 howitzers and 157 mortars ~
33. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 12 February 
1952, JLPC to JCS, JCS 1821/70, and, 14 February 1952, Report Joint Logistics Plans Committee to 
JCS, JCS 1821/71.
34. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 February 1952, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, CoStaff USAF to Secretary 
of Defense.
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among others.35
On 26 February 1952, the Interdepartmental (Defense - State) Wsrking Group 
sent a  report to the Chairman of the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee. It _ 
supported the Joint Chiefs of Staffs earlier suggestion by stressing that the $100 
million should be used in such a way as to create enough counterpart funds to meet the 
construction costs for the bases. In the FY 1953 alone about $78 million had to be 
covered in this way. Should Spain be unwilling to accept a proposal which might 
channel $88 million into pesetas^for construction and $12 million into military training 
then the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee should decide not to use the money at 
all for the construction of bases, but to try to finance them completely through the 
Department of Defense. It was expected that Spain would complain about the 
counterpart arrangement as no other country received aid through counterpart funds for 
the construction of military facilities. Other nations used the money created out of the 
counterpart funds for their economy, while base construction was paid for exclusively 
by the US. At the same time it took away the dollar exchange into pesetas by 
channeling the dollars directly into the base construction. The report speculated that 
Spain might agree to the military proposal but it was not expected that Madrid would be 
satisfied with the economic method, nor with the amount of aid granted.
The report claimed that the fundamental problem was the financial shortcomings 
of the Department of Defense to pay for the base construction plan during the first 
year. In fact it seemed as if the US was trying to make use of the $100 million 
appropriated for Spain twice, once by creating counterpart funds and then by paying for 
the construction of their own bases. If, as had been expected, Spain found out that this 
had not been done elsewhere, it would have complicated the negotiations considerably.
In Washington one of three scenarios were feared to arise. First, the Spanish 
Government would be unwilling to grant all bases, which would reduce the total costs
35. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 15 February 1952, FY 1953, Department of Defense
MDAP, Military end-item grant program.
2 3 2
Chapter 10:1952 Analysis o f the Reports
to merely $152 million, a sum small enough to be financed without counterpart funds. 
Second, the US could simply slow down the construction during the first year to an 
investment of $52 million, which the Department might be able to finance. Lastly, the 
Department could provide funds, which were not specifically earmarked for Spain, to 
pay for the costs during the first year, thus leaving the overall base construction costs at 
$230 million for coming years. The choice between these alternatives by the Mutual 
Assistance Advisory Committee would depend on the willingness of the Defense 
Department to spend money. —
As the issue stood at the moment, the $100 million would have to create $78 - 
million in counterpart funds. The Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee would have 
to balance these aims while taking into consideration that any action taken should not 
inflate or deflate the Spanish economy. The Committee was also to give priority to US 
military requirements and avoid pesetas expenditure on the railways, labour, and 
facilities in Spain for which enough local currency existed in Spain. Nor was money to 
be spent in pesetas for military end-items or for training purposes. This left investment 
in pesetas for Spain's industry, military as well as private industries. The 
Interdepartmental Working Group on Spain endorsed a program which provided $88 
million for counterpart funds rather than $78 million. It considered that roughly $50 
million would be spent to offset inflation. It was estimated that to finance the base 
construction the Navy and Air Force required an additional $52 million for the FY 
1953 on top of the $78 million in Spanish pesetas, created through counterpart funds. 
Over three years the two armed services, USAF and Navy, were expected to require 
$389 million, or $130 million annually, of which the Navy would spent $59 million and 
the USAF $330 million. These costs would be financed to 40% in dollars and to 60% 
in pesetas.
The report gave an initial proposal on how to spemf the $100 million similar to 
the Joint Logistics Committee. However, $17 million would be made available for the 
Spanish private military industry, rather than $12 million. The extra $5 million came 
from planned strategic materials, which were slashed completely. A totaTof $22
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million, was to be spent in pesetas and would create counterpart funds. Altogether, $88 
million in counterpart funds would be created, compared to the suggested $78 million 
by the Mutual Security Agency and the $83 million suggested by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. This amount, which was mainly to be spent in the construction of the bases, was 
enough to cover the estimated $78 million costs during the first year.36
After the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reconsidered the early suggestions by the 
State Department, Lovett was informed that the Chiefs basically agreed with the State 
Department.37 The Memo was simply a repeat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position. It 
did not mention the disagreement over the improvement of Spain's military potential, 
nor the other differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department
On 4 March 1952, the USAF spelled out what the Mutual Defense Agreement 
Program's objectives should be in Spain. It was to "provide a broad base and well- 
trained nucleus for future expansion of the Spanish Air Force. ” This meant that the 
programme had to improve the training of Spanish pilots, equip the air training 
installations and provide modem training equipment. It also had to increase the Air-Sea 
rescue capabilities of the Spanish Air Force. In order to achieve this, the USAF 
estimated that a total of $27.6 million, spread over three years, was required. The 
money was to be spent as follows: $15 million for aircraft; $6 million for electronics 
and communication and $4 million for general equipment. The rest of the $27.6 
million, ie. $2.6 million would go towards related costs. The total aid would be 
delivered to Spain between 1953 and 1955, with the bulk 64% arriving in 1954. It was 
estimated that a total of 93 planes could be purchased for Spain, mostly T-6J and T-33, 
both training planes.38
36. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 26 February 1952, Report by Interdepartmental Working Group 
on Spain to Chairman of MAAC, p. 1809.
37. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1953, 3 March 1952, Hoyt S. Vandenberg to Secretary of 
Defense, also in, FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 3 March 1952, Memorandum by JCS to the 
Secretary of Defense.
38. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 4 Mar 1952, FY 1953, AF MDAP Objectives in 
Spain ^
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On the same day, 4 March, the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee realized 
that the report by the Interdepartmental Wbrking Group on Spain from February, had 
little chance of being accepted by Madrid, mainly because of the idea of counterpart 
funds. This lead to new discussions and to a new proposal on 20 March 1952.39
On 20 March 1952, the Interdepartmental Wbrking Group issued its new 
statement of policy. This document was to serve as instruction to the Mutual Security 
Agency negotiations team during the first several months. This policy paper became 
known as DMS D-7. It argued that the aid program was based on the assumptions that 
there was only $100 million available for the FY 1953 and that no new funds would be 
made available. Furthermore it saw as the US primary objective to obtain base rights in 
Spain. Furthermore, it considered that the $100 million had to cover the base 
construction costs as well as economic, technical, and military aid. The report 
estimated base costs at $390 million plus $15 million for the rails, spread over three 
years. The costs could be covered 40% in US dollars and 60% pesetas,that meant
annual costs o f $52 million in dollars and $78 million in pesetas. There was still hope\
that during the first year the Department of Defense would cover the $52 million costs. 
The alternative, using the Mutual Security Program funds, was far more complicated. 
The report read that:
"It will not be appropriate for MSP funds to be used to finance directly dollar 
expenditures for the construction of military facilities to meet US requirements 
in Spain. This is based on the view that expenditures of MSP appropriated funds 
for this purpose do not appear to constitute assistance to Spain within the terms 
of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act."
This was taken from the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee's decision on 2 
February 1952. The $100 million could create enough counterpart funds to cover the 
peseta costs. The report read "it would be appropriate for counterpart funds, generated
39. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 4 Mar 1952, Editorial Note, N.843, p. 1848.
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through the purchase of dollar commodities for the Spanish economy, to be used for the 
construction of military facilities in Spain, even if for exclusive use by US forces."
This too had been part of the Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee's decision on 2 
February. The $100 million were broken down along similar lines as before.
It was expected that the assistance for Spanish private industry and the 
munitions industry would create a total of $22 million in counterpart funds, as would 
the $50 million spent for consumer goods to offset the inflationary effect of the total 
aid. Thus the assistance would place "no additional burden on the Spanish economy as a 
result of US military objectives." After further studies, it was decided that the money 
flowing into the railways and the technical assistance would not create counterpart 
funds because it became obvious that most of the railroad stock had to be purchased in 
the US. The exchange rate for these counterpart funds was not going to be determined 
under the complicated Spanish multiple exchange rates system but by a previously fixed 
exchange rate. Washington suggested that the $50 million consumer goods, the $17 
million industrial aid and the $5 million aid for railways would be granted in return for 
a  deposit of $78 million in' pesetas. Naturally it was expected that the Spanish 
authorities would not be thrilled by this idea.
The US Embassy in Madrid had expressed their belief that Spain would not 
accept the method of counterpart funds because this system had not been applied to 
other countries. In case Spain should object to the use of the counterpart funds, the 
negotiation team was instructed to point out to the Spanish authorities that Spain was 
not a member of NATO and thus bilateral agreements would be based on a quid pro 
quo. Should Spain continue to oppose, then the negotiatronleam was allowed to go 
down to a $50 million deposit in pesetas by the Spanish government. If  this concession 
was necessary, constructions would have had to be slowed down by lowering 
expenditure and thus spreading costs over a longer period.40
40. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 20 March 1952, Interdepartmental Policy Statement on Spanish
Aid Negotiations, p. 1824.
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In the meantime in Spain, on 12 March, Artajo and Marquds de Prat had a  \  
conversation with the Chargd in Spain, Jones, and others from the American Embassy.
The Spanish Foreign Minister outlined Spain's struggle against communism as well as 
Spain's vital strategic location in the Mediterranean. He claimed that Spanish soldiers 
were brave but lacked modem equipment. In order to strengthen Spain militarily, Spain 
needed a healthy industry as well as arms and munitions. The Spanish Minister also ex­
pressed that his country had no immediate interest in joining NATO. The American 
Embassy Representative Perkins pointed out that 1952 was an election year in the US 
and would therefore cause delay in the negotiations. Furthermore he outlined the 
economic situation in Britain and France, especially French Indochina. London and 
Paris would obviously wonder about Washington's commitment to NATO countries if  a 
bilateral deal with Spain, despite NATO opposition, was struck. These were important 
factors to be taken into consideration. Despite problems between Britain and Spain,\ 
which would further complicate matters, Perkins told Artajo that MacVeagh's team 
might have instructions to start negotiations.41
As the date of Lindoln MacVeagh's departure drew closer, discussions in 
Washington became more heated. Due to the possibility that Spain might reject the idea 
of counterpart funds, Lovett tried to take all necessary steps to at least insure the $52 
million from the Department of Defense funds for the construction of the bases in 
Spain.42
The Secretary argued that as the Department of the Air Force was the main 
benefactor, it would carry the burden of the costs. The Air Force Department was 
expected to pay $44 million out of the $52 million for the first year. Nevertheless, 
when the Department of the Air Force was informed about the possibility of financing 
Spain's bases through its defence funds, it told the Secretary of Defense that neither the
41. FRUS 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 12 March 1952, First Secretary of Embassy in Spain to State 
Department, p. 1819.
42. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 4 March 1952, Robert A. Lovett to Secretary [of 
State].
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x allocated $44 million to the Air Force Department nor the subsequent annual $110 
million had been included in any funds appropriated for the Air Force. Nor had the Air 
Force Department contemplated reprogramming its funds for FY 1953 for such a 
program. Straightforwardly, the Air Force Department was not willing to bear the 
costs required to finance the base construction through the Department of Defense now 
or in the future without further appropriation or reallocation of funds.43
The Air Force had received $82 million for base construction in Europe during 
the FY 1953 and was currently requesting $120 million for military bases in Portugal 
and Northern Ireland. The Department of the Air Force argued that if the Department 
o f Defense had to finance the costs of construction in Spain, then the European base 
construction fiindwould have to be split between Spain, Portugal and Northern Ireland. 
As far as the "Air Force is concerned, Spain is of no greater interest as a location for 
air bases than other areas of corresponding distance of possible targets. ” The USAF 
made it clear that it only wanted to invest in Spain after full political agreements 
assured access to the military bases in times of difficulty.44 ~
The base project was in serious difficulties if the USAF refused to bear its costs. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended economic and military assistance to Spain 
on the assumption that the Department of Defense could partly finance the base 
constructions. William C. Foster, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now put 
pressure on the Chief of Air Staff to get the Air Force Department to approve the 
necessary costs. He wrote to the Secretary "if the Department of the Air Force desires 
the development of the bases in Spain, it should make the necessary budgetary 
provisions therefore."45  _________
43. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 11 March 1952, Department of Air Force to Secretary 
of Defense
44. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 2 April 1952, E.V. Huggins, Assistant Secretary of 
Air Force to Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster.
45. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 29 March 1952, William C. Foster to Secretary of 
Air Force.
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The Secretary of Defense took note, and his office informed the Air Force that 
he would be pleased if "in order to assist the negotiators and to initiate construction 
without undue delay in the event of successful conclusion of the negotiations, reconsid­
eration of the reply by the Secretary of the Air Force is requested."46
Similar problems arose with the Navy. On 11 April 1952, the US Navy 
reviewed the Public Works Authorization and the Appropriation Acts. The Chief of 
Naval Operations concluded that the Navy would be unable to recommend a 
reprogramming of costs to cover either the initial $8 million, which was the US Navy 
share of the construction cost during the first year or the $20 million, the US Navy 
share of the subsequent annual construction costs.47 Neither the Navy nor the Air 
Force Department were willing to cover their share of the costs. Thus the Department 
of Defense was hard pressed to finance the construction themselves.
The Army too became involved in this conflict. Overall the problem within the 
Department of Defense was one of avoiding responsibilities. None of the three military 
services wanted the job and thus coordination between the three even within the 
Pentagon remained a disaster.48
- The Defense Department was denied die cooperation of its Air Force and Navy 
Departments and thus it became clear that the availability of funds for the construction 
depended solely on the progress of the negotiations. If Spain refused to go along with 
the idea of counterpart funds, the Defense Department would not be able to finance the 
construction alone.49
This led to the Joint Chiefs of Staff considering the possible alternatives of
46. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1953, No Date, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense 
from Office Secretary of Defense.
47. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, i f  April 1952, Secretary of Navy to Secretary of 
Defense.
48. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 10 June 1952, William Dunham to MacVeagh.
49. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 1952 Spain, 18 April 1952, Memorandum, Clark L. Rufiner Maj.- 
General, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary for International Security Affairs to Mr Lincoln Gordon.
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Spain rejecting the idea of using counterpart funds* In such a case, the $100 million aid
\
for Spain would have had to be spent differently. A total o f $35 million would have 
gone to military end-items, Spain's munitions industry and strategic material would 
receive $12 million, transport and rails would get $25 million, $10 million would be 
spent in economic investment and $1 million in technical advise while only $15 million 
would have been spent to offset inflation.50
~~ As these financial considerations in the Pentagon were being discussed, other 
important developments had taken place. On 12 March 1952, Acheson declared in a 
press statement that the official beginning of negotiations between Spain and the US had 
started. Britain was pleased that he did not mention possible military aid for Spain.51 In 
fact the State Department had assured the Foreign Office only days before that "if any 
military equipment is provided it will not be such as to affect existing NATO priorities. 
Some training may also be provided" and the "basic concept o f the negotiations remains 
unchanged, ie. a bases for dollars agreement."52
In his press release he claimed that negotiations had to wait until the two 
reports, economic and military, were received and analyzed. The talks would now go 
ahead under the newly created JUSMG Spain. During the talks Major-General Garvin 
Crump would represent the Army, Captain H.G. Sanchez the Navy and Colonel Jack 
Roberts the Air Force. Major-General A.W. Kissner, USAF, was to head the overall 
American military group.53 Kissner, an old friend of William Dunham, had gained 
important practical negotiations skills when he assisted the Azores negotiations with 
Portugal. He was a quiet-spoken and very cooperative man who got on well with the
50. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 23 May 
1952, Memo JCS to Secretary of Defense.
51. PRO, F0371.102022, 14 March 1947, Chancery, Washington.
52. PRO, F0371.102022, 10 March 1952, Sir O'Franks, Washington.
53. Secretary Acheson, "Negotiations with Spain", in "US Dep State Bulletin", 24 March 1952, 
Vol.26, also in American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, p. 1696; for JUSMG Spain officers see 
NA, military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1951, 4 March 1952.
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American Ambassador in Spain.54
\
This was important as JUSMG worked under the Ambassador in Madrid and 
reports were sent through him to AAfeshington. Later, it was expected that the 
Ambassador would personally assist the negotiations. It was notable that by 19 March, 
JUSMG still did not have any final instructions from the State Department on the use of 
the $100 million, despite their planned departure six days later. Finally on 20 March,
DMS D-7 was issued, which was to serve as rough instructions for the negotiation team 
while interdepartmental discussions in Washington continued.55
The Department of Defense claimed that the "one major point of disagreement 
left with State [Department] is their belief that the limitations on the scope of 
negotiations with Spain which were agreed to on 11 July 1951 are still applicable.”56 
This meant that the State Department was still operating under the limitations agreed 
upon by the President, the two Secretaries for Defense and State and Admiral Sherman 
prior to the Admiral's visit to Spain.57 If the US wanted to avoid unnecessary delays, 
they had to sort out the differences between the two Departments.
Nevertheless, it was clear from the start that negotiations would take a while 
due to Spain's peculiar position. Already before any delays became apparent, the press 
speculated about such problems as Franco's strong negotiation position.58
Franco was obviously not a bad tactician. In order to strengthen his position, he 
preempted any criticism by Truman of the lack of Spanish religious tolerance. In a 
letter to President Truman he wrote:
"I hope that negotiations which are about to start shall attain happy ending and
— 54*-NA,- Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 30 January 1952, William Dunham to MacVeagh.
55. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 22 March 1952, Term of Reference for the Joint U.S. 
Military Group (Spain).
56. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 7 April 1952, Memorandum Frank C. Nash for 
Secretary [of Defense].
57. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, Editorial Note, N.848, p. 1832.
58. Freda Kirchway, "Bargaining with Franco" in Nation. 9 August 1952, Vol. 175.
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will draw our two peoples nearer each other... I do not believe there is any 
essential matter between our two nations which can estrange us since friendship 
and understanding between countries have always been above peculiarities of 
each people. These differences of a religious nature which enemies of our 
understanding seek to exaggerate respond to a natural difference in feelings and 
traditions of a country fully united in its Catholicism and where dissident 
confessions do not amount to one per thousand of its population, and of those 
other countries which, due to their diverse and numerically important con­
fessions, are compelled to live under a system of mutual concessions and 
balances... Our system does not interfere with the private practice of other 
cults, which are guaranteed in our nation by its basic laws."59 
Franco also asked for a $750 million credit in order to improve Spanish 
industry. Delegations of the Export Import Bank estimated that $400 million would be 
more than enough and recommended this sum to the Senate. These amounts of 
money threw the Armed Forces back to almost the beginning of the rapprochement 
period. Spain seemed to cost too much money and only the Navy continued 
supportive unabatedly. Through General James V. Spry it became known that parts of 
the USAF had become indifferent towards the possibility of obtaining bases in 
Spain.60 Nevertheless in practice the Department of the Air Force was expected to 
bear most of the base construction costs. No wonder they did not show enthusiasm 
towards the coming negotiations under the new ambassador.
In February 1952, Lincoln MacVeagh officially replaced Griffis, who had 
resigned on 21 January 1952. For Britain as well as many Spaniards, Griffis had not 
been a popular Ambassador due To his strong support for Franco's Cause. During his 
last months in Spain, Griffis received so many threats against his life that the Spanish
1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 7 May 1952, Letter Franco-Truman, dated 17 March 1952 p. 1799. ’
60* NY Times. 4 January 1952
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authorities had to provide him with a permanentsecurity escort.61 Ambassador Balfour
\
was pleased when he was replaced and wrote about the new American Ambassador: 
"Unlike his predecessor... McVeagh [sic.]... appears to assess matters in a realistic 
light and to be confining himself to securing the limited objectives which the United 
States Government have come to set themselves [in Spain]."62 The new ambassador 
arrived in Madrid on 23 March and presented his credentials on 27 March. As he was 
being driven in the ambassadorial convoy to meet Franco for the first time, his 
limousine was being followed by a lorry picking up garbage. Even if  unintentional, this 
was a  nice touch by the Spanish authorities to signal the beginning of new relations. 
Lincoln MacVeagh approached the Spanish Foreign Minister, Martin Artajo, soon after 
his meeting with Franco. Spaniards joked that this Lincoln undoubtedly was unrelated 
to the Lincoln who had freed the slaves. As for Griffis, there was a rumour that he did 
not resign out of personal or health reasons but that his resignation had been due to his 
handling of the post in Spain.
When MacVeagh arrived in Madrid, Artajo went to visit the Middle East, to 
express his gratitude to the Arab nations for their support in the UN.63 This 
encouraged scar§piongers to speculated that Artajo wanted to found a third world 
power, a combination of Arab, Latin American countries and Spain. The Spanish 
diplomatic corps did not discourage these wild rumours as they gave the appearance of 
strong Arab support. This in turn increased the importance of Spain in the coming 
talks.64 But the Americans were not impressed. Indeed the American Ambassador to 
Tlirkey stated that good relations between Spain and the Arab states was desirable.65
Artajo not only failed in his intentions concerning the US but Spain's image with
61. PRO, F0371.102064, 24 January 1952, Balfour, Madrid.
62. PRO, F0371.102014, 22 November 1952, Balfour, Spain.
63. PRO, F0371.102009, 6 March 1952, Balfour, Madrid.
64. PRO, F0371.102009, 23 April 1952, FO Minute Mr Wardrop.
65. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 64D563, 10 April 1952, AmEmbassy Ankara to MacArthur.
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the Arab nations actually worsened because of the bad publicity which the Arab - 
Spanish problem concerning Spanish Morocco received during his visit.66
Shortly afterwards in Madrid, during the annual military parades, the Army 
once again ceremoniously revealed its obsolete war material. Each year this ceremony 
was getting more and more embarrassing for Spain.67 That very same day, Artajo and 
MacVeagh held a conversation at the Ministry in French at 7.30 pm. Artajo believed 
that MacVeagh was ready to start negotiations and had brought with him the proposed 
plans, as the American Chargd had told him. In the conversation he made clear that 
Spain would never be willing to lease or sell bases to the US; military facilities would 
only be used jointly. The Spaniard said in French "We are proud, perhaps too proud, 
but that is the way we are.* As had been feared by Vteshington, the Spanish Minister 
saw the $100 million as a drop in the ocean. "The soil of the Spanish economy is so dry 
that it would take torrents of financial assistance to wet it." Nevertheless, he agreed 
wholeheartedly to the idea that the two special US military and economic groups should 
come to Spain as early as possible to start detailed talks.68
The military group'JUSMG under General Kissner from the USAF arrived on 4 
April and an economic group, MS AEG, under George Train from the Mutual Security 
Agency arrived on 13 April in Spain for talks. JUSMG included Captain H.B. Sanchez 
from the US Navy and Colonel Jack Roberts from the USAF and Major General Garvin 
Crump from the Army. The MSAEG included Hubert Curry, Rifat Tirana, N. Carter 
de Paul and Ivan B. White. JUSMG started talks on the 7 April and MSAEG followed 
on 17 April.
66. PRO, F0371.102009, 6 May 1952, A. Rumbold.
67. Roland Dennis Hasser, "Spain Revisited", in Nation. 9 August 1952, Vol. 175.
68. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 1 April 1952, Ambassador in Spain to the State Department,
p .1828.
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The arrival of JUSMG and MSAEG was followed by several meetings between 
General Kissner and Lieutenant-General Vigdn. On 7 April, the first conference 
between the two took place. The following day, General Kissner presented Vigdn with 
an outline of the proposed contents of a base agreement. This and other questions were 
subsequently discussed. In one of the early sessions, the Spaniards asked for grants to 
train pilots before any agreements were signed due to the urgency of the situation. The 
Americans refused to grant this aid in advance of concrete bilateral agreements.1 
America had not come to Madrid to make easy concessions. Over the next 18 months 
the two sides would be engaged in hard bargaining.
On 16 April, during the third meeting between the two, Vigdn expressed that he 
was satisfied with the military aspects and accepted the fact that the appropriation of 
money was a congressional not a military matter. He also urged that the improved 
installations be under a joint agreement. Kissner still did not mention any particular 
installations. He affirmed that end-item equipment was being considered by the US for. 
all three military branches of the Spanish armed forces. At that moment, Washington 
planned to extend an aid program to Spain lasting three years. Vigdn claimed that three 
years might be too long a period, should an earlier emergency arise. He also feared 
Spanish public opinion if bombers were stationed in Spain. Kissner assured him that 
U.S. requirements did not include peace time stationing of full capacity. The American 
General estimated that if the US wished to rotate planes, an approximate detachment of 
500 soldiers per base was required. Vigdn seemed happy with this but insisted on Span­
ish control over these bases. The Spanish negotiator, due to the forthcoming National 
Defence Council meeting, the top military policymaking body, asked for a delay of the 
negotiations by one week.2
The same day as their meeting, Kissner wrote a letter to the Spanish
1. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1952, 11 April 1952, Edward L. Waddell Jr. for OSD Files.
2. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 18 April 1952, Ambassador in Spain to the State Department, 
p.1833.
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negotiations team. The American stated that he could not answer the question which 
role Spain was going to play in the western defence in the future. Furthermore, Kissner 
claimed that military aid was to be discussed by the economic teams but he could' 
guarantee that funds would be allocated for military training equipment. He explained 
that if  base agreements were reached, and American bases were to be situated in Spain, 
then Congress would naturally want to see the appropriate defence of these bases. 
Unfortunately for the American negotiations team, Kissner's letter, trying to create a 
friendly atmosphere, followed the wording of discussions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
closer than it did his official instructions from the State Department. In his letter despite 
having been instructed not to do so, he gave away the list of eleven items, agreed upon 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Departments of State and Defense, which outlined 
US requirements.3
After seeing these demands, the Spanish negotiations teams had been assured of 
strong and long term US interests in Spain. Thus they had no problem accepting the 
idea of counterpart funds to finance the base construction.4 This was an important step 
forward for the agreements as it solved one of Washington's main concerns. Funds 
were now available for the first year construction plans. However this was only solved 
by creating another problem*, Spain was now certain that they could increase their 
demands without Washington pulling out.
On 26 April, Vigdn had a fourth meeting with Kissner. This time they talked 
about Kissner's letter. Vigdn exposed Spain's position towards this document. He 
assured Kissner that Spanish forces could be mobilized in a short period and even 
before the full mobilization of NATO Divisions. This was important because, according 
to Vigdn, the American demands meant that Spain could no longer remain passive in a 
European conflict. This situation, Vigdn continued, would naturally result in air strikes
3. FRUS. 1952-1954, Vol.VI, Part 2, 16 April 1952, Kissner to Chief of Spanish Military Negotiating 
Team, p. 1835.
4. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain, 1952, 23 May 1953, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense 
from Omar N. Bradley, Chairman JCS.
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and might induce a possible large-scale operation by the enemy against Spain. This line 
of thought developed into one fundamental tenet of the Spanish position throughout the 
talks. Granting of bases to the US would make Spain a belligerent and thus increased 
her vulnerability. The Spanish Government therefore considered it essential that the US 
accepted the principle that there had to be a considerable amount of military equipment 
available for Spain's national defence. Such defensive equipment and the granting of 
bases were regarded as an indivisible whole.
Eventually, Spain would contribute to Western Defence, but due to the urgency 
of the military requirements, Vigdn argued that his country should get war material 
from the existing NATO stocks. He claimed that the delay of the creation of NATO 
Divisions made the material unusable for the time being anyway. Analyzing Kissner's 
specific requests, he seemed willing to grant the USAF and Navy airbase installations 
as long as they would remain under Spanish control. Both nations would use them 
simultaneously. However, Vigdn wanted more details on the American demand to 
develop, equip, man and use facilities as required by any projected US Army operation 
and furthermore the Spanish General demanded that the Americans should be more 
precise about their demands for "additional facilities as may be. necessitated because of 
developments in negotiations with other countries." He strongly objected to the 
demand for an amphibious training area because there did not seem to be a suitable 
area. He claimed that Spain's coast was either too rugged or too densely populated. He 
also demanded that US airplanes in Spain should rotate from base to base and only a 
minimum of US personnel should be stationed at these bases. As for the duration of the 
treaties or agreements, he proposed to have them run for five years with a possible 
prolongation at the end of this period.5
Once Vigdn's reply was received in Washington, the State Department realized 
that Kissner had made a blunder in his negotiations. Instead of presenting the point of 
view of Acheson's letter to Lovett, dated 11 February 1952, he had exposed the point
5. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 29 April 1952, MacVeagh to the State Department, p. 1842.
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of view of-the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An Official of the State Department wrote: "The 
Spanish negotiation [was] nicely off the ra ils / Kissner also admitted that the US 
wanted to develop Spain's military potential to the maximum degree possible within 
existing limitations. The State Department feared that "the trap that we sought to avoid 
- asking the Spaniards for rights in the Army area, which will invoke requests for army 
equipment" had been sprung. The State Department knew that "we cannot meet our 
NATO equipment needs, it would be murder to engage in a major end-item program 
for Spain. ”6 How could they put the negotiations back onto track and how could they __
avoid a similar blunder in the future?
Most of the blame must go to General Kissner himself. However his blunder 
was made possible by the discussions between the State Department and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. These had been unclear, uncoordinated and uncooperative. The fact 
that Kissner was an officer and not a diplomat meant that he was personally more 
inclined to follow instructions from the Department of Defense than from the State 
Department.
Nevertheless, part’of the blame for the overall confusion has to go to Congress. 
Senator Brewster, among others, had put pressure on the talks between the Departments 
of State and Defense as well as between Vigdn and Kissner. During April 1952, he 
compared the slowness of the talks between Spain and the US with the Chinese - 
American talks which, according to the Senator, contributed to the eventual fall of 
China to communism. The Senator also encouraged the President to grant Spain more 
than the already appropriated $100 million. This was possible even without 
Congressional appropriations, according to Truman's legal advisors Mr Wbod andD r— — 
Wilcoy, under title I of the Mutual Defense Bill. The only limitation to the President 
was the amount, 10% of the total funds of the Mutual Defense Act, and his personal 
opinion on the importance of the contribution to the defence of the North Atlantic
6. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 30 April 1952, Memorandum by Acting Officer in Charge of 
Political-Military Affairs of the Office of European Regional Affairs to Deputy Director of Office of 
European Regional Affairs, p. 1846.
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At the same time discussions took place in the Senate concerning an increase of 
aid. Senators Fulbright and Ibbey wanted to kill the discussions, concerning this 
additional $25 million aid package for Spain, entirely and thus stall the talks. On 9 June 
1952, Senators Green and George found it strange that the US had to pay Spain in 
order to protect Spain. Ibbey and Fulbright seized the chance to table a motion to -  
eliminate the $25 million. However others on die Committee opposed this drastic move. 
Senator Knowland claimed that if aid to Spain was slashed then aid to Yugoslavia 
would be in doubt. By increasing the ante, Senator Knowland forced the others to back 
down and Fulbright's motion was voted down.*
In the meantime, the Secretary of State responded to the developments in the 
negotiations in Spain. On 2 May, Acheson tired off a complaint claiming that Madrid 
failed to see the difference between the European Cooperation Administration and the 
Mutual Security Act 1951. The difference was crucial as it determined the way and 
areas for which money was going to be spent He also pointed towards Spain's multiple 
exchange systems, which would have an inflationary impact during the construction 
phase and which blocked an increase of trade.9 _
These multiple exchange rates were inhibiting free trade with Spain. Britain was 
also in favour of putting pressure on Madrid to abolish these. The IMF or the IBRD 
were considered the appropriate institutions to do so. The Bank of England suggested 
that if the US only extended aid to Spain under the condition that Spain joined the IMF, 
the Fund could in turn pressure Spain into a review of the exchange rates. The British 
Treasury supported this suggestion but it was doubtful if Washington-would go along-------
7. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 82nd Congress, 1952, Mutual 
Security Act, 28 Apr 1952, 30 April 1952, Washington, 1976/77.
8. LOC, (83) SFo-T.4, 10.35 am, No. 11, 9 June 1952.
9. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 2 May 1952, Secretary of State to the Spanish Embassy, p. 1847.
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with it.10
On the surface the State Department was in favour of getting the multiple 
exchange rates straightened out through the IMF.11 However for Washington, the 
essential problem of the talks concerned military, not economic issues. Train had 
confirmed this to the UK Commercial Counselor in Madrid admitting that W&shington 
subordinated economic aid to US military requirements.12 On top of that the timing 
was inopportune. After Kissner's initial blunder, Washington was more interested in 
stalling the talks. In fact, with his note to the Spanish Embassy, the Secretary of State 
wanted to delay and complicate the talks and throw the Spanish side off balance in 
order to put Kissner's mistake straight.
Acheson was more successful in achieving this in a note to the US Ambassador 
in Spain four days later. In it, he claimed that Spain was trying to offer a quid pro quo 
for the bases but that the Spanish negotiation team was asking for too much aid in 
return for the bases. Countering Spain's argument of being converted to a belligerent 
nation, the American hypothesis emerged that Spain would inevitably be involved in 
hostilities, even in the absence of US bases in Spain. He concluded that from a military 
point of view, Spain's best defence was north and east of the Pyrenees and thus should 
welcome the chance to contribute to this defence line. At the same time, if a quid pro 
quo was reached, Spain should not forget the value of the economic and technical aid 
she was going to receive. Acheson believed that the discussions with Spain were 
concerned with the amount of aid and the control of the equipment. It was only natural 
for the US to claim that as Spain had less military value than NATO, military supplies 
should go first to the NATO countries. Before any new training material could be 
allocated to Spain, the $100 million had to be used. Finally, Acheson tried to avoid 
further discussion on Kissner's mistake. He ordered that the two demands concerning
10. PRO, F 0371 .102018, 9 April 1952, O. Franks.
11. PRO, F 0 3 7 1.102018, 1 May 1952, O. Franks, Washington.
12. PRO, F 0371 .102022, 6 May 1952, Balfour, Madrid.
250
Chapter l l :  1952 m e  negotiations
requirements of the Army for projected operations and additional facilities were 
scrapped altogether from the negotiations. Acheson claimed that they were no longer 
needed. More important though was Acheson's instruction not to discuss any further the 
US proposal to develop Spain's military potential to a maximum to aid the defence of 
Western Europe.13 Spain was of course unwilling to forget these important demands 
and concessions by the US team.
With these two front lines drawn the talks became more concrete. On 9 May 
1952, Kissner handed General Vigdn a draft of the proposed base agreement. Without 
delay, Madrid started its analysis.
On 15 May 1952, John Wesley Jones, Counselor of the US Embassy, had an 
informal conversation after dinner at the French Embassy in Madrid with Manuel 
Arburua, the Spanish Minister of Commerce. Arburua told the American that Spain 
needed urgent equipment for "no more" than 20 Divisions. The Spanish minister 
pointed out that France and Italy did not have the will to fight because of the large 
Communist groups within their countries. He also felt that Spain was unwilling to 
defend areas like CAdiz while leaving Barcelona unprotected. Thus he implied that 
a commitment to the defence of all of Spain was America's best choice. Arburua 
supported the military point of view wholeheartedly while not even bothering to 
mention the economic talks. One can only conclude that Spain too was generally more 
interested in the military than in the economic aspects.14
The economic negotiations had started on 17 April when Mr Train held a first 
meeting with Mr Arguelles, Under Secretary of Commerce. The Train - Arguelles talks 
were usually held at the Ministry of Commerce in Don Jaime's green-walled office.15 
In this first meeting, Train expressed that the US Government intended to request the 
reappropriation in FY 1953 of the $100 million appropriated by Congress for aid to
13. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 6 May 1952, Secretary of State to the Spanish Embassy, p. 1849.
14. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 16 May 1952, Memorandum by Counselor of Embassy, p. 1850.
15. E. Hauser, "What a bargain Franco drove", in Saturday Evening Post. 21 February 1953, vol.225.
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Spain in FY 1952. His Spanish counterpart made it apparent that they had hoped for an 
appropriation in FY 1953 in addition to the $100 million. In fact, Spain wanted the 
immediate payment of the $100 million without any conditions. Arguelles considered 
that sum of money as rightly Spain's.
Shortly after their first informal discussion, Train, head of the MSAEG, sent an 
aide-memoire to the Spanish Economic Aid Negotiating Group, 19 April 1952. He 
described the legal authority under which US assistancejwas provided and outlined the 
view of the US Government concerning the proposed use of that assistance in Spain. He 
made clear that aid to Spain so far was limited to the Mutual Security Act 1951, which 
granted Spain a maximum of $100 million, split into 88% economic aid and 12% 
military aid. In order to receive the $12 million for military aid a separate "Mutual 
Defense Assistance Agreement" had to be signed. This agreement was separate from 
any agreements concerning construction and the use of bases or the other agreement 
covering economic and technical assistance. From April 1952 onwards, one could 
already see the structure of the final agreements, ie. three separate contracts. It was 
expected that the money from the FY 1951 would be split 84% in grants and 16% in 
loans. Train hoped that the aid would be issued to the most profitable short term 
investments and would counter possible inflation. As for technical assistance, the US 
negotiations team asserted that aid could only cover the dollar costs. The costs in 
pesetas had to be borne by Spain itself. Train also expressed that the US believed that a 
$15 million loan to the railways was required, as well as some aid for the Spanish 
munitions industry. The head of MSAEG also told the Spanish team that all economic 
assistance, which was made on grants, required counterpart funds at an exchange rate 
to be agreed upon. It was expected that the counterpart funds would finance all military 
construction costs for 1952/1953. A "very substantial portion" of the total aid was seen 
as "a contribution by the Government of Spain to its own military potential."16
16. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 19 April 1952, Train to Spanish Economic Aid Negotiating
Team, p. 1837.
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In response, the Spanish formally requestedthat the $100 million should be 
extended completely during FY 1952 and that the Executive Branch should request 
Congress for an additional appropriation for FY 1953. They argued that this should be 
done as recognition in principle of the change in mutual relationships resulting from the 
opening of the negotiations. It is clear that Madrid considered the proposed amount as 
only an initial aid package, soon to be followed by more substantial aid.
The US economic negotiation team advised their counterparts that this was not 
possible. They argued that the availability of further funds provided during FY 1953 
and additional funds for FY 1954 could only be determined after a specific economic 
program had been worked out and agreed.
On 3 May, six days before Kissner handed in the military proposal, Train 
provided the Spanish representatives with a written draft for the economic assistance 
agreement. These two drafts were discussed extensively over the next few weeks.
In a statement, 16 May 1952, Franco said that he was aiming at a Spanish - 
American agreement "in the general area of mutual security” and "corresponding 
military and economic assistance without any infringement of mutual sovereignty”. He 
was asking for a friendly relationship with Washington, as well as for substantial aid 
without granting anything in return. Wfcs Franco overplaying his hand?17 Certainly 
Kissner's initial blunder had encouraged further demands by Spain, but Franco's 
statement was intended for domestic propaganda consumption. For him it was 
important to maintain the appearance of full sovereignty so that his power remained 
unchallenged.
After these initial two months of negotiations in Spain, the US informed Britain 
about the progress of the economic and military talks and about the position the US was 
to take in the future. This was done during a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris on
17. K.M.Smogoreewski, "Spain and the Defence of the West", in Contemporary Review. December 
1952, Vol. 152
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26 May, attended by Acheson and Anthony Eden.18 Major problems remained for the 
American negotiation teams in the two parallel talks. On the economic side Madrid 
asked for more money. On the military side the most pressing problem concerned the 
duration of the bases. Kissner demanded twenty years while General Vigdn only 
offered five with a possible extension of another five years.19
Soon after the talks in Paris, further complicationfarose in the military 
negotiations. All had gone relatively well until a  meeting between Kissner and Vigdn on 
1 June 1952. During this meeting the Spanish General raised the question of US 
continuity of military assistance after the successful conclusion of the agreements. 
Kissner naturally could not guarantee this as ultimately the decision had to be made in 
accordance with the corresponding Committees in Congress or by the President. As it 
was clear that Truman would not continue in power beyond January 1953, Kissner was 
unable to reassure Vigtin. The Spaniard kept pressing for an answer and Kissner 
refused to give it. Naturally the Spanish team concluded that once the agreements were 
signed without such an assurance Washington would not grant more than the $125 
million. During the next meetings and in order to get this assurance for long term 
military aid, the Spanish team decided to go back on concessions made earlier, such as 
peace-time usage of the bases. It was unfortunate that the legal position simply did not 
allow Kissner to make these concessions.20
The Ambassador to Spain confirmed part of Acheson's previous argument in a 
letter on 3 June 1952. The US agreed to Vigdn's statement that US bases meant an 
automatic belligerency for Spain in case of war. Washington also realized that it was 
politically impossible to include Spain in NATO or to sign et tripartite pact with 
Portugal and Spain. MSAEG was only slightly more successful in their talks.
MacVeagh believed that the complications which arose had to be ironed out by force
18. PRO, F0371.102022, 26 May 1952, FO Minute.
19. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 22 May 1952, Dunham, US Negotiations with Spain.
20. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 29 August 1952, Mr Millar to Lincoln MacVeagh.
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majeure. However, he suggested that pressure should be kept to a minimum so that the 
talks, concerning military bases, remained friendly. The American ambassador made it 
clear that Spain considered the $100 million to be very little but they would take 
anything they got and only hoped for the additional $25 million. The Ambassador 
realized that a lot of time had been consumed but he deemed this better than to pressure 
the Spaniards and thus lose what had been gained so far. MacVeagh also confirmed that 
the US team had to reconsider proposals several times and communicate with 
Washington, which had caused delays.21
In their seventh meeting on 5 June, General Vigdn handed Kissner a note. In it 
Vigdn pointed out that Spain had already revealed the weaknesses and deficiencies of 
the Spanish army to Sherman and Spry and thus further studies were unnecessary. The 
Spanish General repeated the argument that a war with the USSR would start eventually 
and if US bases were located in Spain then the Red Air Force would attack these. He 
asserted that the numerical advantage of the USSR would mean that the US aviation sta­
tioned at the Elbe/Rhine area would not stop attacks on Spain by Soviet planes from the 
Balkans and across the Mediterranean. Thus from the Spanish military point of view, 
Spain needed to be able to defend herself. Tb do so, she needed a radar net not later 
than during the first year after the completion of the agreements. Vigdn also argued that 
as the USAF would be required elsewhere, Spain needed her own national Airforce. He 
asserted that this was indispensable and that collaboration for production of jet engines 
and accessories as well as training material were crucial. The US had agreed to send 
more training aid for AA-artillery. Vigdn argued that this only made sense if Spain also
received more material for real defence purposes in the future. The Spanish General-----
continued to argue that arming Spain's divisions to the standard of other nations would 
not place a burden on NATO stocks because most war material could be produced in 
Spain, given adequate financial and technical aid. The $12 million for military end-
21. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 3 June 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh to Milliam B. Dunham,
p. 1852.
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items was expected to cover only the training period, more material was to follow 
later. The Spanish team also claimed that the $100 million aid only covered the first 
year. They were obviously interested in working out a full assistance plan for the 
coming three years. Vigon even proposed that the Mutual Aid Agreement should be
five to nine years long with a possible expansion. He also wanted to reduce the
\
amount of US soldiers stationed in Spain. He argued that it was natural for other 
European countries to see permanent US soldiers stationed on their territory as they 
had been exposed to years o f struggle and occupation, while Spain had remained 
under a national regime. In Spain, the note claimed, US soldiers would be welcomed 
by the communist propaganda machinery. The Air bases, he claimed, did not need a 
permanent presence of wings anyway, their operation could be verified by frequent 
visits of less than a wing of planes.22
The Spanish negotiation team had so far only expressed in vague and general 
terms their military needs. In view of the importance of Spanish interest in such aid, 
and after General Vigon had pushed for long term US commitment, General 
Kissner suggested to the Spanish General in their eighth official encounter, on 9 June, 
that it would be helpful to have more specific information regarding Spain's material 
requirements. The Washington agencies had agreed to this suggestion and had 
informally informed Kissner that they were considering an increase in the amount of 
military aid for Spain by $25 million.
After Congress had approved the extra $25 million, the State Department wanted 
the President to issue a statement, relating.talhis money. It was felt that such a 
statement would help the negotiations by providing a link between the economic and 
the military talks. Otherwise the Spanish authorities would assume that they did not 
have to give military concessions in order to obtain the $125million assistance. This 
would undoubtedly weaken the position of the Ambassador and was thus against the 
interests
22. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI^Part 2, 7 June 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh to the Department of 
State, p. 1854.
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of the State Department.23
Secretary Acheson told the American Embassy in Spain that it was now 
possible to give more military aid out of the newly appropriated total of $125 million. 
Therefore, he suggested that Vigdn should submit a detailed plan for Spain's military 
requirements. It was possible that Spain was going to receive $25 to $30 million 
annually for military aid. The Secretary of State claimed that anything greater was out 
o f question. It was also possible that Spain's munitions industry would receive more 
than $5 million. Nevertheless, Acheson made it clear that none of this should be 
mentioned to Vigdn.24
In June, Vigdn submitted his estimate for Spain's military requirements. 
Naturally, the Spanish requirements took advantage of Kissner's earlier blunder and 
were above anything Washington was willing to accept. Vigdn claimed that the Spanish 
armed forces required 120 howitzers (costs $95 million), 366 AA-guns and equipment 
($415 million), 360 antitank-guns ($50 million), 270 light and medium tanks (61 
million) and 4,500 trucks ($27 million). The total costs during the first year alone were 
almost $650 million.25 In the long term the Spaniards were talking about a total 
assistance of $2 billion.
The amount was for above anything Washington had contemplated. It was time 
to consider how to decrease this astronomical figure. Kissner had indicated after talks 
with Vigdn that Spain was not only after military end items but had also decided to gain 
full international recognition with NATO members. Kissner argued that if the US 
expressed the intent to develop a programme of military assistance for Spain, which 
would_continue over a period of years, then this would "materially assist in the ad-
23. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 11 June 1952, Mr Byington Secret Security Information.
24. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 14 June 1952, Secretary of State Acheson to the Spanish 
Embassy, p. 1859.
25. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1952, 25 June 1952, JUSMG to General Reuben E. Jenkins.
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vancement of an early conclusion of a satisfactory base rights agreement with Spain."26 
Above all it had become important to outline to the Spanish authorities that their 
country had important differences compared to NATO member states and thus could 
not expected to be treated like them.27
The survey team had previously looked into US construction programs in Spain. 
 ^ The Tbrrejon airbase, 15 miles east of Madrid, had a runway of 8,500 by 197 feet, four 
hangers and a gas storage capacity of 52,000 gallons. Tbrrejon was chosen above
Barajas to avoid "confusion with heavy civil air operations and to eliminate duplication
\
of aircraft and maintenance facilities" in the Madrid area. It was considered a good site 
because it was near Madrid and thus was linked with the rest of Spain for 
communication and transportation. Madrid was fairly easy to reach from the rest of 
Spain because of Spain's road network reaching out from Madrid towards the coastal 
centres. At the same time, the survey team wanted the military headquarters to be 
situated in Madrid to provide easier communication and cooperation with the US 
Embassy.
Another site considered for a base was San Pablo, 5 miles east of Seville which 
was considered an excellent site because it was connected with good rails and roads. At 
the same time it could be logisdcally supported through the ports of Cadiz and Seville. 
Moron de la Frontera, 34 miles Southeast of Seville, had the advantage of being easily 
extendible because land was available. It only had three hangers and a gas storage 
capacity of 30,000 gallons but it was accessible by rail and road. El Copero, 5 miles 
south of Seville, was also considered a good site because it lay on a ship channel to 
Seville and thus unloading could take place directly at the base itself. Shipping along 
this channel was limited to 21-feet maximum-draft but considering Spain's 
infrastructure, the sea and rivers were still transportation highways. Furthermore, El
26. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 19 June 
1952, Memo C. Staff, Army to JCS.
27. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, Byington to Clevland, MSA.
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Copero was not subjected to flooding like nearby Thblada. These were the chosen sites 
for airbases near Seville.
Matagorda, across the harbour of Cadiz, was chosen because it had access to the 
protected deep water harbour on the Atlantic coast. Furthermore, it was accessible to 
the mainland by good roads and rails and the acquisition of land did not cause too 
severe civil hardship because land was available. The existing Spanish naval facilities 
were also usable and thus made Matagorda an interesting site. The dock would be 
expanded to 600 by 60 feet large and 40 feet deep. The Navy also required an 8,000 by 
200 feet airstrip and storage facilities for 54,000 barrels o f gas. Rota was the closest 
deep water harbour to the naval air station and thus chosen as a very suitable site.28
Thus most of the bases Were chosen due to their connections by rail, road and 
sea. In the long term, this was a wise economic choice because expensive construction 
costs for Spain's infrastructure and long term projects were thus avoided.
However it was long term commitment by the US that Vigdn was seeking. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff would not decide on this suggestion with the Department of 
Defense alone and urged the Secretary of Defense to pass on Vigdn's demand to the 
Secretary of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that a  note should be sent to 
Vigdn along the following lines: "The Government of the United States considers that 
military relations between the United States and Spain should be on a continuing 
friendly basis in support of the policy of strengthening the defense of the West". The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff realized that this policy would be limited by annual congressional 
appropriations, existing priorities, Korea, the status of supply and the overall 
international situation.29  —---------------------------------
Out of the three armed services, the US Navy was most likely to welcome a 
long term commitment to Spain. On 1 July 1952, the Chief of Naval Operation outlined
28. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1952, 13 June 1952, US Construction Program in Spain.
29. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 2 July 1952, 
JCS to Secretary of Defense.
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the aims of the US Navy to the Commander in Chief of the US Navy in the East 
Atlantic and Mediterranean. The Navy wanted facilities in Spain and suggested that, 
even before an outbreak of a conflict with the USSR, storage facilities at El Ferrol, 
Thrifa, Cadiz, Cartagena, Soller and Port Mahon should be obtained. He also wanted 
anchorage rights almost everywhere in Spain. Furthermore, the Navy required an 
amphibious training area, possibly on the Balearic Islands. At the same time, the Naval 
Chief wanted to improve Spain's logistics. On top of that the Navy wanted an air base 
near Cadiz.
In the case of an outbreak of war with the Soviet Union, the Navy would require 
more facilities and bases at Barcelona, Almeria and on Lanzarote. In addition, the Plans 
Division wanted a ship repair area and air bases near Cartagena or Albacete and 
Majorca.30
As a result of the Spanish Cabinet meeting on 4 July 1952, the US and Spanish 
representatives had another meeting in Madrid. Arguelles told Train that Vigdn and 
Arburua had held lengthy discussions all week long and Vigdn believed that the $12 
million plus the entire new $25 million aid were still inadequate for national defence 
purposes. Both Spanish negotiation teams, as well as the cabinet, agreed to the idea of 
having four different agreements: an economic aid agreement, a Mutual Defense 
Assistance Program agreement, an air base construction agreement and an agreement 
covering the utilization of the bases (the last two would be combined into one 
agreement). Arguelles continued in an open manner to point out that there existed no 
public opinion on the subject and the position of the Spanish government depended 
mainly on the position of the Army. The Spaniard made it clear that the Army would be 
unsatisfied with bases unless it received enough modem material in return. Arguelles 
mentioned that some people in the government did not want to see any agreements at all 
with the Americans. In return, Train pointed towards NATO's priority and the scarcity 
of equipment. One had to conclude that at the moment the talks had almost come to a
30. Strategic Plan Division Records, US Navy, 1 July 1952, Letter Chief Naval Operations.
j
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standstill because Spain was fearing that the $125 million was all the US was willing to 
give and under these circumstances Spain was not going to grant the bases. It would 
have been possible to start constructions of the bases if a MDAP or an economic aid 
agreement, assuring financial aid for some years, had been signed. Nevertheless, even 
if  this had been the case, the use of the bases was still unsettled. The US believed that it 
was possible to get the bases on their terms for a military annual aid of $50 million 
over three years.31 Spain in return was not willing to sell out for so little.
At that meeting between Train and Arguelles, on 5 July 1952, the American 
position had changed slightly. The total aid had been increased from $100 to $125 
million. For military end-items this meant a possible increase from $12 to a total of $37 
million. The rest, $88 million, would still be economic aid. In return, Train now 
proposed to sign three agreements; an economic cooperation, mutual defense and a base 
agreement.
For Spain the $125 million was still not enough. It did not even cover their 
economic demands. Likewise, the total of $37 million for military aid was inadequate. 
Spain sought an assurance of continued military aid for several years. A comprehensive 
outline o f Spain's position was sent to the United States team on 9 July 1952. This was 
the first time that the Spanish Government had coordinated its position regarding 
military and economic discussions. Parts of this memorandum had been drafted by 
Franco himself and deserve a closer look.
Franco believed that difficulties
"encountered in negot[iation]s arise from disproportion which exists between the 
am[oun]t of $125 million... and the obligation which w[ou]ld arise for Spain 
from an eventual agr[ee]ment... that am[oun]t is not by any means sufficient to 
cover requirements proceeding from a later agr[ee]ment under the act cited 
which... w[oul]ld require investments of greater magnitude."
31. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 5 July 1952, Record of Meeting US-Spanish Representatives,
p. 1860.
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Franco also claimed that "if application o f  aid already granted [the SI 25 million] 
had had to be subordinated to prior existence o f an agr[ee]ment under [the] Mutual 
Security Act cited, such aid should have been negotiated previously and... should 
[also] have been increased in am[ou]nt, form, and for [the] period demanded by 
requirements derived from new obligations contracted."
It was obvious that Franco believed that the amount o f  $125 million was 
already rightly his because they had been appropriated specifically for Spain.
Franco said that "comparefing] form and am[oun]t o f  aid granted to the other 
nations with that which is offered to Spain, it is evident that there exists a difference in 
treatment." He pointed out that more money was given to less anti-communist 
nations like Yugoslavia. Franco was hurt in his national pride. He claimed that an 
"assurance o f  continued aid for a period o f  several years would be indispensable."
The Caudillo also argued that if  the external or internal threat to Spain 
increased further due to the new base agreements, then his General Staff and the 
public would be no longer interested in any agreements. He wanted sufficient military 
aid to equip all 22 Spanish Army Divisions, to equip the Air Force with enough 
aircraft and anti-aircraft materiel to protect Spain and to modernize the Navy and the 
coastal defenses. I f this aid was forthcoming: "Spain would be willing to conclude an 
agreement for the construction and organization o f wholly Spanish bases whose 
eventual utilization by American forces in the event o f emergency would have to be 
the subject o f  a later agreement. The use o f  Spanish bases in time o f  peace by a 
foreign power, inasmuch as it is not indispensable, conflicts with national feelings and 
dignity and is considered harmful to harmony and understanding between our 
countries."
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Franco saw the difficulties in the negotiations in the "inability to advance in 
detailed negot[iation]s if a base agr[ee]ment has not been reached previously" and 
the fact that the proposed assistance was in no case sufficient to satisfy the 
obligations of an agreement such as the one suggested. The negotiations were also 
delayed due to the "inescapable necessity for our nation that her security in the face of 
danger be guaranteed with am[oun]t of assistance] indispensable to strengthen her 
economic and military preparedness."
N
The Spanish dictator argued that the talks should continue and if a fundamental 
agreement was not reached, the negotiations should be based upon the "concession 
by US of [the] am[oun]t voted in Congress", ie. the US should grant the full $125 
million to advance the negotiations. Furthermore, he suggested that Spain should study 
the texts for the economic cooperation agreement and the Mutual Security Agreement 
presented by the US delegation "to effect their modification on those points where it 
may be considered necessary." He hoped that the execution of the draft base 
agreement should be postponed until adequate aid had been provided by the 
Americans. He nevertheless confirmed that Spain was willing to use the counterpart 
funds for the construction costs of the military facilities to increase Spain's defence 
strength. Finally, he argued for a “postponement of [the] execution of [the] gen[eral] 
base agr[ee]ment until obligations derived from such an agr[ee]ment are available but 
[he was] allowing [the] necessary study to complete [the] text thereof to proceed."
In the meantime, he suggested that a "fundamental agreement" or "little agreement" 
should be signed to show goodwill between the two countries.32
In the light of these arguments made by the Spanish dictator in a communique, 
MacVeagh's earlier suggestion to increase the newly appropriated aid for Spain from 
$25 to $30 million lost its importance. Under the circumstances, the viewpoints of the 
two negotiation teams were so different that in the absence of further instructions from
32. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 12 July 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh to State Department,
1862; Summary from US point of view NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 29 August 1952, Millar 
MacVeagh.
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Washington, the US negotiation team was unable to act. Spain clearly demanded 
financial and military concessions by the US which were outside the instructions of 
the negotiation teams. The talks were dangerously close to breaking off.
However, MacVeagh, after a meeting with Arguelles, assured Washington that 
Spain had shown no intention to terminate the conversations with the American 
negotiations team but in fact wanted to sign agreements. The problem was that the 
American experts in Madrid could not act beyond their competence and 
instructions. Thus, MacVeagh believed that it might be time to hold official 
governmental talks with the Spanish Foreign Minister Artajo. In a private meeting, 17 
July, Artajo argued that the negotiators seemed to confuse two issues: on one side 
Spain as a factor in the defence of the West; on the other Spain granting bases to 
the US. For the Spanish Minister granting bases would convert Spain's position from 
"neutrality" to "pre-belligerence" and this could not be undertaken without assured 
defensive commitments by the US similar to those made to NATO countries. A 
Mutual Security Agreement could be worked out, according to Artajo, which 
would add Spain's industry to the western defence. In the short term, Spaniards not 
only required an increase of military aid but also desired the conclusion of a "little 
agreement" which would give Spain some advanced assurance of US support in 
case of war. MacVeagh inquired if Spain expected to remain neutral in case of war. 
Artajo answered that it was very likely that Spain would be attacked by parachute 
regiments in case of a conflict but bases in Spain would be more threatening and 
might lead to aerial bombardment of Spain's cities.
After the conversation, MacVeagh concluded that Spain was not asking for 
too much but that the US was. He claimed that Madrid was not anxious to receive 
foreign military detachments on their soil. Spain argued that bases posed an external 
threat in wartime and an internal threat in peacetime to the survival of their regime. 
The Ambassador believed that US failure to treat Spain on the same basis as other 
NATO countries would be seen as a continuation of the diplomatic boycott of the late 
1940's. Thus an overt reversal of this policy was desired. Spain was to be considered as 
a partner in the common defence effort rather than an unacceptable dealer possessing
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vital facilities for sale. In order to conclude the negotiations,' it was vital to find a 
formula which met American requirements and provided Spain with her essential needs. 
This had been the mission of the JUSMG. MacVeagh concluded that the US should 
give Spain the defence guarantees they were asking for and in the meantime the "little 
agreement" should be signed to reassure the Spanish negotiation teams about America's 
long term commitment.33
As MacVeagh was forming his opinion, a draft reply to the Spanish 
memorandum was being prepared in Washington. It came under consideration by the 
agencies and subsequently with the negotiators in Madrid. It was decided not to broaden 
the policy on which the negotiations had been based. The idea of a "little agreement" 
was rejected. This was done to avoid committing a future President who was to replace 
Truman soon after the November elections. Nevertheless, it was considered to be 
advantageous to reply to the Spanish memorandum by giving notice of the plans for 
continuous aid programs over a period of time and placing Spain on the same or similar 
level as other nations. Hopefully this would reassure Spain of US long term 
commitment. This was a very delicate matter as it clashed with usual procedures 
towards other countries. It was thus unclear how much assurance could be given 
without conflicting with US laws and policies.
Much earlier in the year Franco had written to Truman concerning Spain's 
religious freedom. Now, two months later Truman sent his reply. Though this letter 
was similar to one drafted by Truman and Acheson on 14 May 1952, a week after 
Franco's letter was received, it had been kept in Washington for two months. The letter 
was only sent when the American Embassy in Spain requested it. It read:
----------  "In this country the tradition of civil liberties, particularly freedom of
speech, of assembly, of the press and of worship, is deeply ingrained, not by 
compulsion of circumstances but by the choice and conviction of the American
33. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 17 July 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh to State Department, N.
863, p. 1866.
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people... I share your hope that they [negotiations] will come to a successful
conclusion."34
The letter exchange is most interesting because it reflects the eagerness of the 
two countries to conclude the talks. In March, when Franco's letter was drafted, Spain 
wanted to push through the agreements. Then came the complications with Kissner's 
statements and the US wanted to put the negotiations back on track and did not dare to 
go further without making their position clear. Spain in the meantime wanted to take 
advantage of Kissner's blunder and sent oifthe letter drafted two months earlier. 
Washington did not respond immediately. When the American response was at last sent 
in July, the Spaniards wanted to stall over the little money, $125 million, they would 
have received for granting base facilities while the Americans were interested in 
finishing the talks on the negotiated grounds. This coincided with the sending of 
Truman's reply to Franco.
On 30 July, in their eleventh meeting, Vigdn handed Kissner lists of Spain's 
requirements for the Navy and Air Force. These lists supplemented the Army list 
previously submitted. The total cost of needed aid was $1,360,952,000. In return, 
Spain was willing to give the Navy and USAF the facilities demanded. MacVeagh 
suggested to Washington that the US should reverse its policy of buying the facilities to 
a policy of treating Spain as an equal partner in defence, saying that "nothing less than 
injured national dignity is involved." Should the US do this, MacVeagh was certain, 
then the negotiations could be successfully concluded.35
Soon thereafter, journalists, including Cianfarra of the New York Times, 
speculated that the US and Spain were drifting apart because Washington asked for too 
much and was unwilling to pay the price. Cianfarra hypothesized that under these 
circumstances a deal would only be possible if Britain was included and thus bore some
34. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 23 July 1952, Truman to Franco, p. 1865.
35. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 2 August 1952, Ambassador Macveagh to State Department,
p. 1869.
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of the costs.36 As it turned out, he underestimated Washington's willingness to pay and 
overestimated London's desire to be part of a deal.
In response to Spain's outrageous military demands, Acting Secretary of State 
Bruce summarised Madrid's position. Spain, in return for aid was willing to conclude 
an agreement for the construction of bases whose eventual utilization by American 
"forces in the event of an emergency w[ou]ld have to be subject of a later 
agr[ee]ment." The Spanish government rejected the right of US use of these bases in 
peacetime and made wartime use subject to a later agreement. Madrid further proposed 
an immediate extension of the $125 million of aid, already appropriated by Congress, 
without giving any commitment in return. The Secretary stressed that under these 
circumstances an increase of the $125 million would not be enough to bridge the gap 
between the two countries. A new approach was required.
Bruce argued that Spain's defence started further east than her border and 
^military bases in Spain would eventually add to this defence. He claimed that the bases 
would not increase Spain's involvement in a war because of Spam's strategic impor­
tance in the Mediterranean. The Acting Secretary also asserted that war material and 
aid would go to the front line countries first, Korea and Indochina in particular, and 
this was not a discrimination against Spain but simply a policy based on necessity. 
Obviously Spain's pride would be hurt and thus had to be mended. The Ambassador 
was encouraged not to mention Italy, France or Britain as having priority over Spain so 
that Madrid would not feel further sidelined. Bruce continued arguing that due to the 
current world situation there could not be extensive grants of military aid to Spain. It 
was difficult for 'Washington to understand why Spain refused to grant bases for the 
defence of the West. As for the $125 million, Washington had made up its mind that it 
could not be granted without guarantees in return because, under the Mutual Security 
Act, its appropriation was based on the advance of the security of the free world.
36. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 4 August 1952, USARMA, Lisbon to Deptar Washington.
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Extending it without guarantees would violate this Act.37 '
These reconsiderations resulted in a reversal of the US approach to Spain. The 
paper DMS D-7, which had formed the body of the instruction to the negotiations team 
was de facto dead. Secretary of State Acheson had ruled on 31 July, that DMS D-7 was 
obsolete after the $25 million increase of aid to Spain. He then had instructed the State 
Department not to decrease dramatically in any studies the $50 million allocated to 
offset inflation in Spain. DMS D-7, a hastily drawn up instruction document, had until 
August set the requirements and the scope of the negotiations. Now it had ceased to 
function even as such.
After receiving the memorandum from Bruce, MacVeagh told Washington that 
something had gone wrong in the negotiations with Spain. He argued that Spain did not 
need vast military aid but simply adequate aid to organize a national defence. If this aid 
was phased over live years then it could be acceptable to both Spain and the US. The 
Ambassador also believed that Spain did not really require, nor expected a military 
alliance. Madrid simply sought a statement for the consumption of public opinion. Like 
in other fascist regimes appearances were vital. Linked to this was the fact that Spain 
did not reject US usage of the bases but simply pointed towards a possible internal 
conflict which might be caused by US soldiers stationed in Spain. Furthermore, Mac- 
Veagh argued that Spain did not propose to get the $125 million without commitment 
but was willing to sign a modified economic aid agreement and a Mutual Defence Act 
Agreement, which would be followed by certain obligations for the two countries. The 
Ambassador asked the Secretary of State whether the US wanted to change policy in the
light of the new interpretation or if Washington wanted to stick to the policy expressed___
in the letter by Bruce.38
On the 22 August, Bruce decided that a new reply should be drafted to replace
37. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 13 August 1952, Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in 
Spain, p. 1871.
38. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 16 August 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh to the State 
Department, p. 1876.
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his letter. Almost a month had passed and Washington had still not decided on new 
instructions for their teams in Spain. A rift seemed to have opened between the State 
Department in Washington and its Ambassador in Madrid.
Train supported McVeagh's interpretation in a memorandum to the Deputy 
Director of the Mutual Security Administration, Kenney, who had been in Madrid on 
14 August 1952. Train wrote that Spain was right to demand to be treated like other 
nations. The head of the economic negotiations team asserted that the $125 million was 
of little importance and bases in Spain were not an asset for the Mediterranean country 
because Spain would not have, in the foreseeable future, any heavy bombers to fully 
make use of these facilities. Train knew that Franco had realized that Spain could not 
be part o f NATO, but, nevertheless, the Spanish dictator wanted at least to be 
associated with the NATO security concept. So far, the American approach had been 
unacceptable to Spain.39
A new US policy had to be found and it was important to fully understand 
Spain's demands and objectives. In the meantime the Air Section of JUSMG in Spain 
came to the first conclusions with the Spanish Air Force. The military end-item aid 
which was to go to the Spanish Air Force (35% of the total of $37 million as agreed in 
the meeting 5 July 1952, ie. $13 million) was to be used for the purchase of four jet 
engines, to equip three flying and two technical training schools and to initiate limited 
base construction. These were small sums compared to Spain's expectations.
JUSMG sent a report on Spain's position and a proposal of policy to 
Washington. It told the State Department that Spain asked for $349 for the Army, $302 
for the Navy and $710 million for the Air Force, resulting in a total of $1,361 million. 
JUSMG had studied these requests and recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a 
counterproposal should be submitted. General Kissner recommended granting $214 
million to the Army, $100 million to the Navy and $127 million to the Air Force,
39. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 19 August 1952, Memorandum Chief Mutual Security Agency 
Economic Group Spain to Deputy Director MSA, p. 1878.
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resulting in a total of $441 million. He suggested that this aid, to increase the capability 
o f the Spanish armed forces to defend Spain, should be phased over four yean. It was 
less than a third of the aid the Spanish had demanded as "indispensable”, yet Kissner 
claimed that what Spain had called "indispensable” was not their lowest bid. He was 
convinced that Spain would be willing to sign even if they were offered less than the 
"indispensable”. Kissner suggested that the US should find certain tasks and obligations 
in the Western defence for Spain such as an assignment for two Spanish military corps 
to operate outside the Peninsula. General Vigdn had indicated that the Divisions in the 
Pyrenees could be used North of Spain. Now Washington was to take up this offer. 
Ultimately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to decide how badly they needed military bases 
and how high a price they were willing to pay for them.40
This report by JUSMG on the list of Spanish military aid requirements reflected 
a new concept of strengthening Spain's armed forces. Rather than placing emphasis on 
the concept of military aid for the development and protection of the desired facilities 
and training purposes, JUSMG advised to strengthen all Spanish armed forces for 
military use outside Spain. A careful study and review of this report had to be 
conducted. It was clear that a reversal of policy would have to be discussed with Britain 
and France before it could be implemented. It was likely that the two European nations 
would not be pleased. While the Foreign Office feared for British trade with Spain, the 
British Chiefs of Staff had concerns about Gibraltar. The Chiefs opposed the creation of 
a single Iberian Atlantic Command as this would lead to further influence for the 
Americans. They also opposed the proposals made earlier by the American Admirals 
Sherman, Fechteler and McCormick, creating a joint command, as this would have had 
similar results. The British Chiefs still hoped to create an independent British command 
with headquarters in Gibraltar for operations in the Mediterranean.41
40. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 5 September 1953, Memorandum Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs to Deputy Under Secretary of State, p. 1879.
41. PRO, DEFE4.56, 5 September 1952, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes.
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Washington realized that the international climate in Europe still did not favour 
Spain's integration. Nevertheless, the negotiation teams were instructed to proceed with 
the talks without awaiting the review and final decision on the JUSMG report
The Regional Affairs Section of the State Department argued in favour of 
JUSM G's position, that is to seek Spain's commitment outside its own territories. 
NATO policy had always been to defend as far North and East as possible. If Spanish 
troops remained behind the Pyrenees, Spain's role would be negligible, and money 
spent would be going to troops which would not act as a deterrent. Naturally, this 
would create a problem with NATO partners and with Germany's defence plans. If the _ 
policy of the State Department towards Spain had been implemented before 1952, it 
would have made sense because a fallback towards Spain would have been necessary in 
case of a Soviet attack. However, after 1953 this made little sense anymore because 
NATO had by then a reasonable amount of units which guaranteed a defence of 
Europe. No military retreat to Spain or the UK were necessary. Thus if money went to 
Spain then the country would also need to have an allocated role in the western 
defence. Otherwise, the negotiations would lead to no advantages for US defence 
plans.42
The Ambassador in Madrid urged Washington again to commence talks at the 
highest level. MacVeagh informed the Office of Western European Affairs that 
Arguelles was already talking above the informal level in his conversation on 5 July 
1952. It seemed to the Ambassador that the fundamental conflicts of the negotiations 
were unsolvable by the informal talks between the teams in Spain. Therefore, he 
suggested that the parties should take a step towards governmental negotiations. He 
hoped that this would settle the exact relations between Spain and the US and positively 
influence the negotiations. It would also answer the question whether military end-items 
were to be included in an aid package for Spain. MacVeagh pointed out that Spain
42. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 8 September 1952, Memorandum Director Office European 
Regional Affairs to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, p. 1881.
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would be more flexible during governmental talks than during the current talks.43
Given the advice of its Ambassador, the State Department had to determine its 
commitments to Spain in the future. In early August 1952, Nash (Pentagon) advised 
Lovett (State Department) that assurance should be given for long term credits but in 
return the US had to gain control over the use of bases in peacetime and Spain should 
not expect more than $125 million during the FY 1953. The Spanish General Alonso 
Vega, who was touring the Caribbean and the US in August, strengthened Nash's 
advice. On 28 August, in a lunch meeting with General Omar Bradley, member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Alonso Vega told the American that Spain did not really need the 
amount of assistance they had been asking for but simply wanted a reassurance of 
Washington's long term commitment and moral obligation towards Spain. The Spanish 
General seemed to indicate that Franco needed this assurance of long term US 
intentions in order to hail the agreements as a diplomatic coup in front of Spanish 
public opinion.44 If this was so, the proposal suggested by Nash, to grant long term 
credits in return for the bases, was very sensible.
In order to clarify US policy, Perkins, Draper, Anderson, MacVeagh, Kissner, 
Garvin and Train; that is, representatives from Washington and the negotiators in 
Spain, had a meeting in Paris on 29 September. They drafted a response to Arguelles' 
July letter. It had taken from 9 July, when MacVeagh's report was received, until the 7 
October to draft a reply. Full three months had been spent in consultation between 
several governmental agencies and interdepartmental discussions. As MacVeagh had 
suggested, it was decided that the negotiations should move one step up. It was also 
decided that from then on, US policy would
"include support of Spanish defense efforts for agreed purposes by the 
provision of assistance to Spain over a period of several years, subject... to
43. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 26 September 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh to John Y. Millar, 
Office of Western European Affairs, p. 1883.
44. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 5 September 1952, Joyn Y. Millar to MacVeagh.
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limitations imposed by congressional appropriations, existing priorities and 
commitments, the exigencies of the Korean situation, the status of supply and 
the international situation."
It was clear that military aid would go first to countries participating in the 
common defence of Western Europe. During the meeting in Paris, the two sides, State 
Department and negotiation team, came to an agreement and were able to decide on 
their response to Artajo's letter. Back in Madrid, the Ambassador sent this response 
directly to Artajo, who received it on 8 October. The US answer did not mention 
specific military supply to Spain, the only limits being available funds and supplies. All 
the other limitations had been omitted in this note for Madrid. It was clear that Spain 
had already been a part of the US security policy plan, which was to aid all those 
countries which could defend themselves if attacked. "Actually, our intention in prin­
ciple is to give Spain, along with others, whatever we can which will help contribute to 
that general picture". Clearly the Ambassador hoped that Artajo would agree that Spain 
should not be given the same aid as front line countries due to strategic and not political 
reasons. This formed the informal part of the letter to Artajo.45 Included was an 
official memorandum to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Martin Artajo.
The formal reply was divided into nine points. It stated that America's policy 
towards Spain "would include support of Spanish defense efforts for agreed purposes by 
the provision of assistance to Spain over a period of several years." Spain was to be 
treated as other countries under the same restrictions because:
"if war with the USSR should come, Spain due to its strategic location, 
would not be able to escape Soviet aggressive action... Spain's determined anti­
communist position would be at least as suitable a pretext for eventual attack on 
Spain... as would the use of Spanish military facilities by the United States 
Forces."
45. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 7 October 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh to Martin Artajo,
p. 1887.
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Aid to Spain would be administered by the Mutual Security Program. "The basis 
for United States aid is mutuality of efforts." This meant by implication that if 
resources were required elsewhere more urgently, then Spain had to join the queue and 
wait for her turn. Western defence was deemed to be Spain's defence and "under this 
concept Spain can make a valuable contribution at this time to its own defense as well 
as that of Western Europe by granting to the United States the use of military facilities 
in Spain intended to further the common defense capabilities. ” The letter argued that in 
case of invasion of Western Europe, Spain too would be attacked due to its 
geographical position and strong anti-communist stance. This was simply diplomatic, to 
increase Spain’s belief that the US was taking her seriously. The note continued, 
pointing out that the possibility of a sudden attack made peace time preparations 
necessary. Then in point eight came the ultimate bait. If the agreements were signed, 
the Executive Branch "is prepared to include suitable provisions for assistance to Spain 
in its presentation to the Congress." lb  smoothen the hard road ahead, the note finally 
asked for an official statement of friendship between the two countries.46 Now it was 
Washington's time to wait for a reply by the Spanish negotiations team.47
On 24 October 1952, Kissner and Vigdn had another meeting. They discussed 
the letter from the American Ambassador to the Spanish Foreign Minister. Vigdn 
seemed to be pleased with the reply. After being briefed by Kissner, MacVeagh wrote a 
report on the conversation which he sent off to Washington. The ambassador claimed 
that if Spain received "US assistance over a period of years on an equal basis with other 
nations" then Spain would not be unreasonable about base rights and military aid.
MacVeagh speculated that the best way to achieve the agreements was by seeing them 
as on an equal basis and not just as buying rights. "Hence not haggling over 'price', but 
convincing Spaniards that we seriously intend and are actually planning [to] do all we
46. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 6 October 1952, Memorandum Ambassador MacVeagh to 
Spanish Minister Foreign Affairs, Martin Artajo, included in 7 October 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh 
to Martin Artajo, p. 1889. _
47. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 27 October 1952, J.Y. Mliiar "Secret Security Information".
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can to render joint enterprise viable.” MacVeagh continued: "It is principally in 
connection with above picture that we feel failure to provide... reasonable aid to Spain 
in the FY 1954 foreign aid budget at present under consideration might prove 
disastrous.” So far, Spain had not acted without understanding US limitations. It 
seemed that time and political acceptance would reflect the seriousness of America's 
commitment towards Spain. This perception would have been disastrous if Spain was 
really after money rather than recognition of status because it would offer Spain the 
possibility to get more aid then needed. As this was not supposedly the case, MacVeagh 
pointed out that aid should "be sufficient to show we regard giving aid to Spain in a 
serious light." MacVeagh argued in the military sector that aid should be based on 
Kissner's recommendation of not less than $80 million in new funds over several years. 
He also suggested that economic aid was to be based on Train's estimation of not less 
than $57 million in new funds. Both should be in addition to the already appropriated 
$125 million.
The US negotiators also commented on the military aid program during FY 
1954 for Spain. Originally, it had been designed to build up the Spanish military 
potential for territorial defence. Under the revised programme the primary purpose 
recommended assistance to develop and protect the bases and to develop military 
conditions in Spain for a future associations under the programme of US - Spanish 
negotiations with NATO.48
In less then one month, on 31 October, Madrid officially replied to the 
American note. Spain was pleased with the generatycordial tone of the letter and 
underlined again that there was no distinction between Spain and other countries and 
that she agreed to establish a friendship which included assistance over several years. 
The Spanish armed forces were willing to contribute to Western defence through the 
defence of the Peninsula which could only be guaranteed through US aid. Therefore,
48. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 30 October 1952, Ambassador MacVeagh to the State
Department, p. 1892.
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Spain should "receive complementary military means sufficient to assure the 
defence of the peninsula territory." Artajo argued that the communist threat, the 
oscillation by various countries, Soviet affiliation and other factors made the 
strengthening of Spain "the most essential factor for restraining and lessening the 
dangers thereof." The Spanish Government also claimed that: "because of [Spain's] 
strategic position and her anti-Comm[unist] posture, Spain might constitute an 
objective of Sovfiet] aggressive action, in the event of war the pressure on Spanish 
territory of joint bases and military] personnel of the US w[ou]ld necessarily 
aggravate and accelerate the aggression. The Spa[nish] people, to whom it c[ou]ld not 
be explained that they do not themselves^ posses adequate defenses, w[ou]ld 
doubtless consider it thus."
This was a rebuff to the American argument that Spain's anti-communism was 
enough for a conflict with the USSR. Madrid considered air defence as vital for all 
Western European countries, yet above all for ports, industry and populations in 
strong anti-Communist areas. Thus the argument continued, Spain should receive aid 
for its Air Force and air defence. The Foreign Minister stressed the urgency of the 
situation which called for immediate military aid. It was suggested that only later 
should the two countries work out texts for the military base agreements. On the 
other hand, the economic aid and Mutual Defense Agreements should be signed soon, 
according to Artajo. Spain also hoped for an increase of annual aid from $25 million to 
at least $100 million of the previous year as well as a quick investments of the 
previous $125 million credit from 1952. It was unclear from the letter whether US 
use of Spanish military facilities in peacetime and in wartime would be allowed. 
Nevertheless, oral assurance concerning the use of bases in Spain was given on 3 
November "except for details regarding construction and personnel utilization".49
On 4 November 1952, MacVeagh passed on Spain's reply from 31 October to 
Washington. In the light of this reply, MacVeagh expected that, due to Spain's urgency
49. ERUS 1952-1954. Vol. VI, Part 2, 4 November 1952, MacVeagh to Department of State, p. 1895.
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for the two agreements concerning economic and military aspects, it would not take 
long before the US was able to get the third, the base agreement. Vigtin had told 
Kissner, 24 October, that he was confident that the disagreement over the usage of 
bases in peacetime could be resolved soon. On 3 November, Vigdn had gone even 
further and claimed that the US had usage in principle of bases in peacetime as well as 
during a war. However, he had excluded the construction and personnel questions at 
these bases. Spain was giving way towards the American demands concerning the 
military bases. Vigdn, Arguelles and Arburua all expressed their willingness to sign all 
three agreements but preferred to delay the base agreement for political reasons.
Clearly Spain’s propaganda would hail the success of these two agreements as another 
diplomatic coup by Franco. Weeks later, when the base agreement would have been 
sighed, publicity would undoubtedly have been silenced. As for the Americans in 
Spain, Kissner and Train agreed that all three agreements had to be signed at the same 
time because they feared that their negotiation teams would have no bargain power once 
it had committed itself in the agreements concerning economic and military aid. 
MacVeagh agreed with this in principle but also urged flexibility. One also has to 
consider the impact on NATO countries. Signing the agreement separately would not 
have enhanced the US image with these countries. By singing them together,
Washington could at least claim this was done for security reasons. Nevertheless, the 
mood was optimistic. Train indicated that January 1953 could be a possible date to 
conclude the agreements. The go ahead with the base agreement was on from both 
sides.50
On 7 November, according to US policy, the British and French representatives 
in Washington were informed about the status of the negotiations. After a statement by 
Franco in November, the British Foreign Office had been speculating that the American 
- Spanish agreement would be signed by the end of the month. Now the State
50. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol.VI, Part 2, 4 November 1952, MacVeagh to Department of State, p. 1899.
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Department dismissed these speculations.51
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While Spain was formulating its position on the base agreement, the US 
Department of Defense was reconsidering the JUSMG report from 20 August about 
military aid to Spain. On 8 December, the Department of Defense informed the 
Department of State that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reviewed and approved the report 
recommending $440 million in military assistance for the defence of the Iberian 
peninsula as a long term military program. As money for Spain was limited for the tim& 
being to $125 million, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the JUSMG (Spain) recommended 
that the newly appropriated $25 million should be used exclusively for military endr 
items.52 This was partly because Captain H.G. Sanchez, heading the Navy part of 
JUSMG, had already guaranteed $57 million military end-items to Spain.53
In return the State Department pointed out that the basic concept of the JUSMG 
report from 20 August had already been altered by recommendations made in October 
and November. The State Department agreed to the October recommendations 
according to which a military program of $85 million in FY 1954 should provide 
equipment to the Spanish Forces to assist the protection of the US bases and for the 
training of the Spanish armed forces. This was now being considered by the 
Department of Defense. These were concessions by Washington which improved 
Franco's bargaining position during what seemed the final phase.
In the economic field, the US still wanted to import Spanish raw materials, 
remove the foreign investment limitation of 25%, as well as the restriction on profit 
transfer. Furthermore, the US wanted a guarantee for a stable foreign exchange, new 
oil drilling rights along the Ebro valley and larger quotas for imports to Spain to secure 
markets against foreign competitors such as Britain, Italy, France and West Germany.
51. PRO, F0371.102014, 4 November 1952, FO Minute.
52. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 10 December 
1952, JCS to Secretary of Defense.
53. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1952, 1 December 1952, JUSMG to G-3.
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N A new finance agreement with Britain, in December 1952, and an agreement 
with France, guaranteeing the French trade position behind the US, meant that the US 
negotiators were put under pressure to reach an early agreement.
Spain soon became a member of several United Nation Sub-organisations. She 
joined the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the Warld Post Organization, the World 
Health Organization and others. In November 1952 Spain was even allowed into 
UNESCO. These international developments meant that Spain wanted more out of 
Wellington.
N
Minor issues were raised. In November, Lieutenant-Colonel Gonzalez-Camino, 
a former service attachd, told JUSMG that frictions between US military personnel 
stationed in the bases and Spanish troops could result due to the difference of pay 
between the two.54 Over dinner he told representative of JUSMG that he considered 
aid to France a waste, and the resources should have been given to Germany in stead of 
wasting "money in supporting the French in their Tost battle' in Indochina. "55
Vigbn and Kissner had a series of unsuccessful meetings on 5, 6 and 10 of 
November. The problems remained and the two sides seemed to have come to a 
deadlock. Then, on 20 November, Kissner, talking directly to Artajo, was able to break 
this deadlock and pave the way forward. Problems concerning jurisdiction and duration 
of the lease over the base facilities were discussed and solved.56
During the same month, Vigdn requested 100 rounds of 105mm artillery shells 
to see if Spanish artillery could use them. The fact that Spanish guns were lighter than 
American artillery made this doubtful. JUSMG encouraged this grant to advance the 
negotiations. Promptly afterwards the shells were delivered to Spain's armed forces.57
54. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 26 November 1952, S.W. Rockwell to Ambassador.
55. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1952, 26 November 1952, S.W. Rockwell Memo to 
Ambassador.
56. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 24 November 1952, Dunham "Status of Spanish 
Negotiations".
57. NA, Military Branch, G-3 091 Spain, 1952, 8 October 1952, JUSMG to General D. Eddleman.
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In Washington, Propper de Callejdn once again, though with less enthusiasm 
than Vigdn, expressed the desire of the Spanish authorities to sign the military and 
economic aid agreement before the base agreement58 Propper picked up on a small 
blunder by Lincoln MacVeagh. The Ambassador had been instructed always to stress 
that the agreements would be signed together, yet in a  letter, written on 7/8 October, he 
wrote that the agreements were to be concluded in one official ceremony "or closely 
consecutive signature". Propper took this statement as a  suggestion that the agreements 
could be signed separately. Naturally this suited Madrid as it could stress the diplomatic 
success of the aid agreements while ignoring publicity for die price Spain had to pay in 
the base agreement.59 In reality Washington still wanted to sign all agreements at the 
same time.
Artajo initially complained about the proposed agreements. He condemned the 
suggested period of the lease for the facilities. However, the American team remained 
unmoved by this complaint and soon the Spanish side abandoned it. On 2 December 
1952, Artajo gave Lincoln MacVeagh clear indication that the talks should be wound 
up and the agreements signed. Vigdn indicated that his team accepted a lease of ten 
years with one extension of live years. There were no objections to US wartime use or 
to limitations on personnel.60
The State Department was confident that the agreements would soon be signed. 
Bonbright wanted to inform the Secretary of State in waiting, John F. Dulles, about the 
expected success of the negotiations. Washington saw Spain's letter, dated 31 October, 
as an agreement in principle to US use of Spanish bases. Vigdn seemed assured and 
happy to have concluded the talks. Only Franco's confirmation was awaited which, the 
State Department speculated, might express minor complaints about the current deal:
58. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 November 1952, Robert McBride "Secret Security 
Information".
59. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 21 November 1952, William B. Dunham to MacVeagh.
60. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 8 December 1952, Dunham "Secret Security Information
Firstly, the amount of US military stationed in Spain during peacetime and secondly, 
the scope of use of the bases by US troops. Ambassador MacVeagh also feared that 
relations might get stressed by a decrease of appropriated funds for Spain during FY 
1954.61 Other questions concerned issues like isolated cases of jurisdiction over US 
personnel stationed in Spain and tax relief for the Military Aid Agreement.62 However 
these were minor considerations and would not have taken long to solve.
Then, almost out of the blue and taking full advantage of the positive 
international developments for Spain and US concessions, came a shattering note from 
the Spanish negotiations team. This must have been initiated and encouraged by Franco 
himself because all other Spanish negotiators had started to give way to US demands. 
On 23 December, Spain submitted a counterdraft of the base agreement proposing to 
Kissner a link between base construction and military end-items for Spain's forces "on 
a parallel basis" and "when the moment of utilization of the desired facilities is 
reached, the minimum necessities required for the defense of Spanish territory... will 
have been covered." These included "the air defense of its territory, the security of its 
maritime communications, and the completion of the armament of its land, sea, and air 
armies." The Spanish armed forces were to be equipped with modem material which 
would allow them to independently defend the whole of Spain's territory, waters and 
airspace. In late October and November the Spanish negotiations teams had given the 
impression that they would be satisfied with some military aid unlinked to any base 
programmes or specific defence requirements. During these months, JUSMG was sure 
that $440 million in aid was enough to satisfy Spain. Now the Spaniards went back to 
their earlier demands for more substantial and specific aid. At the same time the 
demand for a parallel development of bases and aid posed a serious legal problem. The 
American Administration was legally unable to guarantee in an executive agreement
61. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 December 1952, Bonbright to Acting Secretary.
62. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 23 December 1952, Dunham "Status of Spanish 
Negotiations".
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with Spain any long term financial commitments for which Congress had not 
appropriated any funds, lb  do so would violate Congressional taxation and spending 
rights. Furthermore, Spain wanted the use of bases during war to be joint and based on 
prior consultation. The counterdraft omitted concrete provisions for peacetime use of 
the military facilities. Here again Spain went back to old demands. The oral assurance 
from early November concerning the use of military facilities was thus withdrawn. The 
note made it clear that during times of conflict consultation for the use of these facilities 
was required and peacetime use was left altogether vague. The Spanish Foreign 
Minister told MacVeagh that the two requirements of "parallel development" and _
"prior consultation" were "essential" to Spain. These were unacceptable demands to the 
US and shattered any hopes of signing the agreements in 1952 or in early 1953.63
63. Condit, Doris M., Test of War. Washington, 1988, p.356f
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During early 1953, many foreign diplomats, including staff at the British 
Embassy in Washington, believed that the three agreements between thq US and Spain 
were about to be signed and only some details had to be worked out. It was assumed 
that Lequerica's opportunism and oversimplifications had been abandoned by the 
Spanish negotiation team in favour of honesty and frankness.1 This ignored the Spanish 
negotiation efforts during December.
Spain's counter-draft of the base agreement, dated 23 December 1952, had 
necessitated a reconsideration by the American negotiators in Spain. As a reply,
Kissner presented a revised draft which was designed to accept as. much as possible of 
the Spanish version while not departing in any essential respect from the US position. 
This revision was analyzed by Franco and the Defence Minister. In a letter, 14 
January, General Vigon advised General Kissner that the American revision was 
considered inadequate. He argued that the American draft sill had "the double aspect of 
a concrete military pact for one side, and of a benevolent political declaration of vague 
military content for the other." Vigo'n suggested that the Spanish redraft should be sub­
mitted to the US Government for consideration.
The Spanish counterpart draft was given careful consideration in Washington 
and by JUSMG. The appropriate agencies in Washington felt that the substantial 
changes expressed from the previous position by the Spaniards in the negotiations 
indicated that there might be a considerable degree of bargaining in their 
counterproposal, done to sound out the new administration in the hope of getting a 
better deal. Therefore it was decided that the matter should not be placed before the 
National Security Council for review but rather further discussions should be held to 
determine how firmly the Spaniards intended to hold to their new position.
This decision, to wait and see, was further supported by the fact that some 
Senators feared that entering agreements with Spain without the approval of public 
opinion would be dangerous. These Congressmen continued to argue that to test public
1. PRO, FO 371.107686, 5 January 1953, Burrows, Washington.
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opinion, the US should not enter agreements with Spain but a treaty instead. The 
difference being that treaties have to be approved by Congress while agreements did 
not.2
In his last appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson made some interesting statements. He outlined that it 
had taken the West until now to enlist enough troops "to make it impossible for the 
existing Communist forces in Europe to take off and overrun Europe." Europe was still 
threatened in case of an all out mobilization by the USSR. Nevertheless, a surprise 
attack could be stopped. This was important because, as Acheson pointed out, it would 
require some considerable degree of mobilization to augment the forces in East 
Germany to make a successful attack, and "that is something which is observable and 
something of which we will have cognizance." He underlined this statement again 
stressing that:
"that force [Bereitschaften], plus the Soviet forces, are the ones which have 
been bothering everybody because they are fully equipped, fueled, and have got 
all the reserves of ammunition and everything else they need to take off.
If they took off, and there is nothing to oppose them, then you are in real 
trouble. Once you have a situation where they cannot achieve a quick result 
without a mobilization, that is a wholly different situation."
NATO was now ready to meet the Soviet threat with existing conventional 
forces in Europe. Acheson also pointed out that the negotiations with Spain were well 
advanced and would soon be concluded but he also confirmed that John Foster Dulles 
would carry out the last steps under the new Administration.3
The new military situation which Acheson outlined was not without influence on 
the European member states of NATO. France was reassured that an improvement of
2. LOC, S0062, No. 13, 2 January 1953.
3. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 1953, 19 January 1953, Report by 
the Secretary of State, Washington, 1976/77.
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relations between the US and Spain would no longer threaten her own national security. 
Promptly, she started to suppress clandestine broadcasting stations run byN Spanish 
exiles and prohibited political meetings by Spanish refugees. The government even 
considered compensating the Spanish victims of the 1945 train incident in France.4
Simultaneously, Britain further relaxed her trade relations with Spain. During 
1952, the United Kingdom had lost manufacturing markets in Spain to France and the 
US. Naturally, London was interested in preventing further losses to the competition. 
Trade of military items was relaxed leading to a contract between the Spanish Navy and 
Vickers-Armstrong over £1.5 million for submarine equipment and fire control gear.5 
The UK also wanted to increase Spain's currency receipts from the sterling area, which 
in turn was to lead to increased imports from Britain. The decreasing sterling receipts 
by Spain had already led to the cancellation of a deal for 50 Spitfire planes. By the end 
of 1952, the Spanish government had outstanding payments in pounds sterling: 
£520,000 for English Electric; £300,000 for copper from South Africa; £300,000 for 
raw wool from the U.K.; £274,000 for the Barcelona and Valencia Fair; £140,000 for 
Austin cars; and £66,000 for constructions.6 According to the Bank of England, Spain 
had received in 1952 goods worth £59 million but had only paid £54 million. The rest 
was financed by drafts and drawings on Spain's account balances.7 This meant that 
Spain had already drawn the entire £2 million of their exchange facilities, normally 
used to facilitate trade and payments. If Britain wanted to export manufactured goods to 
Spain, London had to increase the sterling receipts of Spain. Thus Britain was 
becoming increasingly interested in relaxing OEEC trade restrictions with Spain.8
The matter was further complicated when the Board of Trade claimed that Spain
4. PRO, FO 371.107678, undated, Balfour, Madrid.
5. PRO, FO 371.107701, 14 January 1953, Balfour, Madrid.
6. PRO, FO 371.107701, 24 February 1953, Balfour.
7. PRO, FO 371.107701, 10 March 1953, Eggers, Treasury.
8. PRO, FO 371.107701, 4 March 1953, Balfour, Madrid; 14 March 1953, Balfour, Madrid.
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had an interest in playing down her exports vto Britain. The undeclared sterling earnings 
of these exports were not used to pay off past imports, but were invested in Britain, 
held in Spanish accounts, spent on consumer goods in the U.K. and were spent for 
further U.K. goods and services imported to Spain.9 After further discussions with the 
Ministry of Food, the British Ambassador in Spain and Parliament, the Foreign Office 
decided not to take strong actions against Spain. While sterling transfer facilities 
remained unchanged, draft facilities were increased to £4 million. Indirect pressure was 
put on Madrid through economic talks between Arguelles and Mr Cotton from the 
British Embassy.10 “
Generally speaking, Franco could be satisfied with these developments. 
Furthermore, the election of a Republican candidate to the White House seemed to 
favour Spain's position concerning the military negotiations in Madrid. Lequerica was 
still convinced in March 1953 that the new Administration in Washington was a 
positive development for Spain.11 Madrid was so confident about Western support that, 
despite the possible use of the Soviet veto, it tried to rally Latin American, Arab 
nations and the US for Spain's candidature to the United Nations.12 Spain had good 
reasons to be confident. With the election of President Eisenhower, the Truman 
containment policy came to an end and Washington started to try to roll back the 
Communist threat. John F. Dulles, who had not been unfavourable towards fascist 
regimes before the Second World War, was appointed Secretary of State. He had been 
accused by Democrats of being Franco's lawyer. After the Civil War, Spain had made
9. PRO, FO 371.107702, 27 March 1953, Lippetts, Board of Trade; 2 April 1953, Commercial 
Counselor, Madrid.
10. PRO, FO 371.107702, 19 June 1953, FO Minute; 24 June 1953, Lippetts; 3 July 1953, Balfour; 29 
July 1953, Eggers, Treasury; FO 371.107703, 29 July 1953, Lippetts, Board of Trade; 28 August 
1953, Stephens, Treasury.
11. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 5 March 1953, Dunham, US - Spanish Negotiations.
12. PRO, FO 371.107685, 27 January 1953, F. Murray, Madrid.
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an effort to recover silver, which had been shipped abroad by the Republic.13 John F. 
Dulles was connected with this. He had represented the National Bank of Spain, which 
tried to recover the silver for Franco. How did Dulles stand with regard to Spain during 
the post-war period?
Concerning the UN December resolution, Dulles always seemed to have 
opposed it in principle but once it was passed, he realized that it was a symbol of 
opposition to all right wing totalitarian regimes and revocation would be difficult.14 He 
understood Spain's strategic value for the West and would do all to get Spain for a 
price as low as possibly for his own nation.
He was however accused by some in the military establishment of failing to see 
that military forces are not for destruction alone but could be used by the US to gain 
acceptance in the world through indirect pressure.15
Dulles also had problems with people inside the State Department. Sometimes 
he seemed to upset the civil servants in the Department due to his jealousy and 
ambition. In return, he thought the Department was a disaster due to its excessive 
paperwork.16 He seemed to have bypassed the Department of Defense in favour of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff more than once. In return, many military leaders, such as Admiral 
Arthur W. Radford, later head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held him in high esteem.17
The change of Secretary of State was important but not as important as the 
change of President. Truman was from the very beginning anti-Spanish and had 
expressed his dislike for the Franco regime in many press conferences. When given the 
chance to grant credits to Spain, he initially refused.
Eisenhower was different. His army career in Europe and above all the days
13. JFD Papers, Box 29, letter 15 June 1946.
14. JFD Papers, Box 46, letter 13 April 1949.
15. JFD Oral History Collection, Arleigh Burke, Chief US Naval Operations.
16. JFD Oral History Collection, Thomas Gates, Secretary of Navy.
17. JFD Oral History Collection, Arthur W. Radford, Chairman JCS.
287
M. »IIU4
during Operation Torch had shown him the necessity of dealing with Spain. He had 
feared during Operation Torch that the military campaign in North Africa might bring 
Vichy France and Spain into the war on the Axis side.18 As late as November 1942, he 
had been anxious to hear about Spain's intentions.19 The experience proved to him how 
vital Spain's geographic position really was. No wonder that he harboured the belief 
that security in Europe was only possible if a United States of Europe including NATO 
countries, West Germany, Sweden, Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece would be formed.20
Nevertheless, Eisenhower believed that it was also in the interest of Spain to 
help defend Western Europe as far East as possible. Commitment by Spain to aid to 
NATO's defence effort was naturally assumed by the President.21 For Eisenhower, 
there seemed little reason why Spain should not accept the deal offered to her and he 
was unwilling to further compromise on Spain's new demands. It became obvious to all 
that the new Administration in Washington had not shifted its relations with Spain. The 
American negotiation teams in Spain remained unchanged.22 The State Department did 
change the Ambassador in Spain and appointed James Clement Dunn as MacVeagh's 
successor. The Spanish seemed concerned about his religious background and the 
impact on the negotiations.23 Despite this concern, the Spanish propaganda machinery 
claimed that the US was sick of the poor showing of France and had thus decided to 
move their best diplomat, James Dunn, from Paris to Madrid.24 The truth had more to 
do with Dunn's past experience with Spain in 1919.
18. Ferrell, 2 September 1942, p.78.
19. Ferrell, 9 November 1942, p.82.
20. Ferrell, 11 June 1951, p. 194.
21. FRUS 1952-54. Vol. VI, 24 March 1953, President to Dunn, p .1922.
22. PRO, FO 371.107687, 18 February 1953, Makino, Washington.
23. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 21 January 1953, Byington, Base Negotiations with Spain.
24. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 February 1953, Dunham "Spanish Misinterpretation of
Ambassador Dunn's Appointment to Madrid".
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James C. Dunn was bom in Newark in 1890 and studied architecture and later 
law. During the First World War he had served in the Navy. After getting married,"he 
became Special Assistant to Secretary of State Hull in 1935. After the war he was sent 
to Italy as an ambassador and subsequently to France in 1952. His early assignment in 
Madrid made him a wise choice for the post of Ambassador to Spain. All hoped that the 
transition would be smooth and John W. Jones, American charg£ d'affairs, stayed on 
after MacVeagh had left to introduce James Dunn to the necessary protocol.
In the meantime in Spain, as hopes placed in the new Administration were 
shattered, Franco came under some pressure from the nationalists claiming that bases 
and troops in Spain were an offense against Spanish sovereignty and put an end to 
Spain's neutrality, and the Catholic Church which opposed a treaty with a Protestant 
nation. Cardinal Segura saw the Catholic faith in the US at the same level as "heretical 
dollars". Franco would make sure to calm this opposition from the Church by entering 
a treaty with the Vatican shortly before signing the agreements with the US.
The Spanish Air Minister Gonzdlez Gallarza is one example of the first 
category. He vehemently asserted that "We do not want American soldiers here. We 
are not a liberated nation. We won't tolerate it."25 Admiral Salvador Moreno, Minister 
of the Marine, was far more positive about the prospects and enthusiastically 
proclaimed that "the time has come" to sign the agreements.26
Once these were signed the Spanish Protestants could not expect to improve 
their lot. Since 1948 twelve British owned chapels had been seized, closed or assaulted;
2,000 British Bibles had been seized and Spanish authorities caused problems over 
clothing for charities imported by Protestants.27 A Baptist Pastor was fined the 
equivalent of £16 for public proselytizing. As it turned out, he stood accused of having
25. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 11 March 1953, Robert E. Wilson, Memo of Conversation.
26. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 April 1953, J.P. Murray to Ambassador.
27. PRO, FO 371.107730, 22 January 1953, Chancery Madrid; 30 March 1953, Persecution of 
Protestants.
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given details of time of worship to a non-Protestant person in a public market.2*
In a State Department study "Spain Current Problems", dated 11 February 1953, it was 
clearly said that "the Protestant problem is not so important as to merit being placed 
alongside the negotiations."29
Other problems remained. Alberto Martin Artajo saw complications with . 
public opinion in both countries, the opposition of other nations, particularly France 
and Britain and the form of the base agreements.
American surveys, such as the one conducted by Major Sellmer in Seville 
between 9 and 11 February inspecting the area surrounding Moron de la.Frontera and 
El Copero, did not remain unnoticed by the local population.30 Several locals in the 
Moron area, near Rota and Jerez de la Frontera made inquiries with the local American 
consulates. A Spanish hotel owner claimed to have known since 1951 that a US base 
was to be built near Rota.31 US interest in military bases in the area had become an 
open secret but public reaction was still unclear.
While Madrid was concerned about these problems, the US was getting anxious. 
As the Cold War was getting hotter, Washington became more interested in military 
aspects and foreign policy had to change. In 1952, American aid to Europe under the 
Marshall plan ended and further aid was governed by the Mutual Security Program.
This meant that the Mutual Security Administration rather than European governments 
were in control of aid for Europe.32 The Marshall plan had covered the dollar gap 
reducing Europe's deficit to the US from $7,000 million to $2,000 million. From now
28. PRO, FO 371.107730, 9 March 1953, Rev. A.W. Francis.
29. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 29 April 1953, John W. Jones to Dunham.___
30. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 February 1953, Robert E. Wilson, Memo of 
Conversation.
31. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 23 January 1953, Robert Wilson, Consul Seville, Memo of 
Conversation; 24 January 1953, Robert Wilson, Memo of Conversation; 30 May 1953, Robert E. 
Wilson.
32. PRO, FO 371.107693, 18 March 1953, John Balfour, Madrid.
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on, military aid would outweigh economic aid. In 1951, the US gave $3,590 million in 
economic aid and $1,484 million in military aid. One year later economic aid was down 
to $2,840 million while military aid was up to $2,738 million.33 The next year, 1953, 
President Eisenhower asked Congress for $5,829 million out of which 80% was for 
military purposes.34 This aid was spent to enforce the new foreign policy of the 
Eisenhower administration.
The U.S. Air Force had to be expanded. It was suggested that the USSR had to 
be fully encircled with US bases to deliver a vital blow from the air at any time. Spain 
in particular had many advantages. It had little air traffic and few restrictions on flights. 
The weather, with few and short rain periods in the south, was suitable for planes.
There already existed airports which could be extended through cheap Spanish labour. 
Furthermore, to become more cost efficient, the responsibilities of maintaining a 
standing army in Europe had to be delegated to other countries in order to cut back on 
defence costs. Spain was almost ideal for this. It had an army with 400,000 soldiers, 
organized into 23 divisions. The only problem was its lack of modem equipment. The 
US could cut back on overall defence expenditure in Europe by modernizing the 
Spanish armed forces.
On top of that, Spain was required to fully encircle the Soviet Union. Military 
air facilities in Spain were to form a link between European and North African bases.
However, Spain's infrastructure was weak and its economy needed large 
investments to bring it up to Western standards. Mr Walter Lippman described Spain as
"so weak, so poor and so primitive that to make it the kind of 'base' we hear about
would take years and a program of capital investment on a grand scale. ”35
Spain's transportation system had improved little during Franco's early period in 
power. In 1953, Spain had 60,000 cars, 50,000 trucks and 7,000 buses, about 250
33. Calvocoressi. Survey International Affairs 1953. p. 108.
34. Calvocoressi, Survey International Affairs 1953. p. 105.
35. Calvocoressi, Survey International Affairs 1949-1950. p.295.
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people per car. In the period 1949-1953 only 69 miles of new railroad was laid. Spain 
was far from being a modem state. As such any investment had to be planned carefully 
to avoid an overnight boom resulting in high inflation.
Nevertheless, some good economic developments had occurred. Spain's exports 
increased steadily between 2% and 16% annually from 1946 to 1953 with the exception 
of 1952 which saw a small decrease . Imports also increased from 1946 until 1948, 
then slipped until 1951 and increased during 1952 and 1953. Over these years Spain 
could not balance its trade. Commerce between the US and Spain, making up about 
15% of Spain's exports and imports by 1951, saw a similar development.
US exports to Spain were composed mainly of raw cotton, making up between 
27% and 39% of all exports to Spain. American exports to Spain of automobiles more 
then doubled during the first three years of the 1950's. Up to 1950, more than half of 
all imports by the US from Spain were fruits. The US increased cork and mercury 
imports and by 1952 fruits made up only 30%, mercury 7% and cork 5%.
Over this period Spain's trade balance was increasingly helped by tourist 
receipts. In 1950, 75,000 tourists went to Spain, in 1951 105,000, in 1952 1.5 million 
and in 1952 2 million foreigners visited Spain. The same trend can be observed with 
tourists from the.US. In 1950 30,000 Americans came to Spain, in 1951 45,000, and in 
1952 almost 100,000 Americans spent roughly $20 million during their stay.36 By 1953 
a total of 140,000 American tourists arrived in Spain.
Trade competition between the US, Germany, France and Britain over the 
export market in military items was intense.37 France secured a contract with Spain 
selling five 300 h.p. Turbomica jet engines. Shortly afterwards Paris, trying to limit 
foreign competition, suggested an export ban on engines over 500 h.p. and less than
1,000 kg weight.38 Soon the Royal Air Force sent six British "Venom" jets to the
36. PRO, FO 371.107691, 12 March 1953, Economic Report for Spain, February 1953.
37. PRO, FO 371.107710, 13 February 1953, Orme, Air Ministry.
38. PRO, FO 371.107712, 22 April 1953, Cook, Paris.
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Spanish Real Aero Club to impress the authorities in an air show.39 Britain feared that 
due to trade restrictions they would be unable to sell British anti-submarine warfare N 
plane to Spain. These planes were obviously not for common-use, nor wo«.s the 
technology obsolete. Theoretically they were banned from being sold to Spain. Yet it 
was also known that if Spain would be unable to purchase British planes for submarine 
reconnaissance along her large coast, her Air Force would buy the American plane 
"Neptune" instead.40 Rover too was increasingly interested in exports to Spain. Its 
representative in Spain continuously bypassed the British Embassy, and accused the 
Government in London of not doing enough for British companies.41 Therefore the 
Ministry of Supply suggested relaxing export restrictions to keep up with the 
competition. The pressure by the Ministry of Supply and Defence to relax these 
restrictions increased as the conclusion of the American - Spanish agreements seemed 
imminent.42
Issues like these convinced Spain that time would solve their problems. Under 
these circumstances the Franco regime saw no need to change the multiple exchange 
rates which hindered free trade. On the Tangier black market, $1 was worth about 43.2 
pts. Yet the dollar was only worth 10.95 pts according to the official basic exchange 
rate. For exchange rates, imports fell into five groups and their product exchange rates 
stood between 16.4 pts and 25 pts. A products classification depended on the desire of 
the government to import it. Exports similarly fell into five groups with different 
exchange rates ranging between 23.6 pts and 37.2 pts. By allowing lower exchange 
rates for imports than for exports, the government was helping Spain's industry by 
supporting export industries. Another industry that was aided by trade policies was 
tourism. The tourist rate was the highest official exchange rate at 38.9 pts per dollar.
39. PRO, FO 371.107691, 12 June 1953, Economic Report for Spain, May 1953.
40. PRO, FO 371.107710, 21 April 1953, Orchard, Ministry of Supply.
41. PRO, FO 371.107719, 22 January 1953, Balfour, Madrid.
42. PRO, FO 371.107710, 31 July 1953, Lee, Ministry of Defence.
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By undervaluing the peseta compared to the dollar for tourists, Franco made holidays 
comparably cheap. Spaniards carried the burdeh of Franco's restrictive trade policies 
whether they traveled abroad, worked in trade or simply purchased imported goods.43 
The liberalization of these economic policies were one target of the US negotiators in 
Spain.
Another US target was to make use of Spain's strategic geographical position.
On 8 January 1953, the Chief of Naval Operations informed the Secretary of State 
about the Joint Chiefs of Staff decision concerning the Mutual Assistance Advisory 
Committee document. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided that "U.S. objectives in 
Spain go beyond U.S. base rights and include increasing Spain's capability of defending 
the Iberian Peninsula, and of fulfilling possible future NATO requirements." Thus one 
should get rid of any talk about a "quid pro quo" and add instead that the US wanted to 
"increase the Spanish capability of defending the Iberian Peninsula." All of this was in 
reality not the result of a change of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position on Spain but was a 
result of failed talks with Spain during 1952. Spain had made it clear that she was only 
willing to grant bases if she was treated on an equal basis with other European nations. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also argued that
"Until the role Spain will play in Western defense is crystallized, all military 
assistance granted should be with the objective of developing forces which will 
increase Spain's capability of defending the Iberian Peninsula, including defense 
of U.S. occupied Spanish bases, and of fulfilling possible future NATO 
requirements. ',44
While the State Department had decided to wait and see, the military became 
increasingly anxious. The USAF was fully in agreement with the Director of the Office 
of Military Assistance memorandum from the 24 December 1952 on the MAAC D-
43. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 852.000/4-2254, 20 April 1954, 
Spain a Short Economic Review, The Chase National Bank of the City of New York.
44. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1953, 8 January 1953, Chief of Naval Operations to 
Secretary of State.
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3/5a. This document urged an early conclusion of the negotiations. However, this had 
been written before Franco's counterproposal had destroyed hopes for a swift 
conclusion of the talks. The USAF used this outdated document to propose through 
Major-General Haywood S. Han sell that three agreements be signed on 1 February 
1953.45 This attempt was unsuccessful for various reasons. Franco's inspired demands 
during December were one factor, another were logistical problems. Serious shortages 
of military material changed the aim of the aid programs. Originally aid to Spain was 
designed for the defence of Spain’s territory. The revised program was simply to assist 
the development and defenses of the bases. In particular shortage of anti-air equipment 
limited aid to training centres.46
The other problem concerned the use of the bases. On 16 March 1953, the 
American Chargd in Spain, John W. Jones, informed Artajo that the US Government 
wanted to include in the Military Agreements a secret technical annex which would 
allow the US to use the bases in Spain without prior consultation with Spain in case of 
Communist military attack on Europe.47 This was an excellent proposal. After 
discussions about timing of the signing of the three agreements, it had become clear to 
the State Department that Spain was concerned about the perception in Spain of the 
agreements. The demand for prior consultation of the use of bases originated from the 
same desire of Spanish authorities to retain the perception of neutrality and sovereignty 
over foreign policy. By placing this right into a secret annex, Madrid would be able to 
hide it from the public and the US would be satisfied.
On the next day, 17 March, the US reply to Spain's December counter-draft 
was presented. It included the US draft of the Military Facilities Agreement, a covering
45. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1953, 9 January 1953, Haywood S. Hansell, Maj.-General 
USAF to Director, Office Military Assistance.
46. FRUS 1952-54. Vol. VI, 3 February 1953, Acting Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense, 
p. 1906.
47. FRUS 1952-54. Vol. VI, 16 March 1953, Charge Jones to Artajo, p. 1919; also draft NA, Civil 
Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 16 March 1953, Charge Jones to Artajo.
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Knote and a personal letter to the Foreign Minister. The draft was a repetition of the 
American position, avoiding any commitment regarding future aid. It provided clear 
provisions for peacetime and wartime use by the US of Spanish military facilities. 
Furthermore it completely separated the construction of these facilities from the 
development of the military aid program. This was in direct conflict with Spain's draft. 
The covering note claimed that the President’s 1954 budget message to Congress, 
presented on 9 January, contained an estimate for foreign aid which took into account 
potential requirements for aid to Spain. These would be extended to Spain if mutually 
satisfactory agreements were concluded in time. In the personal letter to Artajo, it was 
made clear that the provisions regarding aid to Spain were still based on the 
assumptions mentioned in the 7 October memorandum, ie. that the agreements would 
be completed in time to permit suitable provision for such assistance in the FY 1954. 
This included time required to permit extending previously appropriated funds. 
Nevertheless if time ran out and it was impossible to obligate some of these funds, they 
would be carried over into the next FY with the result that new funds which had to be 
justified by Congress would have to be reduced correspondingly. Consequently the 
longer it took to complete the three agreements, the more difficult it became to justify 
previous provisions for aid to Spain. The Federal Budget and the detailed justification 
for the estimates it contained were under active study and would be presented shortly to 
the President for approval. Thus as indicated in the October memorandum, the time 
factor was essential. This meant that the question who of the two negotiation teams was 
responsible for the time delay arose. The letter not only blamed Spain for the delay but 
also rejected Spain's demands made in December. It was an offensive letter which 
clearly showed that Washington had finally abandoned the wait and see policy and was 
pressing for an answer. Spain's response was awaited anxiously in Washington.
Naturally the Spanish Embassy in Washington was well informed about this. 
Eduardo Propper seemed somewhat reluctant to react while Lequerica seemed willing
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to give in to the harsh treatment by the Americans.48 However, the final decision was 
to be taken in Madrid.
Martin Artajo reacted in a letter, dated 26 March 1953. The contents of the 
American personal letter were to Artajo "of such gravity that they can have 
considerable weight upon the execution of the proposed agreements." The Spanish 
Minister stated that Spain could not in any way be made responsible for the delays in 
the negotiations. He argued that the delays were caused by 1) the decision by the 
former American administration to condition the granting of assistance upon the 
conclusion of a military agreement; that is, the refusal to sign the base agreement 
separately from the other two; 2) the slowness in reacting to the counter-draft by the 
Truman administration because of "the necessity of coordinating the points of view of 
the many interested governmental agencies" that is, to America's wait and see policy; 
and finally 3) the change of the American administration; that is, to Truman's refusal to 
tie down his successor. Artajo tried to intimidate the US negotiators, writing that it 
would be a very serious matter if these complications reduced or delayed the granting 
o f funds necessary for the defence of Spain, since this would weaken the effectiveness 
o f the agreements themselves. He claimed that
"this is precisely the concern which inspired the text of one of the most essential 
paragraphs of the Spanish counterproposal of December 23, 1952... which 
foresaw the necessary and desirable parallelism between the development and 
use of the bases and the strengthening and perfecting of the defensive means of 
the Armed Forces."49 
He also suggested referring from now on to the military facilities agreement as the 
Defense Agreement and thus taking out bad publicity over the use of facilities by i 
making it sound more like a mutual agreement between two equally important nations. 
Negotiations had clearly become unfriendly. One side or the other had to back down to
48. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 24 March 1953, Byington, Memo of Conversation.
49. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol. VI, 27 March 1953, Charge Jones to Department of State, p. 1923.
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avoid further heated exchanges. The Americans had misjudged Spain's reaction, their 
hope of pressuring Spain to give up the desired concessions was shattered. A more 
subtle approach was required.
The situation was so serious that the British Embassy in Washington wrote about 
the possibility that the talks would end without an agreement because Spain seemed to 
have lost interest.50
C.M. Cianfarra of the New York Times wrote that the US had three possibilities 
to deal with Spain's demands. It could drop out and make the communists the sole 
victor in American rapprochement to Spain. The US could increase its aid to Spain, 
something Cianfarra considered political unfeasible. Or the US could keep trying to 
find a compromise through double-talk, hoping Franco would give in.51
On the other hand Spain liberated her trade by reducing import duties for iron 
and steel products by 90% starting 1 March 1953.52 This favored the expanding 
American automobile exports to Spain.
On 26 March, it was suggested to the American Embassy by the State 
Department to reply that the letter by the Charg6, dated 17 March, which resulted in 
the Spanish outcry, had been drafted with the most friendly motive - to share with the 
Spanish Government information regarding more difficult problems confronting the US 
negotiation team. In no way was it meant to assess responsibility for any delays of the 
talks. Washington was retreating. However, at the same time the US could not accept 
the statement that Washington was responsible for delaying the negotiations. Therefore 
the State Department argued that the talks had required considerable time and effort on 
both sides as a direct result of the many important issues and considerations which had 
to be taken into account. The State Department argued that the responsibility for the
50. PRO, FO 371.107687, 23 March 1953, Makina, Washington.
51. Theodore Draper, "The Deal we haven't made with Franco", in Reporter. 26 May 1953, Vol.8.
52. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 452.003/3-853, 8 March 1953, 
Embassy to State Department.
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delay was no one's in particular. It was assessed that further talk on whom to blame for
\
the delays would only waste further time and thus should be avoided by both nations 
until the conclusion of the negotiations.53
Finally, the Embassy in Madrid was advised to send a note that the relationship 
between military aid and base agreements had been made clear in the 19 April 1952 
aide-memoire and the October 1952 note, ie. little or no new appropriations would go 
to Spain until the negotiations were concluded. Washington was not willing to give up 
this link. Nevertheless James Dunn decided against sending such a note after a new 
proposal by Spain had been received in April.
On 23 March 1953, the Department of Defense agreed with the analysis of the 
Department of State concerning the military aid program for FY 1954 to Spain. It was 
made clear that the purpose of this particular aid was to provide equipment to the 
Spanish Forces to assist in the protection of US bases and for training purposes. 
Nevertheless the Department of Defense also made clear that it considered the $85 
million proposed for the FY 1954 as only the first installment. Thus the report by 
JUSMG from 20 August was considered compatible with the later report from October 
1952. If anything, Martin Artajo's outcry had helped to draw the US Departments 
closer together in this matter.
During March 1953 General Hoyt Vandenberg visited Spain and in January and 
April parts of the Sixth Fleet visited Spanish harbours in a friendly gesture. From 9 to 
15 January 1953, 25 Spanish Navy and Air Force officers, including three Rear Admi­
rals, had embarked on the US destroyers Brownson and 'Rimer and later on the carriers 
Midway and Leyte.54 This visit was an expanded version of a similar stay of 16 
Spanish officers aboard American ships during January 1952. The fact that nine more —
officers stayed for a long period and were able to visit, carriers, shows that the US Navy
53. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1953, 10 April 1953, State Department Mr Akers to 
Embassy Madrid.
54. Strategic Plan Division Records, 6th Fleet Annual Report, 20 July 1953, C-in-C 6th Fleet to CNO.
Chapter 12:1953 Final Bargaining
K
had had good experiences with visiting Spanish officers in 1952. One could be hopeful
\
that relations between the two services would spill over to the negotiations.
The military establishment still realized the political complications a treaty with 
Spain might have. On 1 April 1953,. General Gruenther, Chief of Staff of SHAPE 
(Strategic Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that SHAPE was staying out of negotiations with Spain because:
"It carries with it a connotation of withdrawing to the Pyrenees, and we don't 
admit we are going to withdraw any place. We want the people that we work 
with to develop confidence. _
\
The problem that we are facing is basically one of confidence, so that these 
fellows resume normal commercial relations..."
Given Acheson's statement in January, the US still feared an all out attack on 
Europe and if such an invasion took place troops might still have to be withdrawn from 
Central Europe. Gruenther continued "If you give any connotation that there is going to 
be a withdrawal, they [NATO] are not interesteditrihe liberation period."
This put Spain into a strange position in respect to SHAPE. The General said "I 
am not trying to say that Spain doesn't have advantages. I am saying that first of all it is 
not a part of NATO. The reason we stay out of it is that we don’t want to have the 
people of this part of the world thinking of the liberation period." He conceded that 
Spain had a considerable advantage from the Mediterranean standpoint and some value 
to the European, but SHAPE had currently no plans to withdraw to Spain in case of 
military conflict.55
On 17 April, Harold E. Stassen, the Director of the Mutual Security Agency, 
expressed his belief that the USSR-could no longer walk over the NATO forces without 
prior build up. This would give time to the US to prepare for a nuclear attack. Others 
such as Senator Tkft still had skepticism about NATO, at least until the Germans were
55. Executive Sessions o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 1953, 1 April 1953, Chief o f Staff
SHAPE, Washington, 1976/77.
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a full part of it.56 -
Problems during the negotiations between Spain and the US were partly 
alleviated by the arrival on 3 April in Madrid of Ambassador James Dunn, appointed in 
January 1953. MacVeagh's position had became increasingly uncertain, as his goodwill 
towards Spain had led to more demands which the State Department was unwilling to 
grant. Finally the row resulting from John W. Jones' letter to Artajo left MacVeagh's 
staff in Madrid on bad terms with the local authorities. After almost twenty years in the 
State Service Lincoln MacVeagh decided to retire. James Dunn could make a new start.
_ He made his first visit to the Foreign Minister on 6 April. On this occasion Martin 
Artajo stated that despite the speculation by the foreign press that the agreements were 
to be signed soon, he assured the Ambassador that he knew that this was not the case.
The Minister stated that the real difficulty lay in formulating a proper balance between 
granting Spanish bases and provisions for economic and military aid. He vehemently 
defended Spain against a perceived accusation by the US that Madrid had been 
responsible for the delays of the talks. If Washington had hoped that James Dunn's 
appointment would give Spain an honourable chance to back down, they must have 
been disappointed. Artajo was not backing down. Dunn assured the Spanish Minister 
that the US had no intention of blaming either side for the delays.
On 9 April, Dunn presented his credentials to Franco. Franco expressed his 
admiration for General Eisenhower. The Caudillo referred to the current negotiations 
and said that in his original conversation with Admiral Sherman he had expressed 
Spain's desire to enter into an arrangement which would assign Spain a proper role not 
only in the defence of its national territory but also outside its territory in case of Soviet 
aggression. He made it clear that he wanted Spain to align with the West. Nevertheless* 
the role assigned to Spain was conditional on improvements in her economic and 
military situation. During the 50 minutes conversation, the Caudillo claimed that
5 6 . Executive Sessions o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 1953, 17 April 1953, Report by the
Secretary o f  State, and 28 April 1953, Report by the Director Mutual Security Agency, Washington,
1976/77.
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Spain's industry could produce 1,00Q planes annually at costs far below those of other 
European nations. He also regretted the delays of the talks which according to him 
were due to misunderstandings on the part of the US concerning Spain's capabilities to 
contribute to the defence effort and to the increased risks Spain would incur with the 
establishment of US air bases in Spain. Dunn replied that his Government too regretted 
the delays but that with the advent of a new administration it had been necessary to 
reexamine its policy to Spain. According to the Ambassador this had been done and 
Washington had arrived at the conclusion to continue talks based on the 17 March 
communication the one which offended Artajo. Franco was appalled and said that this N 
position was worse than any previous one. In return Dunn pointed out that Washington 
was anxious to be helpful but that there were obvious limitations imposed upon the US 
Government resulting from developments in other parts of the world. Furthermore, the 
Ambassador pointed out that the US Government was reducing expenditure in order to 
balance the budget, an objective which had strong Congressional support.57
Shortly after this conversation, 15 April 1953, James Dunn had a meeting with 
Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s loyal friend. The Spaniard seemed somewhat 
uninformed about the latest developments in the negotiations and repeated old 
arguments put forward by the Spanish negotiators.58
Two days later, 17 April, and exactly one month after the American draft, 
General Vigon handed Kissner the Spanish counter-draft of the military facilities 
agreement. In this counter-draft the Spanish negotiators clearly backed down on some 
of their military demands made earlier. The American harsh policy seemed finally to 
have brought positive results.59 Immediately, Ambassador Dunn recommended 
withholding the note drafted on 26 March, which rejected responsibility for the delays 
and confirming the April and October 1952 communication, at least until there had
57. FRUS 1952-54. Vol. VI, 9 April 1953, Dunn to Department of State, p. 1929.
58. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 15 April 1953, James Dunn, Memo of Conversation.
59. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 20 April 1953, Nash to Secretary of Defense.
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been an opportunity to study the latest Spanish counterproposal, which had come under 
discussion between Vigon and Kissner. The Ambassador suggested to the State 
Department that either he himself, Kissner or Train should go to Washington to discuss 
this newest proposal by the Spanish team with high officials in the capital.60
In the meantime Vigon and Kissner held further talks about the Spanish 
counterproposal, during which the American was able to negotiate some changes 
incorporated in a Spanish redraft on 24 April. Nevertheless even this new document 
still contained two fundamental concepts of the Spanish position which had been 
previously rejected by the US negotiation team. These were firstly the parallel 
development between bases and the aid programs and secondly a military aid program 
designed to equip the Spanish forces adequately to defend all of Spain independently.
Dunn recognized this. Nevertheless, he also pointed out that the concept of 
parallel development in the new Spanish note was only referred to implicitly and 
fortunately left the United States position sufficiently protected so as to avoid legal and 
political complications. Furthermore he said that if the US intended to carry out its 
commitments to Spain as expressed in the "statement of intent" on 7 October 1952, ie. 
"support of Spanish defense efforts... by the provision of assistance to Spain over a 
period of several years", then reasonable military and economic aid had to be provided 
to Spain during this and the following years.61 He wrote: "Should there be any 
intention on the part of the U.S. not to adopt such a premise to the extent possible in 
implementation of the 'statement of intent’, I assume such a decision will have been 
based upon a determination that the U.S. Government does not need bases on Spanish 
territory." He called for approval of the Spanish redraft of the Defense Agreement.
In the meantime in Washington the Department of State argued that to accept the 
military aid program, of such a nature and magnitude as recommended by the JUSMG 
report from 20 August 1952 would require a major policy change. The negotiators had
60. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 29 April 1953, Dunham to Secretary.
61. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 6 May 1953, "US - Spanish Negotiations" for NSC.
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been informed about this in September 1952. The State Department advised that the 
long range planning for US military aid to Spain should be considered in connection 
with the imminent review of all aspects of the negotiations which would take place as 
soon as the new Spanish proposal and the negotiators' comments were received in 
Washington.
The Spanish counter proposal contained some problems which could have been 
solved by the US negotiators in Madrid. Nevertheless, it also indicated that additional 
discussions would not further alter the basic Spanish position regarding aid and US 
obligations in this respect. JUSMG was not in a position to agree to this. The 
negotiations had reached a point at which a decision by Washington, involving a fresh 
look at plans concerning the use of military facilities in wartime and peacetime, as well 
as the parallel development of bases and aid, was required. Accordingly on 30 April 
Ambassador Dunn, General Kissner and Mr Train were instructed to return to 
Washington to participate in a thorough review of the negotiations and the preparation 
o f a paper for presentation to the NSC. The consultations in Washington had started 
earlier but after 4 May they were to include the three important negotiators in Spain, 
the Ambassador and the two heads of the negotiation teams.
On 29 April 1953, John F. Dulles had told the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that the delay of the negotiations with Spain wfas due to complications 
concerning economic aid, equipment for Spain's forces and the military bases. The 
Secretary of State stressed that Spain's expectations as to what they would receive had 
been very high. He claimed that the Spanish negotiation team was asking for $700 
million extended over a period of three or four years. Dulles believed that "that is way 
out of line". Dulles stressed that the air facilities could be duplicated in North Africa 
but that the Navy facilities could not. The Navy facilities in Spain were irreplaceable 
for the US.62 Thus, Dulles favoured new appropriations for Spain during FY 1954 as
62. Executive Sessions o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 1953, 29 April 1953, Report by the
Secretary o f State, Washington, 1976/77.
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well as carrying over the $125 million from FY 1953 to FY 1954. He argued that this 
would be necessary for successful conclusion of the negotiations.63
Ambassador Dunn had informed Franco during early May 1953 that Congress 
had agreed to carry the $125 million credit to Spain through to 1954 and the 
possibilities for future credits and grants during the next FY existed. Other nations had 
given Spain credit facilities. The UK had granted £11 million, Belgium BF 700 million, 
France FF 15 billion and Germany the equivalent of $17 million.64
On 5 May the President Eisenhower presented his foreign aid program for the 
FY 1954 to Congress. Concerning Spain he asked for the carrying over of the 
previously appropriated $125 million as well as adding an additional $10 million in new 
funds for defence and $90 million for military aid. Naturally this was aimed to help the 
negotiations.
On 7 May 1953, Dunn explained to the House of Representatives in Washington 
that the initial delay of the talks had been due to Spain's past neutrality in both World 
W&rs. According to the Ambassador, Spain had wasted six months deciding whether to 
give up that neutrality. He then claimed that Spain had also hoped for a victory in the 
US election by Eisenhower, expecting a better deal and thus further delaying the talks. 
Dunn explained that the US wanted to use military bases in Spain in return for aid. 
Spain on the other hand was afraid of becoming vulnerable in case of war and thus 
wanted enough military and economic aid to guarantee its position during a conflict. 
Ambassador Dunn stated "that one of the elements of Franco's strength is the fact that 
he has kept them out of war [sic.]". He continued, asserting that Franco would need 
some substantial gain to which he could point if he should lose the argument that he had 
successfully defended Spain's sovereignty during the Second World War and could do 
so again during a new conflict. It was clear that the myth Franco had built up
63. FRUS 1952-54. Vol. VI, 26 February 1953, Secretary of State to Embassy Spain, p. 1915.
64. NA, Civil Branch, State Department Decimal File 1950-1954, 852.000/4-2254, 20 April 1954, 
Spain a Short Economic Review, Chase National Bank of the City of New York.
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concerning his diplomatic coup against Hitler was a strong propaganda argument which 
Franco was reluctant to give up.
Nevertheless, Dunn was enough of a realist to see that Spain could not remain 
neutral during a new conflict in Europe but this did not alter the fact that Franco and 
Spain still liked the idea of having the possibility of doing so. Dunn claimed that Franco 
did not ask for defence of the bases by US troops, Spain wanted to defend them. His 
soldiers were good but lacked modem weapons.65
General Matthew B. Ridgway informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
about the Soviet threat to Europe. The USSR and its allied troops in Europe were 
composed of a total of 134 USSR army divisions, 75 satellite army divisions, more than 
15,000 planes (mainly Migl5, stationed on 100 major and 200 second class airfields) 
and over 125 submarines along the coasts. NATO had estimated that it would require 
140 army divisions, 12,300 planes and over 3,000 vessels to check this threat. This 
estimate concerned a long term defence against a Soviet attack. So far NATO had been 
building up its forces from 14 army divisions in 1950, to 20 divisions in 1951 and to a 
total of 91 divisions in 1952. Despite this massive build-up, General Ridgway claimed 
that NATO still lacked sufficient troops.66 However, given these numbers it was very 
likely that NATO forces could delay an attack by the USSR long enough to prepare for 
a nuclear attack in Europe. Under these conditions, Spain was no longer needed to 
cover NATO’s rear but would play an offensive role if bases in Spain could be used to 
freely launch a nuclear attack against the USSR.
C. Tyler Wood, Deputy to the Director for Mutual Security told a House 
Committee in May that the negotiations had advanced encouragingly during the last few 
weeks. Train and Dunn had already been recalled to Washington for last consultations 
and to set the next stage of tactics which was under intensive study at the cabinet level
65. LOC, (82) HFo-3, Selected, 7 May 1953, Establishment o f U.S. Bases in Spain.
66. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 9 May 1953, Mutual Security Act 
of 1953, Washington, 1976/77.
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within the Executive branch. After pressure from the Air Force Department, General 
Kissner joined them in Washington, coming directly from Spain.67
The State Department and Nash, from the Department of Defense, were not 
happy about Kissner returning to Washington for one week. Since December 1952, the 
State Department's policy had been to wait and see if Spain abandoned some of her 
demands. Kissner's return to Washington, while Dunn, Train and MacVeagh were 
already holding talks, would make Madrid realize that a major review of the entire US 
position was taking place. Under these circumstances, it was feared that Spain would 
not accept a reply reconfirming the old US policy. The American negotiators would 
lose their edge as well as having wasted time checking out Spain's real commitment to 
the December 1952 proposal.68 It was another blunder brought about by the 
competition between the different American agencies involved in the talks.
During the meetings held in Washington, a memorandum was being prepared 
for consideration by the National Security Council with the help of Ambassador Dunn, 
General Kissner and Mr Train. The negotiators and the State Department believed that 
the Spanish Government would conclude and carry out a base agreement satisfactory to 
the US if the Executive Branch approved a program of continuous military and 
economic aid to Spain over a period of several years. It was thus estimated that on top 
of the $125 million carried over from the last FY and the new $101 million requested 
by the President, a further $80 million annually or so would have to be appropriated for 
the next three successive years beginning in FY 1955. This would mean a total aid of 
$466 million (FY 1952: $100 million; FY'53: $25; FY'54: $101; FY’55: $80; FY'56: 
$80; FY'57: $80) over a period of four years. The memorandum concluded with a 
reiteration by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the urgent 
importance to US national security of the use of air and naval facilities in Spain.
67. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives: Mutual Security 
Program. Wood, 13 May 1953, Washington.
68. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 7 March 1953, Dunham to John W. Jones, Chargd.
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On 11 May 1953, the Planning Board o f the National Security Council outlined 
eight points o f Spain's importance to US national security. Bases in Spain would 1) 
increase military flexibility in peace and war time; 2) disperse units and thus decrease 
casualties in a sneak attack; 3) provide continuity o f the global base structure; 4) allow  
an expansion o f a counterattack from several bases; 5) help control the Western 
Mediterranean; 6) provide bases for anti-submarine warfare; 7) protect the sea-lanes 
and; finally 8) guarantee over-flight rights.69
On 13 May, Ambassador Dunn, Kissner and Train presented their memorandum 
to the National Security Council. The National Security Council decided (NSC Action 
786) to give the Secretary of Defense authority to further study this proposal. He was 
granted the right to consider compensating savings in other Air Force programs. If he 
was convinced by the arguments presented in the memorandum then he should advise 
the Secretary o f State, who was authorized to proceed with the negotiations after the 
necessary discussions with the Congressional committees had taken place. Furthermore 
Charles Wilson, the Secretary o f Defense, was to report his actions to the next National 
Security Council meeting. The agreements as proposed by the US negotiators were 
generally speaking acceptable to the Council.70
On 19 May, Secretary o f Defense Charles Wilson reported that "after further 
study, I consider that the use of Air and Naval facilities in Spain are o f urgent 
importance to our national security." It was clear that Spanish airbases had been part o f  
U SA F strategic plans for some time and therefore other continental and overseas bases 
had already been eliminated or deferred. To go back on the base plans in Spain would 
have seriously conflicted with USAF plans. The Secretary argued that there was no 
alternative for these bases. According to the instructions o f NSC Action 786, he 
instructed the Secretary of State to continue the negotiations after consultation with the 
appropriate committees o f Congress. Finally he requested the National Security Council
69. FRUS 1952-54. Vol. VI, 11 May 1953, Memo by Planning Board of the NSC, p. 1937.
70. FRUS 1952-54. Vol.VI, 13 May 1953, Memo of Discussion, 144th Meeting of NSC, p. 1939.
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to note that he was asking the Secretary of State to move towards "early" conclusion of 
satisfactory agreements with Spain.71
The next day, 20 May, the National Security Council, meeting in the President's 
Office, noted Wilson's report and following the Secretary of Defense's report, it was 
decided, in Action-795, that "the use of air and naval facilities in Spain are of urgent 
importance to our national security." This action together with the NSC action taken a 
week earlier authorized the State Department to proceed with the negotiations.72 
Negotiations continued with a total of $466 million aid in mind.
N The very same month, James F. Dunn explained to the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee that US aims in Spain were quite simple, if Spain wanted
military and economic aid she had to accept a reversal of her non-alignment policy.
James C. Dunn said: "We feel that this bilateral agreement with the United States may 
be the opening phase of getting Spain back into international cooperation and [this] is 
certainly our purpose".
On 4 June 1953 representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and of 
the Mutual Security Agency talked with the European Subcommittee of the House 
Foreign Relations Committee. The Executive Branch was willing to commit itself for 
an aid period beyond the FY 1954. However it could not force Congress to do the 
same. The risk of Congress not making a financial commitment beyond 1954 and thus 
undermining the whole relationship, meant that the Executive Branch wanted to avoid 
Congressional debate on the issue altogether.73 Senator Knowland was one of the 
Senators on the Foreign Affairs Committee who initially supported the idea of 
establishing the bases through Congressional approval but eventually changed his mind
71. NA, Military Branch, NSC 72 Background Information, 19 May 1953, Report by the Secretary of 
Defense under NSA Action No 786c.
' 72. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 22 May 1953, Negotiating Base Rights with Spain; 5 June
1953, Merchant to General Smith; NA, Military Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 15 February
1954.
73. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 4 June 1953, Report of Meeting with European Consultative
Subcommittee.
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and argued against such a move.74 Congress would have to approve the funds annually 
rather than in one lump sum, thus leaving more freedom in the future. Senator 
Alexander Wiley, generally agreeing to the agreements with Spain, supported the idea 
of allowing Congress flexibility in the future. Senator George agreed that Spain was 
vital to the defence of North Africa and the Middle East but did not favour limitations 
on Congressional appropriations either. In contrast, Senator Fulbright, strongly 
opposed to any alliance with Spain, had proposed a motion to cut the aid to $50 million 
and Senator Green had secondfhim in this motion. However, Fulbright was outnum­
bered, and his motion from the 9 June was defeated five to two.75
Later that month, Mr Wood, Deputy Director of the Mutual Security Agency, 
pointed out that it was important to quickly get the $125 million for FY 1954 to Spain 
and through Congress, as this would be a leverage for the negotiation team. Presumably 
this leverage was needed as Spain wanted to see an early and continuous commitment 
by the US towards the defence of the Peninsula. However, granting aid before the 
agreements were signed was giving up a strong bargaining position.
On 9 June the representatives of the Departments talked to the corresponding 
Committees of the Senate. Senator Bridges, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, was also briefed on the negotiations. Frank C. Nash, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, made the most revealing statements. He started talking about 
visits to Spanish ports, then stressed that Spain had no Communist threat like France or 
Italy and the costs of constructions in Spain were low because there was not going to be 
any import tax for construction or maintenance supplies, and the land required would 
hardly cost anything. He saw that the Defense Agreement might pose some problems 
for Spain and could further delay the talks because of Spain's attempt to gain a stronger 
commitment from the US and due to the secret agreement within the Defense
74. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 22 June 1953, R.K. Scott to General Smith.
75. Executive Sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee. 1953, 10 June 1953, Mutual Security Act, 
Washington, 1976/77, also in LOC, (83) SFo, 1000, No. 10, 10 June 1953, MSA.
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Agreement.76
The Assistant Secretary made it clear that bases in Spain were desirable because 
bases in Morocco, which might have been used for similar military purposes, had 
limitations due to political instability. He confirmed that Rota, Cadiz and four other 
bases were already in the advanced stage of planning. He estimated that economic 
assistance would generate savings for the base costs of roughly $55 million over four 
years. Thus the total costs would be around $760 million over four years ($351 million 
military bases +  $466 aid - $55 savings = $762 million).
Nash also pointed out that he believed that Spain was not too interested in the 
actual dollar amounts but simply wanted to know if the US was willing to enter an 
honest relationship, or was just buying land in Spain. This implied a commitment of 
troops and airplanes to secure bases and anti-mine and anti-submarine assistance to 
keep Spanish ports open.
Nash summed up the aims of the American armed forces. The Army wanted 
geographical sites of bases in Spain as well as "getting Spain on the right side." The 
Navy needed Rota as well as British Gibraltar because "we [the US Armed Forces] 
want to have our hand in there, too." Rota would increase US Navy independence 
during operations in the Mediterranean.
More revealingly, Nash pointed out that "if we have that in hand [the three 
agreements] by virtue of the execution of an agreement with Spain, in my judgment, 
my personal judgment, it will have a strong effect indeed in pushing the progress of the 
consummation of the EDC [European Defence Council]." Apart from the strategic 
considerations, Spain fulfilled the function of a possible threat to French opposition to 
US plans for the defence of Central Europe. Following the outbreak of the Korean war, 
America had begun pressing for a European integrated force under a centralized 
command which was to include German troops. This would have eased pressure on the 
US defence budget. France, feeling the impact of the Korean war less and fearing
76. LOC, (82) HFo-3 Selected, 4 June 1953, Negotiations for US Bases in Spain.
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Germany's remilitarization more, countered with a plan, the Pleven Plan. It called for 
small national contingents integrated in a unified European army with a common budget 
and supranational control. Initially Washington feared that this was not more than an at­
tempt to delay German remilitarization, thus the State Department wanted to continue 
pressure on France. Spain, by giving the US an alternative to the Pleven Plan and a 
possibility to withdraw from France, fulfilled this function. Nash continued, "he 
[Adenauer] pointed out that [if] the United States was going ahead with these 
negotiations with Spain... [then] the United States might be forced to contemplate a 
reappraisal of its strategy in Europe." Finally Nash made clear what he believed Spain 
apportioned to US strategy in European politics: "I think it is an important ace in the 
hole in this important poker game that we are playing now, and I think if we had that 
ace in the hole we would have a better negotiating position." A better negotiating 
position in Europe would help US policies. However, even if the talks with Spain failed 
to push France towards accepting the integration of a remilitarized Germany into the 
NATO, the US would have at least gained another ally.77
77. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 1953, 9 June 1953, Frank C. Nash,
Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, 1976/77; and LOC, (83) SFo, 1000, No. 10, 9 June 1953.
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On 12 June 1953 the consultatiorfwith Congress were concluded and the 
American negotiation teams were informed that they would receive instructions shortly. 
In the meantime they were authorized to inform the Spanish Government that the 
Executive Branch had requested another $101 million. Given the complications in 
March this must have come as a great relief to Spain.
While these developments took place, a last outcry against the proposed^ 
agreements came from the US Army. The Army Chief of Staff had realized that due to 
the political climate in Europe, Spain could only be integrated into NATO_after 
considerable complications had been overcome. The reason for this was both French 
and British opposition. In May some administrators in the military establishment started 
arguing that military command structures outside NATO were undesirable. If political 
aspects really overruled military ones, then Spain should be included in NATO 
instead of entering bilateral agreements.1
Brigadier-General Bergquist from the US Army argued that "no steps should be 
taken by us which would endanger, or even delay, attainment of full Spanish 
participation in NATO." The Army General claimed that the proposed organization 
discussed in Madrid did not dovetail with existing military organizations in Western 
Europe, in particular not with the Mutual Security Agency organization. The General 
concluded that entering the agreements was therefore not in the interest of the US.2
This ran counter to Spain's interests. Bergquist pointed towards a speech held 
by the Spanish Lieutenant-General Martmez Campos, before top military experts in 
Spain, including General Vigon, during which he had claimed that Spain should join the 
Western Defence slowly and with dignity. This was an indicatioirthat Spain preferred a ..
1. NA, Military Branch, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 Spain 1951-52, 8 June 1953 Discussion 
on U.S. Military Command Structure in Spain, letter from 26 May 1953 by Brig.-General E.C. 
Bergquist, Chief Army Section.
2. NA, Military Branch, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 Spain 1951-52, 26 May 1953,
Bergquist to Maj.-Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, USA. .
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bilateral agreement before rushing into NATO.3
As agreed after Congressional consultation, on 20 June 1953, instructions were 
sent to the American Embassy in Spain to proceed with the negotiations.
The instructions contained changes in the wording of the base agreement. The more 
important ones were the insertion in Article 1 of necessary safeguards regarding the 
furnishing of military equipment and the deletion of a phrase which might have implied 
Spanish priority for military end-item aid over NATO. The American Embassy was 
also told that Spain should be informed that the total aid envisaged by the US did not 
exceed $466 million and was subject to future Congressional appropriation.
Despite authorizing the Ambassador to proceed with the negotiations, he was 
told that the signing of the agreements depended on obtaining further legislative 
authority. Washington was considering whether to conclude the agreements in the form 
of an executive agreement without prior Congressional authorization or in the form of a 
treaty. One view was that the agreement, because of its importance and duration, had to 
be submitted to Congress as a treaty. Another was that the abandonment of the 
executive agreement process, as a general pattern, would seriously jeopardize most of 
the current base rights with other countries and critically affect the American defence 
position. In either case, congressional consultation was required.
The American Embassy in Madrid wanted to defer advising the Spaniards about 
the possible necessity of obtaining further congressional authorization because of the 
adverse effect this might have on the negotiations at such a late stage. The last time 
Spain had been informed about a similar problem, in a personal letter to Artajo on 17 
March, the progress of the talks was seriously endangered by the Spanish Minister's 
defiant reply. Washington agreed to this suggestion by the Embassy and Spain was not 
informed about the legal complications. .
In the meantime, the economic teams of the two countries discussed future
3. NA, Military Branch, Army Chief of Staff Decimal File 091 Spain 1951-52, 23 March 1953, 
Campos speech. _   ^
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credits of between $200-400 million. This credit was not only meant for military 
installations but also for economic aid and to improve Spain's infrastructure. In return 
the Spanish Government was willing to drop the strict 25% limitations on foreign 
capital for one which allowed foreign investors to hold control over 45-50% of Spanish 
companies.
Train and Arguelles met on 2 July. The next day they were joined by General 
Kissner. The Spanish team proposed to split the already'appropriated funds as follows: 
the newly appropriated $101 million were to be divided into $91 million military aid 
and $10 million economic aid; the $125 million carried over from the last fiscal year
N
was to be split similarly into $37 million and $88 million.
Overall, Arguelles felt that more economic aid was required. In this context, he 
made it clear that he did not yet understand the actual procedure of he construction of 
the bases but he wanted the Spanish Government to participate in the project. More 
importantly though, he pointed out that he did not fully comprehend some of the facts 
which General Kissner had pointed out during the discussions but he was sure that top 
Spanish officials would. This was a reference to the legal restraiiiunder which the 
American Executive was conducting the negotiations in regard to the future 
appropriation of funds. As agreed in Washington, the American negotiators were not to 
disclose these financial limitations and therefore some of the explanations given had 
been intentionally vague.4
The problem was being addressed in Washington. On 9 July 1953, John F.
Dulles had a conversation with Congressional leaders. It concerned the question of 
Congressional authorization for the Spanish and other base agreements. Again the 
question posed was whether the US should adopt the form of executive agreements or 
treaties concerning the use of foreign military facilities. The latter required 
Congressional approval by 2/3, the former did not.
4. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 3 July 1953, Memorandum of Meeting, 3 July 1953, 
Arguelles - Train - Kissner.
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Senator Know land, who had become the mentor in Congress for the 
appropriation of the funds, approved that the President could enter agreements without 
additional legislation, particularly as future commitment for funds was subject to 
congressional appropriation anyway. The issue was brought up again in a meeting with 
eight other Senators and four Representatives later in July. There were no dissenting 
points of view.5 Evidently the view of those present was that past procedures with 
respect to base agreements could be appropriately continued. However, some Senators 
pointed out that future commitments were subject to Congressional appropriations and 
neither they nor Congress could guarantee these at the time. Furthermore, Senator 
Saltonstadt said that the actual construction of bases was also going to be subject to 
approval by the Armed Services Committee. Overall, the conversation made it clear to 
Dulles and the President that they did not require Congressional support to sign the 
agreements. The Secretary of State informed the Senators that the negotiations would 
proceed accordingly and that the appropriate committees of Congress were going to be 
advised on the negotiations.6 On 15 July the President officially approved the course 
agreed with Congressional leaders.
The President, his legal advisors, the Attorney General and the State 
Department all realized that future legislative appropriations were required for the 
funds. For the Executive the question remained whether to inform Spain about this legal 
complication or not. The State Department favoured disclosure of the fact to Spain. 
However, problems arose in the Department of Defense. On this issue, the Department 
of the Air Force favoured a policy of secrecy. This would have secured the agreements 
with less complication but might have led to severe strain on relations with Spain if 
Congress refused to appropriate the necessary funds. The other services wanted to 
disclose the restrain on the Executive. It was only after Frank Nash overruled the Air
5. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 15 July 1953, W.K. Scott to Merchant.
6. JFD Papers, Herter Collection, Box 1,14 July 1953, also in NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 15 
February 1954.
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Force that it was decided to go ahead and inform the Spanish negotiators of this legal 
complication.7
The fact that no further legislative approval of the base agreements was required 
did not mean that Congress fully supported the agreements with Spain. It only meant 
that for the time being Congress was sidelined. Only future appropriation of funds were 
still controlled by the legislative and these were certain as Congress was still divided 
between those who favoured Spain's inclusion into the western defence structure and 
those opposing it.
Senator McCarran (Democrat/Nevada) continued his crusade for Spain: "We 
need Spain and Spain needs us. We cannot afford to dilly-dally." and "The present 
Spanish Government is violently opposed to communism. So are we... Let us lend aid 
to those who will aid us in the crucial hour." McCarran explained unfriendly US - 
Spanish relations up to 1950 a misunderstanding. He argued that Spain really had 
been a neutral nation during the world war, even supporting the Allies during the North 
African invasion. He argued that only the Soviet propaganda had labeled her pro-Axis. 
Therefore, he suggested that "there should be an immediate agreement" with Spain as 
"communis[m's] enemies are our allies."
Representative Dewey Short (Republican/Missouri) supported McCarran. He 
pointed to 4,000 pilots who sought refuge in Spain during the war and were released to 
"fight another day". He believed that Spain added valuable manpower to the West. 
Furthermore he claimed: "Our aid to Greece and Ttirkey... is obviously intended to 
safeguard the eastern doors to the Mediterranean. Common sense demands similar 
attention to the western door, to which Spain holds the key." 8
Senator Owen Brewster (Republican/Maine) argued along the same lines 
stressing Spain's past: "The Franco regime is the one government in all the world 
which has been successful thus far in dealing with communism and is least likely to
7. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 22 June 1953, Dunham to MacVeagh.
8. "Spain moves into the Defense Picture", in Congressional Divest. March 1953.
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succumb to its blandishments or its dominations". He therefore advocated economic aid 
to Spain as this was the best way to stop the spread of Communism.
Senator Hickenlooper expressed his belief that Spain was the only sure thing the 
US had in Europe in case of war with the USSR. However, Spain had received little by 
June 1953 and yet, according to Hickenlooper, had guaranteed a lot.9 He also asserted 
that
"for every dollar we spend in Spain, we will get more ultimate long-range 
protection than [in] any other place in Europe. That isn't because of the Spanish 
Government, necessarily, but it is because of the geographical location of the 
place, and at least the present determination of the Spanish Government to resist 
to the last ditch the Communists."
The Senator upheld that Spain had a good credit record as reflected in the payments 
concerning the takeover of Telefonica.10
Others simply saw the US policy as a necessity and rather then supporting it, 
tried simply to justify it. Representative Leon H. Gavin (Republican/Pennsylvania) 
said: "If we ever get into a brawl... I want to be certain that Tito is on our side. But if 
we join as partners with Tito, why not with Franco?"
Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat/Montana) simply claimed that Spain was a 
purely military issue and not a political one and as Generals Eisenhower, Bradley and 
Ridgway, all military experts, stressed Spain's importance, the issue was settled for 
Mansfield.11
Not all were convinced. Many Senators strongly opposed a deal with Spain. 
Representative Emanuel Celler (Democrat/NY) argued: "We cannot subscribe to the
9. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1952.. 9 June 1953, Washington, 
1976/77.
10. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1952. 10 June 1953, Mutual 
Security Act, Washington, 1976/77
11. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1953. 9 June 1953, Washington, 
1976/77.
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non sequitc/r that an enemy of an enemy is a Mend. Must Uncle Sam love Franco 
because both hate Russia?" Celler then made the interesting point that:
"by no stretch of the imagination would Franco Spain throw its lot in with the 
Russian cause. No pact of ours need shape Spain's policy in that direction. It is 
already shaped. The word 'welcome' would be on the Spanish mat to American 
aviators. There is no need to buy that welcome."
However, the Spanish mat for the US with its 'welcome' on it, was small, dirty 
and, without substantial investment, useless. Spanish airfields were too small, so small 
that not all US planes were able to land there. Thus before aviators could use facilities, 
Spain had to have appropriate airfields, a modem communication system and a decent 
transportation network to supply a modem army. This required US economic aid.
Was Emmanuel Celler wrong when he said that Franco would never join the 
USSR side? As long as the USSR was not to pose a threat to the survival of Spain, 
Franco had no desire for relations with the USSR. However, if Soviet Divisions 
overran Germany and France and Soviet troops were concentrated along the Pyrenees , 
then Franco might have sold out base rights to the Soviets for a guarantee of his 
position in Spain. It is even likely that he would have explained his anti-communist 
policy as being forced upon him with oil embargoes by the West. The Blue Division 
would have become part of a western conspiracy against the USSR forced upon Spain. 
Franco would highlight his closeness to Hitler as long as the Hitler - Stalin pact was in 
force. The Caudillo could further claim that once Hitler broke it, Franco moved away 
from Germany, a clear sign that Spain's sympathy lay with the USSR first and 
foremost, then with Fascism and always against the capitalist states of the Wfest. Franco 
would have tried to rewrite his own history as well as offering to close the Strait of Gi­
braltar in return for his survival. A second set of lies would have formed a new Franco 
myth.
Representative Celler was not the only one in Congress who was unconvinced 
by the negotiations. Senator Herbert H. Lehman (Democrat/NY) argued against US - 
Spanish agreements from a simple ideological standpoint. With such an agreement, he
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argued, "We are saying to the world that we are willing to support Fascist nations, 
nations which have disregarded and repudiated all their obligations to humanity." 
Furthermore, he drew attention to the fact that an alliance with Spain gave the USSR 
propaganda material and was strongly opposed by European allies.12
Lehman was supported by Representative Chet Holifield (Democrat/California), 
who said: "Until Spain changes her robes of dictatorship for garments of freedom, we 
cannot, we must not feed the flames of Soviet propaganda by courting this Fascist 
regime." For Holifield the US was not only fighting communism but all totalitarian 
regimes including Spain.13
Representative Jacob Javits (Republican/NY) said that an agreement with Spain 
would give the impression that the US would withdraw behind the Pyrenees in case of 
Soviet attack and r an counter to NATO members'interests. Furthermore, Javits pointed 
out that Spain's economy stood for everything the US tried to avoid, regulated trade, 
centralized planning and an unfree market.
Representative John Kee (Democrat/West Virginia) supported this with the 
example of economic regulations concerning oil. Foreign oil trade was allowed to 
provide for only a maximum of 40%, the remaining 60% had to be provided by Spain’s 
oil companies.
Nevertheless, attempts to make cooperation with Spain more difficult were 
defeated in Congress. Senator Fulbright's attempt, supported by Senator Tobey, to cut 
aid to Spain from $125 million to $50 million was defeated in the Senate because some, 
such as Senator Mansfield, greatly valued Spain's strategic importance.14
It became apparent to the negotiators at this critical phase that the effect of 
congressional action concerning the proposed $226 million on the foreign aid
12. "Spain moves into the Defense Picture", in Congressional Digest. March 1953
13. "Spain moves into the Defense Picture", in Congressional Digest. March 1953.
14. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign relations Committee 1953. 9 June 1953, Washington, 
1976/77.
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appropriation for Spain during FY 1954 was a crucial factor. Ambassador Dunn cabled 
on 29 July: "if Spain does not get the $226 million or very near that amount, the 
department should consider the probability of a complete breakdown of the 
negotiations."
Senator McCarren and Senator Ferguson took opposite sides on this issue on 3 
August 1953. Senator Ferguson indicated that the $125 million for Spain appropriated 
for the FY 1953 would be carried over by Congress but it was very likely that the $101 
million in new funds, recommended by the Executive Branch for Spain, might have 
borne a proportional share of the over-all congressional cut in foreign aid funds for FY
1954. McCarren vehemently opposed this. Subsequently on 1 September the Depart­
ments of Defense and State were informed and welcomed the fact that the $10 million 
economic and $91 million military aid originally proposed for Spain would be retained 
without any reduction.
Other supporters of close Spanish - American relations were former ambassador 
Charlton Hayes, who pointed to strong cultural links between Spain arid American 
nations. Dr. Sidney Sufrin who explained the economic benefits for both nations of an 
agreement. Dean Acheson, on the other hand, opposed close relations until Spain 
loosened her grip on freedom, liberty and its economy.15
British opposition against the agreements was by now silent, only the Socialists 
and trade unions opposed US policies internationally. France and Italy faced internal 
problems and had to accept the new American initiatives in Spain. This gave the 
Eisenhower administration a freer hand in Spain.
Indeed by June 1953 Spain had resumed military contact with Western Europe. 
Military missions to Spain arrived from Britain under Air Commander John 
Fressanges, from France under General Goisland, from Italy, Germany and Belgium. 
The Spanish headquarters of Allied Emergency Forces was established in Madrid. 
French observers were at manoeuvres at Navarra. France and Spain had even entered
15. "Spain moves into the Defense Picture", in Congressional Digest. March 1953.
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talks concerning allocation of French troops in sectors of Spain's defence. It was 
established that in case of an attack on Europe, Spain would defend the Pyrenees, allow 
French African troops to use Spanish ports, French airplanes to use Spanish airports 
and French troops to pass through Spain. France even accepted that French troops 
seeking refuge in Spain would operate under Franco's and not NATO command.16 All 
this from the country which had sent planes to the Second Republic.
Many more countries had signed Treaties of Friendship with Spain, these 
included a block of four Latin American countries, Nationalist China, Liberia and 
Iraq.17 In a gesture of benevolence, the Japanese crown prince visited Spain during late 
June.18
In Britain, ever since the Spanish military attachd had expressed interest in 
British military equipment (above all vehicles, Spitfires, Seafires and plane engines), 
the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Supply wanted to relax trade restrictions.
The revision of these had been going on since late 1952.19 One day after the 
agreements between Spain and the US were signed, the Joint War Plans Committee 
met. It was decided that the agreements pushed the UK to revise its trade policy and 
abandon coordination with France.20 During November, the Cabinet decided to relax 
export restriction to Spain.21
Spain's Catholic opposition to the improving relations with the US wajf silenced 
by the Spanish treaty with the Vatican, 27 August 1953.22 Only complications between
16. "Spain: citadel for NATO", in UN World. June 1953, vol.7.
17. BFSP 1952. Vol.159, p.600/603; and BFSP 1953. Vol.160, p.626/628; for Iraq BFSP 1951.
Vol. 158, p.834.
18. PRO, FO 371.107669, 8 July 1953, Monthly Political Summary, June 1953.
19. PRO, FO 371.107682, 18 November 1993, FO Minute, G.P. Young; DEFE 7.840, 19 June 1953,.
20. PRO, DEFE 7.840, 29 September 1953, Extract from JWPC Meeting, 29 September 1953; 20 
October 1953, Memorandum by the Ministry o f Defence.
21. PRO, DEFE 7.840, 5 December 1953, Foreign Office.
2 2 . BFSP 1953. Vol. 160, p.698
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Madrid and Washington delayed the signing.
Final discussions were held in Wishington. Since the Armed Service 
Committee, which still had to approve the base construction, had not been previously 
consulted, arrangements were made to do so. Mr Smart, Clerk of the House Armed 
Services Committee, was briefed on 20 July 1953 by representatives of the 
Departments of Defense and State. Following this the Committee itself was briefed a 
week later.
One day earlier, on 26 July, the Spanish counter-draft of the Defence 
Agreement was received by Kissner's team in Madrid. It contained nine minor changes 
which the US negotiators in Spain approved and others which were not acceptable and 
had to be addressed in Washington.
Spain wanted, by implication only, to make the authorization of the use of 
military facilities in Spain dependent on the fulfillment of the US aid program, a 
watered down version of the "parallel development". Furthermore, Spain wanted to 
authorize the use of Spanish facilities by US forces for the "effective air defence of 
Spain". This latter indirectly implied a US guarantee of Spanish security. Neither of 
these two changes were acceptable to either the US negotiations teams or Washington. 
Spain also wanted to eliminate a clause inserted by the US which made future aid 
dependent on Congressional appropriations. Washington also decided to keep this 
clause so that the US position would be legally acceptable.
Another change referred to Spain's case "as in the case of other friendly 
nations", this implied Spain's equivalence with other NATO nations. The US 
negotiators had agreed to this at one time, but had eliminated it from the US draft on 20 
June because it could be argued that, in this context, it implied that NATO was not 
given priority in military end-items over Spain. The Spaniards wanted the clause to be 
reinserted. They were worried that its omission might imply some sort of political 
discrimination against Spain. Washington only reluctantly agreed to reinsert this phrase 
in the interest of early success of the negotiations.
On 29 July 1953 a telegram was sent from Washington to Madrid which
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included the reaction of the administration to Spain's counter-draft and was to be 
submitted to the Spanish cabinet before their meeting on 11 August. It agreed to all 
Spanish demands apart from 1) implied parallel development Bases- Aid Program and 
2) indirect obligation by US to use bases in defence of Spain. General Kissner who 
received it realized that it was not properly marked with the official "USNEG" and thus 
was not an official instruction for him. The Charg6 John W. Jones believed that this 
was due to a clerical error and was-indeed a "USNEG" paper. The matter was further 
complicated due to Ambassador Dunn having an operation and having to spenJ four 
days in hospital.23 Kissner decided not to follow the instructions until Jones had 
confirmation that the telegram was indeed a "USNEG" document and even then he did 
so against his personal judgement.24
By August 1953, the Base agreement had two phrases left which were 
incomplete and some changes had been suggested by Spain in the Technical Annex. The 
military aid agreement had only one minor complication left. The economic aid 
agreement was acceptable to both parties and Washington still had to consider Spain's 
counterproposal concerning taxes on construction imports.25
The counter-draft by the Spanish negotiators dispelled speculation by Western 
Europe that the signing of the agreements was eminent.26
In a meeting held on 11 August, the Spanish Cabinet considered the agreements 
as proposed by the US. They decided to reject the latest US counterproposal and made 
further minor changes in the texts. Consequently, in a meeting with General Vigon, 
Kissner was able to negotiate restoration of certain American proposals. Afterwards, 
Vigon was able to clear theses changes with Franco. In order to consider the latest
23. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 28 July 1953, Dunn to Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant 
Secretary of State.
24. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 19 August 1953, John W. Jones to William Dunham.
25. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 11 August 1953, Dunham "Status of Nego with Spain".
26. PRO, FO 371.107686, 24 July 1953, Balfour, Madrid.
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Spanish revision, General Kissner flew to Washington on 23 August 1953.
On 27/28 August the Ambassador in Madrid saw Artajo who handed him a 
personal letter from General Franco to President Eisenhower.27 James Dunn took this 
letter personally to Washington on 30 August. In the letter Franco expressed his 
concern over the way in which the negotiations were developing. He considered that 
they were descending to an inappropriate level and that their slowness might create an 
- atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion. According to the Spanish dictator, American 
negotiators seemed to have been more interested in the texts of the technical agreements 
which "refer to details which are of interest to the US but do not specify reciprocally 
the detailed provisions affecting Spanish aid." Franco wrote that the whole structure of 
the agreements "will not be completed until, at the proper moment, there is added to it 
the appropriate annex concerning the details of American aid towards the equipping of 
our armies." The dictator was very much fearing the destruction of Spanish towns in 
case of war. He believed that the US had not shown proper interest in Spain's defence 
preparations and urged Eisenhower to help Spain defend herself against aerial 
attacks.28 It was quite apparent from his letter that General Franco aimed for early 
delivery of equipment for Spain's aerial defence. Nevertheless, he did not at this stage 
insist on an annex setting forth the precise details of US military assistance.
James Dunn had been informed through Artajo, on 28 August, that Franco 
feared that the talks were being delayed by a group trying to block the arrangements or 
alternatively, that Franco feared that the US Government mistrusted Spain's 
commitment. Nevertheless it was clear that the final stage of the negotiations was 
reached.29 _
In Washington, the question was raised which authority would be in charge of
27. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 31 August 1953, Dunn to Secretary of State.
28. FRUS 1952-54. Vol. VI, 22 August 1953, Franco to Eisenhower, p. 1950.
29. NA, Military Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 15 February 1954, also FRUS 1952-54. Vol.VI, 
31 August 1953, Dunn to Secretary of State.
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the construction of the bases in Spain. The Department of Defense recommended in a
\
letter, 4 August, to the State Department that USAF and not CINCEUR (Commander 
in Chief Europe) as in normal procedure, should have authority over the construction of 
the bases. This was done because it was assumed that it provided for a better 
coordination on the American side. The arrangement also made it easier to cooperate 
with the Spanish authorities and above all it avoided direct clashes with the NATO 
structure.30 After further consultation, the proposal was accepted on 15 August.
After consultation with the Secretary of State, Ambassador Dunn flew to Denver 
on 5 September to see the President. There Dunn delivered Franco's letter to General 
Eisenhower together with a draft reply to the letter concurred with the Defense and 
State Department. The reply, as later approved by the President, stated that he shared 
Franco's regret over the delay of the talks caused by the necessity to hold discussions in 
great detail. However, he claimed that this should not give rise to mistrust or suspicion. 
Many technical details in the negotiations arose from legislative practices in the US.
The President informed Franco that US aid to Spain would give priority to military 
end-items but these could not equip Spain's land force more than the draft Defense 
Agreement allowed. Eisenhower confirmed that discussions would go forward 
regarding the programs covering military and economic aid. He hoped that Ambassador 
Dunn, taking back to Madrid the last instructions, would be able to conclude all the 
agreements without further delay. The American head of state stressed the importance 
of Spain's air defence requirements and the fact that the US was aware of these. He 
tried to dismiss Franco's fears about the safety of Spanish cities.31
Before their return to Madrid, Ambassador Dunn and General Kissner attended 
a conference over the wording of the texts and took with them their instructions 
concerning final US changes in the Mutual Defense Agreement, the Technical
30. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol. VI, 4 August 1953, Deputy Undersecretary of State Matthews to Deputy 
Secretary of State Kyes, p. 1948.
31. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol. VI, 3 September 1953, Eisenhower to Franco, p. 1955.
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Agreement and schedules and the Tfcx annex together with authorization to conclude 
these agreements when they believed they had obtained the best position possible.
Concerning the Defense Agreement, Dunn was instructed to seek changes in the 
controversial wording of two paragraphs of Article I. Nevertheless, he was given the 
authority to accept the Spanish formulation if the Spaniards remained adamant. Finally, 
the Ambassador was to deliver a confidential note to the Spanish Government which 
guaranteed, in connection with Article I of the Defense Agreement, a total aid program 
in the amount of $466 million over a period of several years.
The last differences were ironed out in a series of meetings between the Spanish 
Foreign minister and the American Ambassador to Spain. The first of these took place 
on 10 September 1953 at the Club Marftimo of Bilbao. The meeting, which was to start 
at 11.00 am was delayed because Artajo, arriving from San Sebastian, was more than 
half an hour late. It lasted until 3.15 pm by which time the two sides had almost settled 
the defence agreement.32
In order to avoid a similar mishap by the Spanish Minister, the next meeting 
was held in San Sebastian on 17 September 1953. It was scheduled to start at 5.00 pm. 
Arriving by car from Madrid, Ambassador Dunn left with plenty of time and arrived by
2.00 pm, three hours early. During 75 minutes most complications in the other two 
agreements were solved and only minor discussions had to take place.33
Shortly afterwards the appropriate Congressional Committees were informed. 
Ambassador Dunn reported on 14 September that he and the Spanish Foreign Minister 
had settled the Defense Agreement. One week later the other three documents, the 
Economic Aid Agreement, the Military Agreement and the Technical Schedules, were 
completed.34 These last three presented little difficulties. ___
32. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 15 September 1953, Memo "Meeting in Bilbao, 10 
September, between Dunn and Artajo".
33. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 17 September 1953, Memo "Meeting in San Sebastian on 
September 17 between Dunn and Artajo".
34. NA, Civil Branch, Lot Files 59D108, 26 September 1953, "Details of Spanish Base Negotiations"
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As the signature with Spain was only days away, the Chief of Naval Operations 
argued that Spain was ideal for the Sixth Fleet's headquarters. He argued that France 
would object to the use of their facilities and Italy would be associated with political 
complications. The area around Cadiz was the best possible solution.35
The US could by now offer Spain $75 for economic and $50 million for military 
aid during the FY 1953. During the FY 1954 Spain could expect $91 million in military 
aid and $10 million in other aid.36 Wilson, Secretary of Defense, informed the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff that a total of $141 million would be available for the Mutual Defense 
Agreement Material and Training Programs for Spain, ie. $50 for FY 1953 and the full 
$91 million for FY 1954.37 On 17 September Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
recommend a division of the initial $141 million military aid between the three 
services.38
Two days before the signing of the agreements, Dunn confirmed to Artajo that 
the US was planning to spend$465 million in Spain, of which $226 million had already 
been appropriated by Congress.39 The $465 million would be split $390 million in base 
construction costs and military aid and $75 million in economic aid. The $226 million 
had been appropriated in three stages $100 million, $25 million and $101 million and 
wa> to cover all economic aid, base costs and military aid during the first two years. 
The rest of the money, at least $239 million, could be either appropriated by the next 
Congress for future FY or otherwise the Executive could make these funds available 
through the Department of Defense allocations for the armed forces overseas base
35. NA, Military branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 12 September 
1953, Memo Chief Naval Operations to JCS.
36. NA Military branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1953, 15 September 1953, N.E. Halaby Deputy Secretary of 
Defense to Secretary of Defence.
37. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1953, 17 September 1953, C.ErWilson to JCS.
38. Watson, Robert J., The JCS and National Policy 1953-1954. Washington, 1986, p.295.
39. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol. VI, 24 September 1953, Dunn to Artajo, p. 1957.
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programs or alternatively through the approval by the President of funds under the 
Mutual Security Act for Spain. Thus the Americans were able to guarantee the aid to 
Spain without causing legal complications.
There was a last minute fear in the State Department that the wording in the 
Defense Agreement "to cooperate with the Spanish air force in air defense" committed 
US forces to Spain's air defence. This would have required Senate ratification. Bon- 
bright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, argued that the insert "in air defense" 
should be taken out. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense was of the opinion that 
this was not needed, as no implication of military support for Spain had been made. 
On 25 September the Secretary of State decided that the Department of Defense 
analysis was to prevail. Cooperation did not necessarily mean military commitment 
because the USAF would have the option of removing its personnel from Spain in the 
event of a military action in which it did not wish to become involved. Thus 
cooperation would not commit US soldiers. Military cooperation with Spain was 
obviously very likely but certainly not mandatory. It was a legal and not a strategic 
matter.40
In July 1954, after the agreements had been signed, Harold Stassen, Director 
Foreign Operations Administration made it clear that Spain could not be defended 
without defending the US air bases and vice versa. This removed the legal possibility to 
remove troops and planes from Spain in order to avoid defending Spain in a crisis 
which Washington did not want to get involved. Thus Spain had de facto received the 
final commitment by the US to defend her territory in case of being attacked.41 The 
Executive, on the other hand, had bypassed Congress and indirectly committed 
American forces to the defence of a foreign nation.
This was done because the Department of Defense had argued that any changes
40. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol. VI, 25 September 1953, Memo Secretary of State to Bonbright, p. 1959.
41. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1954. 8 July 1954, Harold E. 
Stassen, Washington, 1976/77.
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would have further delayed and even jeopardized the conclusion of the agreements, 
planned for 26 September 1953, and thus had to be avoided.42
On the last day before the agreements were signed, the President had to give his 
final approval. On 25 September, Harold Stassen asked the President to give the green 
light under the Mutual Security Act 1951 which made it necessary in this case that the 
President considered it essential that aid to Spain "will strengthen the security of the 
United States and promote world peace." This was required because it was possible that 
Mutual Security funds would have to be extended to Spain if Congress refused to 
appropriate funds in future FY. On the very same day Eisenhower did so43 and John F. 
Dulles sent a telegram to Ambassador Dunn instructing him to sign the Defense, 
Technical, and Economic Aid Agreement on behalf of the Government of the United 
State of America. General Kissner had already been authorized by the Deputy Secretary 
o f Defense Keyes on 5 September to sign the four subsidiary Technical Schedules of the 
Technical Agreement.
One vital overall question remains for historians to answer. Why was there such 
a long delay between Sherman's visit and the signing of the agreements?
Constantine Brown reported in the Evening Star, October 1952, that 
negotiations "are about to be completed" and "there have never been any serious 
differences." He was of course wrong on both accounts. Likewise Camille Cianfarra of 
the New York Times wrote 3 November 1952 that negotiations would soon be 
concluded. Unlike the Evening Star, he pointed out that delays had been due to Spain's 
army which held an important position in Spain and had interest in end-item like guns 
and tanks. Yet the US was more interested in naval and air bases. Furthermore he 
mentioned conflicts between INI and private investors in Spain and the Church
42. FRUS 1952-1954. Vol. VI, 24 September 1953, Memo Bonbright to Secretary of State, p. 1958.
43. NA, Military Branch, CD 091.3 Spain 1953, 25 September 1953, Harold E. Stassen, Foreign 
Operations Administration to President.
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opposing a treaty with a Protestant nation.44
The Spanish historian Juan Pablo Fusi argues that religious complication in 
Spain, brought about in connection with signing a defense agreement with a Protestant 
nation, might have created an uncomfortable situation for Franco. Thus the Caudillo 
sought to lessen the impact of such an agreement by putting in place a treaty with the 
Vatican beforehand. This however meant that the agreements with the US had to wait 
for the conclusion of the negotiations with the Vatican.45 _
Martin Artajo gave another explanation for the delays. For him they came about 
due to the general public opinion in Spain and the West, especially the opposition from 
France and Britain.
Garriga attributed the delay of talks between the two countries to Spain's 
peculiar position of neither being a former ally nor a defeated nation.46
C.L. Sulzberger reduced the delay to Spain bargaining for a place at the 
same level as NATO countries.47
Sulzberger's colleague, Cianfarra, said, after the 26 September 1953, that the 
delays came about due to a split in political and military opinion in Washington. Spain 
was pushing for inclusion in the Mutual Security Agreements while the negotiating 
team had no clear cut direction and instructions and had constantly to refer questions 
back to Washington which inevitably delayed the process. At the same time aspects 
concerning a possible attack on Spain due to the US bases dragged on to cause the 
delay.48
The Historian Robert Watson, writing about the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
national policy, concluded that the delay came about due to Spain relentlessly
44. Theodore Draper "The Deal we haven't made with Franco", in Reporter. 26 May 1953, Vol.8.
45. Fusi, Juan Pablo, Franco. London, 1987, p.76.
46. Garriga, Ram<5n, Franco-Serrano Suner. Barcelona, 1986, p. 185.
47. NY Times. 30 April 1953.
48. NY Times. 26 September 1953.
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increasing her demands for substantial aid and assistance over a long period of time. 
This apparently led to Washington policy makers constantly having to reassess the 
situation and thus delayed the final conclusion of the agreements.49
A study by Doris Condit, another American historian, argued that delays were 
due to Spain's belief that the $100 million from 1952 and the $25 million from 1953 
were not enough and that the actual status of US troops in Spain was a controversy. 
According to her these two conflicts brought the negotiations to a standstill.50
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant to the Secretary of State for European 
Affairs, claimed that the delays were due to Spain's unfamiliarity with complex US 
requirements. This was likely, because despite the fact that the Mutual Security 
Agreements and the Mutual Defense Agreement Program were on a common basis with 
other bilateral agreements, the NATO allies had become familiar with the statuary 
requirements through living with their development and negotiations over the past five 
years. On top of that the base agreement for the ten air fields, the Navy field, the Navy 
port as well as the secret military and technical annex were new to Franco and the 
US.51
Whatever the answer, on 26 September 1953, the two nations had finished their 
heated debate and concluded three agreements to exchange economic and military aid in 
return for military bases.
49. Watson, JCS, p.295.
50. Condit, Doris M., Test of War 1950-1953. Vol.II, Washington, 1988, p.356.
51. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1952. 9 June 1953, Mr Livingston 
T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Washington, 1976/77.
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On 26 September 1953, at 4:00 pm the Agreements between the two countries 
were signed by James Dunn and Martin Artajo in the Sal<5n de Embajadores of the 
Palace Santa Cruz in Madrid. Spain was represented by the Foreign Minister Artajo, 
the General Staff General Vigdn, the Minister of Commerce Arburua, the Sub- 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Navastues, the Sub-Secretary of Foreign Commerce 
Arguelles, the General Director for Foreign Politics de las Barcenas and the Baron de 
las Torres for the Protocol. The United States was represented by Ambassador James 
Clement Dunn, President of the Committee for Foreign Relations of the House of 
Representatives Robert C. Chiperfield, Member of Congress John Harman, General 
August W. Kissner as chief of the military commission, Advisor to the Embassy Ivan 
B. White, Chief advisor to the economic mission Richard S. McCaffery, Advisor to the 
Embassy Horace H. Smith, First Secretaries of Embassy Merril Cody and Stuart W. 
Rockwell, Civil Servants of the State Department Allen B. Moreland and CDT. Lennett 
with Ramdn E. Benedett from the military mission.
At the same time as the agreements were signed in Madrid, a press release was 
issued in W&shington and Madrid which contained the texts of the three principle public 
documents. Letters were sent by the Department of State to those members of Congress 
who had expressed a special interest in the agreements, enclosing a copy of the press 
release. Finally representatives of the British, French, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, Turkish, 
Canadian, Australian and Portuguese Embassies in Washington were called in and 
briefed on this last chapter of the Spanish negotiations. In a press conference, 27 
September 1953, President Eisenhower agreed to the argument that the US had gained 
certain advantages in a quid pro quo.1
The agreements consisted of three separate bilateral agreements which entered 
into force upon signature. It should be noted that these were agreements and not 
treaties. Treaties have to be ratified by Congress, agreements on the other hand belong 
to the Executive power and as such need not be approved by the legislative, apart from
1. Public Papers o f the Presidents of the USA: Eisenhower. Doc. 198, Washington, 1960.
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financial aspects which have to be appropriated by Congress.
The Spanish constitution had no difference between agreements, treaties, 
convention or protocols and the Cortes had the right to intervene in agreements only if 
they were "objective of law". Its intervention had to be short and could not take place 
after any manifestations by the state. In fact the "Reglamento de las Cortes" of 1943, 
modified in 1946, omitted in its entirety any specific dispositions towards international 
treaties. Thus power to approve international public contracts lay with the Caudillo. 
The three agreements were thus signed by Spain on behalf of Francisco Franco.
The first of these was a ten year defence agreement, which would be followed 
by a six months advice period and if no agreement were reached within this period, the 
base dismantlement would have begun one year later. Through this agreement the US 
gained the right to construct an unspecific number of military bases in Spain for its Air 
Force and Navy. In return Spain would receive US war material and equipment which 
was vital to modernize her army. Through these bases, Spain became strategically part 
of the NATO defence system even though she was still not a member. The bases were 
to be used by both nations but remained under Spanish control. The agreement 
explained the primum mobile: "develop, maintain and utilize for military purposes, 
jointly with the Government of Spain... areas and facilities in territory under Spanish 
jurisdiction.'1 It gave the US the possibility to develop Torrejon, El Copero, Moron, 
Thrragona and Rota as well as naval facilities at Cadiz and Cartagena. Apart from the 
construction of these bases, the US also constructed a pipeline. Naturally, some of 
these expenditures had to be made in Spanish pesetas. In order to avoid the complicated 
Spanish foreign exchange system, the exchange rate was fixed at 35 pts per dollar, ie.
much closer to the black market than to the official exchange rates.2 __  ^ __ ___
Torrejon had only been an air force experiment and a research centre for the 
Spanish Air Force and therefore needed an extensive enlargement. Its runway was to be 
expanded from 4,200 ft to 11,500 ft. The base itself was to be enlarged by 1,500 acres.
2. NA, Civil Branch, NSC 72/6 Progress Report, 15 February 1954.
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Similar construction had to take place elsewhere. El Copero was to be expanded from 
617 acres to almost 2,500 acres. Guadalquivir was an entirely new project and a new 
runway of 11,000 ft had to be constructed. The base at Moron was a fighter and night 
flying school. Despite having two hard-surfaced runways its size had to be increased 
from 900 acres to 1,500 acres and one of the runways was to be enlarged to a total 
length of 10,000 ft. The base at Sanjuijo was a bombardment training base and no plan 
existed in January 1954 to enlarge it on a massive scale.3
The planned naval base at Cadiz completed the "Radford Line" concept, as it 
anchored down the Navy at the eastern end of the Mediterranean with strong areas of 
air and naval defenses. For the USAF, the air fields in Spain were a third airfield 
defence line in Europe. The first line ran through West Germany, Austria and 
Yugoslavia and would have fallen to a USSR attack on Europe. The second line ran 
through Turkey, Greece, Italy, France and Britain. By 1953 it was assumed that the US 
could hold this area against a surprise attack by the USSR. Finally, the bases in Spain 
formed the third line together with bases in Britain.
There were certain limitations in the defence agreement which limited the 
day-to-day use, such as the clause restricting US personnel to wear civilian cloths 
outside the base. The US wanted to avoid mistakes made in France and Germany where 
signs were appearing that part of the populations demanded "Yankees Go Home". Thus 
US personnel was to be put under rigid control.4 In return each soldier got an extra 
$300 allowance for civilian clothes. With an estimate of 8,000 soldiers stationed in 
Spain, this created an annual extra cost of $2.4 million. Furthermore soldiers only got 
1/3 of their salary in pesetas to avoid inflationary effects.5
At the bases, the United States were in charge of personnel, technical aspects, 
efficient operation and US military equipment. Furthermore, under the agreement a
3. LOC, S0343, No. 16, January 1954.
4. LOC, S 0343, No. 16, January 1954.
5. "Truth about the Spanish Deal", in US News and World Report. 29 January 1954, Vol.36.
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military Assistance Advisory Group and one for economic and technical assistance were 
set up under the US Embassy in Madrid, to coordinate assistance projects in the future.
This first part of the agreements was a boost to the defence of the Wjst. The 
failure to include six German Divisions into NATO by the end of 1953 were thus offset 
partially. It was obviously impossible to include Spain in NATO, but the agreements 
improved Spanish forces and thus strengthened the defence of the Wfest.6
The second agreement, concerning economic aid, was in concord with the 
Mutual Security Act. In return for economic aid, Spain was forced to practice an open 
door policy towards the US. Article Two called for Spain to stabilize its currency, 
decrease inflation, disallow trade barriers and open a free market for American goods. 
Spain had to try to balance its budget, maintain a stable financial climate, impede 
formations of cartels and monopolies and supply the US with information about labour 
conditions in Spain.
Furthermore American investors in Spanish companies were allowed to freely 
transfer profits into dollars. Promptly, return on capital invested increased after 1953 
and by 1955 had almost caught up with US returns on investments elsewhere. The flow 
o f capital from the US to Spain in 1950 was negative but as the relations improved and 
agreements for liberalization became a reality, money was flowing into Spain and 
reached a peak in 1953, the year when the agreements were signed. Yet 1953 also saw 
a fall of capital returns from 11% in 1952 to 7% in 1953. Discouraged by this, US 
investment in 1954 increased by only 7.5%.7 Thus despite the liberalization of 
monetary and economic policies in Spain, her economy did not immediately become 
attractive to foreign capital.
The third agreement concerned freer trade between the two countries. Raw 
materials, services and patent rights would be exchanged without barriers. Spain lost
6. Watson, JCS". p.294.
7. Stanford Research Institute, Las inversiones Norteamericanas en Espana. C2mara de Comercio 
Americana Espana, Barcelona 1972.
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part o f her sovereignty when it was agreed to integrate Spain into the American trade 
policy. This meant that Spain had to join US embargo policies towards the East.
The same day as the agreements were signed, the Office for Diplomatic 
Information of the Foreign Ministry made a public statement. The treaties were 
described as agreements for peace and international security. Spain was to receive $226 
million in the next year and $465 million over the next several years.
The $226 million was composed of a $100 million credit, extended by $25 
million, and a new $101 million credit for the FY 1954.8 $85 million was economic 
aid. The rest, $141 million, would be for military costs, of which 40% went to the 
Spanish Air Force. Part of this money had went for the construction costs of the bases.
General Vandenberg had recommended the formation of a Mutual Assistance 
Advisory Group, which would administer the bases under the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Program as against the USCINCEUR (US Commander in Chief Europe) or 
SACEUR (Strategic Air Command Europe) which did so in other countries. This was 
done to avoid political problems with allies. The Secretary of Defense recommended 
that the USCINCEUR would take over once the political climate permitted it. The 
Department of Air Force agreed to this in November 1953.9
In confidential letters between Artajo and Ambassador Dunn in 1953/54 the use 
of $465 million aid was settled. According to instructions by the Joint Strategic Plans 
Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program stressed 
the importance of the air defence forces, ground troops and anti-submarine warfare.
This was reflected in the allocation of financial resources.
The threat to Spain was recognized:
"In the event of general war, units of the US Strategic Air Command, based in 
or operating through Spain, would pose an immediate threat of great magnitude 
to the USSR. In view of this threat and in light of the USSR capability of at-
8. "Agreement concluded with Spain", in US Dept State Bulletin. 5 October 1953, Vol.29.
9. Watson, JCS, p.295/296.
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tacking any base in Spain it appears reasonable to expect that the Strategic Air
\
Command bases would be attacked early in the war."10
Compared to other nations, the aid Spain received was unique. Normally 90% 
of the aid would flow into the countries economy while 10% would flow back to the US 
for costs of administration. The construction costs for military facilities were usually 
met by the American service departments. In Spain only 30% of the aid benefited the 
Spanish economy, 10% covered administration costs and 60% paid for the construction 
costs of the bases themselves. This in fact meant that compared to the rest of Europe 
Spain's aid was worth much less. The Americans could have been pleased with the 
arrangements.
So was Franco who argued nine days after the agreements that Spain's anti­
communist attitude had made the agreements possible. Yet, he also stressed that any 
alliance with NATO "was out of place for the moment" due to Britain's and France's 
position.
Britain was soon informed through the Quai d’Orsay that there existed secret 
clauses in the agreements which were to remain hidden from the public.11 Due to the 
information leakage of a marine officer and later repeated by statements in Congress, 
these secret clauses became known. They gave America the right to freely use parts of 
the bases in peacetime as well as in war time. In extreme moments of Communist threat 
by the USSR to western security, the US government was not forced to consult with the 
Spanish government prior to the usage of the bases. This meant that in these cases 
Spain's foreign policy was limited by US actions concerning the military establishments 
in Spain.
The secret note was attached to the second paragraph of Article three of the 
Defense Agreement. The military use of the bases were governed by two distinct
10. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 30 October 
1953, Report Joint Strategic Plans Committee to JCS.
11. PRO, FO 371.107686, 5 November 1953, FO Minute, Lord Hood.
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scenarios. In case of an "evident Communist aggression which threatens the security of 
the West", the US forces were to
"make use of the areas and facilities situated in Spanish territory as bases for 
action against military objectives, in such a manner as may be necessary for the 
defense of the West, provided that, when this situation arises, both countries 
communicate to each other, with maximum urgency, their information and 
intentions."
In other cases of emergency the two countries were to enter "urgent consultation 
between both governments, and [action] will be determined in the light of the 
circumstances of the situation which has developed."12
This cast a shadow over Martin Artajo* s statement that the agreements were an 
"undisputable success" and "occurred without the most minimum damage to our 
sovereignty and independence" Spain also gave tacit agreement to the stationing of 
nuclear weapons on its soil and the anchoring of nuclear submarines at Rota.
It had even been argued before the 26 September that the Spanish armed forces 
would lose sovereign control due to the agreements. Whether it was unavoidable for 
Spain to give up some of her sovereignty can be discussed at length. What mattered 
was Franco's natural interest to pretend that Spain's sovereignty remained unchanged. 
Unfortunately for him, a few days after the signing of the agreements, the American 
press speculated that important matters were covered in secret agreements.13 It was not 
known for a while that the bases would be under American control in wartime.
To keep up good relations with Spain, James C. Dunn wrote to other diplomatic 
missions in Spain that bases were under Spain's command at all times and that the US 
had no intention of stepping on Spain's sovereignty. He stressed this point during an 
address to the American Chamber of Commerce in Seville in November 1953.14 James
12. Duke, Simon, US Military Forces and Installations in Europe. Oxford, 1989, p.253.
13. "Franco Deal", in US News and World Report. 9 October 1953, Vol.35.
14. PRO, FO 371.107686, 4 November 1953, Balfour, Madrid.
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Dunn knew that this was riot so but it was beneficial to keep up appearances. For 
Franco retaining sovereignty was important due to possible internal challenges. At the 
same time, the US had good reasons to avoid great publicity on the topic. Firstly, 
\Mashington had just extended credits and was about to embark on military base 
constructions in Spain. Anything that hurt Spain was to hurt the US as well. Internal 
conflicts and instability would threaten America's position. Secondly, America wanted 
to avoid being labeled imperialistic because of having forced Spain into giving up 
sovereignty. On the other hand, the agreements without the secret clause would appear 
very weak to the American public unless the rights of the secret agreement became 
known.
In the US Department of State Bulletin, James C. Dunn wrote about the 
economic impact of the agreements. He argued that there was no immediate fear of 
inflation due to the system of mutual beneficial counterpart funds. The system worked 
as follows: A Spanish firm needed foreign credits to, let us say, buy raw materials 
abroad in a foreign currencies. The company could file an application with the Spanish 
and American government for aid. After both governments approved, the company 
would receive the materials paid for out of the counterpart fund established in dollars. 
The firm would pay the equivalent in pesetas at a fixed exchange rate. These pesetas 
were placed into a special account of the Bank of Spain and the US would spent the 
pesetas on specific projects in Spain with the approval of the Spanish government, 
mainly the construction of the military facilities.15 Spain would retain full control over 
monetary policy and money flow while the US avoided complicated exchange 
regulations to convert dollars into pesetas for expenditures in Spain on projects by fixed 
exchange rates.
Once the agreements were signed, there seemed to be a loss of interest in a 
quick development of the bases. There was no crash construction as in Morocco. This
15. D unn, James C., "Mutual Benefits from US - Spanish Security Agreem ents", in US Department o f  
State Bulletin. 7 December. 1953, Vol.29.
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was due to public opposition to the waste of money of crash programs. The builders 
used construction equipment from base construction carried out in Morocco. This 
further delayed the operation due to the salvage of equipment. The base construction 
took five years and consisted of three main air bases and one port and air base at Rota. 
The three main air bases were situated near Saragossa, Torrejon near Madrid and 
Moron close to Seville.
Once the bases were constructed the shortcomings of the military surveys and 
constructions became obvious. For example, the Moron de la Frontera runway, after 
- being enlarged, was crossed by a railway line! This lead to an incident in February 
1959 when "two F-100's declared an emergency because of minimum fuel as a result of 
two go-arounds ordered by ground control approach and tower personnel because a 
train was on the end of the runway. They finally landed safely."16
The Chief of Naval Operations soon realized that the Matagorda strip was 
unsuitable, while the Rota base was satisfactory but 27 miles away from Matagorda and 
thus required extensive road constructions.17 The choice by the Navy for the airfield 
had been based on considerations for naval operations and not on Air Force 
convenience. This becomes clear as we look at a survey of airfields in Spain conducted 
in 1942. In this survey neither Matagorda nor Rota had been listed in the top ten 
airfields in a zone around Gibraltar.18
The Navy was more successful in taking advantage of the agreements. Unlike 
the Air Force, the US Navy in Spain was under the Commander in Chief US Naval 
Forces Europe in London. Under his guidance, Rota soon developed into the 
headquarters of the American Sixth Fleet operating in the Mediterranean. Up to then 
the Sixth Fleet was stationed in Norfolk/Virginia. Its ships operating in the
16. NA, Civil Branch, R&A Report 363, 13 October 1942, Report on Spanish Airfields.
17. NA, Military Branch, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 092, Spain (4-19-46), Sec. 1-8, 12 January 
1954, Memo Chief Naval Operation to JCS.
18. NA, Civil Branch, R&A Report 363, 13 October 1942, Report on Spanish Airfields.
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Mediterranean had been supplied by transport vessels and tankers, which proved 
expensive.19 This had posed political and a security problems for troop and fleet 
movement, especially for submarine operations in the Mediterranean, which were 
solved with the development of Rota.
From a strategic point of view, the value of Rota to the US was threefold. In a 
unilateral conflict in the Mediterranean, it could be used as a naval base. In a limited 
war in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with conventional and tactical 
nuclear weapons, Spain was required as a platform for transportation via air and sea. In 
an all-out-nuclear war, Rota would have been a vital nuclear base for American 
submarines.
Later the USS Holland, a repair ship, was to be based at Rota to service all 
possible conceivable faults of submarines, both nuclear and conventional. This cut costs 
in the millions for the US Navy as it was no longer necessary to return subs to the US 
for repairs.20 This added greatly to the strategic value of the fleet.
In fact military experts like Jesse W. Lewis, the military affairs officer at the 
US embassy in Saudi-Arabia, later argued that the Sixth Fleet was only superior to its 
Soviet counterpart, the Fifth Escadra, due to an extensive base system along the 
Mediterranean coast. This facilitated easy supply, land-based support and emergency 
repair facilities. Rota was vital for the first and last strategic advantages.21
The three main air bases were Strategic Air Command bomber bases for post 
attack fueling, servicing and landing. The only other bases with similar capacity were 
situated in Britain. Rota had no bombers but operated as an aid to the Navy in 
reconnaissance and communication as well as for basing aircraft units. Above all 
though, Rota supported the nuclear strike power of the Sixth Fleet. The US saved an 
estimated $24 million per year per submarine, as the submarines did not have to return
19. "Spain moves into the Defense Picture", in Congressional Digest. March 1953.
20. Lewis, Strategic Balance, p. 19.
21. Lewis, Strategic Balance, p.67.
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to Charleston or New London, a 14-day trip, for refueling and maintenance.
Thking the development, construction and assistance costs, and comparing them 
to the money saved, the US bases in Spain were a very good investment for the US 
Armed Forces.22 Spain's large standing army also provided a second defence line 
against a Soviet attack through Europe as well as a first European defence line against a 
thrust by the Soviets from the Balkans, across to North Africa and into Spain. It also 
opened the possibility of Spain's troops fighting north of the Pyreneese.
Nevertheless, the speed of development with which technology influenced 
warfare had complicated the aims for military planners in the postwar period. From 
1945 to 1948 the US had to relay on B-29’s for the delivery of nuclear bombs. In 1949, 
the US had 500 B-29's capable of delivering more then 100 A-bombs. These had to rely 
heavily on overseas bases. By 1953, the US had more than 1,000 A-bombs or H-bombs 
which could be delivered by B-36 or B-47, two long range bombers.
Already by 1957 this had changed. The US was in possession of 7,000 to
10,000 bombs. These could be delivered by the Stratofortress B-52. The B-52 had a 
range of 10,000 miles and a capacity of 60,000 lbs of bombs. At the same time the US 
had developed tactical and strategic missiles. The Redstone missile had a range of 249 
miles, but still lacked the capability to carry enough weight. The Pershing missile had a 
range of 400 miles. At the same time the US Navy had developed the ability to launch 
missiles from submarines. The USS submarine Nautilus was commissioned in January
1955. The USS submarine Halibut was commissioned in 1956 and could carry three 
Regulus missiles. With the development of these new weapons delivery systems it was 
no wonder that overseas bases lost some of their value. The military bases in Spain had 
to gain new strategic value to justify further expenditure.
The bases in Spain, Greece and Turkey served as a connection to the Persian 
Gulf and during the late 1950's the Moroccan base functions were transferred to bases 
elsewhere: Operations were conducted from Spain. The logistic function from the
22. Baker, US Overseas Basing, p. 100.
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Moroccan bases was also transferred to American bases in Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
During the 1960's bases in Libya were dismantled and as a result operations and 
logistics functions were transferred to Spain and Italy. Yet immediately after the 26 
September 1953, the Spanish air bases were planned above all to cope with operational 
function of the Algerian bases which had been dismantled during the late 1940's.
As the American base system was once more streamlined after the Korean 
conflict, Spain's new military facilities took over the function of other bases. Overall 
capital value of facilities in Spain in 1988 was estimated at $298 million, only sixth
behind Germany, Korea, Japan, Britain, Italy, Philippines and Canada only, thus ahead -
\
of the value of bases in Panama, Ttirkey, Greece, Benelux, Iceland or Australia.
Spain had gained vital importance in two military aspects. According to a study 
by James R. Baker, Spain was for the US the sixth most important country for tactical 
air operations and naval operations. She had little importance for airlifts and no 
importance for ground operations. The two important areas, tactical air and naval 
operations, greatly enhanced US international power projection and thus worked as a 
deterrent. Given USSR real nuclear capability by 1954, the West had to put another 
deterrent against the Red Army. Up to 1954 the threat of US nuclear attacks countered 
the massive Soviet army along the Iron Curtain. After 1954 when the Soviets had 
gained delivery systems for their nuclear weapons and thus completed their nuclear 
deterrent, the two superpowers nuclear capabilities canceled each other out. After 1954, 
a conventional war in Europe became once more a possibility and had to be deterred by 
power projection and the Spanish bases were, according to James Baker, one of the best 
in the US base system to deter a possible sneak attack.23
In order to fulfill this, the 16th Air Force was established on 15 July 1957. It 
was the largest overseas Strategic Air Command of the United States. It operated in 
Spain and Morocco and reported directly to the HQ of Strategic Air Command at 
Offutt, Nebraska. The B-47 of the 16th Air Force in Spain could reach its target in six
23. Baker, US Overseas Basing, p.52, 117, 121.
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hours.24
The concept on which the Spanish airfields had been planned was soon 
challenged by new military studies. In April 1954, the RAND Cooperation published 
the R-266 study "Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases" which concluded that the 
current base system was the worst possible option compared to four alternative basing 
systems in relation to the capabilities of the B-47. During the study the RAND 
cooperation analysed the costs and military use of operating bases, overseas refueling 
bases, strategic bases and air-refueling systems. Operating bases would have bombers 
and fighter planes stationed on the airfields but these would rotate with other planes at 
other operating bases as well as with planes stationed in the US. Overseas refueling 
bases were designed to only refuel already armed planes on their way to their bombing 
targets. Strategic bases, on the other hand, were designed to have planes stationed there 
permanently to assure the defence and the bombing capability of the base itself. The 
idea of the air refueling system is well known and needs little explanation.
In its conclusion, the report read: "It appears on the basis of this analysis, that 
systems consisting of U.S. operating bases and overseas refueling bases are markedly 
superior" to any other alternative. Overseas refueling and operating bases were less 
vulnerable to Soviet attack compared to strategic air bases. Although they would make 
strategic bases save AA-guns, early radar warning systems and fighter planes would 
have greatly increased the costs of running these bases with extended personnel, 
housing and above all underground hangers to avoid complete destruction in a surprise 
attack. Another alternative, the US-based air-refueling system, was considered but was 
found to be too expensive and risky. The time saved could not justify the extra costs of 
having several refueling planes in the air. Thus the cheapest and most efficient way was 
to have the bombers stationed in the US and other safe bases. In case of attack they 
would take off, land at the refueling base, refuel in as short a period as necessary, take 
off, complete their bombing mission, and return to the refueling base before returning
24. "Truth about the Spanish deal", in US News and World Report. 29 January 1954, Vol.36.
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to the US. The extra-costs for flying the whole route US - refueling base - target and 
back easily outweighed the costs of overseas airports with stationed bombers as well as 
decreasing the risk of losing the bombers while operating from the overseas base. The 
fact that the bomber was a sitting duck while on the ground made it necessary to refuel 
in as short a period as necessary.
If the refueling bases were overrun by the Soviets, the Americans could have 
easily fallen back on air-refueling, and they would not have lost bases together with the 
planes. The RAND study also showed that it would pose no problem to convert the 
existing overseas bases into refueling bases.^ Spain had not yet any bases constructed 
but those planned and later constructed were strategic air bases. By the time the bases 
were completed, the weapon arsenal of the US had changed and the RAND report itself 
was outdated. However at the Spanish bases the B-47 was the backbone of the strike 
capability until 1965.
Several smaller bases, seven radar stations with a radius of 300 miles and 23 
other military establishments including radio, ammunition depots and a 800 km pipeline 
were also constructed.
The US expenditure on the base construction ranged between $300-420 million, 
out of which 1/3 was paid in Spanish currency. In addition there was a yearly 
maintenance cost until 1963 of around $50 million. The construction was mainly 
carried out by three companies, Brown & Root of Houston, Raymond International of 
New York City and Walsh Construction Company of Daveport. A total of 5,000 
Spaniards were employed directly and a further 15,000 through subcontracts.
Military aid to Spain started with a delivery to Cartagena, 15 February 1954, of 
1,800 tons of military equipment. In ten years; US military end-items aid sent to Spain 
added up to around $600 million, of which two fifths was received by the army and the 
rest was split by the other two forces. Naturally the Spanish army was the main
25. "Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases", April 1954, RAND Report R-266, A.J. Wohlstetter 
et.al. in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., Writings on Strategy 1952-1960 Volume I. Garland Publishing, New 
York, 1988.
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beneficiary of the agreements. By 1963 it had been fully restored to a modem fighting 
force.
However, Spain also received a large amount of economic aid. In order to 
administer the flow of aid and new credits, a United States Operations Mission was set 
up with 23 officers and supporting staff. It covered seven sectors including economic 
analysis, several industrial sectors and the infrastructure.
Between 1953-1957 Spain received $280 million in economic aid. Surplus 
commodities of the US valued at around $250 million were sold during the same 
period. On top of that, Spain was able to gain access to foreign credits. The Export 
Import Bank credits, which accumulated to over $500 million in ten years, together 
with private credits of $1 billion, enlarged the Spanish market for American goods.
Spain had also gained recognition in the Western World and was integrated into 
the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, as well as into the International 
Monetary Fund. During December 1958, John F. Dulles visited Spain and one year 
later President Eisenhower did the same. The renewal of the Defence Agreement 1963 
was merely a formality. By then Spain was an acceptable international partner, even 
though the old regime of the 1930's was still in power.
Former Ambassador Hanson Baldwin praised the treaty and pointed towards 
Spain's geographical position and the fact that the Franco regime was more stable than 
France or French Morocco which might have posed an alternative to Spain's US 
installations.
The Pentagon repeated Acheson's statement from 1951 that the agreements did 
not mean that Europe's defence would start across the Channel and behind the 
Pyrenees. It claimed that Spain was vital for a powerful retaliatory blow and thus 
prevented war and furthered peace and international security. Furthermore the military 
planners asserted that Spain had proven to be a reliable anti-communist force and thus 
would be a reliable ally in case of war.
Dictator Hdctor Trujillo Molino, from the Dominican Republic described it as a 
"profound delight for the democratic nations." Brazilian President Getulio Vargas saw
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it as "an important and good piece of new s/
Public opinion did not always support this new relationship. The New York 
Times expressed its dislike of the relationship and wrote on 27 September 1953, "we 
are now faced with the necessity of swallowing a bitter pill- the military agreement with 
Franco Spain." The New Republic went even further and claimed that the agreements 
meant that in the future and in coming conflicts, the neutral world would oppose 
America.26 The US News and World Report knew about certain secret agreements and 
basically analyzed the agreements as an exchange, a quid pro quo. It was worked out 
that a_ Spanish soldier cost $275 per year compared to $5,000 for an American in 
Europe.27
The French press was divided. Le Figaro claimed that the agreements were a 
response to strategic realities and added an important sector to the European Defence 
system: "Like the military and economic co-operation between the West and 
Yugoslavia, the agreement represents a strategic reality.M Le Monde said that the 
Spanish-American agreements meant that Spain’s candidature for NATO would not be 
delayed and therefore NATO would look more offensive and less democratic. 
L 'H um aniti went further and claimed that Franco "the Fascist dictator of Spain 
becomes an Atlantic ally." More critique came from Le Populaire. It called the agree­
ments "a defeat for the free world" and asserted that "the military takes precedence 
over the moral".28
The French government was very mild in its reaction to the agreements. It only 
expressed strong opposition to Spain's possible inclusion in NATO. This again shows 
that Paris had feared agreements between Spain and the US as long as they posed a 
national security risk to France. Once NATO forces in Europe were expected to 
successfully defend France against a Soviet sneak attack, the French government
26. Frank Gorrell, "Success for Franco", in New Republic. 19 October 1953, Vol. 129.
27. "Franco Deal", in US News and World Report. 9 October 1953, Vol.35.
28. PRO, FO 371.107686, 28 September 1953, O’Harvey, Paris.
3 4 8
UtlQpKT signing me /igrccwcf*w
s
beconte more and more reluctant to voice its opposition.29
Just as the French press, the British press was divided on its opinion to the 
recently signed agreements. The Daily M ail saw the agreements of "momentous 
importance" for "it closes a gap in Western defence along the Atlantic seaboard." The 
Times was more critical and said that "it is not the first time military necessity has been 
regretted on other grounds." The Daily Telegraph wrote that for Spain it was a 
"bargain which cannot fail to reduce the authority of the United Nations". The Daily 
Worker spelled out his opposition in strong words claiming that this was the "final 
comment on American aggressive aims".30
In Germany the press made surprisingly little comments on the agreements and 
simply summarised them with hardly any editorials.31
The communist paper, Estrella Roja saw the agreements as "Hispano - 
American aggression and a hard blow to the interests of Britain and France." Great 
Britain supposedly feared for the future of Gibraltar while France was estimated to have 
returned to a pre-war situation, caught between Germany's militarism, revived with the 
help of the US, and Franco's Spain.
J. Alvarez del Vayo claimed that Franco eased his economic short term 
opposition but created a long term opposition due to loss of Spanish pride by giving 
away Spanish sovereignty.32 It is true that Spain was unique in Europe because it 
provided permanent bases to the US without being a member of NATO. Yet Spain's 
social as well as political developments lagged behind those of Europe. It was also clear 
that Franco's victory in the Civil War had delayed the continuous struggle between left 
and right which would lead, as in the rest of Europe, to a social political compromise. 
Robert Okin already in 1947 saw that unavoidable modernization of the Franco regime
29. PRO, FO 371.107686, 28 September 1953, O'Harvey, Paris.
30. NY Times. 29'September 1953.
31. PRO, FO 371.107686, 1 October 1953, F. Hoyer-Miller
32. Alvarez del Vayo, "From Franco's Border", in Nation. 6 October 1951, Vol. 173.
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would inevitably bring about social improvements and thus new political consciousness. 
The day Franco would be removed, his power vacuum, Okin speculated, would be 
filled with a continuation of the chaotic struggle between left and right. Yet Franco 
could not avoid modernization if he wanted to avoid social and economic unrest 
dethroning him.33
Madariaga, a former Representative to the League of Nation, said: "when the 
regime falls, as fall it must, the nation will refuse to acknowledge herself bound by an 
acquiescence given when she was gagged."
Against this the former American ambassador Hayes upheld that "any future 
Spanish Government (short of a puppet one forcibly intruded by Moscow) will respect 
the agreement now being negotiated by our Government." He thought that "our 
ostracism of the [Franco] regime only served to strengthen it with the Spanish people 
and to deny us what our military authorities deemed highly desirable, strategic bases for 
our naval and air forces in the defense of Western Europe."
Spain's totalitarian aspects had not changed. Franco was still the only legislator 
holding the main functions of the government. People were still jailed for threatening 
their head of state, advising Franco's incarceration (25 years), abusing the chief of 
Government (20 years), distributing or producing illegal propaganda or belonging to an 
illegal society (16 years) and participating in strikes (8 years).34 Military 
considerations had clearly overruled America’s democratic and liberal convictions.
33. Robert Okin, "Spain in the Post-War Period”, in Foreign Policy Report. 1 August 1947, Vol.23.
34. Cleugh, Spain in Modern World, p. 131.
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Conclusion
As I have argued in the introduction, the analysis o f  the American primary 
sources relating to the negotiations provides us with a very different picture from 
the one which has become generally accepted.
Vinas' argument that Franco sold out Spain's sovereign control over foreign 
policy, defence policy and, to some degree, economic policy in return for obsolete 
war material, minimal economic aid and good publicity, consolidating his position 
as Spanish caudillo, only shows one side o f  the negotiations. The fact that the US 
negotiation team was willing to compromise on several occasions demonstrates 
their eagerness to enter agreements with Spain.
Following Franco's December surprise, the negotiations came to the brink o f  
disaster and the team under Vigon had accepted such a risk. Again in March 1953, 
following the American Charge's letter to Artajo, the Spanish negotiators seemed 
willing to push the process to its very limit. Franco's statement on the eve o f  the 26 
September 1953: "in the last resort, if  you don't get what you want, sign anything 
that they put in front o f you. We need that agreement", must be seen in the context 
o f  the whole negotiation process rather than as a summary o f  Spain's position 
throughout the entire negotiations. Clearly Franco did not mean that if, for 
example, the US would have suddenly refused to grant any aid, the signing o f the 
agreement should still have gone ahead. What he clearly indicated was that the 
remaining bones o f  contention, which Artajo and Dunn had been unable to settle 
during their meetings in Bilbao and San Sebastian, such as the legal aspects over 
the Administration's guarantee o f funds which had to be appropriated by a future 
Congress, did not matter too much anymore.
The two most fundamental Spanish demands, which in fact had been put 
forward by Franco in December 1952 and had caused headaches in Washington, ie.
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the concept o f "parallel development" and "prior consultation", had been settled 
not unfavourably for Spain.
Parallel development meant that "when the moment o f  utilisation o f  the 
desired facilities [was] reached, the minimum necessities required for the defense o f  
Spanish territory... will have been covered." The minimum necessities included "the 
air defense o f  [Spain's] territory, the security o f  its maritime communications and 
the completion o f  the armament o f its land, sea and air armies." This meant that 
Spain should have been able to defend herself against a Soviet attack without the 
help o f NATO forces, an important point given the increased probability o f  aerial 
attacks on the military bases and the nearby Spanish cities.
In the final agreements, the US did not guarantee this. However, Washington 
promised to support Spain in case o f  war by using the troops and equipment 
stationed in Spain and if necessary in the rest o f Europe. As we have seen, during 
the last days prior to the conclusion o f the agreements, the Department o f  State 
and Defense Department made it clear in internal discussions, which for obvious 
reasons were not leaked to the Spanish negotiators, that there did not exist a legal 
commitment to do so. Such a legal commitment would have required 
Congressional approval, something which had to be avoided. More importantly 
than the legal aspects, however, was the perception o f  this commitment and, as we 
have seen, it was recognised that it was unthinkable to sent US troops to Spain and 
not use these in case o f  attack on Spain by a foreign nation. The net result 
therefore was that Spain had obtained an indirect guarantee from the US to defend 
her territory, this being almost as valuable as "parallel development" and as a 
deterrent even more precious.
The second concept Spain had demanded was " prior consultation" that is to 
say that the US would have to consult with the Spanish government before making 
use o f  the bases. The reasons for these demands were twofold. On one side Franco 
wanted to make sure that the bases would not drag his country into an unwanted
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conflict. Secondly, prior consultation assured that his regime was still being 
perceived as nationalistic with sovereign control over defence and foreign policy.
In the final agreements Spain was guaranteed that the US would consult with the 
Spanish government prior to using the bases as long as the aggressor was not the 
Soviet Union. However, Washington was not required to consult or even inform 
Spain about the use o f the military facilities in advance if the Soviet Union 
launched an attack on Europe. It was considered that the seriousness o f  such a 
situation would make it o f utmost importance to react with speed and no time 
could be wasted in diplomatic communications.
Overall for Spain this meant that the US could not drag her into an unwanted 
conflict with a third country. Furthermore, a surprise invasion o f  western Europe 
by the Soviet Union had a high probability o f involving Spain anyway. The Madrid 
government would have been unable to conduct its own policy and would have 
been at the mercy o f the Soviet and US military strategists. In fact prior to the 
agreements, US strategists had considered occupying Spain even against Franco's 
will, should he have opted for neutrality. Furthermore, the past record o f  the 
Francoist regime and Spain's geographic position made her an attractive target for 
the USSR with or without bases.
The Spanish negotiators had also avoided publicity and public outrage by 
getting the US to structure the agreements in such a way as to place the American 
right o f using the facilities in Spain without prior consultation in a secret annex 
while the official public document clearly stated that consultation had to take place 
prior to the use o f the facilities. This safeguarded the perception that control over 
foreign and defence policy remained fully in the hands o f the Madrid regime.
Spain thus retained her control over defence and foreign policy in all cases 
apart from a Soviet attack which set limitations to her independence anyway.
Hence, the greatest real limitation for Spain's sovereignty came in the field o f  
economic policy. The agreements, theoretically at least, forced Spain to relax her
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trading restrictions, soften regulations concerning foreign investments and 
generally conduct a sensible anti-inflationary fiscal and monetary policy. Clearly 
this contrasted with the economic theory o f autarky which the Franco regime had 
been defending in the 1940's. Despite strong rhetoric concerning autarky, the 
regime was flexible and had already embarked on a process o f liberalisation before 
26 September 1953. In this respect the agreements where only part o f a process 
rather then the commencement o f one. As commercial relations became more 
complex Franco and his older advisors willingly withdrew from the active role o f  
economic policy making and delegated this part o f  the regime to younger members 
o f  the government. As a result o f this, we see by the end o f  the decade an 
economic policy made by technocrats as opposed to generals. While the 
agreements were an important part o f  this process, we still see high inflation and 
severe restrictions on trade after they had been completed.
Even though the agreements clearly limited Franco's control over economic 
policy, this was in itself not a bad thing. If anything it helped the country to go  
through a sometimes painful process before being able to emerge as a stronger 
economic power. The consumer boom o f  the 1960's, when Spaniards rushed out to 
buy small cars, television sets and washing machines, would have been unthinkable 
without the abandoning of autarky.
One o f the reasons why Spain was able to obtain her demands in the 
agreements was because the Spanish negotiation team was at no time under any 
pressure to come to a conclusion. The economy had already started to pick up, 
trade was increasing and economic aid, while very welcomed, was not essential. At 
the same time Spain was under no immediate threat o f  being invaded by a foreign 
country or exposed to an internal, well-organised opposition. Thus the Franco 
regime was not forced to sign a defence agreement or seek protection in the 
western defence structure. The negotiators on the Spanish side could afford to 
delay the talks if such a move was likely to further their gains from the US.
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The US was also under no immediate pressure to conclude the agreements 
and when pushed by the Spanish team in December 1952, they were willing to stall 
the talks until March 1953. The fact that both sides could afford to delay the talks 
meant that neither o f  them was in a position o f weakness. At least in theory such a 
situation is likely to produce a final outcome to the negotiations with a 
compromise between the two sides, giving each what they demanded. Indeed as we 
have seen both sides did obtain the objectives they had set out to win. The US 
wanted to obtain military bases in Spain which could be used in case o f  Soviet 
attack without any delay or political complications. At the same time Washington 
wanted to tie Spain to the western defence structure. Minor objectives such as 
obtaining access to Spain's market, relax trade restrictions and lifting o f  limitations 
on currency transfers were also reached.
In return Spain wanted to obtain sufficient economic aid and a considerable 
amount o f military end-items which were to replace the obsolete Spanish war 
material. At the same time, the Franco regime wanted these agreements for 
propaganda reasons, as they, better than anything else, demonstrated that the 
period o f ostracism was over and that Spain had become a respectable nation in the 
western world. This in itself was o f great importance as it could be used for further 
publicity showing that Franco's analysis over the past decade, pointing out the 
USSR as the threat to western society, had been correct all along.
This gave enormous internal as well as external respectability and assured 
that any opposition, above all domestic, knew that it could not rely on support 
from any o f the western countries. Franco had thus consolidated his position and, 
at least in the public eye, he had done so without relaxing control over his country's 
policies. For the Franco regime the agreements were undoubtedly a great success.
As for Spain, it is too easy to subscribe to the idea that what was good for 
Franco was good for Spain, as Francoists did; or to the opposite view that what 
was good for Franco was bad for Spain, as exiled Republicans and their
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sympathisers did. With the hindsight o f history, we can see that Spain obtained 
military and economic aid, as well as the foundation for economic prosperity based 
on commercial relations with the West in return for granting military bases which, 
as it turned out, have not caused Spain to be dragged into an unwanted conflict. As 
the Cold War ended some of these military facilities remain in Spain and are likely 
to stay there. Overall their importance is clearly diminished but undoubtedly they 
will continue to influence Spain's position in the western defence structure.
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